The challenge is to have one or more nuclear weapons used/attacks occur during the Missile Crisis, but to have the powers keep it to that and not engage in full nuclear exchange. Bonus points if Cuba is not completely nuked to oblivion.
The challenge is to have one or more nuclear weapons used/attacks occur during the Missile Crisis, but to have the powers keep it to that and not engage in full nuclear exchange. Bonus points if Cuba is not completely nuked to oblivion.
Indeed, with the Single Integrated Operational Plan in place, there is very little chance of the war not escalating to a full nuclear exchange.What I think has every likelihood of happening is that once a single nuke is fired in anger that the responses will not stay proportionate.
Also known as SIOPIndeed, with the Single Integrated Operational Plan in place, there is very little chance of the war not escalating to a full nuclear exchange.
SIOP-63
During 1961-1962 the Kennedy administration revised this plan as supervised by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. SIOP-63, which took effect in July 1962 and remained mostly unchanged for more than 10 years, proposed five escalating attack options:
1) Soviet nuclear missile sites, bomber airfields, and submarine tenders.
2) Other military sites away from cities, such as air defenses.
3) Military sites near cities.
4) Command-and-control centers.
5) Full-scale "spasm" attack.
Limited tactical nuclear weapon use in Cuba following an early US invasion perhaps? I don't know if Khrushchev really would have thought Castro was worth WWIII, the whole crisis itself was based on him making a gamble and recognizing he lost.
Considering that they sent nuclear-armed cruise missiles to Cuba to avert a potential american invasion, I'd say Khrushchev did think such, and they'd planned to bleed any invasion force pretty seriously.
There's no way this wouldn't escalate to World War Three.
I wasn't aware of that, I thought that the tactical nuclear weapons that were present in Cuba were of a smaller scale. I stand corrected.
Wish granted: the U.S. performed 4 above-ground nuclear weapon tests during the Cuban Missile Crisis:
CHAMA, 18-Oct-62, Johnston Island, airdrop, 1.59 Mt
CHECKMATE, 20-Oct-62, Johnston Island, rocket, <20 kt
BLUEGILL 3 PRIME, 26-Oct-62, Johnston Island, rocket, >200kt but <1 Mt
CALAMITY, 27-Oct-62, Johnston Island, airdrop, 800 kt
And the Soviets performed 8 tests during the crisis:
181, 14-Oct-62, Semipalatinsk, airdrop, <20 kt
182, 20-Oct-62, Semipalatinsk, airdrop, 6.7 kt
183, 22-Oct-62, Novaya Zemlya, airdrop, 8.2 Mt
184, 22-Oct-62, Kapustin Yar, unknown, 300 kt
185, 27-Oct-62, Novaya Zemlya, airdrop, 260 kt
186, 28-Oct-62, Semipalatinsk, airdrop, 7.8 kt
187, 28-Oct-62, Kapustin Yar, unknown, 300 kt
188, 28-Oct-62, Semipalatinsk, airdrop, 7.8 kt