Challenge: Better Tank for US in WW2

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Additionally, it has AMAZING mechanical reliability. Recently, a farmer pulled a T-34 from out of a swamp, and after one false start, it started like it was fresh off the factory floor.

Hi Killer, do you have a link to this? I can't find it despite googling many permutations of 'farmer', 'swamp' and 'T-34'. :(
 
i can't help but to be skeptic, it sounds too much like propaganda, to tell the praise about mother Russia.
Especially since lately they seem to revert to cold war habits.
 
i can't help but to be skeptic, it sounds too much like propaganda, to tell the praise about mother Russia. Especially since lately they seem revert to cold war habits.

I actually don't think this was in Russia, but the Ukraine, however don't remember for sure sadly.
 
Additionally, it has AMAZING mechanical reliability. Recently, a farmer pulled a T-34 from out of a swamp, and after one false start, it started like it was fresh off the factory floor.

There is no way that's true unless the farmer parked the t34 in the swamp a week before he " pulled it out.". The very fact anyone would believe that shows how far from being a manufacturing society the US has become. It shows a clear lack of basic automotive understanding for anyone to believe a engine would still start after its fuel had been sitting for 60 years or that any of the fuel lines and seals would still be any good. Did it say he replaced the fuel?

You want a good idea the machinical problems of the early T34s engine google the tests the US Army did on the 2 they received from the Soviet union during WW2.
 
No way that the fuel was still good after that time.
Diesel doesn't degrade like gasoline does.

The only major problem with long term diesel storage is keeping it from getting contaminated. Chances are, if it was submerged in a bog, that is exactly what would happen.

A bog is a good place to preserve something though. Peat creates an anoxic environment, which is likely why the tank's parts could all be restored, since there was almost no oxygen to corrode them.
 
Diesel doesn't degrade like gasoline does.

The only major problem with long term diesel storage is keeping it from getting contaminated. Chances are, if it was submerged in a bog, that is exactly what would happen.

A bog is a good place to preserve something though. Peat creates an anoxic environment, which is likely why the tank's parts could all be restored, since there was almost no oxygen to corrode them.

indeed the the link that posted was about a T34 that had been ditched in a bog after it had run out of fuel.
 
Okay, again, I point to the T-34 as an example of what a country with much more limited resources than the United States was able to get. It wasn't perfect, but it was easily one of the best tanks of the war, and was even produced far more than the Sherman. Additionally, it has AMAZING mechanical reliability.

You are on crack.

"The full name of the document is, "An Evaluation of the T-34 and KV tanks by workers of the Aberdeen Testing Grounds of the U.S., submitted by firms, officers and members of military commissions responsible for testing tanks." The tanks were given to the U.S. by the Soviets at the end of 1942 for familiarization.")
The condition of the tanks
The medium tank T-34, after driving 343 km, became disabled and could not be fixed. The reason: owing to the extremely poor air cleaner on the diesel, a large quantity of dirt got into the engine and a breakdown occurred, as a result of which the pistons and cylinders were damaged to such a degree that they were impossible to fix. The tank was withdrawn from tests and was to be shelled by the KV and its "Z/ 3" (?) -- by the cannon of the M-10 tank. After this it would be sent to Aberdeen, where it would be analyzed and kept as an exhibit.
The heavy tank KV is still functional. Tests are continuing, although it has many mechanical defects.
The silhouette/configuration of the tanks
Everyone, without exception, approves of the shape of the hull of our tanks. The T-34's is particularly good. All are of the opinion that the shape of the T-34's hull is better than that of any American tank. The KV's is worse than on any current American tank.
Armor
A chemical analysis of the armour showed that on both tanks the armor plating has a shallow surface tempering, whereas the main mass of the armored plating is made of soft steel.
In this regard, the Americans consider that, by changing the technology used to temper the armored plating, it would be possible to significantly reduce its thickness while preserving its protective capacities. As a result the weight of the tank could be decreased by 8-10%, with all the resulting benefits (an increase in speed, reduction in ground pressure, etc.)
Hull
The main deficiency is the permeability to water of the lower hull during water crossings, as well as the upper hull during rain. In heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/ cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition.
The Americans liked how the ammunition is stowed.
Turret
Its main weakness is that it is very tight. The Americans could not understand how our tankers could fit inside during winter, when they wear sheepskin jackets. The electrical mechanism for turning the turret is very bad. The motor is weak, heavily overloaded and sparks horribly, as a result of which the device regulating the speed of the rotation burns out, and the teeth of the cogwheels break into pieces. They recommend redoing it as a hydraulic or simply manual system.

