Chinese win in the Opium War?

Hey everybody! There are several really good responses in amazing detail here. I would just like to personally thank everyone for making my first discussion here a great one. Anyways, I was thinking of doing a collaborative TL around this topic, the rejuvenation of the Qing Dynasty, and I was wondering if anyone was interested. Please feel free to message me further.
 
In almost every conceivable way the Qing were a great improvement on the late Ming, especially in the domains of warfare, administration, agriculture, and economy. The Manchus essentially reinvigorated what had been a declining system of administration and allowed the creation of China's greatest empire since the eighth century AD.


From the Kangxi emperor:
The Russians, Dutch, and Portuguese, like the other Europeans, are able to accomplish whatever they undertake, no matter how difficult. They are intrepid, clever, and know how to turn a profit. As long as I reign there is nothing to worry about from them for China... But if our government were to become weak, if we were to weaken our vigilance over the Chinese in the southern provinces and over the large number of boats that leave every year for Luzon, Batavia, Japan, and other countries, or if divisions were to erupt among us Manchus and the various princes of my family, if our enemies the Eleuths [Zunghars] were to succeed in allying with the Tatars of Kokonor, as well as our Kalmuk and Mongol tributaries, what would become of our empire? With the Russians to the north, the Portuguese from Luzon to the east, the Dutch to the south, [they] would do with China whatever they liked.​

I didn't say that the Qing weren't accomplished. I said that the trends of the Late Ming were stopped. For example, the "revival" of Buddhism and it's syncretization into Taoism and Confucianism was stopped. Or for something more relevant, the Qing were very worried about southern Han sea commerce and the diaspora. I know that the Qing elite made their fortunes through trade later on but they still had to pretend to the life of an ideal Confucian gentleman because the Qing had to promote very orthodox Confucianism. Someone like Koxinga could never emerge and gain power under the Qing. Or to take another example, what became of the very interesting writings of people like Huang Zongxi? These kinds of proto-democratic writings could never gain purchase under ethnic military rule.

I know about that quote which is why I accounted for it in the post above yours:

The best you'll get is an acknowledgement of a possible threat in the distant future.

Kangxi said what you quoted but-to my knowledge-it never translated into concrete policy or even a possibility of concrete policy being implemented. The threat isn't obvious enough which is why OTL you needed the Qing losing the Opium Wars to recognize the urgent need for reform. Consider global warming and how utterly obvious it needed to get before people would begin taking it seriously. Then consider how many people TODAY-many in very high places-still actively fight against necessary action.
 
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Pretty much yeah. Now, if Zheng Jing were still around on Taiwan, then the Qing would be much more alert to the threat from the sea. Europeans alone can't do that though. The best you'll get is an acknowledgement of a possible threat in the distant future.
I don't meant to sound rude but the BEIC of the late 1700s would be perceived to be a far greater threat than a longer lived pirate kingdom that occupied a tiny portion of Formosa and liked to consider itself to be a continuation of the Ming. The "acknowledgement of a possible threat in the distant future" is all you really need to have a few court officials ringing alarm bells when the British require only a mere month to seize Java.

I don't understand how the Qing campaigning on land disproves my point that the Qing can accomplish everything they want by staying on land :confused:.
I probably should have mentioned it in my previous post, but all those land based campaigns were colossal failures for the Qing. Short of invading Siberia, the Qing had hit the limit on what they could reasonably hope to achieve by land alone.
 
The Qing could win the opium wars with a bit of convincing, it isn't particularly impossible to make happen. I just want to point out if Europe ever wanted to actually beat China, even when she was sick and dying, it always took more than one European 'great power' to bring her to heel. While she was sick and dying.

The ramifications of China winning would be rather... varied. If it happens in a truly resounding victory that leaves the British (and eventually the French) utterly demolished, they might actually come to respect the mere yellow men and **** off from interfering in China's sphere of influence, where, if it's Pyrrhic.... not much of a victory, that and more extortion etc as OTL.
 
