Challenge: Greater Serbia

Your challenge, should you choose to accept it, is to keep the 3rd Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from breaking apart or losing any of its territory while also incorporating at least 1/2 of Bosnia and 1/4 of Croatia by the present day with a POD after its foundation. Bonus points if it gains all of Bosnia and also Macedonia.
 
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Between the Serbian Republic of Krajina and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was pretty close. Perhaps if the assaults on Dubrovnik and Split succeed, splitting Croatia in half and seizing another bargaining chip, then we could see the collapse of croatian government, leading to less opposition for the Serbs in Bosnia. Kill of Izetbegovic during the Kidnap crisis and reduce the effectiveness of western intervention (both possible) and you've got a situation where this is quite possible.
 
Maybe in a timeline where the Cold War doesn't end, this means the interventions seen in our timeline aren't able to happen, so the Serbs/Yugoslavs are able to press home their advantages.
 
Perhaps if the assaults on Dubrovnik and Split succeed, splitting Croatia in half and seizing another bargaining chip, then we could see the collapse of croatian government, leading to less opposition for the Serbs in Bosnia.

Dubrovnik is at the edge of Croatia and I don't know if Split was ever attacked - maybe you mean Zadar or Sibenik.

Kill of Izetbegovic during the Kidnap crisis and reduce the effectiveness of western intervention (both possible) and you've got a situation where this is quite possible.
What's the deal with this Izetbegovic kidnapping I keep hearing about?
 

abc123

Banned
Dubrovnik is at the edge of Croatia and I don't know if Split was ever attacked - maybe you mean Zadar or Sibenik.

What's the deal with this Izetbegovic kidnapping I keep hearing about?

True, Zadar is far more important tha Dubrovnik. Šibenik too. Split was too far.
Karlovac was also VERY important.

Well, IIRC, Izetbegović was on some talks with JNA commander in Sarajevo when he was arrested and taken for a hostage for a some time...
 
After 1900?


Suppose there is no balkan wars and a different start to WW1, which doesn´t involve Serbia.

The CP looses WW1, Austria-Hungarya collapses, which causes TTL balkan wars. Bulgaria have tried attacking the Greeks, Romanians and when the entente attempted to establish a foothold in Anatolia, attempted to seize Istanbule in a bloodthirsty campaign but are defeated.

Serbia comes up as the big power in the balkans after WW1.

In the 1930s or 1940s, inspiration comes from other countries to some Serbioan parties that eventually conquers power.
Policies of forced integration are applied to Croates and Bosnians, orthdoxe christianity becomes the official religion, while catholicisme and islam are ruthlessely repressed.
Due to the policies against the catholic church, a war with Italy occures in the early 40s, the Italians looses, badly and are forced to give some territorial concessions.
Albania is annexed, albanians that refuses to become Serbians are basically declared to be turkish and are forced to immigrate to turkey or Italian colonies.
 
Well, IIRC, Izetbegović was on some talks with JNA commander in Sarajevo when he was arrested and taken for a hostage for a some time...

Not quite. Izetbegovic had been out of the country trying to rally western support, and the airport had been captured. He ordered the plane to land after some confusion believing that Bosnian forces had recaptured it, and walked strait into the arms of the JNA.

The rediculous thing is that Sarajevo found out on national television (the phone lines having been cut). A phone rang in the barracks where he was being held, he ordered the guards to let him speak to the government via the Television, and came out with the line

'I'm allright, but I think I've been kidnapped'.

He then organised a trade of his freedom for the release of some JNA soldiers and equipment holed up in Sarajevo, but the convoy was attacked by Bosnians.
 
You'd need different leadership and different politics. I'd say earliest POD you could achieve that is '90 or better magical '87.

But it was damn close all the time. Peace process had started simultaneously with hostilities and there was a conference somewhere in Europe every couple of months, with dozens of different plans. For Bosnia it was all about whether Serbs get 49% or 51% of territory, and ofc exact borders of that fraction. Croatia was much more fluid as RSK positions were much weaker than RS.

There were couple round of talks where it was Bosnians and Croats who refused international peace accord drafts. Regarding Bosnia to be exact. When it came to Croatia they were pushing all or nothing. Best that was on the table was supposed autonomy for RSK within Croatia.

