Chances of a negotiated peace between the WAllies and Germany if the Soviets quit the war

[Onkel Willie]

Let's posit a scenario like the one in this TL I wrote two years ago. The TL;DR version is that Case Blue is highly successful because Hitler doesn't divert the Fourth Panzer Army to the Don Crossing, which results in the fall of Stalingrad in summer 1942. Stalin subsequently wastes men and materiel in useless offensives to retake the city bearing his name and quits the war in March 1943 IIRC. The TL continues with the Western Allies (Britain and the US) continuing the war and choosing a peripheral strategy and, starting in the summer of 1945 nuking German cities and Stalin eventually rejoining the war. This results in VE Day in 1946 after a much more difficult European War.

The Allies would know in advance how hard and bloody a war without the Soviets in the war would be as dozens of divisions would be freed up for other fronts while a lot of the Luftwaffe would be freed up to deal with the bombing campaign against German cities. There will be voices in favour of ending the war because it'll be too damn bloody. The question of this thread: how likely is it that the British and US agreed to some kind of negotiated peace if the Soviets quit the war in late 1942/early '43?

 

[The Byronic Hero]

FDR knew the threat Germany under Hitler posed to the world and after Pearl Harbor, Americans were all in. If the Soviets surrender in late '42/early '43, the Germans are still going to have running ulcers all throughout the East and are still spending needed resources on the Final Solution. (Soviet surrender will also be used to further paint Communism in a negative light). Allied forces may be bloodied, but the sheer resources of the Allies will still wreak a heavy price on the Nazis and the A-Bomb is not that far off.

 

[sloreck]

The only way the Western Allies negotiate an end to the war leaving Nazi Germany and most if not all of their conquests intact is if they are so exhausted they cannot continue. By October 1943 the Germans are out of North Africa, Sicily, and the Allies are somewhere north of Naples in Italy. The Germans will need to have a large force in the conquered areas of Russia to deal with partisans and beginning to enforce their rule and extract materials and food. Additionally the Germans will have to keep forces to defend along the armistice line - expecting a potential resumption by Stalin. Because of this while forces can be redirected against the west, it will take some time to redeploy these forces. So what now.
1. I expect Italy will, as OTL be a stalemate somewhere north of Naples and south of Rome - neither side will be able to push the other very far.
2. The Allies will take Corsica and Sardinia, relatively lightly defended, more or less for the Germans to reinforce, and the Italians have already surrendered so no help there. These are useful springboards against Northern Italy and Southern France as well as air attacks.
3. Crete and the Aegean Islands, especially those held by Italy alone will pass to Allied hands.
All of the above would happen shortly after the Soviets throwing in the sponge and before the Germans could really reposition a lot of the Eastern forces.

So as 1944 dawns the Allies have half of Italy, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, and some Aegean Islands. Such islands as they may not occupy, including possibly Crete, are cut off and cannot be reinforced or even significantly supplied and they can get the die on the vine treatment many Japanese held islands got. The Germans are very busy in occupied Russia trying to put down partisan bands, rounding up and killing Jews and other undesirables, trying to rebuild (to European gauge) the Russian RR system, repair the oil fields, and dealing with setting up border defenses across the "DMZ". All of this requires personnel of all sorts as well as both military and civilian equipment and material. Rails, rolling stock, refinery equipment, etc are needed to get any use out of the Russian territory they now own. At this point in time the Germans are not going to be getting much manufactured goods out of their conquered territory yet - even if the Soviets return some of the factories they have moved to the east. Maybe in 1945 or later.

Most of the Luftwaffe was in the west anyways, and it is questionable how much could be moved west after the fighting ends as there will be needs there for anti-partisan use and potential defense.

I agree that it will probably take nukes to end the war, taking at least the Southern Pelopenese or even an invasion of Southern France is possible. Assuming that Stalin jumps back in after the first atomic weapon or two are dropped, I doubt he will get in to Germany and it is entirely possible he won't get further than the pre-1939 Polish border.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The Allied leaders (and public) generally believed that Germany was incorrigibly militaristic and aggressive, and had to be destroyed as a military power. This was in addition to the crimes of the Nazis.

