Of course they are all a series of trade offs. The T-34 was a nightmare for the crew in order to get smaller size and more armor efficiency. With that in mind, I just thought that the USA perhaps could've done better, but now I see I'm wrong.
Challenge: Better Tank for US in WW2
- Thread starter Killer300
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Of course they are all a series of trade offs. The T-34 was a nightmare for the crew in order to get smaller size and more armor efficiency. With that in mind, I just thought that the USA perhaps could've done better, but now I see I'm wrong.
The US simply did not have the experience in the very technical design to build a much better tank than the Sherman, there lack of building of tanks just generally left them to be playing catch up. The British similarly really didnt juts build or operate enough tanks prior to the war. The Russians did have larger experience no surprise they got a good design, the Germans started late but had better engineers and military thinking behind there efforts as well as resources pre war. But their late start left their early war efforts on the light side.
The Sherman packed and shipped easily with in the allies logistic system, no effect replacement would be viable if substantially bigger.
The US strategic production strategy of Standardize then mass produce had many benefits, aircraft was one were than had multiple designs, but the Idea of Standardization was a real strength of the US logistics. The Sherman was part of that.
The Sherman was the best they could do considering their tank design and operation experience, the principle of setting a standard model and producing a lot, would have been comprised if another tank had been introduced in what mid 1944.
The Sherman packed and shipped easily with in the allies logistic system, no effect replacement would be viable if substantially bigger.
The US strategic production strategy of Standardize then mass produce had many benefits, aircraft was one were than had multiple designs, but the Idea of Standardization was a real strength of the US logistics. The Sherman was part of that.
The Sherman was the best they could do considering their tank design and operation experience, the principle of setting a standard model and producing a lot, would have been comprised if another tank had been introduced in what mid 1944.
Killer300 said:
I don't know if you are wrong or not. Both the T-34 and the Sherman were superbly designed weapons. There were different assumptions made and different values assigned to features which caused two different vehicles to be developed.I suggest reading Commanding the Red Army's Shermans by Dmitry Loza. He was the commander of a battalion of Shermans in both Europe and Manchuria. He describes the differences and why both had good and bad features. It is a very interesting read
Thing was at the time the Sherman was being designed in 1940 it was virtually superior to all the German tanks designs that were already in Whermatch Heer service. The most common hostile tank the Sherman had to fight was the Panzer IV which was a whole generation of armoured vechile design behind the Sherman and it only because the mid and late war variants of the Panzer IV which were armed with long barreled 75mm guns was the Panzer IV was able to compete with the American Sherman, Soviet T-34 and British Cromwell. The problem with the Panzer IV by 1942 it had reached its optimal potential development and any further development would begin to seriously degrade its overall performance.
I think a best potential ww2 era Sherman variant which would mostly serve as a stop gap until the M26 can have a proper full development cycle would likely use the widetrack HVSS suspension that was historically used in late war variants of the m4 sherman, the turret of the T25 prototype, a 90 mm M3 gun.
I think a best potential ww2 era Sherman variant which would mostly serve as a stop gap until the M26 can have a proper full development cycle would likely use the widetrack HVSS suspension that was historically used in late war variants of the m4 sherman, the turret of the T25 prototype, a 90 mm M3 gun.
FBKampfer
Banned
So literally every person in this thread has screwed something up at some point.
At time of introduction, the M4 was an outstanding tank. It could reliably penetrate the 50mm armor of the Panzer III and IV at ranges exceeding 2000 yards.
It was also well protected, having about 87mm effective thickness of frontal armor on the glacis on the cast hull M4A1 and 103mm on the welded M4A3 (note that this is superior to the Tiger I at close-medium ranges)
But it had flaws; notably ammunition storage and a poor design of the optics, reticulated with a simple ladder sight, and lacking any clear horizontal graduations for target leading. This introduced potential for misestimation of both lead and range as the gunner had to estimate what the gun was layed to based on his own interpretation of the sight.
This was compounded by low shell velocity.
Optical clarity and magnification were good if not outstanding.
The M1 76mm retained the flaws of the gunsight, but with improved 6x magnification and higher shell velocity and a flatter trajectory, reducing the likely impact of human error.
