Chapter 16

Extracts from US II Corps After Action Reports from May 1940

.... The principle weakness of the German artillery we faced was a lack of corps or army level regiments of heavy & medium artillery. During the initial clash with the enemy XIX corps on 16 & 17 May we detected no evidence of supporting corps artillery. The enemy armored divisions attacking those two days each had a 12 piece medium battalion of 150mm howitzers, similar to our divisions. On the 18th & 19th some medium artillery other than the battalion in each infantry division was detected. This was both 105mm & 150mm longer range guns. Initially those were used against the bridges in Rethel. Later on the 18th and after up to three longer ranged 'corps' artillery battalions were identified facing II Corps. In contrast II Corps had eight battalions of howitzers and long range guns reinforcing the division artillery.

A second weakness was in the volume of ammunition used in each attack. 'Counting shell holes' suggests the German artillery fired about a third of the ammunition in a attack as the II Corps artillery. This may have reflected difficulties in bringing up ammunition from the depots in Germany. Such intel that we had indicated the roads back to the Rhineland were named with traffic. While II Corps had its difficulties in bringing up artillery ammunition it was seldom the reserve for each battalion fell below a full unit of fire.

....The enemy infantry was aggressive in executing infiltration. Rather than directly attacking the flanks of a position their infiltration parties went deeper & sought the rear of the position or interdiction of support. Steady troops were able to ignore the infiltration parties until counter attack or combat patrols dealt with them. There was some success in placing ambush parties along likely infiltration routes. Infantry battalion reserves are critical for dealing with infiltration parties. Rapid deployment of groups from the reserve to attack & destroy infiltrators is essential. While good intelligence is necessary rapid action is necessary as soon as any enemy infantry are identified. While immediate destruction of the infiltrating group is desirable it is not necessary in all cases. Often it is enough to pin the enemy group with small arms or light mortar fire.. If driven to ground they become vulnerable to increased mortar fires, a artillery strike, or a well organized assault. Where armored cars or tanks were available (of the 12th Cav) combined arms attacks on pinned infiltration groups were extremely successful.

....Tank support for the infantry is highly desirable. The new doctrine of concentration of the tanks into a single division that operates on its own is leaving the rifleman without a valuable supporting weapon. (Note, this was not US Army doctrine. Independent tank regiments were authorized for assignment to the corps, however the lack of tanks led to the concentration of the few available in the AEFs armored division.) The French army assigned their tanks on the basis of one battalion for each division & it seems worthwhile to follow their success. Twice we were supported by the tankettes of the cavalry, making the attacks by the infantry companies far easier.

....Location of the artillery observation posts has been critical. Good view for the OP cannot be emphasized enough. Static OPs are useful however the artillery observer needs more mobility. The SRC is too heavy and bulky for mobile foot operations. The Forward observation party can't keep up with the infantry maneuver. Often it proved easier to unspool wire behind the FO party as the telephone kit weighed only a few kilograms. The telephone could also be put into action faster than the SRC. Dedication of light trucks to the FO party will be helpful, but too vulnerable in small arms range. The French SAU artillery tank shows some promise. Its radios can remain in continual operation. Those and its sophisticated optical equipment are protected by the armor. This type of vehicle provides a protected & mobile OP for the artillery. If the SAU40 cannot be obtained some other protected vehicle must be provided.
 
Absolutely the last US Army Cavary Charge


Most accounts are based on the After Action reports of the 4th Cavalry & the personal account of Master Sergant Vlarney. The latter has been suspect since Vlarney was not actually present, & the Regiments AAR has the usual problems of a offcial record written imeadiatly after a event. Possiblly the best source are the interviews Walter Lord collected in his research for his seminal book ‘The Longest Summer’ . Those interviews were not used in his book, but are preserved in the W Lord collection & available to any historian.

