Titus_Pullo
Banned
So what might have happened if Hitler mistakenly assumes that the French were planning an attack, after German intelligence reports on French troop movements along the Belgian border?
Part 1.
January 11, 1940
Two thousand feet above the Ruhr Valley, a German Taifun BF 108 plowed through a low fog bank, as Major Erich Hoenmanns struggled to maintain his view of the landscape. What should have been a routine flight from Loddenheide airfield near the Dutch border to Cologne was made more complicated by nearly zero visibility that made it nearly impossible to tell where he was. Nevertheless Hoenmanns set a SSE course, as he assumed the course would take him along the Rhine and to Cologne which is situated along the Rhine. But he saw nothing below except a thick layer of fog. He decided to trust his navigator’s instinct, that his assumptions were correct, that he was indeed flying above the Rhine. At any other day this would have been a routine flight for the fifty two year old pilot as he had taken this same exact flight path countless times and as a veteran of the Great War, was not easily panicked. Flying with him was a passenger, Major Helmut Reinberger, a personal friend who had just arrived to Loedenheide the previous night. Hoenmanns upon learning that the Reinberger was headed to Cologne in the morning, had offered to give him a lift. Reinberger had initially planned to go to the Muenster railway station the next morning and travel to Cologne by train(some seventy nautical miles south of Loedenheide) Reinberger was assigned to the planning staff of the 7th Division commanded by Kurt Student. Not one to turn down a polite offer, Reinberger accepted the ride. As the lone BF 108 droned on, Reinberger grew increasingly uneasy. “its hazier outside than the officer’s club in Muenster” he muttered to himself. Hoenmann’s must not have heard him, through the din of the plane engine. Reinberger bit his lip and tried to repress the worst. He knew he was in clear violation of rules involving the carrying of important documents on flights, for with him, were plans for Case Yellow, hilighting the plans for the invasion of Belgium and France, set to commence on the 17th of that month.
“I can’t see a thing up here, I’ll have to descend to a lower alititude to see where we are,” Hoemann’s metalic voice rang out. As the plane sliced through the haze in what seemed to Reinberger the longest three minutes of his life, both men n saw no sign of the Rhine down below. Panicking now, Hoemann’s decided to change course again. Whatever he was feeling must have been doubly felt by Reinberger concerning the important documents he was carrying. People in Germany have disappeared for lesser offenses, and Reinberger shuddered at the thought. As they maintained their present course, the two lost majors were elated to spot a curved dark line on the horizon, which they were confident was the Rhine. Breathing a sigh of relief, Hoenmann’s set a course towards this dark line.
Maj Reinberger carried the documents for case yellow
when his plane crashed in the Belgian countryside
Some historians disagree on what happened next. Some claim that as Hoenmanns tried to get a better view of what he thought was the Rhine, accidentally hit the fuel switch, while others argue that the plane had simply run out of fuel. In any case the lone BF 108 crashed. Losing two wings as Hoenmanns struggled to keep the plane’s nose up, the two majors escaped with only minor injuries. Their relief was short-lived as it dawned on them that this was not the Rhine but the Maas some fifty miles East. They were in Belgium. After the two men were taken into custody by Belgian authority, Hoenmann’s realizing the important documents he carried would compromise the upcoming Case Yellow operation, took out a lighter and attempted to burn them in a holding cell in front of an amused Hoenmann’s who had not known about the documents until now. Realizing what he was doing, a Belgian police officer managed to enter the cell and stomp out the fire, managing to salvage ten typewritten documents along with maps that were of clear military value. The plans which clearly showed Germany’s plan to violate Belgian neutrality were soon handed over to the Belgian and later also to the French army.
Meanwhile, as news of the crashed German plane reached Berlin and became international news, Hitler flew into a rage upon learning from the OKW that it was likely that Major Reinberger was in possession of valuable documents concerning case yellow, firing both Hellmuth Felmy and his chief of staff Col. Josef Kammhuber. If the Belgians were indeed in possession of these documents then it was likely that the January 17 invasion of Belgium and France were compromised. Most military historians argue that a combination of Belgian deception and French army movements along the Belgian border played a crucial role in Hitler’s decision to proceed with the January 17 operation. During the interrogation, Belgian authorities managed to successfully convince a panicked Reinberger (who, fearing reprisal from Hitler’s henchmen had unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide) that the documents seized from him were so badly burned that they were unreadable. This was quite easy to do as Reinberger himself had burned the documents and was himself convinced at the time that the papers, even those taken by the Belgian police were so badly damaged as to render them utterly useless, and those words that were readable appeared unimportant and nonsensical. So complete was the Belgian deception that the Luftwaffe attaché to the Hague, Ralph Wenninger, and the German attaché in Brussels, Col. Friedrich Carl von Pappenheim were also convinced during a briefing with Reinberger. Even Alfred Jodl who had urged scrapping the January 17 plans altogether became convinced that case Yellow has not been compromised. In his diary entry written on January 13, Jodl states, 'Report on conversation of Luftwaffe Attaché with the two airmen who made forced landing. Result: despatch case burnt for certain.”
