Challenge: Succesful Operation Barbarossa

What steps could Germany feasibly take to obliterate/defeat/overpower or force a favourable peace with the USSR, just in a 1941 Blitzkrieg offensive? Could they possibly reach further, or what imcompetances on Russia's part could result in victory (for example, if they allowed more of there men to be captured killed). Extra points for explaining how Germany could capture the Caucasus and cut off oil or Moscow (how feasible these are in real life); and also how could this cause a collapse of the USSRs economy. Thanks for your time.
 
weeell, this has been thoroughly discussed here on numerous occasions, but being as you're new I'll give you a break. In short, the Germans got ridiculously lucky OTL to get as far as they did, for them to be more fortunate is borderline ASB. the longer version is that there is very little the germans can do without drastically changing the political situation surrounding the war(i.e. not have the nazi's be even more barbarious than Stalin's goons), and really without someone as batshit insane and evil as hitler running the show it's doubtful that there would ever be a barbarossa. If stalin foolishly decided to purge even more people leading up to the war, then perhaps things could go better for the germans, but that is far from a guarantee of victory. The Russians had too much territory, too many people, too many resources, and too many allies. You need the allies to act even more stupidly than they did OTL, which is a tall order.
 
While agreeing with DRTG that the Germans were lucky that Stalin and his generals were incompetent, there do seem to be logical steps that Germany might have taken which would make Barbarossa more likely to succeed or at least inflict extra damage on the USSR. It seems most logical to start after the French campaign to include German preparations for and planning of Barbarossa.

Political options:
Germany might have tried to appear as liberator of either the various nationalities of the USSR or of the Russian people or it could have tried, with difficulty, to play both roles. It could also have treated prisoners much better. It is not obvious that any of this would have changed the course of the 1941 campaign. Initially most Ukrainians seemed to have believed that a German occupation would be relatively civilized. Thus little will change before September 1941. It should be possible to reduce the impact of partizan warfare and, perhaps, resume useful economic activity in the Ukraine by the end of 1941. Possibly many of the 4-6 million prisoners taken in 1941 would have agreed to work in Germany had they survived (especially if they believed that they would be punished if Stalin won). The real benefit of coming as liberators might be expected to be seen if and when Moscow falls and individuals and units have to decide whether to surrender or retreat towards Siberia. One rarely explored possibility is that neutral, including American, journalists could have been encouraged to follow behind the German Army and investigate the nature of Stalinism. It is possible that this might give a boost to American Anti-Communism and Isolationism.
The problem with such an approach, apart from its conflict with Hitler's hatred and Goring's rapacity, is that it would involve moving food from Germany into the conquered territories. Food existed but there was only about a year's reserve against German starvation (many ways of improving Barbarossa's chances in 1941-2 risk disaster for 1943-4). Transport was a very serious problem (see below). The Soviet collective farms were designed to take food from the farmers to the cities. Thus de-collectivization risked making it harder for the German Army to seize food.

Strengthening German and Allied Forces for Barbarossa:
Rust[FONT=Times New Roman, serif]ü[/FONT]ngsprogramm B (described in Tooze, “The Wages of Destruction”, ch. 13) was a plan to produce the arms and ammunition necessary for Barbarossa. It was not an attempt to mobilize the entire German Economy for war with the USSR because that was considered unnecessary. As an alternative to Overy's earlier ideas that the German Economy was inefficient, Tooze argues that Germany was preparing for a grand 1944 confrontation with the Anglo-American powers. However, some of the preparations seem unnecessary once it has been decided to attack the USSR. For example, if Soviet oil field are going to be captured by the end of 1942, it is illogical to build synthetic fuel plants to come on stream after early 1943. In any case, it is clearly possible to have more weapons in 1941 if you are willing to have fewer in 1943-4. and doubling tank production for 1941 is possible. To skip ahead, it can be argued that Barbarossa failed partly because the German Army ran out of infantry (although it also ran short of tanks and most other essentials). Rumanian, Italian and Hungarian forces were substituted in 1942 but were much less effective partly because their equipment was poor. However, if German anti-tank gun production can be dramatically raised and guns supplied to their allies, these forces will perform better and can be used earlier.
German forces can also be qualitatively strengthened if the lessons of the French Campaign are learnt and if better intelligence is available on Soviet forces. Most obviously, German tanks and anti-tank guns had found the French S-35 and Char B tanks, with 60 mm armour, hard targets and the British Matildas, with 78mm, still worse. It should have been obvious that German tanks needed to be able to penetrate such targets, especially after Guderian reported that Soviet visitors examining the PzKW IV had refused to believe that it was the heaviest German tank, implying that they had heavier tanks. Thus the development of a PzKW IV with a long 75 mm gun should have started long before September 1941 and the PzKW III should also have been fitted with the L60 50 mm rather than the L42. Powerful anti-tank guns could also have been mounted on PzKW II and ex-Czech tank chassis as was done later in response to encounters with T-34s and KV-1s.
If Germany starts planning for Barbarossa in July 1940 and realises that Sealion is impossible, the Luftwaffe can be much stronger if it does not fight the Battle of Britain (the RAF might also have more pilots but would not send many to Russia). Another benefit is that the American public's support for Britain would likely be weaker. Not collecting and modifying barges for an invasion should improve coke transport and boost steel production as well as increasing warship production.