Notable for the 17lber, which had a variable magnification ladder sight similar to the M3 75mm and M1 76mm, however the maximum range graduations extended beyond the field of view at its doubled 6x magnification, potentially limiting the magnification's utility in long distance gunnery (but remaining fully useful for target identification and acquisition).
Additionally all Allied sights lacked any range calculation system.
The vulnerability of the M4 body to ammunition explosions and brew ups was greatly over exaggerated, likely the result of human negativity bias. The wet stowage was a solution to an imagined problem, though still generally useful.
Notable as well, brew ups and fires weren't a tremendous concern for the German Panzers either, nor were the diesel T-34's themselves any less vulnerable to engine fires given a proper source of ignition. Diesel is simply less volatile, and slower burning than is gasoline of any octane or composition. This resulted in more time for the crew to bail out.
Regarding the 76mm and 17lber HE shells; it didn't matter. In virtually all situations, machine guns were more effective, or the target was well enough dug in that the difference between the shell's bursting charge was largely irrelevant. If a machine gun is well sandbagged and dug in, it can survive anything up to a near miss from anything up to a 105mm.
High explosives have a very crucial, but very narrowly limited use on the battlefield. Any competent individual who has seen service or worked with explosives will tell you that a few ounces of blasting compound does not make up for poor placement of your charges
But the M4 was reliable, produceable, maneuverable, and capable. However it was not upgraded as it should have been, and it wasn't without its flaws.
The reality falls somewhere between the two vocal groups on the board. It was far from great, but neither was it awful either.
As for the German weapons, their gunsights worked on a different system entirely. The reticulations themselves were moved as the gun was layed to a different range (as indicated by range graduations around the interior perimeter of the gunsighs), eliminating any need for the gunner to use hold over to aim. Additionally the gunsight had lead markings graduated at 1 mil (apparent size of 1 meter at 1000 meters) increments, doubling as a range calculation system using known length, width, and or heights of enemy tanks, allowing gunners on the 88mm L/71 to achieve 85% first round hit probability under ideal conditions at 2km.
Magnification was average on 50mm and 75mm weapons at 2.5x, and good on 75mm L/70 and 88mm weapons. Optical clarity was outstanding.
Combined with a high shell velocity and flat trajectory, this made quality German tank crews exceedingly deadly in engagements at extended ranges.
Taken as a system, I would say that these all made the KwK 42 L/70 the best cannon of any nation in the war.
Regarding the Panthers weight, as best I can calculate (lacking exact composition or density of German steels, I used density for cold rolled chromium-carbon tool steel as an approximate substitute), the increase in the Panthers armor thickness from 50mm to 80mm only added 3 tons out of the near 10 tons of weight gain over the prototypes.
I cannot account for the rest of the weight gain.
Alright, thread arguments resolved. Case closed. Somebody lock it please.
At time of introduction, the M4 was an outstanding tank. It could reliably penetrate the 50mm armor of the Panzer III and IV at ranges exceeding 2000 yards.
It was also well protected, having about 87mm effective thickness of frontal armor on the glacis on the cast hull M4A1 and 103mm on the welded M4A3 (note that this is superior to the Tiger I at close-medium ranges)
But it had flaws; notably ammunition storage and a poor design of the optics, reticulated with a simple ladder sight, and lacking any clear horizontal graduations for target leading. This introduced potential for misestimation of both lead and range as the gunner had to estimate what the gun was layed to based on his own interpretation of the sight.
This was compounded by low shell velocity.
Optical clarity and magnification were good if not outstanding.
The M1 76mm retained the flaws of the gunsight, but with improved 6x magnification and higher shell velocity and a flatter trajectory, reducing the likely impact of human error.
Notable for the 17lber, which had a variable magnification ladder sight similar to the M3 75mm and M1 76mm, however the maximum range graduations extended beyond the field of view at its doubled 6x magnification, potentially limiting the magnification's utility in long distance gunnery (but remaining fully useful for target identification and acquisition).
Additionally all Allied sights lacked any range calculation system.