What West sources completely ignore is that after '93 Milosevic was ready to give up and salvage whatever could be, but appointed leaders of RSK and RS were far too headstrong, believing in themselves as great leaders and nation-builders and refusing to sign treaties Milosevic was begging them to agree on.

Getting part of Bosnia could have been done with agreeing on one of earlier peace plans, before Western public became so intoxicated with anti Serb propaganda it would never allow giving parts of Bosnia to Serbia formally. Would help a lop if Russia was stronger than it historically was at the time under Yeltsin.

For Croatia... Looking at how half heatedly YNA offensives in '91 were done one has to assume that Western diplomacy told Milosevic that if he wins too much in Croatia there would be repercussions stronger than sannctions. And the issue that both head of Milosevic's secret police and last chief of staff of YNA were confirmed CIA controlled people. (Kadievic, Stanisic). Without much stronger position on the ground there was little chance you could get formal independence of RSK, let alone right to join
with Serbia.




Its all big clusterfuck the truth about which will never be known. Too many stuff done off the record, too many notes and records falsified and altered for political gain.
 
Sorry to revive and old thread, but I think this topic is pretty interesting.

In my opinion, it would have been fairly difficult but not impossible to actually create a Greater Serbia after 1992. There are a couple of alternatives that could have been pursued.

Firstly and most importantly, is that Milosevic would have had to refuse to withdraw the JNA from Croatia and Bosnia. Remember, that Milosevic withdrew the JNA From Croatia in January 1992 when the EC recognized the country as independent and agreed to have a UN force deployed in the Serbian majority Krajina areas until a political solution was found. For the next 3 years the Krajina Serbs were basically then left to fend for themselves against the Croatian government and we all know that when Croatia began with its Operation Storm in August 1995 to take back the Serb held territory, Milosevic refused to redeploy the Yugoslav Army back in Croatia to hold back the Croat advance. If the JNA had never been withdrawn in 1992 then it would have been much harder for Croatia to take back the Krajina and it would definetly have been a much bloodier and longer war.

The same holds true for Bosnia. Remember that after Bosnia held its referendum on March 3rd (boycotted by Serbs) and Izetbegovic declared independence, to the time the West recognized that independence in April, the JNA was still officially stationed all over Bosnia and Bosnia was still officially a part of rump Yugoslavia (along with Serbia and Montenegro). Under pressure from the international community and the imposition of sanctions, Milosevic eventually did agree to withdraw the JNA in May of 1992. And again, the Bosnian Serbs were pretty much left to fight their own war from then on with Milosevic even abandoning the Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership by mid 1993 after they rejected the Vance Owen Plan.

So basically in my opinion, theo nly way for Greater Serbia to have succeeded in 1992 is if Milosevic kept the Yugoslav Army in Croatia and Bosnia instead of withdrawing it after those republcis were recognized. Eventually the internaitonal community would maybe have accepted the military superiority on the ground and then accepted a withdrawing of republican borders that would allow the Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs to be attached to Serbia.
 
JNA is not the problem but population of SR Serbia itself that flatly refused to participate in such a conflict. When the fightning began JNA draft completely failed in SR Serbia with roughly only 10% of the drafted reporting for duty.


I will write a complete scenario when I get home.
 
As a quick reply to my suggestion earlier about the RSK capturing Split in an offensive, it looks likely that both Split and Zadar could have been captured in a concerted effort (certainly there was a plan to try and get Split, and had that suceeded, Zadar is a logical next step. Combine these with Dubrovnik falling (quite possible) and it seems possible that with most of Dalmatia and a fair bit of the rest of the country lost the RSK could end up at the very least like the modern RS in Bosnia.

Map_of_Republika_Srpska_Krajina.png
 
Dr. Pervez @

this is a list of what the Serb/Yugoslav side should do if it wants to build/conquer Greater Serbia, it is in no particular order


1) JNA battle doctrines need to modernised to match western countries idea of a modern warfare and much of their equipment should be modernised before all hell breaks loose. In order to do that you need to avoid the economic criss of the '80 and such moves should be started before JNA gets and overwhelming majority of Serbs among the officers.

2) The Serb population of Serbia proper and the Serb and Monenegrin population of Montenegro have to be commited and willing to fighting a total war that would be necesary to achieve their goals.

3) The political leadership of Serbia would need to be bat shit insane along the lines of Šešelj and his ilk at the helm.