The Allies had agreed to "negotiated peace" at the end of WW I. Less than twenty years later, Germany was fully rearmed, more dangerous and more destructive than ever. So in WW II, the Allies' motto might have been "Won't get fooled again."

It would of course be more difficult for the US and Britain to defeat Germany without the USSR. But the resources available to the Allies far exceeded what Germany and its allies could muster.

As to competence - I would note that from late 1942 to 1945, US/British/French forces defeated German forces in every campaign, despite the fierceness of German resistance. I will quote a sentence from Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe, regarding the Sicilian campaign: "Panzer and paratroop elements here were among the best we encountered in the war, and each position won was gained only through the complete destruction of the defending elements." Note however that the "defending elements" were completely destroyed, again and again.

Is there any doubt that on any fighting front, the US/UK would have complete air superiority? That they would have massively superior artillery firepower? That they could field more troops than Germany? The fighting would be hard - very hard - but the result would be inevitable.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Is there any doubt that on any fighting front, the US/UK would have complete air superiority? ...

Something the Tiger tanks worshiping crowd has long seemed oblivious to.

 

[elkarlo]

Something the Tiger tanks worshiping crowd has long seemed oblivious to.

Without the Russian front and no Stalingrad airlift, you have hundreds or thousands of active pilots . Plus production can be shifted to more aircraft, training aka no more instructors flying combat missions.
The Wallies may well win, but I think a D day landing is much harder and less likely to break out.

 

[M79]

It means the Germans can pull the vast bulk of their armed forces back into Western Europe and make it *very* tough for Western Allied forces to regain turf. It may be enough to focus on Italy and Dragoon instead of trying Normandy. Gettong German research labs and factories out of bomber range for the moment would not hurt either, and if Stalin saw an opportunity to break a negotiated peace I think he'd do it. That said, the new Iron Curtain becomes either a Vistula-Danube line or whatever the new Soviet border is.

 

[Mr.Wigglemunch]

Well theoretically don't the Allies now have a border with Nazi Germany in the Caucuses/Iran? (Will it also force Turkey to enter the war in 43 or 44?)

 

[pattersonautobody]

I think it waits for nukes. In reality, while the landings in siciliy maY work, the Italian landings almost failed OTL. So, with a much stronger German military, it makes Wallied preparations necessarily much more intense.

So, I think we do wait for overlord--which will work, but the break out won't be easy, due to the difficulty of putting tons of men in makeshift port facilities. It is possible the Wallies will go for a death of 1,000 cuts. Take Corsica, land near Toulon, land near Normandy, land near Greece, land near Narvik...etc. Stretch the Germans thin everywhere and wait for the front to collapse in one of these areas and then break out.

Nukes will end the war.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Without the Russian front and no Stalingrad airlift, you have hundreds or thousands of active pilots .

How many??? Historians who have examined the decline of the German air forces come up with a far smaller number. I'd trust Alfred Prices numbers. More to the point is the number of operational aircraft that were sustained. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' identifies a biannual average of a little over 5,000 front line combat air from from latter 1942 thru mid 1944. The low point being 4500 & the high point being 6000. Of that the allocation to the Eastern Front declined from around 3200 in 1942 to 2500 - 2800 thru 1943 & much of 1944. The balance were distributed from Scandinavia (approx 300) to Germany & the west (800+) to the Mediterranean and Balkans (1300+). There were shifts or fluctuations between fronts. Three times from November 1942 to September 1943 the German air force in the Mediterranean was rebuilt with a surge of replacements from Germany & western Europe In late 1944 over 600 fighters were transferred enmass from the east to Germany to deal with the growing Allied bomber offensive. The point here is there was not massive pool of aircraft in the east to fly west to deal with the RAF or AAF. This problem for the Luftwaffe is aggravated in that their losses in the west were roughly double that in the east. That is in 1943 68% of the German aircraft losses (from German records) were in the west, principally in the MTO. In other words shifting air forces west will in the long run accelerate the German front line losses. Another way to compare is in overall front line operating strength. While the German strength held more or less steady 1942-44 the West Allied air strength nearly tripled. At the end of 1943 the combined MTO & UK strength was far over 10,000 aircraft, with substantial reserves. By mid 1944 there were some 12000 operational aircraft in the UK and over 6,000 in the Mediterranean theatre. Despite some spectacular tactical successes the Luftwaffe was simply shot out of the sky at the operational and strategic level. Germany produced over 80,000 aircraft in 1944, mostly fighter planes, and could not compete in the air.

