I have to admit that I agree with a lot of what I Blame Communism said, especially as far as border issues are concerned, but my general outlook of the country and it's performance is much more grim. I should also say that I drew a lot from comparison between OTL post-communist Russia and "Keresnkyist Russia". After all, there's very close similarity between ways peoples thought and acted in those periods. Kerensky strikes me as Yeltsin 70 years earlier.
I'd like to emphasize that following is written for Kerenskyst Russia. Not "Whites Won Civil War" one, not "Kornilov ended Civil War earlier". It is a TL where Bolshevist autumn uprising remained a tragic and violent but not regime-changing accident. After all, Russia survived similar accident in Summer 1917 IOTL (July "demonstrations" in Petrograd). Constituent Assembly had been successfully elected and assembled, it adopted constitution of the Russian Republic and life went on. I have to admit, I am pretty skeptical about this Russia in general. And my views of the country's performance during alt-WWII are just dim. But, let's start from very beginning.
1. Borders. I completely agree with IBC here. Bolshevik uprising (not necessary their policies) is responsible for independence of everyone but Poland and Lithuania (they owe Germans, not Lenin, for that) IOTL. Mounted statues of V. I. Lenin should gratify capital squares of Finland, Latvia, Estonia (and one in Cisinau should be "to the great stateman who allowed us to join Greater Romania"), if those nations were honest. Kerenskyist Russia would surely keep Finland. Germans didn't even think about landing there even in darkest days of Summer 1917 and hypothetic civil war would pitch all OTL Reds and good chunk of OTL Whites (Mannerheim was a loyal Russian subject up to November 1917) against radical pro-German fraction, who's doomed ITTL. Shape and form of Finnish membership in Russian federative republic is a matter of discussion, but not the membership itself. Same goes for Bessarabia, Estonia and Latvia, except that even their autonomous status is not assured (some form of autonomy might be granted to Balts, but Bessarabia is likely to remain a governorate). So, we have Russia in borders of OTL USSR of 1945-1991 plus Finland, sans Lithuania and Western Belarus and Ukraine (even that isn't a given, there would be a complex chess game about who would have what; Poland has huge sympathy from France, but French can't reward their Polish buddies ITTL at expense of their ally Russia, so Curzon-based border still possible; Lithuania is another complicated issue, Poles are as likely to alienate them ITTL as they did IOTL).
2. Political system.
Pre-February Russia was many things in one, but a harmonious society it was not (anyone viewing Russian Revolution as successfull Masonic/Communist/Jewish plot is in heavy denial). Most of all, the country had a very deep divide between noble landowning class and peasant majority. One of 3 main slogans Bolsheviks used to lure masses ("Land to peasants", other two being "Bread to hungry ones" and "Peace to nations") was actually introduced by SRs and SRs were MAJORITY fraction in what arguably was 1st and last free and equal elections in Russia before 1991, Russian Constituent Assembly. By the way, it helps to know that left and center-left parties controlled 90%+ of the Assembly, with extreme left (Bolsheviks and left SR) having very respectable 30%+ of the chamber. I suspect that it didn't represent a true picture of the society (SR late division IOTL doesn't let us gauge their electorate properly, but Bolshies, at least, are likely to keep their iron grip on electorate of industrial centers), but it gives you an idea how radicalized the country was. Now, taking into account that majority of army's officer corps and high-level bureaucrats weren't exactly supportive of the whole land redistribution thingy, I don't see "February Russia" being able to resolve the agrarian issue (a violent overthrow of Februarist regime by non-communist uprising, likely by Left SRs, isn't impossible, but this is whole other TL of "Peasant Socialst Russia"). So, it would likely be something similar to another victorious Entente power, Italy. Very bitter, divided and disappointed country, which has all the trappings of democracy, like elections, parliament, free press etc. Government, if country doesn't slip into outright dictatorship, is likely formed by different fractions of SR (which are very likely to become "a natural governing party" in this TL), but it's control over army and security forces is weak even in comparison with Weimar Germany. Which, in turn, is likely to lead to proliferation of left-wing militias, initially as a form of protection of leftist organizations, and then as a mean to keep righitst militias (black hundreds) and right-leaning security forces at bay. Employing Yeltsin-Kerensky analogy, by mid- or late-1920s (depending on constitution, two six-years presidencies or three foru-year ones give Kerensky up to 1930 to rule) the country could fall under some "Putin" (i.e. authoritarian figure declaring his desire to restore order and former glory), but this is pure speculation.