Precisely why or how the 4th & 12 Cavalry had a squadron each of horse mounted troopers and horses shipped to France is a convoluted and not entirely revealed story. In October of 1939 when the initial composition of the AEF was being established & the early shipping schedules set Lt Gen _____ Commander of the newly organized US Army Field Forces, the temporary precursor to the Army Ground Forces, issued a directive specifically excluding the transfer of any horse cavalry units of any size as part of the AEF or to Europe. Had political interferance by Legislators in the mobilization not existed the influence of the Cavalry Corps as a distinct & still influential entity would not have existed. By January 1940 Marshal had gotten enough control the head of the Cavalry or any other Corps branch would have rolled had he attempted the same stunt..

Once in France Embick & Krueger, did what they did with the commanders of the two regiments for their part in the subterfuge. The two squadrons were left intact and put to work as a parade detail & a supplement to the military police battalions. They also were a sinking fund as requests for manpower supplements were dealt with by pointing to the ‘3rd Squadron’

The advance to contact of 16 May was one illustration of the obolescence of the horse on the mechanized battlefield. The two squadrons took relatively light losses, through extreme dispersal nearly to the point of ineffectiveness. In the cases where a few dozen were a target the casualties soared. The progress of the mounted troops north was reasonable tho the inability to concentrate in day time left the mounted troops of marginal value. II Corps eventually had its mounted squadron deployed on the Aisne wheree it rounded up stragglers. Cattle herding & cow poking as the troopers joked. The mounted squadron of the 4th Cav had a portion at that task. Otherwise two troops and the heavy weapons troop were split between two liasion tasks with the 2dAD and within the III Corps, between the 2d & 30th ID.

On 18 May J Troop reinforced with a machine gun section, a mortar & two AT guns from the HQ troop had been following a stream west from Tavaux et Pontsericourt acting as a link between the 2dID & 2dAD. Shortly after 12:00 it followed the road along the south side of the river into Bosmont sur Serre. The troop scouts spotted a column of enemy vehicles parked on the main street. They reported the enemy was not deployed for combat, but was servicing the vehicles and the bulk were seated on park benches & at a Cafe eating lunch. The troop commander 1st Lt Stuart ordered the First Sgt to deploy the troop and attack the enemy immediately, then deployed the AT guns, the mortar, & a MG squad to cover the east & south approaches to Bosmont sur Serre. First Sgt Rocque sent a party up a parallel street to try for the far end of the column. The rest of the troop he led at a gallop around the corner and along the parked enemy vehicles, firing into the nonplussed Germans. The enemy who attempted to flee north ahead of the charging troopers were cut off by the enveloping party. It was over in a little more than five minutes. 4th Cavalry records refer to 78 enemy prisoners & 40 dead. III Corps records count 66 prisoners, but this clearly does not include wounded who had been seperated to hospital care before III Corps took custody. German records identify 81 missing, presumably captured, & 36 survivors. 14 of those survivors were wounded left behind by the Americans. All the vehicles of the motor rifle company of the 1st PzD were described as “lost”.

Lt Water found himself in possession of some ten trucks, a enemy AT gun & a mortar, long with the stunned enemy soldiers. Some scattered rifle fire continued as the cavalrymen traded shots with a few holdouts lurking in the village. Guessing correctly that the villiage was nearly enveloped by the enemy he ordered the prisoners to be packed aboard the trucks still running & the troop to move SE to regain contact with III Corps. The sense of urgency was increased when the AT covering the south side of Bosmont sur Serre knocked out a armored car hastening back from the south. Another armored car & a pair of Kregasse tracked trucks also succummed to AT rounds and point blank MG fire. By 13:00 the horse & motor column had departed & the villiage was left to the German skulkers.
 
US View, Afternoon & Evening 18 May

By mid after noon Krueger & his staff were validated in their acceptance of French intelligence that Laon & St Quenten were the objectives of the German armored attacks. The relative weakness or lack of density of the US 1st Armys left wing led to a execution of a swinging door maneuver, where the 2dAD & 2ID withdrew south & south west before the German columns advancing nearly straight west. This worked due to the ability of the French 6th Army to redeploy the 4thDCR to cover the Oise River crossings. Monday morning quarterbacks have been persistent in their criticism of Krugers withdrawal. The common view being the 2dAD should have stood fast with its infantry battalions nested with their AT guns, & the divisions tanks counter attacking the enemy by passing these nest. However these critics are never able to identify where the necessary mass of tanks would come from. By the morning of 18 May the 2AD could muster barely fifty tanks & the days loses were steady. By evening the division resembled one of the German motor rifle divisions, with a few tanks attached. This was reproduced across the battlefield in that less than 50% of the machines on hand on 10 May were still in usable condition. For both sides the tanks were a rapidly sinking resource & their ability to influence the battle sharply reduced. The critics also seem to ignore the stay behind strong points around Montcornet. The 2d ID