Armament
The gun of the T-34 is very good. It is simple, dependable and easy to service. Its weakness is that the initial speed of the shell is significantly less than that of the American "Z/ 3"

Aiming/Back-sight
The general opinion: the best in the world. Incomparable with any existing (well-known here) tanks or any under development.
Track
The Americans very much like the idea of steel tracks. But they believe that until they receive the results of the comparative performance of steel vs. rubber tracks on American tanks in Tunis and other active fronts, there is no basis for changing from the American solution of rubber bushings and pads.

The deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint results from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small calibre shells and mortar bombs. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of poor steel. As a result they quickly wear and the track often breaks. The idea of having loose track pins that are held in place by a cam welded to the side of the hull, at first was greatly liked by the Americans. But when in use under certain operating conditions, the pins would become bent which often resulted in the track rupturing. The Americans consider that if the armour is reduced in thickness the resultant weight saving can be used to make the tracks heavier and more reliable.
Suspension
On the T-34, it is poor. Suspension of the Christie type was tested long ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected. On our tanks, as a result of the poor steel on the springs, it very quickly (unclear word) and as a result clearance is noticeably reduced. On the KV the suspension is very good.
Motor
The diesel is good and light. The idea of using diesel engines on tanks is shared in full by American specialists and military personnel. Unfortunately, diesel engines produced in U.S. factories are used by the navy and therefore the army is deprived of the possibility of installing diesels in its tanks.

The deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device. They also don't understand why in our manuals it is called oil-bath. Their tests in a laboratory showed that: - the air cleaner doesn't clean at all the air which is drawn into the motor;
- its capacity does not allow for the flow of the necessary quantity of air, even when the motor is idling. As a result, the motor does not achieve its full capacity. Dirt getting into the cylinders leads them to quickly wear out, compression drops, and the engine loses even more power. In addition, the filter was manufactured, from a mechanical point of view, extremely primitively: in places the spot-welding of the electric welding has burned through the metal, leading to leakage of oil etc. On the KV the filter is better manufactured, but it does not secure the flow in sufficient quantity of normal cleaned air. On both motors the starters are poor, being weak and of unreliable construction.
Transmission
Without doubt, poor. An interesting thing happened. Those working on the transmission of the KV were struck that it was very much like those transmissions on which they had worked 12-15 years ago. The firm was questioned. The firm sent the blueprints of their transmission type A-23. To everyone's surprise, the blueprints of our transmission turned out to be a copy of those sent (?). The Americans were surprised, not that we were copying their design, but that we were copying a design that they had rejected 15-20 years ago. The Americans consider that, from the point of view of the designer, installing such a transmission in the tank would create an inhuman harshness for the driver (hard to work). On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.
Rolling friction clutches
Without doubt, poor. In America, they rejected the installation of friction clutches, even on tractors (never mind tanks), several years ago. In addition to the fallaciousness of the very principle, our friction clutches are extremely carelessly machined from low-quality steel, which quickly causes wear and tear, accelerates the penetration of dirt into the drum and in no way ensures reliable functioning.
General comments
From the American point of view, our tanks are slow. Both our tanks can climb an incline better than any American tank. The welding of the armor plating is extremely crude and careless. The radio sets in laboratory tests turned out to be not bad. However, because of poor shielding and poor protection, after installation in the tanks the sets did not manage to establish normal communications at distances greater than 10 miles. The compactness of the radio sets and their intelligent placement in the tanks was pleasing. The machining of equipment components and parts was, with few exceptions, very poor. In particular the Americans were troubled by the disgraceful design and extremely poor work on the drive/ gear/ transmission links/ blocks (?) on the T-34. After much torment they made new ones and replaced ours. All the tanks' mechanisms demand very frequent adjustments/ fine-tuning.
Conclusions, suggestions
1. On both tanks, quickly replace the air cleaners with models with greater capacity capable of actually cleaning the air.
2. The technology for tempering the armor plating should be changed. This would increase the protectiveness of the armor, either by using an equivalent thickness or, by reducing the thickness, lowering the weight and, accordingly, the use of metal.
3. Make the tracks thicker.
4. Replace the existing transmission of outdated design with the American "Final Drive," which would significantly increase the tanks' maneuverability.
5. Abandon the use of friction clutches.
6. Simplify the construction of small components increase their reliability and decrease to the maximum extent possible the need to constantly make adjustments.
7. Comparing American and Russian tanks, it is clear that driving Russian tanks is much harder. A virtuosity is demanded of Russian drivers in changing gear on the move, special experience in using friction clutches, great experience as a mechanic, and the ability to keep tanks in working condition (adjustments and repairs of components, which are constantly becoming disabled). This greatly complicates the training of tankers and drivers.
8. Judging by samples, Russians when producing tanks pay little attention to careful machining or the finishing and technology of small parts and components, which leads to the loss of the advantage what would otherwise accrue from what on the whole are well designed tanks.
9. Despite the advantages of the use of diesel, the good contours of the tanks, thick armor, good and reliable armaments, the successful design of the tracks etc., Russian tanks are significantly inferior to American tanks in their simplicity of driving, maneuverability, the strength of firing [reference to speed of shell], speed, the reliability of mechanical construction and the ease of keeping them running.
Signed -- The head of the 2nd Department of the Main Intelligence Department of the Red Army, General Major of Tank Armies, Khlopo... (end missing: Khlopov?)