3. Economy.
So, how would this country go about industrial development. Methink, with the same degree of success as other democratic but weak regime of Russia did seven decades later (I refer to Yeltsin's decade). I.e. doing nothing at all. Just like Russia of 1990s completely missed the boat of development, so would Februarist Russia (FR) of 1920s. Why? For numerous reasons. To begin with, to industrialize a country you need a source of capital. It can be either internal market or foreign trade. Internal market is weak in Russia and, by any economic estimates I read (which are many) service of wartime foreign debt would eat up all proceedings from exports (which, by the way, would be much less then what Commies had at their disposal, as much of Soviet exports consisted of grain expropriated from peasants, as well as bulk goods produced by forced labour, like ores and timber, and FR would have neither). Industrialization can be also driven by governmental procurement policies (as it was largely the case in Czarist Russia). This wouldn't happen in FR too, as weak government is unable to implement sane procurement policy. Besides, there are numerous examples of other post-WWI countries of the region who could not do a thing about it's economic development in interwar years. Even Czech were only able to maintain their formidable industries, but didn't grow significantly. All projections of 1908-1913 development being repeated in interwar years is ASB (as it was for OTL Poland). on the top of that, whatever industrialization would happen (and some would, no "buts" about it) would concentrate on consumer industry. No OTL accelerated development of heavy industry for you. And ALL development would overwhelmingly be in Western regions of the country (as in OTL, despite questionnable loyalty of Poles, it had been turned into the Empire's industrial powerhouse by invisible hand of market). Forget about OTL Siberian and Uralic (to a lesser extent) industrial monsters of Magnitogorsk, Komsomolsk etc. It wouldn't happen. And one more factor to take into account. IOTL Soviet industrialization happened in the same time as Great Depression crippled the rest of the world for a reason. Stalin was bying technologies where he could at deeply discounted prices, and everyone was willing to sell. FR wouldn't be able to exploit this advantage.
4. Foreign relations and international situation.
Czarist Russia was promised Bosporus by British and French. However, this promise had been made in desperate situation of war, to a relatively powerful country. Now, would Powers keep it's world in postwar world, when they don't need the Russia anymore? Well, I might be cynical, but OTL American promise to Gorby not to militarize Eastern Germany and not to extend NATO East of Germany springs to mind almost immediately. IOTL British were having kittens about Russians sitting just short sail from Suez, so the promise isn't too likely to be kept. This turn of fate would automatically send Russia to "cheated and robbed nations" camp of Italy and Germany (I fear to even speculate about possible WWII of resurgent imperialistic Russia and Germany versus OTL Western allies; "Eagles of Imperial Glory" would just wipe the floor with French and British). However, keeping Anglo-French promises to Russia is likely to produce not much nicer consequences, as it would keep Russia firmly in Entente camp, i.e. in position of dependent and heavily indebted ally of France, unable to conduct foreign policy distinct from French interests.
Now, where does it all leave Nazis? Unfortunately, very likely pretty much where they were, in charge of Germany by early- to mid-1930s. They were pretty much product of two factors: (1) Versailles and (2) Fear of internal Commie takeover (chances of Red Army invading Germany circa 1930 are as good as chances of Taliban to defeat US army today and march to D.C. victoriously, i.e. less than ASBish). Now, no USSR doesn't change the first reason one red cent. Germans are still humiliated and pining for rematch. Second reason is somewhat changed, but not much (and I'm not even sure, is it increasing or decreasing ITTL). You see, FR is still country governed by dangerously left government, who implemented such outrageous ideas as universal suffrage, legislative ban on ethnic discrimination (which was alive and well in all Western countries at this point), universal education and healthcare and, possibly, even land reform (a.k.a. "stealing lands from lawful owners"). Such a country is bound to produce crippling fears of red subversion among ruling elite of Germany, so Hitler is very likely to become Germany's chancellor ITTL.
5. WWII
It is bound to happen in any TL where Versailles did happen. ITTL it might be along the lines of OTL (Germany versus Russia+WAllies) or along the lines of Russo-German alliance versus "Western plutocrats". Actually, 2nd scenario is likely to produce pretty interesting bipolar world where "other" side does control enough industrial capacity to be a credibe alternative for the Anglo-Saxon giant (OTL 2nd world never was more than third of their opponents in terms of industrial capacity, so Soviet attempts to reach parity were punching far above their true weight; an effort which likely killed OTL USSR). Russo-German alliance is bound to control Europe (except Great Britain, Eagles are unlikely to unleash unmentionnable sea mammal before nukes make any inter-block war a suicidal affair), Northern Africa, Turkey, Iran (at least Northern part of it), most of China and Korea. However, 1st scenario is clear and pure disaster for Russia. Imagine weak and underfunded army of today's Russia, hobbled by outdated French tactic doctrines, trying to resist Blitzkrieg machine, even if Russian Amry has somewhat (just barely, methink) more sane officers... IOTL we had Vichy France. What would we see ITTL? Yakutsk Russia?