This matter of the weakness of the left flank of the 1st Army was at the core of Krueger & Embicks conversation in the last hours of the 18th. The 'corps' training south of Riems was in no wise a combat formation. As a corps & divisions the formations had to be dismissed as reinforcements. The regiments were mostly suspect as well. The only truly combat ready regiment the 24th infantry had already been moved to the battle the evening before. This had also impacted truing as the 24th Inf was the demonstration and school formation for the AEF. After some telephone calls by the staff & intervention by Embick orders stood to transport six infantry battalions & a regimental HQ to 1st Army during the night. 48 AT guns & crews, with or with out transport were also to be moved to the battle. A comb out of selected officers & NCO was to be done with the object of providing replacements NLT the 20th May. Embicks memoirs & later staff memos also show he was thinking at this time of trying to remove the US V Corps or at least the US 5th ID from the Allied strategic reserve & to US 1st Army.

Kruger reiterated orders to establish a strong entrenched position on the Aisne River. In this effort the stragglers rounded up from 1st Armys rear were drafted. A decreasing number were sent along to their regiments & more found themselves with a defacto sentence of hard labor for several days digging bunkers and gun pits in the May sunshine. Along the right flank in II Corps & 2dDLC sectors the entrenchment of the artillery was taking on some urgency. with the arrival of the German infantry corps the US artillery men were starting to see a threat of significant counter battery fires. Ammunition pits in the battery positions suddenly were found inadequate and digging was becoming as demanding as unloading the frequent deliveries of projectiles and propellant.

II Corps found the character of the battle of the 18th radically different than previous. While the enemy artillery fire was a bit greater the lack of tank attacks made a huge difference. The battle slowed to a walking pace, there were no more mobile light guns & MG inside wandering steel bunkers. The tactical commanders found they could deal with the enemy attacks in a slower and more methodical manner. There was time for more coordination, and to organize more precise counters. The artillery attacks became more economical. The combination of 105mm & 75mm projectiles with reinforcing 155mm proved decisive against the enemy infantry. Text book webs of interlocking lanes of MG fire appeared, with mortar targets covering the defense as if in a school problem solution.

Rethel continued to be a focus for the enemy air attacks. By the end of the 18th the US II Corps had ceased trying to use the town, other than defense positions in the northern edge. This pattern was repeated across the 1st Armys front. The soldiers were learning that dispersal in the countryside was preferable to the comforts of the towns & losses to air attacks started to decline.. While visible enemy air losses were not great those that did go down over the battle field were becoming a morale booster. Particularly when it was thought the AA guns had inflicted the loss.

In the US the reports from the AEF and 1st Army were starting to make a deeper impression of the national leaders. Marshal & Roosevelt spent several hours in the White House on the 18th reviewing the two days accumulation of battle reports. Both left the meeting contemplating plans. marshal for initiating the shipment of a wave of ready combat power to France. He judged correctly trained replacements and fresh equipment would be needed soon, as well as combat ready reinforcements. Roosevelt went to prepare year another series of speeches and lobbying efforts to strengthen the position of the war hawks. On the 18th the the newspapers became flooded with news of the US Army in combat. Both side took up their version. The head of the America First organization made a impassioned two hours speech that repeatedly condemned the Murder of American Boys of Foreign Soil. A portion of this was broadcast nation wide further hardening positions on the war. Casualtiy lists or numbers were not made public by the War Dept, & were not yet compiled anyway, but the memories of the Great War were clear and most folks feared or assumed similar numbers. For the moment the public had lurid and patriotic head lines and news stories in the papers and on the radio. Walter Cronkites seminal live radio report from the battlefield near Rethel lay a couple more days in the future, but the public was well prepped for it by the late evening of the 18th.
 
