In 1998, Clinton appointed
Richard Clarke—who until then served in a drugs and counter-terrorism division of the CIA—to lead an interagency comprehensive counter-terrorism operation, the Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG). The goal of the CSG was to "detect, deter, and defend against" terrorist attacks. Additionally, Clinton appointed Clarke to sit on the cabinet-level Principals Committee when it met on terrorism issues.
[31]
Clinton’s Counter-terrorism Center began drafting a plan to ambush bin Laden’s compound in
Kandahar. The CIA mapped the compound and identified the houses of bin Laden’s wives and the location where he most likely slept. The plan was relatively simple, at least on paper. Tribals would “subdue” the guards, enter the compound, take bin Laden to a desert outside Kandahar, and hand him over to another group of tribals. This second group would carry him to a desert landing strip—which had already been tested—where a CIA plane would take him to New York for arraignment. When they completed a draft plan, they ran through two rehearsals in the United States.
[39] Confident that the plan would work, the Counter-terrorism Center of the CIA sought the approval of the White House. While they acknowledged that the plan was risky, they stated that there was “a risk in not acting” because “sooner or later, bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD.”
[40]
Clarke reviewed the plans for
Sandy Berger, the National Security Director, and told him that it was in the “very early stages of development” and stressed the importance of only targeting bin Laden, not the entire compound. The NSC told the CIA to begin preparing the necessary legal documents to execute the raid.
[41]
The senior management of the CIA was skeptical of the plan, and despite objections, canceled the operation, fearing that the risk to their operatives and financial costs were too high. It is unclear whether or not Clinton was aware of the plan.