As vision blocks were so crude, T-34 drivers often left their hatches open about a hand's width, even in combat. Even then they could not see except directly ahead.

If the tank flamed, the radio operator almost never escaped. He had no hatch. The extra seconds to follow the driver out or to go out through the turret were fatal.

Soviets found that their diesel T-34's burned more frequently than their gasoline powered tanks. To fit the tranny into the rear meant moving the fuel cells forward near the crew and the ammunition. Diesel does, in fact, explode at the temperatures caused during armor penetration and cordite fires. If a fuel cell was not full when it was hit it very often blew up.

During fire, fumes accumulated in the turret as the T-34 (all models) lacked adequate ventilators. Loaders often passed out due to these fumes in extended combat. Also, lacking a turret basket, the loader had to shuffle his feet as the turret traversed. With expended shell casings on the floor he was at risk of not only tripping but had difficulty in accessing the ammo boxes under his feet. Soviet tankers claim that loaders would try to keep their hatches open in hopes of ejecting as many of the spent casings as possible while trying to keep their feet and service their gun.

Shermans initially had problems with cordite fires due to the stowage of ammunition in their sponsons. This was corrected in later production models with the introduction of wet stowage. The ammo was removed from the sponsons and relocated to water protected boxes in the floor and a water protected ready rack. This reduced the likelyhood that a Sherman would catch fire down to around 10-15%.

Soviet studies found that their T-34's burned nearly 25% of the time. Part of the T-34's ammo was stored in the turret without any protection. Compounding this was the fact that fuel cells were installed in the crew compartment in order to make space for the rear-mounted transmission (diesel or gas doesn't matter, the flash points for both are easily exceeded under these circumstances and Soviet tankers often talk about those fuel cells igniting).

Another tank with the ammo storage problem was the German Panther which, like the early Shermans, used sponson storage. This was a major complaint, among others, that General Guderian wrote about in a letter from June 1944 when he demanded the Panther be modified. The German response to the sponson storage was nearly identical to the first American response: Weld thin sheet metal around the ammo. It didn't work for the Americans and it didn't work for the Germans.
 
The M-6 still had issues even if they had worked out the mechanical kinks. It was basically a stretched Sherman, just as tall but longer as well with thicker armour but the same gun.

Actually the M6 initially used the 3" gun that was used in the M10 TD mounted coaxily with a 37mm. Later there was a modified M6 with a 105mm GUN (not a howitzer, a long barrelled gun) that was offered to SHAEF in limited numbers. SHAEF decided that the limited numbers would not be worth while. The M6 was NOT a stretched Sherman. It had some advanced features such as a rear mounted drive train (instead of running the drive shaft through the fighting compartment) While the U.S. considered the M6 'unreliable' that was only in U.S. terms. It passed the 1000 mile test run (Could a Tiger do that?) The U.S. knew they would be supporting an army across the ocean so they demanded much higher reliability standards than any other army.

The U.S. also knew that they would have to ship their tanks overseas to theatres where port facilities would be marginal. So weight was important. 30 tons was pretty much the upper limit of standard shipboard cargo handling equipment. So while they could handle heavier tanks 30 tons was pretty much the upper limit for 'standard' tanks.