Afternoon 17 May Germans

The attack of the 10th PzD developed more or less as that of the 1st & 2d PzD had the previous day. The forward outpost line had been swiftly overrun & the tanks moved with some speed west, crossing the Montcornet-Neufchatel road a little after midday. Montcornet proved a nest of AT guns covered by artillery fires & the tank formations quickly turned south and skirted the town at some distance. The right hand battle group turned north behind Montcornet where it rescued a odd lot of the 2dPzD holdouts. A few more kilometers west the column found the main 'battle zone" if the US III Corps. Repeated attacks through the afternoon failed to dislodge the nests of AT guns and their artillery observers. The left hand column also relieved some survivors of the 2dPzD, and gradually worked its way through a gap between the III Corps strong points. By late afternoon it reached Liassie & won a brief battle against the defenders. At this point the division commander reported optimism about reaching his objective of Laon by nightfall. However he also advised there was already pressure on the 10ths left or south flank, & how the constant & violent enemy artillery strikes were sapping the divisions combat strength. In the Laon outskirts another sprinkle of AT guns, MG, and artillery fires slowed the tank advance to a halt. Sunset intervened before the attack could be revived. the final reports from the 10th PzD for the 18th have a much more pessimistic note. There are the usual complaints about the devastating effects of the enemy artillery, notes on the overall exhaustion of the men, and messages about post night fall probes of the dovosopns flank and the danger of night attacks.

The 1st PzD found the afternoon less violent but no less exhausting. As the afternoon spun out the tanks lurched and ground their way west as the enemy battalions darted out of the way. Unlike with III Corps the US 2dAD battalions did not try to remain in isolated strong points. Instead withdrawing in a series of quick rearguard actions. Probing to the Oise River the leading companies found the French 4thDCR had advanced its tanks across & created a strong point in Ribamont and blocked the other crossings. a few hours of bloody attacks drove to the Oise River but failed to secure a viable crossing. Sunset found the division retiring the tanks to refuel & rearm. After dark scattered probes by the enemy kept the flank defense alert through the darkness.

Kliest was disappointed by the days results. The 8th PzD had also failed to secure St Quentin. Losses in a afternoon attack were heavy from a combination of MG, AT guns, and endless artillery attacks. The French tanks continued to collide with the tank attacks of the 8thPzD & for the first time the armored commanders were disturbed by the heavy losses in their light tanks. At sunset the armored regiment commander reported his strength still operating at 27% & was not optimistic about restoring to 50% by sunrise. The artillery commander reported ammunition exhausted and the expected resupply that night essential. Elsewhere the armored division commanders complained about the halt orders & related restrictions. Their fears being the enemy resistance solidifying before them. Kleist did have good news in the transfer of the 3rd & 4th PzD from central Belgium to his Armored Group. Their unsucessfull attacks on the French 1st Army led to the decision to reinforce the more sucessfull sector. Perhaps Kliests largest concern was in getting the supply convoys through to the depleted battalions. While roving French soldiers had proved little danger thus far the few that did resist suggested a latent danger.

A few questions and thoughts about the differing defense styles of US III Corps and the 2dAD. The 2dAD has greater mobility than the infantry divisions of III Corps, combined (maybe) with less infantry available to hold the strong points. That is in addition to differences in orders, the overall strategy of the US 1st Army, and other reasons.

Oh, will the US artillery be facing supply problems? The 8th Panzer's situation has me thinking the US artillery could be using more ammo than was planned for.

Carl, Chapter 16 has me wanting to find a copy of Panzer Leader: France 1940, complete with the US 1st Army scenarios and counters. Sadly, that game expansion doesn't exist.
 
One thing the French could handle in this campaign was artillery ammo. Over the two days described thus far I could not see a ammunition shortage.

Gaming this is on my list. Will have to create the game pieces myself.
 
One thing the French could handle in this campaign was artillery ammo. Over the two days described thus far I could not see a ammunition shortage.