Timing and a diversion to the South:
Barbarossa was planned to start on 22nd June 1941 rather than in May to allow for the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece followed by the return and refitting of the German units involved. However, the full extra six weeks of summer would not in fact have been available because heavy rain and flooding in May 1941 would have forced a postponement. The ground had dried by 1st June, so Germany could have actually gained three weeks. These are still three very valuable weeks because the Germans encountered two serious problems in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow in November 1941, the rasputitsa (autumn rains turning roads into quagmires) and whole Russian tank units equipped with T-34s. Even the arrival of forces from the Far East may not occur three weeks earlier as that depended partly on Japanese decisions.
The problem of Yugoslavia and Greece developed because of the Italian invasion of Greece and of the series of Italian defeats in Greece, Egypt and Taranto. It seems clear that the dispatch of German forces could have prevented all those problems and captured Egypt by December 1940. However, the problem is that Mussolini did not want German forces! The Germans offered forces in 1940, Mussolini refused and asked for German equipment which Hitler was unwilling to send. Mussolini also felt excluded from relations with Romania, his only source of oil, and may have invaded Greece in reaction. To illustrate further the potential for improvement, we note that there were more Italian ground forces used against Greece than against Egypt and more Italian aircraft were sent to Belgium to take part in the Battle of Britain than sent to Libya/Egypt.
Probably arrogance and stupidity will lead to Axis failure to cooperate but if some deal can be done between Hitler and Mussolini, with Italy receiving weapons and promises of territories in a peace settlement, being invited to send an army to help defend Romania but otherwise agreeing to focus on capturing Egypt and with some German forces (Pz and LW) sent to operate under Italian command, perhaps Egypt can be captured (there were only 30,000 British troops there even by December and the only modern fighter was one Hurricane until September). The logistics of attacking Egypt in 1941-2 were horrible with approximately a quarter of the German Army's trucks (all theatres) bringing supplies from Tripoli to the front. They would have been slightly better in 1940 because the forces were smaller and ports such as Tobruk were undamaged. However, once Egypt falls, ships can bring supplies direct to Egypt (or Syria) and the British position in the Middle East probably collapses.
If the Axis can gain control of Iraq by passing through Syria to support the Iraqi forces, they may significantly improve their oil supply. Iraq produced about 4 million tons of oil p/a and, with local help, everything may be captured intact. Iran produced over 10 million tons p/a. Thus together they roughly double the Axis supply although the pipelines through Syria and the railway through Turkey will not be able to get most of it to where it is needed. Soviet oil production in the Caucasus was significantly higher, 26 million tons or 90% of the Soviet total, but if Iran does decide to throw in with the Axis, this becomes very vulnerable to Luftwaffe attack. Axis success in the Middle East might also alter Turkish politics leading to Turkey considering joining Barbarossa. Thus rather than Soviet forces entering Northern Iran in August 1941 and establishing a route for future Lend-Lease after which many could be redeployed to fight the German advance, the Caucasus must, at best, be reinforced; at worse, Soviet tanks will be short of fuel and lubricants for the decisive battles.

Operations and Logistics:
I am going out on a limb by guessing that Barbarossa failed to take Moscow because it was not possible to get sufficient supplies and equipment to the front. There are more respectable alternative views, for example, that the continuous creation of new Soviet units and the arrival of forces from Asia wore down German units until they were defeated. However, German casualties will have increased when there were insufficient tanks, because new engines had not been sent forward, and insufficient shells for the artillery. My feeling is that a mobile, well supplied German force in 1941 will generally defeat its opponents. Of course, the rasputitsa affected both mobility and supply. Another view is that Germany could have taken Moscow by Army Group Centre advancing during August-September rather than being diverted to attack Kiev and Leningrad. The problem with that popular idea is that the supplies may not have arrived in sufficient quantities in August for a general offensive and that the Soviet forces weakened themselves severely by futile offensives during September. Thus Typhoon was better supplied and against weaker opponents than the suggested equivalent advance six weeks earlier. Typhoon was also launched on a wider front because Guderian started from further South and benefited from having few initial threats to its flanks.
Thus on my view, the main miscalculation slowing Barbarossa was the belief that Soviet rolling stock would be captured. In fact it was not and the rate of advance was controlled by the rate of conversion of railways to the German gauge. A much larger railway conversion and repair organisation might have helped. More and better trucks would also have helped (although note that more trucks in 1941 would leave reduced fuel reserves for 1942 and later). The German conclusion was that half-tracks were needed (reflected in later German production). These might have helped in the mud but are slightly double edged as they would have quickly wrecked the Russian roads and used more fuel.
Of course, even if the German offensive is much more successful, there is still the question of whether Soviet resistance would have collapsed after the capture of Moscow, which returns us to the political approach discussed initially. Even if Soviet armies continue to resist effectively, it is possible that an externally perceived collapse would have induced Japan and perhaps Turkey to have made their own grab for Soviet territory. Combined with a German-Finish offensive towards Murmansk, such developments could prevent any Lend-Lease aid reaching Russia. Although many factories were East of the Urals by 1942, it is likely that critical shortages would develop (rubber, lubricants, aviation fuel etc.) to make it difficult for Soviet forces to wage a large scale mechanised war.

Further reading:
Adam Tooze, “The Wages of Destruction”, is the best single account of the German economy. His view that Germany was preparing for two wars depends on accepting the view of Andreas Hillgruber's “Hitlers Strategie” rather than Gerhard Weinberg's “World in the Balance:Behind the Scenes of World War II”. To find what the various powers actually produced, Mark Harrison's “The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison” would also be useful.
There are many good studies of the campaign such as David Glantz's “Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941”.
 
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