Others have mentioned some other Sherman myths. There was a book Faint Praise by Charles M. Bailey that did a good job of debunking them. (He also did an article I think in ARMOR magazine that covered the high points I have it filed away somewhere) The book DEATH TRAPS by Belton Cooper is also mentioned. Mr Cooper was also featured on some History or Discovery channel shows along the same lines. Mr Cooper was an Ordnance Officer with 2nd Armored Division. One of his primary tasks was recovering damaged tanks. And the 2nd Armored Division had I believe the highest tank casualties of ANY American Armored Division (and yes it is adjusted for the fact that 2nd and 3rd Armored were organized under the older 'heavy' organization) so his point of view may have been influenced by that.

The high British casualties in Normandy also have some other causes. The 7th Armoured Division (Desert Rats) came into Normandy feeling they knew everything about tank warfare based on their experience in North Africa. They quickly (and expensivly) found out that the tactics that worked in the wide open desert didn't work in Normandy.

The Sherman was getting a little 'long in tooth' but it was still a good tank. There were replacements that had been or were being developed but because of the logistics issues the tanks used in 44 had to be standardized in early to mid 42. In fact one reason M26s were not issued sooner was because the wider trackbase of the Pershing was marginal for the bridging equipment that had been stockpiled for the European campaign. So it was decided to hold off issuing them until most of the major rivers had been crossed.
 
There is no way that's true unless the farmer parked the t34 in the swamp a week before he " pulled it out.". The very fact anyone would believe that shows how far from being a manufacturing society the US has become. It shows a clear lack of basic automotive understanding for anyone to believe a engine would still start after its fuel had been sitting for 60 years or that any of the fuel lines and seals would still be any good. Did it say he replaced the fuel?

You want a good idea the machinical problems of the early T34s engine google the tests the US Army did on the 2 they received from the Soviet union during WW2.

I've seen that story (and a couple similar ones) and I believe in all cases the fuel was replaced.

The T34 was an excellent tank there was a certain 'form follows function' in that there was an acceptance that the vehicles life would be very short so why spend time doing 'finishing touches'

I was a volunteer at Aberdeen I've conducted tours of their tank collection and the 'cut open T-34/76 was one of my favorites. It allowed me to show the simplicity of he fittings (no turret basket, ammunition boxes on the floor where the crew had to move to follow the rotating turret) but it was an effective tank.
 
One thing I recall reading (a long time ago, so I might be dead wrong--please take with a grain of salt) was that the gun for the Sherman had to be capable of firing as many shots as an artillery piece before being replaced. Since artillery has to fire an incredible number of rounds in battle, often fireingthousands of rounds, that resulted in the Sherman's gun firing a lower velocity round than competing guns. (Tank guns don't usually have to fire as many rounds before either being blown to bits, or the tank can recieve a new gun between battles)
This actually happened due to the overpowering influence of the artillery branch of the army.

So you would need changes in the us army armoured doctrine (no infantry support/ tank hunter division for example).
I don't think this alone at this stage would be enough. It just means you'll get a 76mm Sherman sooner, but even that is iffy if the US Army still thinks the Germans are still using mostly Panzer 3 and early Panzer 4 and that the M4 Sherman is 'enough'.
Part of the problem is that in 1942, the M4 Sherman is one of the best tanks out there. Getting the Army Ground Forces to upgrade or replace a tank it just finally got is the challenge here.

The US built the M26 in 1944, it was mechanically unreliable and withdrawn from service in Korea in favor of...more Shermans. The M46 force suffered 30% mechanical failures every month in korea, and 1/3 of those were permanent losses. M26s suffered higher loss ratios to enemy action then Shermans in ETO and Korea. The M26 could not shoot through the Panthers frontal slope, and the Panther could core it at 1000m from any angle. That's 'better'?
....M26 or M46? And what have you been reading? A 40 ton tank suffered greater losses to the enemy then the Sherman? According to what?
You're arguing that the M4 Sherman is a more powerful tank then the M26 Pershing?

Decrease the number of tanks in the ETO, and infantry losses go up, but I guess there's no glory in saving infantrymen.
I think you're presuming too much. A tank with better armor design for example can lead to far fewer tank losses. so fewer needs to replace tanks so your infantry losses doesn't go up.
 