Plus production can be shifted to more aircraft, training aka no more instructors flying combat missions.

Meaningless if true. Even in 1942 the quality of training was declining for the Germans. Allied pilots were leaving the schools with 20% to 30% more flight hours than the German counterpart. by early 1944 the official ciriculum for the German trainee included 170 flight hours. The US pilot received 300 hours, and the RAF was at 340 hours. The reality was fuel restrictions meant the German pilot had fewer than 170 hours.

The Wallies may well win, but I think a D day landing is much harder and less likely to break out.

Harder for the Germans as well. OTL the ratio of killed, maimed, captured was near 2-1 in the Allied favor. As in the air the German ground forces were handicapped by declining training, declining equipment reliability, declining leadership at the top, declining supply service. Their discipline was held together by draconian measures. In the last year of the was the US Army shot exactly one soldier for desertion. The Germans killed over 5000 in a effort to stem desertion and combat avoidance.

 

[sloreck]

The OP said the USSR quits in October, 1943. By that point the Allies are north of Naples in Italy. Also don't forget that the minute Russia is out of the war LL stops, so that not only do the Germans gain materiel etc with one less front the Allies can use the production capacity that went in to LL (a lot) for use either against Germany or Japan (probably both). With no convoys going to Russia, the allied navies have one less burden and more resources to devote to finishing the U-boat threat in the Atlantic as well as more merchant shipping for their own use. The departure of the USSR from the war is not a one sided gain for Germany in terms of materiel, in fact the allies gain more for US/UK use in the west than the Germans gain. Again, they have vast areas of Russia to be policed against partisans, defended against resumption of the war by Stalin/USSR, and restoring Russian infrastructure so "goodies" can be extracted and transported.

You could see a "Free Russian Army" being set up and armed by the allies in northern Iran - a non-communist force btw. No reason they can't make life difficult for the Germans on top of the bombing of Baku by the allies. The allied supply line to Iran/Persia while long, is in much better shape than the German supply line the the Iranian/Persian border with the USSR.

 

[Cryptic]

In the last year of the was the US Army shot exactly one soldier for desertion. The Germans killed over 5000 in a effort to stem desertion and combat avoidance.

Though the Germans mixed desperation with an extreme authoritarian regime that allowed such executions, the fact that the US executed only one deserter had more to do with democratic values than the actual U.S. desertion / combat avoidance rate.

Rather, the execution of the man was in part to serve as a warning to the tens of thousands of US troops (I read one estimate of 20,000 in France alone) who had actually deserted or in the case of a larger number, were avoiding duty by deliberately caught illnesses, feigned illnesses, creatively getting "lost" in a lenient system, or otherwise malingering in rear areas etc.

This does not mean that the US Army was unwilling to fight. US commanders, did however, note a lower per capita efficiency between US "ordinary Joe" conscript units and British equivalents. This led to the adaptation of some aspects of the British regimental system by the US doe to its psychological and social strengths.

 

[Catsmate]

Without the Russian front and no Stalingrad airlift, you have hundreds or thousands of active pilots . Plus production can be shifted to more aircraft, training aka no more instructors flying combat missions.
The Wallies may well win, but I think a D day landing is much harder and less likely to break out.

What the Germans don't have is fuel and materials.

 

[elkarlo]

What the Germans don't have is fuel and materials.

True But no eastern front means a massive amount isn't being used there. Massive fuel savings as well as material not being work out and destroyed

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Though the Germans mixed desperation with an extreme authoritarian regime that allowed such executions, the fact that the US executed only one deserter had more to do with democratic values than the actual U.S. desertion / combat avoidance rate.

Rather, the execution of the man was in part to serve as a warning to the tens of thousands of US troops (I read one estimate of 20,000 in France alone) who had actually deserted or in the case of a larger number, were avoiding duty by deliberately caught illnesses, feigned illnesses, creatively getting "lost" in a lenient system, or otherwise malingering in rear areas etc.

What you need to look are the estimates for combat avoidance and desertion within the German armies in 1944, and at the surrender numbers outside the large pockets, like Falaise, or Mons. I don't have any data at hand here, but willingness of the German soldiers in the east to make unauthorized retreats to avoid capture, or surrendering in the west was a problem in 1944. It got worse in both cases in early 1945. From at least mid 1943 most thinking Germans understood the war was lost. that was filtering forward to the soldiers, who were increasingly less inclined to act aggressively for the fatherland. The difference between the first rate formations, and the second or third tier was becoming marked.

 

[elkarlo]

How many??? Historians who have examined the decline of the German air forces come up with a far smaller number. I'd trust Alfred Prices numbers. More to the point is the number of operational aircraft that were sustained. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' identifies a biannual average of a little over 5,000 front line combat air from from latter 1942 thru mid 1944. The low point being 4500 & the high point being 6000. Of that the allocation to the Eastern Front declined from around 3200 in 1942 to 2500 - 2800 thru 1943 & much of 1944. The balance were distributed from Scandinavia (approx 300) to Germany & the west (800+) to the Mediterranean and Balkans (1300+). There were shifts or fluctuations between fronts. Three times from November 1942 to September 1943 the German air force in the Mediterranean was rebuilt with a surge of replacements from Germany & western Europe In late 1944 over 600 fighters were transferred enmass from the east to Germany to deal with the growing Allied bomber offensive. The point here is there was not massive pool of aircraft in the east to fly west to deal with the RAF or AAF. This problem for the Luftwaffe is aggravated in that their losses in the west were roughly double that in the east. That is in 1943 68% of the German aircraft losses (from German records) were in the west, principally in the MTO. In other words shifting air forces west will in the long run accelerate the German front line losses. Another way to compare is in overall front line operating strength. While the German strength held more or less steady 1942-44 the West Allied air strength nearly tripled. At the end of 1943 the combined MTO & UK strength was far over 10,000 aircraft, with substantial reserves. By mid 1944 there were some 12000 operational aircraft in the UK and over 6,000 in the Mediterranean theatre. Despite some spectacular tactical successes the Luftwaffe was simply shot out of the sky at the operational and strategic level. Germany produced over 80,000 aircraft in 1944, mostly fighter planes, and could not compete in the air.



Meaningless if true. Even in 1942 the quality of training was declining for the Germans. Allied pilots were leaving the schools with 20% to 30% more flight hours than the German counterpart. by early 1944 the official ciriculum for the German trainee included 170 flight hours. The US pilot received 300 hours, and the RAF was at 340 hours. The reality was fuel restrictions meant the German pilot had fewer than 170 hours.



Harder for the Germans as well. OTL the ratio of killed, maimed, captured was near 2-1 in the Allied favor. As in the air the German ground forces were handicapped by declining training, declining equipment reliability, declining leadership at the top, declining supply service. Their discipline was held together by draconian measures. In the last year of the was the US Army shot exactly one soldier for desertion. The Germans killed over 5000 in a effort to stem desertion and combat avoidance.

I think you're painting this situation as though the Germans are still fighting the Soviets.
Less fuel consumed on a massive front would allow for better pilot training. Less pilots flying combat shorties in the East would reduce attrition , even if it reduces it 30~% that is still a lot more left alive and able to softie against the Wallies.
As for morale , as was said it wasn't as high as reported. Plus the US was winning most the time and fighting reformed and third rate divisions for the most part. Against non attritied units the US wouldn't do as well, especially without overwhelming air superiority. That's and solider amount and quality allowed D day to be successful .
If the Germans can send reinforcements to Normandy, and not allow their troops to be bombed mercilessly, I don't see a breakout happening.

 

[Bernard Woolley]

Now if only someone, like say @CalBear, had written a really long, detailed TL examining what might happen in this scenario.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

True But no eastern front means a massive amount isn't being used there. Massive fuel savings as well as material not being work out and destroyed

I doubt massive. For the aircraft side the sortie rate was higher in the west, as the tempo of air operations higher. The Allied availability rate, & gross numbers, forced the German AF into a higher level of activity. Each aircraft transferred west is liable to burn more fuel each week of its operating life. What might decline slightly is the rate of non combat losses. Better weather, airfields, and communications would reduce the mechanical and accident losses some from in the east.

A large variable in the overall question is the degree of defeat of the Red Army. There is a huge difference if 'peace' leaves a requirement for 80 static and field infantry & 25 mechanized divisions in the east to deter the residual Red Army, or under fifty of each.

Other variables are:

Number of high quality German soldiers returned to industrial & agricultural production. For any real benefit of winning in the east all those surviving engineers, technicians, farm managers, ect... need to be shifted to keeping German industry going, and exploiting the conquests. Otherwise we see the same problems of OTL continue.

*US and Britain developing their ground and air forces to deal with a longer war. On the US side the development of new ground combat forces ceased in mid 1943. The number chosen proved fairly accurate for needs. Absent the Red Army a larger US supported force would be aimed for. Both the US and Britain would be taking a harder look at the requirements in support terms for a longer war. One of the reasons for the infantry replacement shortage 1944-45 was the assumption the war would end in 1946 and the present allocation good enough. The prospect of ending the war in 1948 would cause both Chiefs of Staff to rethink long term reorganization and goals for sustaining the field armies.

*The US is not going to start rolling back industrial mobilization in middle 1944. As with ground and air forces a end date of 1946 is a non starter. New weapons like the 90mm tank gun, jet engined aircraft, the JB-2 Loon, tactical air control radar, tank chassis would have a higher priority as they would clearly have a use in campaigns extending into 1947-48.

Altered tactics. Both the US and Commonwealth armies grew enormously. on June 5th 1944 only eight US Army divisions had combat experience against the Germans, & three of those was negligible-a few weeks in Africa & Italy. Six months later the number with 30 days or more had quadrupled. A longer land campaign means a lower portion of 'green' units over time, and more effective army at killing the enemy. After thirty days combat in Normandy the US Army had

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I think you're painting this situation as though the Germans are still fighting the Soviets...

No, I'm looking at it as the fight is solely against the Allies. The fact is they were more efficient at destroying German combat power than the Soviet military 1943-45. This is obscured by the nature of the campaigns in the Mediterranean, and that the US Army ground forces were nearly non participants until 1944. Once the US Army (and Comonwealth) got some real combat experience under its belt in 1944 the flaws in the German ground forces were exploited in a way the Red Army could not. Beyond that, the savings in the east are easy to over estimate, as well as the other benefits in the near term of 1-3 years. A close look at what the Axis gained or failed to gain from the conquest of France and the low countries is instructive. A state of the art industrial plant and transportation system, along with a neutral conduit to outside Europe provided surprising little for the Axis. Why that occurred is instructive.

 

[Captain Homicide]

Now if only someone, like say @CalBear, had written a really long, detailed TL examining what might happen in this scenario.

Though the war only ended (until the Reich attacked the WAllies in 1954) because the Reich offered to end their air campaign against Britain and release all their POWs in 1947.