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OK, ok, there might not be a huge reason why I'm creating a new thread for an edited version of what had been a fairly short timeline - but there were some stuffs that bugged me with the old one. Most of that is that I didn't feel like I got some smaller stuff historically right, and parts where I wanted to add some more details or change a small part of the story, and there were enough places where I wanted to do that to make me feel like this was necessary. Plus, I redid some of the maps to have writing on them after I figured out how to do that, and I don't want to post maps twice.

Anyways, I think that I'm going to get back on top of this - I haven't finished the next update yet, but I'm feeling really good about getting started on it. I think I wrote too much last time all at once, and my interest plummeted as soon as I hit a writer's block for this update (which btw will cover a Third Punic War emerging over a Arvernian invasion of Marseilles, henceforth referred to as Massilia)... so I'm going to try and take it slower, and do a good job, and get it right on the first time, so that no one will have to suffer through a Carthago Invicta 1.5. I've started looking some stuffs over, bought a couple big books on the Histories of Carthage and a thing on Gaul, and I'm feeling good. Plus, Carthago Invicta v. 1.25 sounds so much cooler than plain old Carthago Invicta, so maybe new readers will flock here. :rolleyes::p

*cracks knuckles, neck* OK, lets get started on some alternate history! :cool:

P.S. *collective groan from audience*
Here's the first two parts today (to get us to Rome's surrender), we'll kind of ease back in it, plus it makes me feel less rushed to write about the Third Punic War. These two are probably be the least edited, as I've looked them over about a million times.



Carthago Invicta, v 1.25
POD: No Battle of Metaurus, 207 BCE

Excerpt from “A History of Carthage”, by Hanno Abonibaal

Chapter 23

Hasdrubal Barca, in nearly the same fashion as his brother years before him, had crossed the Alps with an army equipped with the necessary weapons to defeat the Juggernaut that had fought his brother to a stalemate over what was now nearly a decade. To boost his men’s morale after the long march over the Alps, and to rest them, he decided to siege the Roman colony of Placentia. Once his army reached the colony, he sent six messengers, two Numidians and four Gauls, out to seek Hannibal, who was thought to be somewhere near Tarentum at this time, and tell him of Hasdrubal’s plans, his location, and where he planned to meet him at. Around half of the way there, a Samnite woman told the messengers that Hannibal was nowhere near Tarentum, and that her husband was with him in Bruttium. This message was received by Hannibal a couple weeks later, by which time Hasdrubal’s siege had failed – the defenders were stronger then Hasdrubal had anticipated, but this had absolutely no impact on the war. The important part is that now Hannibal had all the information he needed to reach the necessary materials to end his war against the Romans, and now, Hannibal was marching out of his recent encampment in Bruttium to Southern Umbria. Both of the brothers had to evade or defeat two large armies under both of the Roman consuls, Nero defending against Hannibal, and Salinator against Hasdrubal. It is Hasdrubal’s march that I shall recount to you first, and then afterwards, Hannibal’s march and the Battle of Grumentum.

Hasdrubal’s March to Umbria

Hasdrubal’s army left Placentia towards the middle of Maius that year, which was the 607th after the founding of the New City. His army was around 35,000 strong, the majority of which were infantry, and the majority of those being Gallic recruits from his recent expedition through the Alps. Unlike at the beginning of Hannibal’s campaign into the peninsula where the Gauls openly attacked Barcid, the tribes now feared and respected Punic might, and with their usual urge for warfare made them decide to join Hasdrubal - for a small fee. Not that Hasdrubal was complaining of course – he was there at Cannae with his brothers, he knew how many men Rome could field. Every man was needed for this expedition.

Hasdrubal’s army made good time, having had their major rest stop at Placentia; most of the army was ready to march on and meet Hannibal. By the end of Iunius, they had reached the Metaurus River, where the army camped for a couple days, and then made the final push from the Alps to Southern Umbria. Hasdrubal was openly astonished with his luck that they hadn’t met a major Roman army whilst on their march… they had of course met Fabian’s foxes, as Hasdrubal called the small Roman bands that would attack Punic foragers, but the northern consular army was nowhere to be seen. Hasdrubal saw this as a sign that Ba’al approved of the Barcid plan, and his army made it safely to Umbria towards the middle of July that year.

