Caucasus offensive in 1941?

If the nazis had chosen to do a more limited offensive in 1941 with a main thrust toward the Caucasus, a secondary toward Leningrad and a holding action in the Center, how would have it fared? Let's say that it's executed with forces equivalent to the 85-90% of OTL Barbarossa offensive, The POD would have been a harder French Campaign for the Germans.
 
I'm not an expert, but it seems this would lead to even longer frontlines than IOTL and logistic problems would not be butterflied away although the strategy from the beginning would need even better logistics (Moscow is far, but Baku is even farther away). All that with a smaller force.

My guess is that the Russians meet the Americans in late 1944, probably farther West than IOTL.
 
AGS (or whatever you call the southern part of the forces) run into majority of Soviet forces (Soviets though main thrust will be sounth of Pripyat, not north as it was). If there is no AGC (split between AGN and AGS) AGS has to punch itself through Soviet forces. AGC can't assist in closing Kiev pocket. German lines resemble <, exposing looooooooooooooooooong flanks to any counter attack. AGS is able to push Soviets back however as they advance they have to peel forces to guard their flank, as there is no AGC to be there. Overall I think their advance stops somewhere along OTL lines with addition of looooooooooooooooooooong, exposed flank.

Now, if you want to play with objectives, combine AGC and AGN and have Moscow as primary and Leningrad as secondary goals
 
There is no way the Caucasus could be a legitimate goal in 1941. The Donets Basin was the objective of Army Group South which was the starting point in the Summer 1942 offensive.

I think Hitler originally envisioned the Ukraine as being the area where the most forces should mass, and it's possible a southern strategy could be emphasized. It's still highly unlikely that the Caucasus would be the goal.

After the Ukraine and the Donets Basin was secured, most troops would likely be diverted north in order to present such a long front along its northern lines - too much danger in a Red Army counterattack cutting off most of the German Army. Only after that danger was eliminated would a substantial offensive to the Caucasus be attempted.
 
There is no way the Caucasus could be a legitimate goal in 1941. The Donets Basin was the objective of Army Group South which was the starting point in the Summer 1942 offensive.

I think Hitler originally envisioned the Ukraine as being the area where the most forces should mass, and it's possible a southern strategy could be emphasized. It's still highly unlikely that the Caucasus would be the goal.

After the Ukraine and the Donets Basin was secured, most troops would likely be diverted north in order to present such a long front along its northern lines - too much danger in a Red Army counterattack cutting off most of the German Army. Only after that danger was eliminated would a substantial offensive to the Caucasus be attempted.

Interesting, thanks! Strategy isn't my thing, that's why I was asking. So 1941 Leningrad and Ukraine, with a later offensive in the Center to shorten the front, and in 1942, Caucasus and Moscow?
 
Interesting, thanks! Strategy isn't my thing, that's why I was asking. So 1941 Leningrad and Ukraine, with a later offensive in the Center to shorten the front, and in 1942, Caucasus and Moscow?
Capturing Leningrad will help tremendously for the Germans. Compared to the OTL situation where they had it under siege for 2,5 years an blitzkrieg capture would much improve the German position in the North. However, there aren't too much troops to spare for it and even more importantly the logistics aren't there. I've heard on this side that not sending the Afrikan Korps to Libya would greatly help the Germans in the East. Not only would there be the extra troops, but also the invaluable trucks and logistical support, which could make it possible. I'll be quiet here about stuff like treating the local population better, it's still the Nazi regime we're talking about.

In 1942 in my humble opinion capturing Moscow is not a good idea; the Soviets expected it to be the place where the Germans would attack and therefore fortified it very heavily. Germany should not attack such fortified positions and, if that succeds go hand-to-hand with the Russians in Moscow. At best that will be a Pyrrhic victory for them. They should go for Stalingrad and cut off the Russians from its oil supply. It will probably not end well for the Germans, but the alternatives are even worse.
 
Top