Ceasar's Invasion of Britain

Caesar had two expeditions to Britain. The first one was... kind of a bit of a fail since the Romans learned how to sail in the Mediterranean and lost ships to Channel Weather.

The next one resulted in several skirmishes (which the Roman cav won). The Romans restored Mandubracius as king of The Trinovantes. There was a battle between the Romans led by Caesar and some Britions led by Cassivellaunus, which the Romans won, leaving the latter so sit trapped in a fort. In the end Cassivellaunus, allowed Mandubracius to stay unmolested and he agreed to pay tribute to Caesar.

What if Cassivellaunus decided he couldn't face Caesar at all and just allowed them to make Mandubracius as a client king (against his interests since he previously took prime hunting ground and forests from the Trinovantes) and pay the tribute? It would mean less material losses by both sides (because they aren't fighting) and Caesar sets up his client king, but at the same time he doesn't get anything to brag about.
 
Cassivellaunos' power seems quite akin to what chiefs of a complex chiefdom (a dynamic hegemony over various chiefdoms, mobilisating resources and power trough control of ressources distribution and added ressources from conquests, roughly). Meaning that agreeing to suddenly stop his power build-up wouldn't just make restore the independence of Trinovantes, but would most likely fragilize Cassivellaunos' power (probably based on Catuvellonoi people).

Note that the problem isn't a territorial takeover of "hunting grounds and forests" (especially since the wealth of Trinovantes came from agricultural production and metal, but the topic of late Celtic people being more sophisticated societies than quasi-prehistoric men should be develloped elsewhere), but a mobilisation and monopolisation of chiefdoms ressources by the hegemonic rulership. Keeping Mandubracios as a sub-king would have let to some issues (the unreliableness of Trinovantes' elites, notably) that would have led to acknowledging Trinovantes de facto-independence.

In short : for the sake of the complex build-up he led, Cassivellaunos couldn't give away too much without suffering the same effects than the defeat that was inflicted to him (especially with his likely function as a war leader). He didn't had much to loose with an indirect comfrontation, as he did acknowledged that a traditional warfare against Caesar wasn't exactly to work, and elected to use the same guerilla tactics that continental Belgians (don't forget that several southern British peoples were kin to continental Belgians, or at least had strong political/economical relations with them and Armoricans) used in Gaul at the same time.
 
We really only have Caesar's word for what actually happened. I am sure if he had wanted a fight for political reasons he would have had one and sorted out the propaganda afterwards.
 
We really only have Caesar's word for what actually happened. I am sure if he had wanted a fight for political reasons he would have had one and sorted out the propaganda afterwards.
I'm rather supportive for criticism of primary sources, but I don't think we need to be extra-suspicious of Caesarian accounts of what happened in Britain.

Not only there's nothing really colliding with archeological sources for what matter the devellopment of regional hegemonies, but we should remember that Caesar wasn't the only ancient writer to record his campaigns : contemporary and later historians did also wrote about it, using more sources just than De Bello Galico, and when Caesar took too much liberties with facts (as he did with his conflict with Helvetii), these same historians did pointed it.
Really, if Caesar would have just made-up the context of his campaigns in Britain, we would have this underlined by contemporary or later Roman texts. It doesn't mean that he didn't painted himself in a favourable way, but probably not outright liying about it.
 
I'm rather supportive for criticism of primary sources, but I don't think we need to be extra-suspicious of Caesarian accounts of what happened in Britain.

Not only there's nothing really colliding with archeological sources for what matter the devellopment of regional hegemonies, but we should remember that Caesar wasn't the only ancient writer to record his campaigns : contemporary and later historians did also wrote about it, using more sources just than De Bello Galico, and when Caesar took too much liberties with facts (as he did with his conflict with Helvetii), these same historians did pointed it.
Really, if Caesar would have just made-up the context of his campaigns in Britain, we would have this underlined by contemporary or later Roman texts. It doesn't mean that he didn't painted himself in a favourable way, but probably not outright liying about it.

I was not suggesting he was out and out lying, just that he was writing propaganda supporting his fame. If the Britons had been unwilling to fight but he decided he needed a victory I suspect he would have discovered some insult, omen, oath breaking, disgruntled sub chief or ravaged maiden to hang his battle on. After all it doesn't really matter who or why he is fighting just that he is victorious.
 
I was not suggesting he was out and out lying, just that he was writing propaganda supporting his fame.
Which doesn't have to really collide with historical reality : when Caesar describes the various Gallic revolts, there's nothing really contradictory from what we know from different sources (archeological or litterary).

After all it doesn't really matter who or why he is fighting just that he is victorious.
The "History is written by victors" whole concept is really problematic, because it gets down to "we don't know, and arguing that we do is being biased, period" and acontextual hyper-criticism.

It does matter to know why Caesar decided to fight in Britain, would it be only to make a point about the political situation in Southern Britain from one hand, and its relationship with Northern Gaul, on the other : the building-up of, roughly, two regional ensemble in south-eastern Britain is attested, and these kind of cyclical chiefdoms are generally along the line of what Caesar describes about Cassivellaunos.
We do know furthermore, that Romans generally frowned upon this sort of border building-up (especially in the case of a not that controlled Gaul) and intervened regularily to maintain the status quo. On this regard, Caesarian campaigns are hardly exceptionnal or primarily due to Caesar's ego.

That Caesar decided to made it and to depict it at its advantage have no much relevance in this situation (altough it is for what matter Roman politics), as it appears that there was not enough reasons for other authors to consider it as bogus (when contemporary or later authors tought Caesar was blowing his own trumpet, or was really ambigious regarding the attack on Helvetii or against Ariovistos, they did told so), and that it's roughly on line with what we know aditionally.
 
I agree, History happened it is not just a figment of later historians' tales.
Also I really know very little about the period. Would he lose status by not having a battle or gain status by solving a frontier problem without (serious) bloodshed. I don't know and it is very difficult to put ourselves in his sandals and try to guess what he would do in the circumstances proposed.
 
Would he lose status by not having a battle or gain status by solving a frontier problem without (serious) bloodshed.
A major prestige bonus for Caesar was that he got, once more, to fight at the edge of known world, attempting an Alexandrine geste. Now, Britain wasn't exactly India, and it didn't have the same impact.

But while prestigious, the Caesarian campaigns in Britain are largely tied to the Gallic Wars : most of southern British peoples were either kin to Armoricans and Belgians Gaul, or at the very least closely related economically and politically. They basically were a rear-base for any opponents to Caesar conquests in the continent, and Caesar needed some clients and stability to avoid the trouble of relatively wealthy and warring allies to his foes on his back. The operation was more or less hastened (which led Romans to be surprised by the bad wheater in Channel and North See), which led to a relatively favourable peace for Romans, having then maintained a status-quo with tributary Britto-Belgian tribes.

It's noteworthy that the soving for the British situation was shoddy at best : not that you had any real bloodshed in first place IOTL (altough the British guerilla costed natives important losses), but it's not really clear if Brittons really respected the agreement.

Caesar seem to have been content with their non-interference, and the general polarization of the region continued. For all intent and purposes, it was a fairly secondary campaign, which several authors (as Suetonius or Plinius) argued it was essentially about "opening" Britain to Roman influence; and possibly to tie several Gallic allies to himself (which more or less fizzled, in lack of real plunder).
 
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