....M26 or M46? And what have you been reading? A 40 ton tank suffered greater losses to the enemy then the Sherman? According to what?
You're arguing that the M4 Sherman is a more powerful tank then the M26 Pershing?

In WWII, the M26 killed 6 tanks, and lost 3 in combat.
Documented Sherman actions in WWII have higher kill ratios.

In Korea, the M26 killed 35 T34/85s and lost 6 (<6:1),
Easy 8s killed 49 T34s and lost 7. (7:1).
The M46, btw, scored 12 kills against 8 losses.
M26s and M46s combined had twice as many losses then the M4 while killing one tank less (49 vs 48 kills, out of 97 total T34/85s)

I repeat that M26s had worse loss ratios then the Sherman in both the ETO and Korea. I never said more powerful, but the M4 was more effective. One would also say that the Panther was more powerful then the Sherman, but it was also much less effective.

Both the M26 and M46 had mechanical loss ratios of about 35% per month. I mentioned the M46 because it was a more advanced tank and should have had better reliability then the WWII M26. Both the M26 and M46 had mechanical failure rates more then 50% higher then the worn out Shermans in Korea, and about 4x those of Shermans in WWII.

I think you're presuming too much. A tank with better armor design for example can lead to far fewer tank losses. so fewer needs to replace tanks so your infantry losses doesn't go up.

And the heavy tank has 4x the mechanical losses of the medium tank, so not only do you start with fewer tanks, a greater portion is also out of combat waiting for repairs. German tank guns were powerful enough that the Pershing's heavier armor was, in fact, not effective against them. You are also ignoring the high percentage of losses to mines and infantry HEAT weapons, and mobility kills would be higher since the ground PSI was greater. US engineers could throw a bridge across a river in under 24 hours that the M4 could cross, but not the M26.
 
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In WWII, the M26 killed 6 tanks, and lost 3 in combat.
Documented Sherman actions in WWII have higher kill ratios.

In Korea, the M26 killed 35 T34/85s and lost 6 (<6:1),
Easy 8s killed 49 T34s and lost 7. (7:1).
The M46, btw, scored 12 kills against 8 losses.
M26s and M46s combined had twice as many losses then the M4 while killing one tank less (49 vs 48 kills, out of 97 total T34/85s)

I repeat that M26s had worse loss ratios then the Sherman in both the ETO and Korea. I never said more powerful, but the M4 was more effective. One would also say that the Panther was more powerful then the Sherman, but it was also much less effective.

Both the M26 and M46 had mechanical loss ratios of about 35% per month. I mentioned the M46 because it was a more advanced tank and should have had better reliability then the WWII M26. Both the M26 and M46 had mechanical failure rates more then 50% higher then the worn out Shermans in Korea, and about 4x those of Shermans in WWII.
This why I dislike kill/loss ratios. They don't tell all that much you skip out on the context. Statics can be the most misleading fact out there.
I have wonder how many Sherman and Pershing were out there compared the T-34 at various times of the Korean War.
In WW2, the Pershing tank barely had any time to make any impact.

And the heavy tank has 4x the mechanical losses of the medium tank, so not only do you start with fewer tanks, a greater portion is also out of combat waiting for repairs. German tank guns were powerful enough that the Pershing's heavier armor was, in fact, not effective against them. You are also ignoring the high percentage of losses to mines and infantry HEAT weapons, and mobility kills would be higher since the ground PSI was greater. US engineers could throw a bridge across a river in under 24 hours that the M4 could cross, but not the M26.
The M26 is likely still much more reliable then Panther due to better design, crew training, and supply. Yes, its unreliable to the Sherman, but the Sherman is very reliable to begin with. The heavier armor would still make it more difficult for a Panther to penetrate its armor at long range. It becomes a very close thing on if the 75mm gun will penetrate compared to that it will penetrate a Sherman. And the 88mm AT guns and Tiger 1 tanks will have a even harder time trying to penetrate the front hull armor of Pershing.

Seriously, where is your source for your claims?

Ah, interesting. So, the Sherman traded some things to have long term mechanical range? I see.
Not really, it just had a better supply train and design that let it be much more reliable. You have to remember that in terms of armor and gun it is comparable to the T-34. But the Sherman is far better in reliability and in crew efficiencies.
 
