Tokyo-based civilian and military officials opposed early Japanese
aggression in Asia, but did not enforce their policy preferences on
commanders in the field.
Instead, they allowed the forward commanders, especially in the
Kwangtung Army, to present them with a fait accompli. As these faits
accompli were successful, Tokyo's objections lessened, and the
prestige and boldness of aggressive militarists increased.
However, it seems Chiang judged that resisting Japan would be counter-
productive. In China, local commanders in Manchuria for instance felt
like Chiang Kaishek was deliberately sabotaging their attempts to
resist, and that he was certainly unsupportive. Apparently, regardless of whether Chiang saw Japan's moves as rogue, or centrally directed, he assumed that any reaction or resistance
would be more likely to escalate rather than quell Japanese
aggression.
What if Chiang Kai-shek instead calculated that the Kwangtung Army was
violating Tokyo's policy, and that what Tokyo needed to get control of
its forces was to have the costs and ineffectiveness of KA land-grabs
to be demonstrated, and this caused him to try to crush the incursion?
In the case, is the more likely result Tokyo pulling in
the horns of the Kwangtung Army or its Navy, or is it escalation to
fullscale war between Japan and China in the early 1930s?