(Note: This is disclaimer/introductory/what I used to write it kind of thing at the beginning. Feel free to skip straight ahead to the beginning.)
Here we go again…
I decided to write this towards the end of June or so after reading Adrian Goldsworthy’s The Fall of Carthage, and I was inspired to write a timeline on it. He mentions in his book that “Six riders, two Numidians and four Gauls, were sent with sealed letters to find Hannibal. As usual in the campaigning season, Hannibal’s army was constantly on the move and it was near Tarentum that some of the messengers were arrested by the Roman patrol. After interrogation their letters were discovered and sent to the Senate, who read in them that Hasdrubal hoped to meet his brother in Umbria.”
What I did for my point of divergence is make these messengers reach Hannibal, and this both gets rid of the Battle of Metaurus (Which is in 207 BC, in case you’re unfamiliar), which destroyed Hannibal’s real last shot of reinforcements, and it alerts Hannibal of his brother’s arrival in Italy, which he didn’t realize IIRC until his brother’s head was tossed to him. This leads to a Punic Victory, but Rome will still survive, though obviously in a much weakened state, and the Diadochi states will continue to fight without Roman interference.
A few quick notes: I couldn’t find what the Carthaginians used to date their calendar, so I used the standard Gregorian months and dated from the year that Carthage was founded. I also use Latin without really knowing what I’m doing, so watch out for that. Roman months are for now from the Numa Calendar, and are dated by what consul is in charge, but in the future I’ll switch to AVC. Greeks date from Alexander’s death, and use Macedonian months, and the Egyptians (not Greek, you’ll see) will use the Coptic version of Ancient Egyptian months, and I haven’t decided from which point they’ll date from, but that’ll be decided shortly I’m sure. No BC or AD here, unless I decide to give Christianity a role, which I haven’t decided that yet. If I do, I already know that it won’t be nearly to the extent of OTL. Oh, and the Gauls will use their calendar as well, or what Wikipedia told me anyway. They won’t play a major role for a while though…. Research came primarily from Goldsworthy’s book, this website, and Wikipedia, as well as a few other random places. And thanks to cf.net for helping me develop this thus far. And, one more thing, this is written by in excerpts (mostly chapter long stuffs) from various historians that I made up, and will continue to be like that. Some of these will be Thucydides like historians, and others will be more like me writing (like the first guy) and others different then both of them. I've got a detailed idea of what will happen up until 100 BC, a pretty good idea up to 50 BC, and after that is bits and pieces. I'll write this until I get bored or until I get booed off for implausibility, but for right now I don't have a problem writing this until they get to modern tech.
Anyways, with that off my chest, I hope you 1) enjoy it, 2) tell me you enjoy it, and 3) tell me what I did wrong, because I am no expert on the subject. So, here we go….
Excerpt from “A History of Carthage”, by Hanno Abonibaal
Chapter 23
Hasdrubal Barca, in nearly the same fashion as his brother years before him, had crossed the Alps with an army equipped with the necessary weapons to defeat the Juggernaut that had fought his brother to a stalemate over what was now nearly a decade. To boost his men’s morale after the long march over the Alps, and to rest them, he decided to siege the siege the colony of Placentia. Once his army reached the colony, he sent six messengers out to seek Hannibal, who was somewhere near Tarentum at this time, and tell him of Hasdrubal’s plans, his location, and where he planned to meet him at. This message was received by Hannibal a couple weeks later, by which time Hasdrubal’s siege had failed – the defenders were stronger then Hasdrubal had anticipated, but this had absolutely no impact on the war. The important part is that now Hannibal had all the information he needed to reach the necessary materials to end his war against the Romans, and now, Hannibal was marching out of his recent encampment in Bruttium to Southern Umbria. Both of the brothers had to evade or defeat two large armies under both of the Roman consuls, Nero defending against Hannibal, and Salinator against Hasdrubal. It is Hasdrubal’s march that I shall recount to you first, and then afterwards, Hannibal’s march and the Battle of Grumentum.