This why I dislike kill/loss ratios. They don't tell all that much you skip out on the context. Statics can be the most misleading fact out there.
I have wonder how many Sherman and Pershing were out there compared the T-34 at various times of the Korean War.
In WW2, the Pershing tank barely had any time to make any impact.

Less then half the tanks sent to Korea in 1950 were M26/46 tanks. 309 Pershings, 200 Pattons, 679 E8s, and 124 Chaffee’s were sent.

According to "The Korean War" by the Korean Institute of Military History, the NKs had:

on December 27 1950:

120 Tanks (T34/85)
73 Self-propelled guns (SU-76s)
60 Armored Vehicles (BA-64s)

on May 12 1950:

173 tanks
176 Self-propelled guns
60 Armored vehicles

on June 25 1950:

242 tanks
176 Self-propelled guns
54 Armored vehicles


The M26 is likely still much more reliable then Panther due to better design, crew training, and supply. Yes, its unreliable to the Sherman, but the Sherman is very reliable to begin with. The heavier armor would still make it more difficult for a Panther to penetrate its armor at long range. It becomes a very close thing on if the 75mm gun will penetrate compared to that it will penetrate a Sherman. And the 88mm AT guns and Tiger 1 tanks will have a even harder time trying to penetrate the front hull armor of Pershing.

The fact is that you would have a fraction of the number of Shermans in action. Shermans fired HE shells 3.5:1 over AP shells. If you keep the number of AT missions the same (why else would you field the heavy tank?) then the HE missions will suffer, that's your infantry support. Good luck with the Race Across France in a fucking heavy tank. How many people will get killed fighting all the way across France now? How many Germans were captured in France that you now have to fight again?

The Panther and the Tiger can penetrate the Pershing's turret out to 2000m.

Pershing turret vs Panther
99.jpg


Pershing turret vs Tiger1
1.jpg


Pershing Turret vs Pak 40
79.jpg


Pershing hull vs 8.8L88
73.jpg


The Sherman 75 will penetrate the side armor of a Panther over 1000m, and the side armor of a Tiger out to 600m. Studies showed that 60% of hits on tanks were on the side and rear armor. Less obvious then sheer gunpower Tigers and Panthers were often set on fire by HE and WP shells. One Tiger in Italy was set on fire by a .50cal (well, the haybales wired to it were, and the tank burned as a result). The 76mm and 3" armed tanks and Destroyers could engage both successfully past 1000m. The average range for Allied tank kills was 893m in Western Europe.

Seriously, where is your source for your claims?

Osprey's books; US Army's Ballistics Research Laboratory Report no. 798; Operations Research Office Far East WO 342/1 Tank and anti-tank warfare: tanks; battle performance and tactics 1951 Feb - 1953 Sept; "Armor in Korea" Department of Operational Studies, Far East Command, 1951
 
Ah, interesting. So, the Sherman traded some things to have long term mechanical range? I see.
Actually all tanks are a series of tradeoffs. Weight, speed, size, reliability, armor thickness, cost are just some of the items that to mind that are part of the equation

Someone mentioned the short gun of the Sherman as being a result of the dominance of the artillery in the design process. I haven't heard it expressed that way before.
The Sherman's gun was based on several factors a major one is that it have a good HE capability. The 75mm gun that was used was based on the alread developed 75mm field gun that had a broad spectrum of ammunition already developed. When the tank was being developed most tanks had smaller guns. The Germans were using 37mm, short 50mm and short 75mm guns in their various tanks. The 75mm guns were meant for support firing primarily HE. The British used the 2 pdr (40mm) as the main tank gun that fired only an AP round and only had two CS (close support) tanks with 94mm howitzers firing only HE and smoke. Only the Soviets with the 76.2 mm gun in the KV-1 and T-34 fielded a comparable weapon with a broad range of ammunition.

There was a requirement that the gun barrel not overhang the hull. I have not seen the detailed justification for this requirement but it does make some sense when working in urban or forested environments.

In general the higher a guns muzzle velocity the less effective of an HE capability it has. Since the Sherman was supposed to be a general purpose tank and not specifically a tank killer its gun was a reasonable compromise. Given the usage pattern of the Sherman that was a reasonable choice.

As an aside I was watching a show about tank warfare in WWII today and they were interviewing a German Waffen SS tanker from 2nd SS Panzer talking about Shermans killing their Panthers with side shots from Shermans at 500-600 yards. He also talked about killing them but it was not a complete one sided situation.
 
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