Maj Erich Hoenmann.
Unbeknownst to the Germans, the Belgians had already given the French liasson officer, Lieutenant-Col. Harcoeur, a two page summary of the documents. In a January 12 meeting between the French General Staff, and the Chief of Military intelligence, Col. Louis Rivet, Gamelin saw this as an excellent opportunity to try and convince the Belgians to allow the French into Belgium. Gamelin’s plan of launching an offensive against Germany no later than 1941 through the Low Countries, was however complicated by Belgian neutrality. Now he was convinced this invasion scare would finally make the Belgians finally join France and Britain, as it clearly served as a proverbial smoking gun, showing German intent to violate Belgian neutrality. The chance that the documents might themselves be a German deception didn’t matter in the slightest sense. In a sign that the Belgians were gradually coming around, the border barriers between France and Belgium were indeed removed, and Gamelin quickly deployed the 1st Army group and the 3rd Army to the Belgian border, both of which were rapid reaction divisions comprised of motorized units. The fact that an official invitation had not yet been given out by the Belgians, who were holding out until the allies could guarantee that they would not be excluded from any any and all negotiations in the event that a deal to settle the conflict became apparent. Indeed, the French column spent a freezing night camped along the border while the Belgians waited for a deal to be made from London. In what could only be called a blessing in disguise, the German Abwehr was monitoring the situation along the Franco-German border. German agents relaying reports back to Berlin indicated that the Belgians were inviting the French into the country. These initial reports was enough to convince Hitler that the French were preparing for an attack. Hitler realizes that the longer he waits, the invasion of Belgium would be much more difficult now with well entrenched French defenses waiting for them. Making matters worse, Belgium is much too close for comfort to Germany’s industrial area in the event that the French are preparing to launch an offensive. Some in the General Staff had been advocating a wait and see approach and postponing the Case Yellow operation entirely, atleast until the Spring. However, more convinced than ever that to wait now could prove disastrous overrules the General Staff, it was now or never, and the fuhrer orders the Luftwaffe to destroy a number of key bridges that the French are sure to use as it crosses the counrry. The first hit was the Belgian airforce, completely caught off guard its planes were picked off from the air by German stukkas.
French tanks move into Belgium January 1940
Launching a military campaign in the dead of winter is a rarity in military history, where the campaigning season were almost always set for Spring and summer, this was true two thousand years ago and certainly rings true in 1940, atleast in retrospect, where mud and snow can drastically hamper modern equipment. Indeed military historians agree that the Germans began the campaign in the west was ill-timed, ill-concieved and doomed to fail from the get go. German collumn’s roll into hostile territory hampered by bad weather. Contrasted with the French who were now being begged by a frantic Belgium to come to its aid, and was, despite the inclement weather, atleast marching into friendly territory. Further adding to the logistical nightmare that snarled German traffic, the Germans are deploying to the Front in pieces. Adding to an already confusing situation, the fog that had helped bring down Major Hoemann’s BF 108 had not lifted and Belgium was enveloped by a thick fog cover, which also grounded German air support. Army commanders on both sides were hardpressed to coordinate troop movements in the dense fog as Belgian and German troops run smack dab into each other, resulting in a confused firefight characterized by friendly fire on both sides. With French troops arriving into the mix, elements of the 35th, the 6th and the 12th Seneglese stumble into the fray, and during three days of fighting halts, four German divisions, as soldiers on all sides fought and died in waist deep snow . Always low on ammunition, firefights often descended into brutal hand to hand combat in which the Seneglese made a name for themselves. Later writing of his experience as commander of the 12th, lieutenant Fornamy declared, “We managed to take 300 prisoners and have beaten back the German advance inspite of all efforts made by the enemy.” It was quite clear that bad weather has taken its toll on both sides, more so for the Germans however whose advantage in airpower and mobility has been rendered useless, neutralized by nature. For the type of war the French were expecting, the Germans had marched right into a battle not of their own terms, but of the French. Since the end of the last war, the French had trained for this type of fighting, which as the German timetable ticked, was turning more and more into the kind of stalemate that the Germans had wanted to avoid. In this sort of stand up slug match, the French are more than able to hold their own. The French army seemed to excell at wearing down the enemy face to face rather than trying to outmaneuver the enemy...
The German army, for the most part however was better trained and much more disciplined than its French and Belgian counterparts and it was extremely capable of siezing the initiative even when things don’t quite turn out as expected. Even in retreat the Wehrmacht had the ability of employing and forming ad-hoc units using what ever happens to be at hand, and turning them into a Kampfgruppe. Nevertheless, pleased with, and rather surprised at the weakness of the initial German thrust into Belgium, Gamelin was further emboldened to push deeper into the country, advancing farther than what he had initially intended or expected. If all goes well, he thought he may even execute his own offensive through the low countries earlier than he had planned. In any case, those plans would have to wait, as German paratroopers on January 15th suceeds in breeching several Belgian fortifications. The Germans are quick to exploit the breech and immediately begin throwing their available panzer units into the gaping holes, as German paratroops reek havoc behind allied lines. All of a sudden the rest of the Belgian forts along the river face the very real threat of being cut off and overrun. Realizing the danger, Gamelin hurriedly rushes one French light armored division and three
mechanized infantry divisions to undo some of the damages, in an attempt to plug the holes and block the German advance.
