No one plane is going to give Germany air supremacy in 1944-45. Germany's problem was systemic and a result of poor long range planning and an unwillingness of Nazi leadership to put Germany's economy on a pure war footing until too late. Also, once the USSR is involved the problems are further magnified since the majority of the best trained and most experienced fighter units are in the East. But if we give the Nazi's the benifit of hindsight that the war woud not be over in 1941, here's some ideas:
(1) Foster (not retard) R&D and production of new planes to supplement and replace current models. More than any other major power, Germany seems to have put so many eggs into so very few baskets. Where the US, Britain, and USSR commonly supported the development and production of a variety of similar fighters and bombers for essentially the same tasks, the RLM tended to focus on one or two key types and hope they were initial successes and/or had the stretch to still be first-line 5 years later. They were lucky with the Bf-109 and even more so with the Fw-190. But this philosophy virtually crippled German quality in most other major categories. Highly favored new types (such as the Ju-288, Me-210, or He-177) were failures, often because they were designed to fullfill a variety of roles better filled by more specialized aircraft). Otherwise excellent planes (like the He-100, Fw-187, He-219) were opposed for political reasons or because of the "one basket" notion.
(2) Fight the BoB differently (focus almost entirely on damaging the British aircraft industry and RAF), and put more effort into maintaining some sort of continued bombing campaign over Britain during 1942-44. This would force the RAF and USAAF to expend resources in defending their own bases and/or to move them farther to the north. Of course this would require long-range bombers more capable than the He-111 or Ju-88 and escort fighters better than the Bf-110 (see point 1 above). This would be a very costly war of attrition, but it would at least delay the buildup of allied airpower in NW Europe.
(3) Uhh...don't attack the USSR until you believe you can maintain a Luftwaffe presence over the southern British isles and NW Europe to at least keep these areas contested airspace with the expected diversion of resources to the Eastern Front.
(4) Do whatever is possible to interdict the buildup of US forces and equipment in Britain. This is where I believe the failure of Germany to develop an effective long-range bomber force really hurts them. A force of several thousand strategic bombers and long range fighters that actually worked like they were supposed to and dedicated to maritime recon and coordination with U-boats might have made a big difference in the Battle of the Atlantic