China and Europe in the 18th century: Possibilities

We have an extremely interesting quote from the French Jesuit Correspondance de Pékin. This is from the Kangxi emperor himself in the early 18th century, more than a hundred years before European expansionism became a clear danger to the security of China:

The Russians, Dutch, and Portuguese, like the other Europeans, are able to accomplish whatever they undertake, no matter how difficult. They are intrepid, clever, and know how to profit themselves. As long as I reign there is nothing to worry about them for China. I treat them well, and they like me, respect me, and attempt to please me. But, if our government were to be weak, if we were to weaken our vigilance [...] what would become of our empire? With the Russians to the north, the Portuguese from Luzon to the east, and the Dutch to the south, [the Europeans] would be able to do with China whatever they liked.​

The gist of this is repeated in Chinese sources, such as his remark upon the visit of a Russian ambassador:

Although it is splendid that [Russia] should come to pay us tribute, we fear that after many generations, Russia might cause us trouble. In short, as long as China is at peace and is strong, foreign disturbances will not arise. Therefore, building up our strength is a matter of fundamental importance.​

The Kangxi emperor had an informed outlook on general European geopolitics thanks to his Jesuit informants and, as these quotes show, rightfully believed that the Europeans could pose a serious threat to China in future generations once Qing power declined. In 1716, his distrust of Europe contributed to his myopic decision to ban trade in the South China Sea, explaining that "I suspect that the countries in the Western Ocean [i.e. maritime nations to the west, including Europe] will become a threat to China in one hundred years." The ban was quickly cancelled in 1728-1729, and the Chinese were legally free to trade in Southeast Asia again.

With this in mind, what if the Kangxi emperor had decided that the best way to strengthen the empire's positions with Europe was the reverse, to strengthen and expand the Qing navy into a force that could challenge its enemies in the open sea as well as subduing possible threats among overseas Chinese? While the interest in the possible European threat would probably still decline after the emperor's death, a revamped Qing navy would not go to waste; in the 1720s there would be a near-confrontation with Japan, in 1740 a possible clash with the Dutch in Java, and so on. Such a navy would also secure the positions of Thailand, an earnest Chinese tributary, and that would change the landscape of Indochina. And once Europe is much stronger in the 19th century, the Qing empire's maritime frontiers could look quite different.
 
That would be very interesting. The Euro-Asian divide is not nearly as big back then.
If China doesn't close, they could keep dominating the China sea, closing Indochina and possibly Indonesia to as much foreign influence.

If an Emperor like Yongle was to come back, a resurgent China could actually dominate the Indian Ocean. Especially in the early XVIIIth century, India isn't completely the Franco-English playground it would become a couple decades later.

If China was to better exploit the Jesuits, maybe hinting at conversion he could get actual artillery/naval tech to balance European power. Alternatively, recognising the temporary superiority of European tech (something very un-chinese) could allow him to seek a mixed race founder, like some Vietnamese ruler did around the same time.

The problem for China is of course to get humbled for a second and realise they have something to learn from the Europeans besides funny toys like the astrolabe.

Big butterflies right there
 
If China doesn't close, they could keep dominating the China sea, closing Indochina and possibly Indonesia to as much foreign influence.
Actually, Qing China never really did close. The government initiated the so-called "Canton system" in the 1750s, but that was strictly for Europeans and such who were coming to China - the Chinese elsewhere were free as always to sail away to Southeast Asia or Nagasaki, for example. Until the 19th century the China Seas were economically dominated by Chinese merchants.

The bigger issue is that Chinese governments have very rarely (with exceptions, like the Yongle emperor as you pointed out) been interested in extending government control overseas. But here the Qing obsession with Han Chinese rebellion might possibly work out in favor of an interventionist policy; what better way to deter treason overseas then to actually set up government control over these areas? While difficult or impossible for many places the Chinese viewed as potentially dangerous (such as Dutch Indonesia), it could work out quite well for underpopulated areas like Borneo where Chinese immigrants founded independent states IOTL.

If China was to better exploit the Jesuits, maybe hinting at conversion he could get actual artillery/naval tech to balance European power.

I don't pretend to know anything about Early Modern European mentality, do you think there's anything actually stopping the Chinese from just buying weapons at Batavia, Manila, Macao, or Guangzhou?
 
The big issue with buying weapons is that you're reliant on the seller accepting to keep selling to you.
Weapons get obsolete, canonballs and powder run out, canons breaks... It is dangerous to start a war without a steady supply.

The Europeans were aware of that and didn't sell that many of them. You can see that in the Vietnamese civil wars, the ability to secure supply had a massive impact, and basically the only reason they tolerated Jesuits and missionaries in the country.

The ability by the Jesuits to act as gateway to weapons was a major aspect of their penetration. If the Chinese were to get their own foundry, they would get independant from European supply and could challenge them. They could get almost as many as they want and experiment with them, to fit them on their boats for example.

They'd also have to update their naval technology. Asian boats were simply no match for European ones.
 
I don't pretend to know anything about Early Modern European mentality, do you think there's anything actually stopping the Chinese from just buying weapons at Batavia, Manila, Macao, or Guangzhou?

European governments and trade companies were iffy about that. Besides, they needed a good deal of them to defend themselves with. If high enough prices are given, perhaps.
 
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