Hasdrubal’s March to Umbria
Hasdrubal’s army left from Placentia towards the middle of May that year, which was the 607th after the founding of the New City. His army was around 35,000 strong, the majority of which were infantry, and the majority of those being Gallic recruits from his recent expedition through the Alps. Unlike at the beginning of Hannibal’s campaign into the peninsula where the Gauls openly attacked the General, the tribes now feared and respected Punic might, and with their usual urge for warfare made them decide to join Hasdrubal - for a small fee. Not that Hasdrubal was complaining of course – he was there at Cannae with his brothers, he knew how many men Rome could field. Every man was needed for this expedition.
The army made good time, having had their major rest stop at Placentia; most of the army was ready to march on and meet Hannibal. By the end of June, they had reached the Metaurus River, where the army camped for a couple days, and then made the final push from the Alps to Southern Umbria. Hasdrubal was openly astonished with his luck that they hadn’t met a major Roman army whilst on their march… they had of course met Fabian’s foxes, as Hasdrubal called the small Roman bands that would attack Punic foragers, but the Northern Consular Army was nowhere to be seen. Hasdrubal saw this as a sign that Ba’al approved of the Barcid plan, and his army made it safely to Umbria towards the middle of July that year.
Marcus Livius Salinator, the consul of the Roman Legions in Northern Italy, was about a week behind Hasdrubal’s army because Hasdrubal was much faster down the Alps than Rome had anticipated. Salinator rightly assumed that Hasdrubal had successfully contacted Hannibal as soon as he, and thus was afraid to trail Hasdrubal’s army too closely, knowing that it would be very tough to catch up to Hasdrubal, and, even if he did, it would likely be close enough to Hannibal’s army for both of them to simply crush his. He could not retreat ahead of Hasdrubal either, because he did not know exactly know where he was going; he only knew whom he would meet once he got there. Salinator did not fear either in a pitched combat, but both at once with a tired army that’s been force marched to catch up to an army that’s also being force marched was, in his eyes, insane. Salinator instead preferred to take his, Varro’s, and Licinius’ armies towards Praeneste, where they could restock their legions, (and possibly raise another) and prepare for an army of nearly 60,000 men compared with his army of around 30,000 – 36,000 when restocked. He also sent messengers out to his colleague Caius Claudius Nero, informing him of Hannibal’s intentions and of his plans. If both of their armies could link up, they could have an army of around 70,000 men, which Salinator was confident could defeat Hannibal.
This plan is one of the most hotly contested what-ifs of the war. Most modern scholars agree with Salinator that fighting outside the city of Rome was possibly the best chance for Rome’s future. However, many ancient Roman/Latin scholars strongly disagree with this plan, instead pointing out that Hannibal's weak point was his sieges, and say that if Salinator was to put his army inside the city, they could have a strong garrison that could defeat Hannibal if he decided he had to storm the gates, and the garrison could help out any army that managed to make it to Rome to fight Hannibal's army. They could wait nearly indefinitely inside the huge city, and it is a plan that Salinator seriously considered. The only problem with this is: what if Hannibal did storm the gates before any reinforcements could come? Could Rome be confident that they could hold out against Hannibal anywhere? Who could've saw Cannae coming? Or for that matter, Trebia, or Trasimene. It was unpredictable, what miracles Hannibal Barca could perform. Who knew if he could pull another one? And what if the city burned down during the fight? Even if they won, Rome would be destroyed. Without a city, Rome would have far more difficulty in holding their allies.
As you can probably tell, I think that Salinator was right in the end. Salinator, unlike the passionate ancient Latin scholars, had foresight. He figured that if his army could outnumber them outside of Rome, and had the ground, they had a good chance of winning without putting Rome itself in jeopardy. Romans were never not abundant in confidence, and his legions were now indistinguishable from the eastern Hellenistic professionals, (other than of course, their fighting styles) not the ill prepared mass levies that were fielded at Cannae. These men would be much tougher than conscripts to kill. And, on top of all that, Salinator knew that it would be their last chance. His men would fight harder than ever before because they knew that a Punic Victory could mean the end of nearly everything for them. If they were to do this in Rome itself, the city could easily be laid to waste during the fight, and, Salinator knew never to doubt what Hannibal could do. Hannibal would still have just as good of a chance of winning inside the gates of Rome, Salinator felt, as he would outside the gates. He felt that even if he lost, his men could kill enough Punic soldiers to make a final siege too difficult for Hannibal to pursue, and a truce could be reached allowing Rome to survive. If the city burned down, well Rome wouldn’t be around.