Gaming this is on my list. Will have to create the game pieces myself.


Let us know when you do. It's got me thinking along the same lines.
 
French View Evening 18 May

As the 18th May progressed both the Allied 1st Army Group-Billiote, and the North West Front-Georges came to understand how the German offensive was slowing, and that the US 1st & Fr 6th Armies were fighting and holding in a major battle on & north of the Aisne River. Among some HQ staff the news caused a wild swing in outlook & a proliferation of overly optimistic ideas. Rescue of the 9th Army was brought up, a 'converging' counter attack on the enemy salient by the 1st Army Group, a massing of the Allied armored formations for some sort of strike. Georges himself remained seemingly overwhelmed by events and focused on reinforcing the line of the Aisne River and Ameins area. More divisions were entrained for the Fr 6th & 10th Armies. It was also a determined late afternoon to reinforce the US 1st Army with a Fr infantry division. The notification of which did not reach Kruegers HQ until after 01:00 of the 19th. Billotte was more focused on the problems surrounding the endangered twins, the advanced portion of the BEF and Blanchards Fr 1st Army. The collapsing Belgian army threatened to expose the left flank of the BEF. On the right the Fr 1st Army already had its flank hanging in the air. By this point it was clear the 9th Army had ceased to exist in anything larger than the odd regiment or battalion. Efforts by the Fr 1st Army to extend its right and to counter attack the northern side of the enemy tank salient had mixed results. A extremely thin screen of reconisance units and small outposts had jelled as far as Cambrai, but no one believed this screen would do more than note the passing of the enemy tanks on their way west on the 19th May. Efforts to counter attack the flank between Valenciennes & Maubeuge were disappointing in ground gained. Communications still existed through Amiens & trains still passed on the railways to Belgium but as on the 17th the question of the main crossing of the Somme being cut was raised in staff confrences. Establishing the Fr 10th Army had become of first urgency

At the top Renaud was wholly focused on the replacement of Gamelin the following day.
 
Just caught up on the action and the posts. My apologies for not posting sooner. Too many timelines and threads, too little time to get to them all.

That aside I really enjoyed reading the last cavalry charge and the follow up. Things are settling down to a possible static battle line around the Americans and French Corps. Hopefully with extra reinforcements and additional tanks, they will hold against the German Panzer and Infantry.

How much of the Luftwaffe is still available in the battle area at this time and has the Allies been able to bring more of the French AdA to give the Allies more cover?

With the British and French holding some of Belgium, are there reinforcements available to stabilize the lines there, or would they need to pull back closer to tighten the lines?
 
...
That aside I really enjoyed reading the last cavalry charge and the follow up. Things are settling down to a possible static battle line around the Americans and French Corps. Hopefully with extra reinforcements and additional tanks, they will hold against the German Panzer and Infantry.

There are no additional tanks. OTL both sides had committed every vehicle of any value. The Brits did have some uncommitted in the UK or with their other tank formation (Division?), but permanent losses on both side amounted to over 30% of the starting totals by the 9th day of the campaign.

How much of the Luftwaffe is still available in the battle area at this time

I dont have exact info on German AF losses through the 18th May. For the entire campaign OTL the Germans permanently lost a third of their starting strength. Counting machines repaired in time for the Battle of Britain the temporary loss was closer to 40%.

and has the Allies been able to bring more of the French AdA to give the Allies more cover?

No. Adding in a single US bombardment & pursuit wing each just does not add that much to the Allied air strength. OTL the French were handicapped by the April decision to stand down most of the obsolete aircraft groups to requip with some 1,500 new models that were delivered/to be delivered between 1 April and 30 June. 300 new aircraft had been delivered from the US in April & another 300 were enroute May/June. The reorganization & retooling of the French aircraft industry was well under way in the spring of 1940 and full production had restarted. The newly built aircraft were in hand, but the air crews had to franticaly retrain during May & June. As it was some 200 of the US made M-167 bombers went into combat in May-June, & somewhat more of the DB-7 & other new models.