A Char B 1 crew
The Germans outnumber the French in terms of tanks, and perhaps in a more cooperative weather and favorable conditions, the Germans might have won, as the German tanks were faster and more maneuverble. Mud, snow and fog however had greatly reduced this German advantage in mobility. Historians today still debate this issue , Stephen Ambrose characterized, the first tank engagement of the war as like a “slug fest” between two dumb street brawlers with very little attemp to outwit the other. Others, such as British military historian John Keegan point to the fact that French tanks outclassed German tanks in both firepower and armor. Keegan cites one particular encounter in which a single French Char B1 near Eben Emael, attacked thirteen German tanks head- on (all panzer IIIs and panzer IVs) and took them out all in the course of a few minutes. The Char B1 survived despite taking a direct hit no less than 140 times. In his memoir, Heinz Guderian recalled attempting “in vain to destroy a Char B with a captured 47 mm anti-tank gun; all the shells I fired at it simply bounced harmlessly off its thick armor. Our 37 mm and 20 mm guns were equally ineffective against this adversary. As a result, we inevitably suffered sadly heavy casualties". At Eben Emael, elements of the French 3rd Light Cavalry managed to knock out 40 Panzer IIIs, but lost nearly a third of its artillery, barely managing to hold out against superior numbers until the 1st DCR consisting of 124 tanks, supported by the 23rd alpine infantry division came to its rescue and suceeds in pushing the Germans back, of course the fact the German logistics was a snarled up mess also contributed to their defeat. By the 17th of January, it was the German paratroopers who were now cut off from their own lines, but doesn’t stop them from harassing French tanks at every turn. The French had to divert a considerable amount of troops just to hunt them down. This defeat shook German confidence to its foundation, sinking German morale to its lowest point since the Great War. On the other hand , certain defeatist rhetoric by some in the French officer corps were silenced. In short, French moral rises as German morale plummets. As a result the long standing mistrust the Army had of Hitler began to resurface, which never really went away even with the German success in Poland.....
Historians all agree that the Germans had simply overextended their flanks and all blame points to Hitler’s costly decision to launch an early preemptive strike into Belgium during the dead of winter just as the French were already on the move.. Had Hitler waited until atleast spring, as many in the General Staff had been advocating, things might have turned out differently. The Germans also found themselves in an increasingly difficult position of having to defend these overextended lines while fast running low on food, ammunition and above all fuel. The French and Belgians, even though experiencing similar difficulties that the Germans were facing, were atleast able to rush in more of their divisions to plug up the holes to stabilize the front quicker than the German could. It was clear to every reasonable person, that the situation in Belgium was fast deteriorating, the commanders on the ground knew it, and in order to save the German army from certain destruction, German commanders were now advocating pulling back. Enraged at the suggestion, Hitler hurls abuses at his generals and flies into one of his characteristic rants about cowards and traitors. In the furher’s eyes, he was the lone hero in a Wagnerian showdown in which he would lead the German army to a smashing victory at all cost. To the dismay of the commanders on the ground, and in an all or nothing bid to salvage the situation in Belgium, Hitler orders them to stand fast and hold their ground to the last man. This would prove to be the second of Hitler’s many military blunders, as a French counterattack on January 18 manages to sever one of the German supply columns . Suddenly several German mechanized infantry divisions as well as four panzer divisions found themselves trapped in a French pocket, and the French were slowly sealing that pocket. It was only thanks to the fact that overly cautious French commanders were slow in completely closing the remaining escape routs, that a German commander manages to stage a sucessful but costly breakout knowing he was in full violation of Hitler’s stand fast order. With every available tank and artillery the Germans could muster, they concentrated their firepower on a particularly weak sector in the French line with such ferocity that it buckled, creating a corridor that enabled most of the Germans to pass through and escape. They did so however at a tremendous cost in materiel, as men abandoned their trucks and tanks in the mud and snow many out of gas and others simply stuck in the mud. Almost 4,000 Germans, were taken prisoner, most of them wounded, who were simply left behind by the hasty German pull out. The Germans also left behind close to a 1000 tanks, about 1700 artillery pieces which included various anti aircraft and anti tank guns, which fall into French and Belgian hands. Some of the German heavy equipment were damaged, but for the most part most were in excellent to salvageable conditions, and German trucks and artillery are quickly pressed into French and Belgian service. German 88s, which had been pummeling French columns since the start of the German offensive, were turned against the retreating Germans.
A halfhearted German push towards the Ardennes on the 28th peters out, and with the exception of sporadic skirmishes, raids and the ocassional exchange of artillery fire in this sector, all military operations had, for the most part ceased… for the time being.
Last edited: