Actually, as Michael M. Sheng notes in his
Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton University Press 1997) Mao in August 1945 wanted to seize major cities (including Shanghai) and start a civil war in August 1945; only Stalin restrained him. (Sheng's book is invaluable for showing that Mao's claims from 1956 on--that he had won in spite of Stalin's mistaken advice--were false. Mao always in the end did what Stalin wanted and it was a good thing he did, according to Sheng, because Stalin was much more level-headed on China, and saved the impulsive Mao from many mistakes--Mao had even wanted to put Chiang Kai-shek on trial and execute him during the Xi'an incident!)
There was a time in early 1946 when the CCP did seem to be serious about a "parliamentary path" and eager to cooperate with General Marshall. As usual, the source for this apparent moderation was Moscow:
"There were two contradictory factors in Communist thinking during the first stage of the Marshall Mission: the hope for peace, and the desire to fight. Because the CCP perceived the GMD-CCP struggle as a part of the U.S.-USSR global conflict, when the Moscow Conference reached a series of agreements on 27 December, the CCP sensed that a GMD-CCP compromise was necessary and possible. In early January 1946, the CCP consulted Moscow as to what China's future should be. On 17 January, Zhou Enlai informed Yan' an of Moscow's response. The message from Moscow stated that due to the lack of knowledge of the Chinese situation, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) could not provide a detailed agenda for the CCP. Nevertheless, the CCP should not attempt to sovietize China, but should determinedly stop the civil war and democratize China in cooperation with Jiang. If the CCP could not stop a civil war from breaking out, the U.S. army and air force would jump on the CCP, and Yan' an should not underestimate the strength of the United States.' Considering what Truman told Marshall about an all-out U.S. support of the GMD military campaign against the CCP in case of CCP fail-ure to go along with the peace process, Stalin's warning of a possible U.S. direct intervention against the CCP was not off the mark. Stalin would continue to sound the alarm to Mao throughout the entire Chinese civil war period, and Stalin's caution served as a balancing mechanism to Mao's often impulsive and radical policy, as we have seen, and will see later on.
"The impact of Moscow's message on the CCP was felt immediately. On 1 February, the Party Center dispatched the "Directive on the Current Situation and Task," which stated that China had "entered a new stage of development of peaceful and democratic reconstruction. . . . Currently, the main form of Chinese revolution has changed from armed struggle to nonarmed parliamentary struggle of the masses. The domestic issues should be settled through political means; and therefore, the whole work of the Party should be adjusted according to the new situation." Since Moscow was in agreement with Marshall's mediation effort, Yan' an further considered that "Marshall not only represents the United States, in fact he is the representative [of the international community] to carry out the agreement of the Moscow Conference of the three Powers."
"This, however, should not be taken as an indication that Mao abandoned his belief in armed struggle. Mao had repeatedly concluded that the parliamentary path did not fit China's reality, and he would in a later day blame this "parliamentary attempt" on Liu Shaoqi's "rightist deviationism." It appeared that Mao's flirtation with the parliamentary path was one more repetition of an old pattern: when Stalin speaks, Mao listens and complies, willingly or not. Later, Mao explained to Yudin why he heeded Stalin's advice so closely and sometimes unwillingly: he had no other choice because it was something Stalin wanted him to do. If the parliamentary path was Mao's lip service to Stalin, Stalin's peace approach followed by Mao benefited the CCP a great deal at the time. Soon, Mao was also to learn that Stalin did not really ask the CCP to lay down its arms.
"The Communists' fundamental distrust of both the GMD and the United States urged them not to lay down their arms. Although the CCP publicly welcomed Truman's China policy statement of 15 December, it maintained that the nature of the U.S. China policy was still "supporting Jiang, containing the USSR, and suppressing the CCP." Thus, although the CCP declared that the armed struggle was to be replaced by peaceful parliamentary struggle, the Communists refused to disarm themselves. In the same directive of 1 Febru-ary, which was revised and approved by Mao in person, it was stated that "the GMD is still likely to launch a military assault on us, and we should tighten our vigilance. Generally speaking, armed struggle is over now; but, to safeguard peace, the CCP everywhere shall make use of the current situation to launch a three-month campaign to train our troops."11 In reality, what Mao meant by "parliamentary struggle" was only another way of expressing his coalition agenda. The paradoxical coexistence of a peaceful political struggle and the expansion of military strength was a typical feature of Maoist dualism. The CCP intended to hold on to its military forces, and at the same time, to take part in the "parliamentary struggle" to undermine the GMD's political institutions and to enhance the CCP's political power. One of Mao's reasons to cooperate with Marshall was to pursue the political destruction of the GMD by using American democratic principles.
"On the other hand, Jiang had always been opposed to any CCP power-sharing scheme. He said that a coalition government was the vital step in Moscow's scheme of "peaceful competition," which would put China under Russia's con-trol.12 Jiang did not want to share power with the CCP, but intended to use Marshall to induce the Communists to give up their armed forces..." (Sheng, pp. 123-4)
What, basically, were Mao's terms in that early 1946 period when armed struggle was to be replaced by parliamentary struggle?
First--and this was the big sticking point between Mao and Marshall--Mao insisted that unlike the French and Italian Communists, the CCP would not give up its armed forces, would not integrate them into a single army under Chiang Kai-shek's government, even if it became a coalition government. The Communist units would be retained as separate units, controlling the Communist-ruled territory, though nominally under the authority of the central government. Mao put it this way to the Politburo:
"The United States and Jiang Jieshi intend to eliminate us by way of nationwide military unification. We want unification, but we do not want to be eliminated. The principle of separating political parties and military troops is not most dangerous to us; it is most dangerous to let Jiang integrate our troops and to deploy them in different places..This danger can be avoided only if we are going to manage the situation carefully and properly. In principle, we have to advocate national military unification; but how we shall go about it should be decided according to the concrete circumstances of the time. This is the difference between our way and the way of the French Communists."
https://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126 (And before criticizing Mao for not going along with Marshall on this point, let's remember that Thorez and Togliatti, having surrendered their arms for participation in coalition governments, were ousted from those governments in 1947...)
Second, there was to be local autonomy for the various regions of China--which means that in effect the Communists would still be ruling the areas where they had military supremacy.
Third, the Communists and other forces (e.g., the Democratic League) that seemed closer to the CCP than to the GMD would not only participate in a coalition government but would in effect have a veto power there. "As a result of intensive bargaining and political maneuvers, the PCC [Political Consultation Conference] reached final resolutions on various issues regarding the democratization of the government. The CCP saw the resolutions as a political victory because the seats which the CCP and the Democratic League would occupy in the State Council constituted the minimum one-third necessary to make proposals and to veto any government nomination of nonpartisan personnel to the Council whom the considered undesirable."
https://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC&pg=PA125
So--the Communists would retain their own Army, would retain (under the guise of "federalism" or "autonomy") control of their own regions, and in the central government have both a powerful voice and full democratic freedom to agitate against the GMD and blame it (with some reason) for the country's many problems. What are the chances Chiang would accept this? It's always possible, but only in the sense that it's always possible for someone to agree to commit suicide... As Sheng writes, "It seemed beyond Marshall's comprehension that in the estimation of both the GMD and the CCP, the CCP would soon gain the upper hand in the political struggle should a democratic system be in place."
https://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC&pg=PA125