And so, Salinator chose to march to Praeneste.
Hannibal’s March to Umbria and the Battle of Grumentum
Hannibal now knew of Hasdrubal’s plans, and promptly began to reorganize his army for another march. At this point, Hannibal’s army numbered around 25,000, the majority of those being the toughest of his men from his Spanish campaigns and Gauls. Hannibal knew that the Romans knew what Hasdrubal’s intentions were, they were blatantly obvious. After all, what else could a large Punic army traveling from the Alps mean? He also knew that they didn’t know exactly where Hasdrubal was headed; the only way they would have known is if they had intercepted that letter, which, luckily for Hannibal, they didn’t. Thus, Hannibal guessed that Nero’s army would likely be called up from the southern portion of the peninsula to fight alongside Salinator’s army, probably in Rome or in a strong defensive position near it. Obviously after the previous couple paragraphs, this was completely correct.
After figuring this, Hannibal decided that the best course of action was to destroy Nero’s army before it could meet up with Marcus Salinator’s army, thus making his and Hasdrubal’s battle with Salinator and whatever forces he could muster far easier.
Hannibal promptly adopted this plan, and then marched his army at a furious pace to reach Nero’s army. Nero had not yet received Salinator’s bid for assistance, all he knew was that Hannibal was now aggressive once more.
Correctly assuming that Hasdrubal Barca had made his way to the peninsula, Nero decided that he had to use his army stop Hannibal from reaching Hasdrubal. He outnumbered Hannibal, and felt that he had a good chance of victory.
He camped near the town of Grumentum, which lies in Bruttium, beginning on the evening of the twentieth of June. Hannibal did the same a Roman mile away the next evening. Both sides rested their armies for another day, and, the day after, battle commenced.
The battlefield was a large plain, there were few trees in sight, and the ground was level. The wind was coming from the south-east blowing at a leisurely pace. Hannibal, positioned with his back to the wind, placed 8,000 Spanish infantry on his right flank, whilst the same number of Gallic infantry was located on the left. Hannibal placed the remaining infantry (a mixed group of Italians, Carthaginians, Gauls, and Spaniards) in the middle, where he himself was located, and he had his 5,000 cavalry evenly split, guarding both flanks. Nero set up his 30,000 man army in the typical Roman fashion, except for one part: he grouped nearly all of his cavalry onto his right flank, while he himself was on the other flank with a small contingent of allied horse.
The battle started as most battles during the time period did with skirmishers, and little damage was done to either side after both sides retreated back to their own lines. Nero then did a very bold, and a widely recognized foolish move shortly after this took place. He took his small group of horsemen out in front of the Roman lines, hoping to entice a rash Carthaginian charge towards him. However this did not happen; instead, several of the Balearic slingers who still had ammo from the skirmishing round turned around and whipped a few rocks out towards the trotting cavalry, and nearly all of them missed. Nearly. One of them hit Caius Claudius Nero in the helmet very hard, and knocked him out cold.
To be fair to Nero, he assumed that his men were too far away for javelins and slingers to reach, not recognizing the Balearic Slingers’ skill. He thought it was a clever and bold ploy that might make Hannibal make a big mistake, and boost his men’s morale at the sight of their brave commander. But, even if Hannibal was about to act on a sudden burst of aggressiveness to kill the Roman consul, I doubt he would’ve acted on it. Hannibal was methodical, and stuck to his strategy, which always served him well. He wouldn’t have risked anything on such an unlikely endeavor. And it certainly did not improve the men’s morale by watching their commander get knocked out by a rock.
After Nero had been knocked out, the twenty or so cavalry that accompanied him out into the open plane hurried to grab their leader, fearing that Hannibal would be completely merciless with, what they thought, was their leader’s dead body. Hannibal marched his infantry forward at a rapid pace, and his both of his cavalry contingents charged, one for the Roman horse, and the other for the Romans’ left flank. The Roman horsemen charged bravely for Hannibal’s men, apparently shouting “For Nero!” However, once it was obvious the Numidians were going to outlast Nero’s men, they fled, fulfilling their own stereotype on barbarians.