The vulnerability of the M4 body to ammunition explosions and brew ups was greatly over exaggerated, likely the result of human negativity bias. The wet stowage was a solution to an imagined problem, though still generally useful.
Notable as well, brew ups and fires weren't a tremendous concern for the German Panzers either, nor were the diesel T-34's themselves any less vulnerable to engine fires given a proper source of ignition. Diesel is simply less volatile, and slower burning than is gasoline of any octane or composition. This resulted in more time for the crew to bail out.
Regarding the 76mm and 17lber HE shells; it didn't matter. In virtually all situations, machine guns were more effective, or the target was well enough dug in that the difference between the shell's bursting charge was largely irrelevant. If a machine gun is well sandbagged and dug in, it can survive anything up to a near miss from anything up to a 105mm.
High explosives have a very crucial, but very narrowly limited use on the battlefield. Any competent individual who has seen service or worked with explosives will tell you that a few ounces of blasting compound does not make up for poor placement of your charges
But the M4 was reliable, produceable, maneuverable, and capable. However it was not upgraded as it should have been, and it wasn't without its flaws.
The reality falls somewhere between the two vocal groups on the board. It was far from great, but neither was it awful either.
As for the German weapons, their gunsights worked on a different system entirely. The reticulations themselves were moved as the gun was layed to a different range (as indicated by range graduations around the interior perimeter of the gunsighs), eliminating any need for the gunner to use hold over to aim. Additionally the gunsight had lead markings graduated at 1 mil (apparent size of 1 meter at 1000 meters) increments, doubling as a range calculation system using known length, width, and or heights of enemy tanks, allowing gunners on the 88mm L/71 to achieve 85% first round hit probability under ideal conditions at 2km.
Magnification was average on 50mm and 75mm weapons at 2.5x, and good on 75mm L/70 and 88mm weapons. Optical clarity was outstanding.
Combined with a high shell velocity and flat trajectory, this made quality German tank crews exceedingly deadly in engagements at extended ranges.
Taken as a system, I would say that these all made the KwK 42 L/70 the best cannon of any nation in the war.
Regarding the Panthers weight, as best I can calculate (lacking exact composition or density of German steels, I used density for cold rolled chromium-carbon tool steel as an approximate substitute), the increase in the Panthers armor thickness from 50mm to 80mm only added 3 tons out of the near 10 tons of weight gain over the prototypes.
I cannot account for the rest of the weight gain.
Alright, thread arguments resolved. Case closed. Somebody lock it please.
DougM
Donor
We have to be careful not to judge a tank from 1941 by today’s views on tanks. Today the M1 is an all powerful all singing and all dancing tank that does everything that you can ask of a tank.
In 1941 as far as the US was concerned the tank was NOT an all purpose design. You had basically two functions and as a result two basic design concepts and while each was able to perform the job of the other one they had limitations in doing so.
For lack of better terms We had the infantry support and we had tank vs tank. And the design of the Sherman was in the infantry support branch so if the designers had to choose between two options they went with the one that helped in that area and if it reduced the anti tank eliminates then so be it. That is what those tank destroyers are for.
And for the general use in supporting the infantry the Sherman was perhaps the best on the battlefields in WW2. It was dependable so it was able to keep doing the job. It was light enough to pretty much cross anything (well as much as any tank can) it was small enough to go most places. It was fast enough to keep up. It was armored well enough that it took something major to nock it put and it was armed well enough to knock out pretty much anything that the infantry wanted knocked out. And it was built in very large numbers so it was readily available when needed. So I am not sure what more the infantry can ask for.
As for the view of those tank guys. Well from the point of view of the infantry they where basically whiners. They rode everywhere they were immune to almost all attacks while being able to destroy everything up to and including most tanks. While the infantry guy is walking everywhere while humping his equipment food and ammo out in the weather and with absolutely Zero protection and while being so poorly armed that even an enemy soldier hiding behind just about anything is impervious to his weapon. And yet the tanker still bitched.
So it is a matter of perspective. And that is probably why if you ask the infantry soldier from WW2 or even Korea the Sherman was amazing but if you ask the tanker it was problematic.