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An important thing to note is that the Qing did not really conceive of the First Opium War as a resounding defeat. The Treaty of Nanjing seems humiliating to us now. But really, these policies were almost identical to the Altishahr Treaty of 1835 signed with the Muslim Khanate of Khoqand after the Khoqandis invaded Qing Central Asia. The Khoqandis also won extraterritoriality, fixed tariffs, and even some concessions the British could not have even dreamed of (such as the right to literally collect taxes on trade within Qing territory). Such "inequal treaties" and concessions to barbarian raiders were not out of the norm for the Qing, especially after the state retreat of the Jiaqing era in which the Qing government recognized its limits and became much less assertive (e.g. their lack of intervention in the British invasion of Nepal).

Yes, if the Qing had fought to the bitter end, they could have easily "won" the First Opium War by making the war far too costly for the British to pursue. But the Qing had no reason to.
 
I don't meant to sound rude but the BEIC of the late 1700s would be perceived to be a far greater threat than a longer lived pirate kingdom that occupied a tiny portion of Formosa and liked to consider itself to be a continuation of the Ming. The "acknowledgement of a possible threat in the distant future" is all you really need to have a few court officials ringing alarm bells when the British require only a mere month to seize Java.


I probably should have mentioned it in my previous post, but all those land based campaigns were colossal failures for the Qing. Short of invading Siberia, the Qing had hit the limit on what they could reasonably hope to achieve by land alone.

Assertions are not arguments. The Qing in OTL displayed far more fear towards Zheng Jings state than they ever did towards pre-Opium War Europeans. Surely you've read about the horribly destructive effects of the coastal displacement policy? Why would the Qing maintain something so costly if they didn't fear the possible consequences? They also offered to completely give into Zheng Jings previous demands if he went back to Taiwan during the revolt of the 3 feudatories. On what basis do you consider Tungning so irrelevant? Not to mention that you completely ignore any possibility of Tungning becoming stronger over time. I mean, how powerful was the BEIC in 1680? I also don’t see how Tungning wasn’t a continuation of the Ming. They even had Ming princes.

Okay, and why is that that after 6 colossal failures, we never heard a peep of interest in naval expeditions OTL? It feels like you’re completely discounting the structural factors that stopped Qing interest in the sea. Why do you think the Qing never went to sea OTL except to dethrone Zheng Jing?
 
On what basis do you consider Tungning so irrelevant?
It was perceaved as a threat OTL, but I specifically mentioned a longer lived Tungning. As take away its ability to incite revolt in southern China and it's basically a refugee camp with an army of pirate who took more than a year to capture a colonial outpost, and between the clearances and the Qing inevitably sniffing out Zheng's agents on the mainland, and it's ability to influence the mainland rapidly diminishes.

Not to mention that you completely ignore any possibility of Tungning becoming stronger over time.
As a state it could become stronger, take over more of Formosa, reorganize its military into a more professional force, ect... but the state itself wasn't what threatened the Qing, it was the state's ability to influence and organize the Han Chinese, and as I previously mentioned that threat will diminish rather than grow over time. Should the Kingdom survive long enough, fighting it will become a mere vanity project for the Qing.

It feels like you’re completely discounting the structural factors that stopped Qing interest in the sea.
I will admit that my knowledge of the Qing's political structure is lacking, which factors in particular makes my proposed POD impossible? I know the Qing did maintain a fairly large navy, so it's not like they're the Safavids with no maritime tradition at all.
 
It was perceaved as a threat OTL, but I specifically mentioned a longer lived Tungning. As take away its ability to incite revolt in southern China and it's basically a refugee camp with an army of pirate who took more than a year to capture a colonial outpost, and between the clearances and the Qing inevitably sniffing out Zheng's agents on the mainland, and it's ability to influence the mainland rapidly diminishes.


As a state it could become stronger, take over more of Formosa, reorganize its military into a more professional force, ect... but the state itself wasn't what threatened the Qing, it was the state's ability to influence and organize the Han Chinese, and as I previously mentioned that threat will diminish rather than grow over time. Should the Kingdom survive long enough, fighting it will become a mere vanity project for the Qing.


I will admit that my knowledge of the Qing's political structure is lacking, which factors in particular makes my proposed POD impossible? I know the Qing did maintain a fairly large navy, so it's not like they're the Safavids with no maritime tradition at all.

