Challenging a common assumption of the "no great war ca. 1914" school of thought

It seems to me that (nearly) everyone assumes that had war not broken out in late July/early August 1914, given the regicides (to use the term loosely) in Sarajevo, it was merely a postponement; that is, sooner or later it was inevitable given the state of interlocking alliances and arms races. I'm asking this: who says that particular state of affairs continues forward much beyond 1914?

Consider: Charles, Franz Josef's successor in Vienna, was a far more modern and compassionate type than his predecessor. While there doesn't seem to be a great deal of documented evidence one way or the other, I suggest that his application of his faith (in OTL) would have led him to liberalize the Habsburg dominions significantly in an alternate timeline in which war didn't occur after the regicides in Sarajevo. A liberalization would probably have done much to defuse tensions in the Balkans, especially if the south Slavs were granted significant measures of autonomy. I realize that might get the Hungarian nobles rather incensed but a liberalization that benefitted the average types might well also squelch any attempts at counterrevolution through sheer numbers.

Consider: Nicholas II had his son with him at Stavka through much of the conflict, where he was under more-or-less constant supervision and protection. In the absence of a conflict, that doesn't happen and he's able to roam the various palace rooms and grounds largely freely. An otherwise-unremarkable household accident could quickly turn fatal (e.g., a seemingly innocuous head bump leads to a massive, rapidly increasing hematoma, resulting in death). If the Tsarevitch dies, Rasputin is discredited, as is the incumbent branch of the Romanovs. Kerensky and friends/allies would likely force the issue of Nicholas' abdication in favor of perhaps his brother Michael or his uncle the Grand Duke Nicholas. Now, you have a sea change in St. Petersburg, wherein focus on internal reforms rather than an arms race becomes primary.

Consider: residents of the Reich look across the border in 1916 and thereafter, seeing the increasing freedoms in Austria-Hungary and ask, quite naturally, "why not us?" That sentiment sweeps the German Empire until it's evident to even the most rigid reactionary that it's a case of give in or go home, as it were: the alternative to liberalization would be a sweeping revolution. Now you have the stage set (after some epic royal histrionics, of course) for a far more liberal Germany--focused, like (oh, the irony!) Russia on internal reforms rather than an arms race.

OK, these are just rough ideas, but I suggest that a sort of inverse domino effect might just head off European conflicts for a generation or so--say, until the 1930s or thereafter. Have at it.
 
I think the massive, quick, and widespread liberalization in the three empires is a bit optimistic, and depends on everything going right and the wave of nationalism stopping and the Balkans no longer being an utter mess with a decaying ottoman empire with a hungry Russian one looking to expand t[and the Austrians looking to prevent that at all costs. You also forget that the two power blocs, the entente and and central powers had also been antagonizing each other for years preceding the first world war, along with there being o major war between the major powers in decades, at that point in time war was seen as a glamorous and desirable thing. While war in 1914 might not have been inevitable, the outbreak of war had been built up to for decades by nations eager for it, so it is safe to assume war would have come eventually.
 
I agree with you. If the Balkans issue is somehow avoided, there would be no cause left for WWI. Basically the Balkan inception scenario, as Chris Clark aptly named is the only one that has all the ingredients for general war.

But, I think that to change that PoD before 1914 is necessary. Entire assassination plot must be avoided. That in turn requires as a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient factor to butterfly away the Black Hand. How do you that?

My soultion, though by no means sure fire is to have Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis die. The earlier, the better. He almost bled to death on the flooe of Royal Palace in Belgrade in 1903. So that is the possible spot to start from. Also, the Russian Ambassador Hartwig should be changed for someone more moderate and less Pan-Slavic.
 
Likely no war breaks out because the balance of power changes due to Russia getting stronger and Germany thinks its no longer in her best interests to provoke a war. (i.e. if a Sarajevo like incident took place later, there would be a European conference to address the issues)

In reverse I don't see any power picking a fight with Germany due to her warlike reputation and actual substantial military power.

If Europe can get to 1916 without war its likely over the hump.

Also if the Germans and British can actually agree to a split in the Portuguese colonies (close OTL) this will keep the Germans busy with "their place in the sun" for a long long time, dealing with the expense of incorporating all that.
 
Assuming war must happen, do you think it could be delayed enough for technology to be developed to counteract trench warfare?
 
Consider: Charles, Franz Josef's successor in Vienna, was a far more modern and compassionate type than his predecessor. While there doesn't seem to be a great deal of documented evidence one way or the other, I suggest that his application of his faith (in OTL) would have led him to liberalize the Habsburg dominions significantly in an alternate timeline in which war didn't occur after the regicides in Sarajevo. A liberalization would probably have done much to defuse tensions in the Balkans, especially if the south Slavs were granted significant measures of autonomy. I realize that might get the Hungarian nobles rather incensed but a liberalization that benefitted the average types might well also squelch any attempts at counterrevolution through sheer numbers.

Charles had one or two good ideas, but not the skill or willpower to execute them, let alone really fix his Empire. He was far more traditionalist then he's sometimes considered, and like his uncle he tended to blame everything on Hungarian aristocrats; when the fault for the state's problems (especially the biggest flashpoints such as Bosnia) lay much deeper, in the Empire's regime and administration as a whole.