You can’t design a tank (or anything else) to do everything perfectly. And this was even more a think in WW2 then it is today. You have to pick your priorities. And while today we want a tank that is extremely well armored and able to fight other tanks and we put up with a reduced usefulness to the infantry that was not always the case. Today if the infantry gets in trouble they usually call for a helicopter but in WW2 it was the tank they called. And the tank better be close as it was to slow to come from very far. So dependable available and small enough to get there with just enough firepower to do the job was what 90% of the Army in WW2 wanted. An M1 magicly transported back to the War is probably not of interest or use to the vast majority of the folks fighting the way. As it’s size made it hard to use and it’s firepower is overkill for most things the average soldier needed. But the tankers would have had a field day taking out German tanks,
So it is all a matter perspective. To design a better tank you have to first decide what your definition of better is and what you want it to do. Because better at fighting other tanks is worse at supporting the infantry And the opposite holds true too.
So the reality is that you appear to be interested in a better tank fighter and that means that for probably 80-90% of the war your tank will actually be worse for what it is actually doing. We (the US) had what something like 40,000 Sherman tanks in Europe vs something like 2 million Men most of the being grunts. So I ask you which is more importan to the way a tank that safes the Infantry or one that save the tanker? In the long haul in WW2 you probably save more lives by building a good infantry support tank then a good tanker killing tank.
In 1941 as far as the US was concerned the tank was NOT an all purpose design. You had basically two functions and as a result two basic design concepts and while each was able to perform the job of the other one they had limitations in doing so.
For lack of better terms We had the infantry support and we had tank vs tank. And the design of the Sherman was in the infantry support branch so if the designers had to choose between two options they went with the one that helped in that area and if it reduced the anti tank eliminates then so be it. That is what those tank destroyers are for.
And for the general use in supporting the infantry the Sherman was perhaps the best on the battlefields in WW2. It was dependable so it was able to keep doing the job. It was light enough to pretty much cross anything (well as much as any tank can) it was small enough to go most places. It was fast enough to keep up. It was armored well enough that it took something major to nock it put and it was armed well enough to knock out pretty much anything that the infantry wanted knocked out. And it was built in very large numbers so it was readily available when needed. So I am not sure what more the infantry can ask for.
As for the view of those tank guys. Well from the point of view of the infantry they where basically whiners. They rode everywhere they were immune to almost all attacks while being able to destroy everything up to and including most tanks. While the infantry guy is walking everywhere while humping his equipment food and ammo out in the weather and with absolutely Zero protection and while being so poorly armed that even an enemy soldier hiding behind just about anything is impervious to his weapon. And yet the tanker still bitched.
So it is a matter of perspective. And that is probably why if you ask the infantry soldier from WW2 or even Korea the Sherman was amazing but if you ask the tanker it was problematic.
You can’t design a tank (or anything else) to do everything perfectly. And this was even more a think in WW2 then it is today. You have to pick your priorities. And while today we want a tank that is extremely well armored and able to fight other tanks and we put up with a reduced usefulness to the infantry that was not always the case. Today if the infantry gets in trouble they usually call for a helicopter but in WW2 it was the tank they called. And the tank better be close as it was to slow to come from very far. So dependable available and small enough to get there with just enough firepower to do the job was what 90% of the Army in WW2 wanted. An M1 magicly transported back to the War is probably not of interest or use to the vast majority of the folks fighting the way. As it’s size made it hard to use and it’s firepower is overkill for most things the average soldier needed. But the tankers would have had a field day taking out German tanks,
So it is all a matter perspective. To design a better tank you have to first decide what your definition of better is and what you want it to do. Because better at fighting other tanks is worse at supporting the infantry And the opposite holds true too.
So the reality is that you appear to be interested in a better tank fighter and that means that for probably 80-90% of the war your tank will actually be worse for what it is actually doing. We (the US) had what something like 40,000 Sherman tanks in Europe vs something like 2 million Men most of the being grunts. So I ask you which is more importan to the way a tank that safes the Infantry or one that save the tanker? In the long haul in WW2 you probably save more lives by building a good infantry support tank then a good tanker killing tank.
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