We have an extremely interesting quote from the French Jesuit Correspondance de Pékin. This is from the Kangxi emperor himself in the early 18th century, more than a hundred years before European expansionism became a clear danger to the security of China:
The gist of this is repeated in Chinese sources, such as his remark upon the visit of a Russian ambassador:
The Kangxi emperor had an informed outlook on general European geopolitics thanks to his Jesuit informants and, as these quotes show, rightfully believed that the Europeans could pose a serious threat to China in future generations once Qing power declined. In 1716, his distrust of Europe contributed to his myopic decision to ban trade in the South China Sea, explaining that "I suspect that the countries in the Western Ocean [i.e. maritime nations to the west, including Europe] will become a threat to China in one hundred years." The ban was quickly cancelled in 1728-1729, and the Chinese were legally free to trade in Southeast Asia again.
With this in mind, what if the Kangxi emperor had decided that the best way to strengthen the empire's positions with Europe was the reverse, to strengthen and expand the Qing navy into a force that could challenge its enemies in the open sea as well as subduing possible threats among overseas Chinese? While the interest in the possible European threat would probably still decline after the emperor's death, a revamped Qing navy would not go to waste; in the 1720s there would be a near-confrontation with Japan, in 1740 a possible clash with the Dutch in Java, and so on. Such a navy would also secure the positions of Thailand, an earnest Chinese tributary, and that would change the landscape of Indochina. And once Europe is much stronger in the 19th century, the Qing empire's maritime frontiers could look quite different.
The Russians, Dutch, and Portuguese, like the other Europeans, are able to accomplish whatever they undertake, no matter how difficult. They are intrepid, clever, and know how to profit themselves. As long as I reign there is nothing to worry about them for China. I treat them well, and they like me, respect me, and attempt to please me. But, if our government were to be weak, if we were to weaken our vigilance [...] what would become of our empire? With the Russians to the north, the Portuguese from Luzon to the east, and the Dutch to the south, [the Europeans] would be able to do with China whatever they liked.
The gist of this is repeated in Chinese sources, such as his remark upon the visit of a Russian ambassador:
Although it is splendid that [Russia] should come to pay us tribute, we fear that after many generations, Russia might cause us trouble. In short, as long as China is at peace and is strong, foreign disturbances will not arise. Therefore, building up our strength is a matter of fundamental importance.
The Kangxi emperor had an informed outlook on general European geopolitics thanks to his Jesuit informants and, as these quotes show, rightfully believed that the Europeans could pose a serious threat to China in future generations once Qing power declined. In 1716, his distrust of Europe contributed to his myopic decision to ban trade in the South China Sea, explaining that "I suspect that the countries in the Western Ocean [i.e. maritime nations to the west, including Europe] will become a threat to China in one hundred years." The ban was quickly cancelled in 1728-1729, and the Chinese were legally free to trade in Southeast Asia again.
With this in mind, what if the Kangxi emperor had decided that the best way to strengthen the empire's positions with Europe was the reverse, to strengthen and expand the Qing navy into a force that could challenge its enemies in the open sea as well as subduing possible threats among overseas Chinese? While the interest in the possible European threat would probably still decline after the emperor's death, a revamped Qing navy would not go to waste; in the 1720s there would be a near-confrontation with Japan, in 1740 a possible clash with the Dutch in Java, and so on. Such a navy would also secure the positions of Thailand, an earnest Chinese tributary, and that would change the landscape of Indochina. And once Europe is much stronger in the 19th century, the Qing empire's maritime frontiers could look quite different.