I've been neglecting the Kamikaze part of this thread. Time to remedy that.
True. I did have training more pilots starting before Pearl Harbor as one of my suggestions for the Japanese, but I wasn't thinking in terms of using them for kamikaze missions. More on that later.
It does take a shift in Japanese thinking, but not necessarily one of realizing that the situation was hopeless. The Japanese were incredibly cavalier with the lives of their soldiers early on, as evidenced by their practice of sending 'human bullets' against Soviet tanks as early as Nomanham.
Pilots were initially in a different category because of their elite status as aerial samurai. The shift in Japanese thinking would have needed to be something along the line of deciding that people not as elite as those chosen to be pilots could be of use as flying human bullets. They were certainly callous enough to do that. I'm not sure they would have done so early enough to have made a difference, at least partly because their aircraft production wasn't high enough to make one-ways worthwhile until later.
True. Kamikaze attacks are less likely during the "victory disease" phase of the war. They become more likely after Midway. On the other hand, people like Yamamoto were quite aware of how much more the Japanese had bitten off than they could chew. I could see him thinking in terms of what happens after the six months he predicted that the Japanese would run amok.
Again, I agree with most of what you're saying here. At some point the US preponderance in--well pretty much everything--meant that the kamikaze tactic (and pretty much anything else the Japanese could do) was futile, though the kamidazes did give the US fits. How many ships did the US lose to conventional Japanese attacks off of Okinawa?
Where this tactic would be helpful would be during the period between mid-1942 and mid-to-late 1943 where the US/Japanese balance of power wasn't too far tilted toward the US, and when the Japanese still had significant conventional naval airpower.
Another possible use, though I haven't thought this through completely, is for surprise raids on targets that are out of range of conventional attacks. No need to return means double the effective range, though that sort of thing would require a fair amount of training.
I'm done with it.
elkarlo...
First, resorting to such attacks brings back the Japanese problem of losing pilots faster than they can be replaced. Every professional who does this is not going to be around for many other operations.
True. I did have training more pilots starting before Pearl Harbor as one of my suggestions for the Japanese, but I wasn't thinking in terms of using them for kamikaze missions. More on that later.
Second, it implies acceptance by Japan's leadership astoundingly early that the situation is so hopeless that such attacks must be considered.
It does take a shift in Japanese thinking, but not necessarily one of realizing that the situation was hopeless. The Japanese were incredibly cavalier with the lives of their soldiers early on, as evidenced by their practice of sending 'human bullets' against Soviet tanks as early as Nomanham.
Pilots were initially in a different category because of their elite status as aerial samurai. The shift in Japanese thinking would have needed to be something along the line of deciding that people not as elite as those chosen to be pilots could be of use as flying human bullets. They were certainly callous enough to do that. I'm not sure they would have done so early enough to have made a difference, at least partly because their aircraft production wasn't high enough to make one-ways worthwhile until later.
Third, this requires the Japanese leadership to somehow conclude that their torpedo and dive bomber pilots have suddenly become incapable of doing the job, this after several sweeping victories early in the war.
True. Kamikaze attacks are less likely during the "victory disease" phase of the war. They become more likely after Midway. On the other hand, people like Yamamoto were quite aware of how much more the Japanese had bitten off than they could chew. I could see him thinking in terms of what happens after the six months he predicted that the Japanese would run amok.
Yeah. Going strictly after capital ships has it's downside.Fourth, the idea of concentrating on capital ships simply won't work. Japan had no intention of sending out thousands of aircraft to target any but the most lucrative targets but massive numbers were shot down by American anti-aircraft and fighter cover trying to get to such targets and many of those which may have gone for the first available target were likely damaged or low on fuel or had other sound reasons to assume that a smaller ship on the perimeter was the only target they could hope to reach.
Informing the pilots that they must go for only certain ideal targets will cause grave suspicion that the kamikazes have been dying in droves for little success and then lead to even more being shot down as they search for something on the list of acceptable targets.
DaleCoz, except that once the USN could field a substantial force after the battle for Guadalcanal the losses in the air favored the USN to a massive degree, such that a handful of suicide planes in the hands of marginally competent pilots are extremely unlikely to achieve anything in the face of USN airpower and anti-aircraft. For that matter, why would a dozen suicidal incompetents who have to actually touch the target to achieve anything be more likely to succeed than scores or hundreds of professional torpedo and dive bomber pilots available for a single battle?
As I recall Japan threw away @5000 aircraft to sink 34 American ships off Okinawa, a single light carrier being the worst loss. That isn't trading 12 for a carrier but 150 for any possible target.
Again, I agree with most of what you're saying here. At some point the US preponderance in--well pretty much everything--meant that the kamikaze tactic (and pretty much anything else the Japanese could do) was futile, though the kamidazes did give the US fits. How many ships did the US lose to conventional Japanese attacks off of Okinawa?
Where this tactic would be helpful would be during the period between mid-1942 and mid-to-late 1943 where the US/Japanese balance of power wasn't too far tilted toward the US, and when the Japanese still had significant conventional naval airpower.
Another possible use, though I haven't thought this through completely, is for surprise raids on targets that are out of range of conventional attacks. No need to return means double the effective range, though that sort of thing would require a fair amount of training.
As for this discussion about the search function, hasn't that already been done to death?![]()
I'm done with it.