4) Any operation should avoid Dubrovnik as a plague because once the bombs start falling on the old town the Western media and their various biases will be all over the place.

If those 4 criteria are met Greater Serbia will have a considerable chance of happening though it might backfire even worse than it did in OTL. Also people should understand that Serbs should expect to fight a war with an excess of 500 000 casulties in the heart of Europe to achieve the goals of Greater Serbia.

OTL was as screwed as it was due to arms embargo. If that doesn't happen and everything else stays as OTL the wars in Croatia and BiH would have ended by late 1992, early 1993. Or if the Serbs of Serbia are willing to support their kin it would be a bloody war lasting into the late '90 with a Albanian uprising on Kosovo and a Muslim uprising on Sanjak to escalate things even further.

In the last war the Serbs tried to bite more than they could chew and did not pay as hard for their folly only due to the intervention of the international community. Getting them to achieve their goals would need a PoD in the 19th century or no Tito but then it would probably mean no second Yugoslavia and a western Slovenia, Croatia and parts of BiH and communist eastern parts.
 
As a quick reply to my suggestion earlier about the RSK capturing Split in an offensive, it looks likely that both Split and Zadar could have been captured in a concerted effort (certainly there was a plan to try and get Split, and had that suceeded, Zadar is a logical next step. Combine these with Dubrovnik falling (quite possible) and it seems possible that with most of Dalmatia and a fair bit of the rest of the country lost the RSK could end up at the very least like the modern RS in Bosnia.

If things are as OTL until summer '91 the chance of such a thing happening is beyond miniscule. By November '91 JNA and RSK in Croatia are outnumbered (though they had local numerical superiority around Vukovar and Dubrovnik)and the only thing they have going for them in superior equipment and the momentum that was almost dead. Capturing Split was beyond JNA since summer of 1990, with the armed uprising of Croats in BiH in late summer/early autumn of '91 it was downright improbable. Taking Zadar was still on the cards and offensives were launched by taking of the town remained beyond the capabilities of the unit JNA and RSK had at their disposal and Croatia was sending fresh troops (and increasingly better equiped) to the front each day.

JNA+RSK+Serb militias needed between 60-70K troops to complete the conquest of Vukovar, a town 2/3 of the size of Zadar that was completely surrounded for almost two months and it was only achieved after Croat leadership abandoned the breakthrough towards the town to apease the western diplomats. Zadar had connection with the rest of Croatia, offensive against it happened later in the conflict allowing the defenders to better prepare. So it was speculated JNA+RSK+Serb militias would need around 90-100K of troops to complete the conquest of Zadar, that was just the manpower they did not have.

As I have mentioned earlier JNA draft failed spectaculary(not just in Serbia proper but everwhere) and non Serb soldiers deserted daily, even Serb soldiers diserted in a non-insignificant number. The moral of non-militia units was almost non-existant and there are reports of soldiers and in some ocasions even officers flatly refusing to follow orders to attack/shoot.


The conquest of Dubrovnik in a Vukovar style fashion could have occured since the JNA+RSK+Serb and Montenegrin militias had local numerical superiority and superiority in equipment but in order to completely conquer Dubrovnik the attacker would have to completely demolish the old town. In a case of of a risk of the town falling a plan was made to retreat all the defenders behind the walls of the old town and hold on until help comes or until they are overrun. To break into the old town the attacker would have to demolish large sections of the medieval walls. I just can see the west no reacting to such wanton destruction especialy after the fall of Vukovar and the events that followed them.

The capture of Karlovac is even completely in the sphere of academic discusion.

In late November JNA was a spent force in Croatia. The offensive capabilities have been too dented to provide serious resistance to an organised Croatian counterattack (operation Orkan '91) without support from units in other republics and the Serb population outside Croatia and BiH. The only reason western Slavonia was not completely retaken in winter of 91/92 was the Sarajevo ceasfire. Without the Sarajevo ceasfire and the continuation of hostilities the war in BiH would have looked very differently since the JNA would have a 600km front line to worry about in addition to any opposition in BiH. Dubrovnik might have fallen in such a setting but that is highly unlikely preparations were allready made for a counter offensive that would have relieved the city by mid January '92.

With the units at their disposal in '91 the JNA+RSK+Serb militias were bound to fail, it was just a matter of time when that would happen.


Also the map you posted above is somewhat deceptive because it ignores the terrain.


Cheers
 
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