How do you take away Tungnings ability to incite revolt when that ability is tied in to the very nature of the Tungning state? The Zheng regime can't stop itself from being a Ming loyalist, Han ethnic state. I don't know what you mean by "clearances" but I see no reason why the Qing would "inevitably" sniff out Zheng agents. The Qing had an extremely light government structure which they needed to rule such an ethnically subordinated huge area with such a dense population. How are they going to reveal the intricate, deep-set Zheng agents spread throughout the mainland-especially if the Qing have accepted the Zheng regime and allow trade with them?

Tungning already had control over all Taiwan (except for useless mountainous areas filled with aboriginals). They had rich, booming economy-I don't know how you can call it a "refugee camp"- and the population was swiftly growing. I don't know how their military couldn't be considered professional? Koxinga almost managed to take Nanjing, the capital of Southern China. How on earth is that an "army of pirates" instead of a professional force? The amount of ships he was able to pull for that expedition stunned the Jesuit that was with him. Koxinga literally had elite "iron men" units picked specially for their ability to carry massive metal armor in battle. This is not the mark of an unprofessional military force.

After Taiwan was conquered, the Qing navy was drastically scaled down and mainly served as a coastal defense force against minor pirates. The Qing were fundamentally a land-based northern agrarian Manchu empire. This is fundamentally opposed to the maritime, commercial, Han Chinese south. The Qing were inherently conservative and oriented towards maintaining Confucian orthodoxy. This does not jive with expanding outwards into the ocean. Creating and maintaining a good navy costs money and requires the Qing to fill the naval positions with people who are actually familiar and trained in maritime affairs-the south Chinese. This is in fact what they did for Shi Lang and other Chinese defectors. It was only with their help (many of whom came over during the 3 feudatories rebellion), that the Qing were able to conquer Tungning. Granting so much prestige and power to one of the lowest groups on the Qing ethnic totem pole makes no sense when there is very little incentive to do so. The attacks of Tungning were a big incentive because it struck at the core of Qing rule. Extremely expensive and wasteful wars in Burma and so on might cause the Qing to draw from resources in their own element but did not at all cause them to want to go maritime. As far as I'm aware, there was 0 interest in doing anything more with the navy until the 19th c.
 
How do you take away Tungnings ability to incite revolt when that ability is tied in to the very nature of the Tungning state? The Zheng regime can't stop itself from being a Ming loyalist, Han ethnic state. I don't know what you mean by "clearances" but I see no reason why the Qing would "inevitably" sniff out Zheng agents. The Qing had an extremely light government structure which they needed to rule such an ethnically subordinated huge area with such a dense population. How are they going to reveal the intricate, deep-set Zheng agents spread throughout the mainland-especially if the Qing have accepted the Zheng regime and allow trade with them?

Tungning already had control over all Taiwan (except for useless mountainous areas filled with aboriginals). They had rich, booming economy-I don't know how you can call it a "refugee camp"- and the population was swiftly growing. I don't know how their military couldn't be considered professional? Koxinga almost managed to take Nanjing, the capital of Southern China. How on earth is that an "army of pirates" instead of a professional force? The amount of ships he was able to pull for that expedition stunned the Jesuit that was with him. Koxinga literally had elite "iron men" units picked specially for their ability to carry massive metal armor in battle. This is not the mark of an unprofessional military force.

After Taiwan was conquered, the Qing navy was drastically scaled down and mainly served as a coastal defense force against minor pirates. The Qing were fundamentally a land-based northern agrarian Manchu empire. This is fundamentally opposed to the maritime, commercial, Han Chinese south. The Qing were inherently conservative and oriented towards maintaining Confucian orthodoxy. This does not jive with expanding outwards into the ocean. Creating and maintaining a good navy costs money and requires the Qing to fill the naval positions with people who are actually familiar and trained in maritime affairs-the south Chinese. This is in fact what they did for Shi Lang and other Chinese defectors. It was only with their help (many of whom came over during the 3 feudatories rebellion), that the Qing were able to conquer Tungning. Granting so much prestige and power to one of the lowest groups on the Qing ethnic totem pole makes no sense when there is very little incentive to do so. The attacks of Tungning were a big incentive because it struck at the core of Qing rule. Extremely expensive and wasteful wars in Burma and so on might cause the Qing to draw from resources in their own element but did not at all cause them to want to go maritime. As far as I'm aware, there was 0 interest in doing anything more with the navy until the 19th c.
Why are you trying to revive a debate after 3 months?
 
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