How a early entry of the US into the war would affect this I cant say. Given the extremely low production capacity of the US aircraft industry in September 1939 I cant see any significant change in production. Perhaps some partial improvement in the transition of French aircrew to the new machines?

With the British and French holding some of Belgium, are there reinforcements available to stabilize the lines there, or would they need to pull back closer to tighten the lines?

No, not in the near term. The decision to withdrawn from the Dyle Line had catastrophic consequences for the Belgian Army. It effectively wrote off 75% or better of the Belgians combat power. The field strength of the French 2d & 3rd Army Groups was insufficient to build new armies needed to cover the Somme-Aisne River line between Sedan and the sea. Adding in the five divisions of the US 1st Army is just not enough to make up the large deficit. So, the BEF & Fr 1st Army are in a very exposed place.

Understand at this point in my narrative the Germans have not lost much in terms of time. Halting the 5th, 6th, 7th PzD on the 18th May is just a day earlier when the historical rest halt occured 19 May. More important are the tank & rifle losses to the other four PzD on the 17th & 18th May.
 
I am going to shelve this for a while. The research has always been demanding, but Im also nearing the point where major departures will occur from the historical trend. Those can go in several directions and I'm unwilling at this point to make arbitrary or whimsical decisions on what direction to take. Have come too close to that on these pages. I do hope to game this out. If anyone has a game on this campaign I'd be happy to discuss the details of a variant here of elsewhere. I dont have any readily available & it will take some time for me to adapt what I do have to test this scenario.

I do have some very brief out lines of a few earlier 'chapters', & another for a Scadinavian campaign assuming the Allies hold Norway. Cant promise I'll be able to pursue any of those, but hope to.

Certainly will participate in any further discussion here or questions.

..and my profuse thanks to the support for this effort. I've been suprised at the interest. Thanks again.
 
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I am going to shelve this for a while. The research has always been demanding, but Im also nearing the point where major departures will occur from the historical trend. Those can go in several directions and I'm unwilling at this point to make arbitrary or whimsical decisions on what direction to take. Have come too close to that on these pages. I do hope to game this out. If anyone has a game on this campaign I'd be happy to discuss the details of a variant here of elsewhere. I dont have any readily available & it will take some time for me to adapt what I do have to test this scenario.

I do have some very brief out lines of a few earlier 'chapters', & another for a Scadinavian campaign assuming the Allies hold Norway. Cant promise I'll be able to pursue any of those, but hope to.

Certainly will participate in any further discussion here or questions.

..and my profuse thanks to the support for this effort. I've been suprised at the interest. Thanks again.

a fine job, I will be looking forward to more when you are ready
 
I am going to shelve this for a while. The research has always been demanding, but Im also nearing the point where major departures will occur from the historical trend. Those can go in several directions and I'm unwilling at this point to make arbitrary or whimsical decisions on what direction to take. Have come too close to that on these pages. I do hope to game this out. If anyone has a game on this campaign I'd be happy to discuss the details of a variant here of elsewhere. I dont have any readily available & it will take some time for me to adapt what I do have to test this scenario.

I do have some very brief out lines of a few earlier 'chapters', & another for a Scadinavian campaign assuming the Allies hold Norway. Cant promise I'll be able to pursue any of those, but hope to.

Certainly will participate in any further discussion here or questions.

..and my profuse thanks to the support for this effort. I've been suprised at the interest. Thanks again.

I'm sorry hear that - this has certainly been an interesting TL, even with its purely military focus. I'll certainly be looking forward to when you (hopefully!) resume this!

By the way - I've noticed quite a few parts where sentences just stop in the middle, as well as some other grammatical points that stick out. Would you like a proofreader in the future?
 
I'm sorry hear that - this has certainly been an interesting TL, even with its purely military focus. I'll certainly be looking forward to when you (hopefully!) resume this!

By the way - I've noticed quite a few parts where sentences just stop in the middle, as well as some other grammatical points that stick out. Would you like a proofreader in the future?

Thanks for the offer. When I can I write long posts on a doc app. Still there are times I don't have time to proof things in any fashion.

I did touch on a few political or social items, but not in depth. It is suposed to be a military history.
 
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