The role of Huntzingers action @ Sedan, however valid the criticizims of the decisions of 14-17 May, has been gradually accepted as contributing in a large way to the sucess of the subsequent US 1st Army attack. While the intial view of the time, and for a decade after was the 10th Pz of Guderians corps found its self in position to attack deep into the 1st Armys right flank. Two problems with this view have been identified. First was that on the 16th the 10th Pz Div, was still deeply involved in its defense of the Sedan crossing with the French 21st Corps. A small kampfgruppe was split off on the night of the 16th/17th May, but this constituted the effective reserve of the 10th Pz Div. Further this KG was badly attenuated. Only 21 tanks seem to have accompanied it west on its night march. Orders for more to move west were issued the morning of the 17th, but those were not assembled & refueled until mid afternoon. Extraction from the ongoing battle around Stonne & preparation required some seven hours.
The second problem was the general exhaustion the 10th Pz Div was approaching. Having been in continual combat since the 12th May & movement from the 10th both the state of its men & equipment was declined significantly. Reports from the components & the consolidated division reports show casualties amoung the tank crews, and in the infantry brigade had reached some 25%, including a growing number of exhaustion cases. Those were discouraged as a matter of policy, but the medical establishement was not yet under the gun of the Nazi fantics of a year later. The 55 exhaution cases recorded on the 16th seems to have been the tip opf the iceberg as it were. The after action reports of the battalion and company commanders describe numerous syptoms of fatigue, and how the opportunities to rest even a small number of men were desperately sought. The loss of equipment, specifically the tanks is more precisely recorded The division recorded on the morning of the 16th that 37% of its tanks were "irrecoverable losses", and another 26% could not be expected to be repaired within 72 hours, with another 17% probablly could be repaired in under 48 hours. ......
..... Unlike so many generals Walther Krueger left no selfserving biography. His account of the experience in France is more of a combat history of the US 1st Army. There is painfully little from him concerning his decisions and thinking in turning the screening mission of his command into a offensive into the flank of the Pz bulge. The only relaible account was left by his Chief of Staff Col Eisenhower. While Eisenhower has nothing usefull about Kruegers intial thinking or decision he did leave some usefull detail on the development of the plan and operation. He notes the receipt of fresh orders shortly after 08:00 on the 16th, the third change of orders in 24 hours. There is a implication in his description that Krugers decision was deeply influenced by the clear state of confusion in the French command.
While the planning was the direct reponsibility of the Army G3 Eisenhowers fingerprints are clearly on it. His account has nothing on this aspect, however he does note the presence of the commander of the embryonic US 2d Armored Div Maj Gen Patton at a early stage in the planning. Eisenhowers account implies at least a portion of the 1st Armys manuver was from Pattons mind. Others, such as Pattons aide, the Army G3 A Lt Col ___ & the Army G4, confirm this & suggest various levels of credit to the 2d AD commander for the 1st Armys scheme of manuver. From a variety of witnesses its clear Kruger & Patton spent a significant amount of time together in the previous spring dicussing mobile operations armored warfare. Pattons subsequent death the following autum prevented any usefull account from his memory. However his letter to his son includes the remark about the battle being executed as best we coul to the plan "we had made". remarks from the 2d AD staff strongly suggest the 2d AD role in the operation was clearly Pattons concept. Beyond that the aggresive and fluid nature of the overall concept of operations seems to have been at its core Kruegers inspiration. That is bourne out in part by portions of the 1st Armys methods being clearly present in the unit training earlier in 1939 & 1940. Krugers intent there is documented in the orders & guidance for the training.
Perhaps the most detailed & human portion of the CoS account is in the discussion between Kruger & himself about the ability of the army to execute the plan. Kruger asked for a opinion on the attitude of the two corps commanders. The CoS allowed the II Corps commander would be utterly professional and do his part. Kruger remarked in agreement, then answered for the III Corps commander himself noting that he'd protest, but would carry through. Eisenhower then remarked that they had given the pair a "hell of a task" . Krueger responded to the effect that they had given the entire Army a hell of a task. The ability of the others, the Serivce Command & capability of the G4, the Army artillery chief, the 2d AD commander, & other key players. Eisenhower spent a long paragraph on this conversation & it reads as a poignat moment in military command. ....
...... There are a set of myths surrounding the French 2d Light Cavalry Division & its role in the US 1st Armies advance. First is that it was not actually assigned to the 1st Army & was only incidently present on the right flank. In fact a message from the French 1st Army Group transfering command of the 2d LCD to 1st Army was received on the evening of 15 may @ 1st Army HQ. The French archives contain the order to the 2d Lt Cav Div attaching it directly to the US 1st Amys command. This is part of the larger order to the 1st Army.
2d Myth is this unit was a horse cavalry formation armed with lances. Like the other four Lt Cav Div in the French Army orders had been issued in very early May detaching the horse cavalry brigade from the division. The formation that reported to 1st Army the night of 15/16 May was a entirely mechanized formation, including light tanks, armored MG carriers, armored inf (dragoons) carriers. Its artillery & AT guns were entirely motorized.
3rd Myth: The unit was a remnant of no combat value. The division had suffered heavy losses in five days of combat, it still had better than 50% of its armored vehicles, all its artillery, & the bulk of its AT guns. Morale was described as damaged in the divisions report to 2d Army on the 15th, but from the accounts of several members it was improved by the rest on the 16th and the knowledge the US ally would be attacking imeadiatly.
4th Myth: The French were attached to the US ___ Inf Regiment or the ____ Brigade or the ____ Division. In fact Krueger left the 2d Lt Cav independant of the of US Corps & Divisions. The US ____ Inf Regiment was attached to the French div by Krugers orders. That regiment came out of II Corps reserve brigade & was reinforced with a battalion of artillery, a extra AT gun company, and a transport company trucks.