Nero and his bodyguard had managed to escape this onslaught, and they went to the middle of the formation. The bodyguards then checked to see that Nero was still alive, and, seeing that he was, arranged for the back legion to fight solely around his body and to protect it with their lives. Nero’s praetors would take over the battle until Nero awoke, which they decided would probably be very quickly – who could stay unconscious during an important battle?
However, Nero did not wake up in time to see Hannibal’s cavalry secure the edges, or to see his infantry be met with Hannibal’s barbaric mercenaries. Hannibal’s Numidians rained javelins down on to the middle legions during the fight, taunting them to come within their range for their pila to strike.
This was unsuccessful, and the Numidians charged, leaving the Spaniards behind, which Hannibal planned to keep in abundance for the final charge for the last two legions. Hannibal’s Spaniards fought the left two legions, and his Gauls fought the right two, with his center infantry fighting on both sides. The Numidians charged the legions outer flanks, and they (the legions) tired easy after losing their commander, and routed. However, most of them did not escape. Hannibal had minimal casualties after the first bout of fighting.
Hannibal regrouped his men, and reinstated discipline upon them. He knew that the final two legions would be tougher than the first four. Again he lined his men, except this time he split his remaining Africans on the far edge, hoping that they would keep the Spanish and Gauls in check, both in the same place as they were at the beginning. Once they were adequately rested, he sent his men out, himself again in the center block of infantry.
Once his infantry were just out of pila range, he sent his remaining cavalry at the weak center of the Roman line. Nero’s bodyguard was nearly destroyed in the subsequent clash. Hannibal then pulled back his cavalry, not wanting them to take too heavy of losses, and sent forwards his infantry. Gaul, Spaniard, Libyan, Carthaginian, and even Italian alike fought very hard against the legions, who were desperately trying to stay alive at this point.
It is here that Nero reawakes, and, with a burst of energy at seeing their consul still alive, a huge burst of energy from the legions came. However this spark cost them a great amount of energy, and, with the next infantry charge, the Romans fled. Nero also tried to escape, but he was captured by Hannibal. He gave him a choice: Do you want to be a humiliated prisoner, or do you wish to commit suicide? Hannibal had no reason to really keep him alive, he already had far more Roman prisoners then they had Punic, doubted he’d get much extra for him, and he didn’t think he’d get any information out of him that he didn’t already know. So, he gave him the honorable chance of suicide over capture, and Nero graciously took suicide. He promptly killed himself the next morning.
The Punic army lost approximately 3,000 men in the battle, whilst the Romans lost around 15,000. The remainder of the army regrouped a ways in the distance, where a letter from Salinator reached them, telling Nero to come straight to Praeneste for a final battle with Hannibal. The remainder of Nero’s army proceeded to march there.
This battle is often referred to as “a gift for Hannibal” because the battle went so extraordinarily perfect for him. Many of his detractors state that it took little skill for anyone to win this battle, and state that two of his great victories were ambushes and one was utter luck. Indeed, most see it as by far the weakest victory of Hannibal’s great five, however, it was not his fault that the Roman consul had been so foolishly brave and unlucky, and so I tend to appreciate the fact that Carthage killed or captured five times more of the enemy then they lost themselves, and Hannibal showed that he could still slaughter legions with ease. However, this battle is often overlooked compared to the Battle of Praeneste and the Battle of Cannae, and this is rightly so, both of those battles showcased Hannibal’s ability far more than Grumentum did, but one cannot fault Hannibal for a lucky victory. He took advantage of the situation in front of him, which is what all great generals do.
After this, Hannibal’s march to Umbria went very well, and he made decent time. His army reached towards the end of July. From there, Hannibal and Hasdrubal devised a route to Rome, and planned on trying to siege the city if no army crossed them on their route. If an army did block them from Rome, they would highly consider bidding for peace with Rome, assuming they win a subsequent battle. If Rome was stupid enough to refuse, they would pay dearly...