Also, he gets his chance to shine (or not) only after Franz Joseph dies, which will be in 1916 and maybe even later.
Consider: residents of the Reich look across the border in 1916 and thereafter, seeing the increasing freedoms in Austria-Hungary and ask, quite naturally, "why not us?" That sentiment sweeps the German Empire until it's evident to even the most rigid reactionary that it's a case of give in or go home, as it were: the alternative to liberalization would be a sweeping revolution. Now you have the stage set (after some epic royal histrionics, of course) for a far more liberal Germany--focused, like (oh, the irony!) Russia on internal reforms rather than an arms race.

IIRC Germany was considerably more democratic than Austria-Hungary in 1914. And it would likely stay that way for years, unless the Habsburgs are blessed with some supernatural levels of wisdom, competence and sheer luck.
 
I thought Wilhelm II had spent the last twenty years going out of his way to try a pick a fight with the Entente. If it wasn't Serbia, maybe a conflict over subsaharan Africa would be the powder keg.
 
Charles had one or two good ideas, but not the skill or willpower to execute them, let alone really fix his Empire. He was far more traditionalist then he's sometimes considered, and like his uncle he tended to blame everything on Hungarian aristocrats; when the fault for the state's problems (especially the biggest flashpoints such as Bosnia) lay much deeper, in the Empire's regime and administration as a whole.

Also, he gets his chance to shine (or not) only after Franz Joseph dies, which will be in 1916 and maybe even later.


IIRC Germany was considerably more democratic than Austria-Hungary in 1914. And it would likely stay that way for years, unless the Habsburgs are blessed with some supernatural levels of wisdom, competence and sheer luck.

OK I have to disagree with you. For one, Emperor Karl had neither the time nor resources to begin a proper and full scale reform when he came to the throne. Coming to power in the middle of a war is completely different than coming to the throne during peace. Second, by 1906 the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary had universal suffrage and had already done away with censorship. Yes direct attacks on the Imperial House were censored but not much else. So at least part of the Duel Monarchy was fairly democratic.

Third, the Hungarian nobles WERE a huge problem for reform. The only way the empire could have survived was via federal reforms. However, the Hungarians were a millstone around the Emperor's neck. Their dominance needed to be smashed and Hungary's "special" status destroyed in order to allow the Empire to survive.

Fourth, remember that Franz Joseph was 86 when he passed. Realistically he could like to maybe 1918, but not much farther.
 
OK I have to disagree with you. For one, Emperor Karl had neither the time nor resources to begin a proper and full scale reform when he came to the throne. Coming to power in the middle of a war is completely different than coming to the throne during peace.

I'm basing that judgement on Karl mostly on what is known about his pre-war and pre-reign views and characteristics. Karl's plans for reform in the monarchy were very mild and outdated, and apparently didn't include federalization. He had very little patience and skill for details in general; his ideas for the South Slavs were benevolent in theory but very vague and poorly defined; his ideas for the Czechs were openly rejecting most of their desires and demands.
He did very little research on the problems of nationalities to begin with, and his fear of socialists, alleged masons and Jews led him to ignore several advisors who could have otherwise been quite helpful.

You are free to disagree with my opinion on Karl, but I feel at least one very good source (recommending Christopher Brennan - The domestic policies of Emperor Karl I) supports it.
Second, by 1906 the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary had universal suffrage and had already done away with censorship. Yes direct attacks on the Imperial House were censored but not much else. So at least part of the Duel Monarchy was fairly democratic.

True - but as you noted, only part.
Third, the Hungarian nobles WERE a huge problem for reform. The only way the empire could have survived was via federal reforms. However, the Hungarians were a millstone around the Emperor's neck. Their dominance needed to be smashed and Hungary's "special" status destroyed in order to allow the Empire to survive.

The Hungarian aristocracy presents a considerable problem but they are not the cause of all troubles in the Habsburg Empire. The Hungarians had no real blame in the Czech demands for autonomy and Polish-Ukrainian antagonism, and are only distantly related to the mess in Bosnia. (in fact, had Vienna listened to the Hungarian nobles in the 1860s it would have avoided at least that major headache)
Fourth, remember that Franz Joseph was 86 when he passed. Realistically he could like to maybe 1918, but not much farther.

3-4 dangerous and turbulent years before the reforms can even be attempted (and still more time until they - maybe - succeed and restore the Habsburg monarchy's internal stability) - I don't think that's such a short time.
 
What do you do about the Austrians? They'd pushed the Serbs hard, & when the Serbs gave them virtually everything they wanted, the Austrians said, "This means war!":confused::rolleyes:

I'm not seeing how you avoid that, even absent a shooting or two.
 
What do you do about the Austrians? They'd pushed the Serbs hard, & when the Serbs gave them virtually everything they wanted, the Austrians said, "This means war!":confused::rolleyes:

The Serbians should have been compelled by the British and Germans to hand over to the Austrians Apis and the men mentioned in point 7 of the note for trial. That would implicate Belgrade and leave France and Britain clear to abandon Serbia and warn Russia.
 
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