Marcus Livius Salinator, the consul of the Roman Legions in Northern Italy, was about a week behind Hasdrubal’s army, because Hasdrubal was much faster down the Alps than Rome had anticipated. Salinator had rightly assumed that Hasdrubal had successfully contacted Hannibal, and thus was afraid to trail Hasdrubal’s army too closely, knowing that it would be very tough to catch up to Hasdrubal, and, even if he did, it would likely be close enough to Hannibal’s army for both of them to simply crush his. He could not retreat ahead of Hasdrubal either, because he did not know exactly know where he was going; he only knew whom he would meet once he got there. Salinator did not fear either in a pitched combat, but both at once with a tired army that’s been force marched to catch up to an army that’s also being force marched was, in his eyes, suicide. He instead chose to contact Gaius Terentius Varro and the praetor Licinius, demanding them to merge their armies and advance south towards Praeneste, where they could restock their legions and alae, possibly raise another, and prepare for an army of approximately sixty thousand men with an army of thirty to thirty-six thousand when restocked. He also contacted his fellow consul, Gaius Claudius Nero, informing him of Hannibal’s intentions and plans, and of his plan to merge Rome’s Italian armies at the hilly city of Praeneste, preparing in good position for the renewed Punic advance. If they linked up, they could have an army of nearly seventy thousand men, which made Salinator very confident in Rome’s abilities to defeat Hannibal Barca, as they would outnumber him and have excellent ground, and Rome’s legions were no longer the pushovers that they were at Cannae, having enough experience to nearly be counted as full professionals.

This plan is one of the most hotly contested what-ifs of the war. Most modern scholars agree with Salinator that fighting outside the city of Rome was probably the best choice for Rome’s future. However, many ancient Roman/Latin/Etruscan/Piceni scholars strongly disagree with this plan, instead pointing out Hannibal’s weak sieges during his Italian campaign. If Salinator made his army a strong garrison inside the city, then Hannibal would find it impossible to siege Rome. He could not wait Rome out, because Rome still held naval superiority, and Rome’s near equivalent to infinite supply of water would be very difficult to cut off. The city could wait indefinitely, meaning that Hannibal’s only option would be to storm the city. With that large of a garrison, this would be close to impossible, as Hannibal was outnumbered, and, in that situation, you want an army that at least outnumbers the enemy garrison two to one, rather than being outnumbered seven to six. Rome could wait for Scipio and other commanders to return from their outposts in Sicily, Hispania, and other regions, to fight Hannibal, and outnumber the already large Punic force by at least two to one. This would destroy Hannibal’s army, and the war would be won. So, basically, the Roman theory, bluntly, was that Hannibal would be screwed going either direction with a Roman siege.

Salinator seriously considered this idea, but he instead chose to wait and fight Hannibal at Praeneste. Why? Because Rome had learned never to underestimate Hannibal Barca, that’s why. Who could’ve seen Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae coming? It was unpredictable, what miracles Hannibal could perform. If anyone could defeat a garrison larger than the invading force, it’d be Hannibal. And, the odds of Rome being destroyed in an urban environment would be permanently damaging to the city, and the city might even be burned down in the process. If Rome were to be destroyed, how could they expect to negotiate as winners? How could they expect to keep hold of their exposed fragile group of vassalized allies on their side? How could they expect to hold on to more territory after the war, without a city? They’d have to force Carthage to pay tens of thousands of talents in tribute after the war, which Carthage would obviously refuse, and the Carthaginians would be able to crush Rome like Surus, the greatest of Hannibal’s great elephants, would crush a young Roman Hastati. Salinator thought about these things, and decided that outnumbering the enemy in a great position was a much safer option, and was the better option for Rome’s future. The odds of victory were lower, but the odds of survival were exponentially higher, and so a Roman chose the cautious plan that a Punic general might have chosen, and Salinator advanced to Praeneste with a combined army of just under thirty thousand men.

Hannibal’s March to Umbria and the Battle of Grumentum

Hannibal now knew of Hasdrubal’s plans, and promptly began to reorganize his army for another march. At this point, Hannibal’s army numbered around twenty-five thousand, the majority of those being the toughest of his men from his Iberian campaigns, the Gallic mercenaries that he had picked up when he had crossed the Alps. The remainder of his men were Italians and cavalry, the majority of the Italians being Bruttians. Hannibal knew that the Romans knew what Hasdrubal’s intentions were, they were blatantly obvious. After all, what else could a large Punic army traveling from the Alps mean? He also knew that they didn’t know exactly where Hasdrubal was headed; the only way they would have known is if they had intercepted that letter, which, luckily for Hannibal, they didn’t. Thus, Hannibal guessed that Nero’s army would likely be called up from the southern portion of the peninsula to fight alongside Salinator’s army, probably in Rome or in a strong defensive position near it. Thus, Hannibal decided that he needed to seek a battle with Nero so as to destroy half of the possible army that could destroy his and his brother’s armies.

Hannibal promptly adopted this plan, and then marched his army at a furious pace to reach Nero’s army. Nero had not yet received Salinator’s bid for assistance, all he knew was that Hannibal was now aggressive once more.

Correctly assuming that Hasdrubal Barca had made his way to the peninsula, Nero decided that he had to use his army stop Hannibal from reaching Hasdrubal. He outnumbered Hannibal, and felt that he had a good chance of victory.

He camped near the town of Grumentum, which lies in Lucania, beginning on the evening of the twentieth of Iunius. Hannibal did the same a Roman mile away the next evening. Both sides rested their armies for another day, and, the day after, battle commenced.

The battlefield was a large plain, there were few trees in sight, and the ground was level. The wind was coming from the south-east blowing at a leisurely pace. Hannibal, positioned with his back to the wind, placed eight thousand Spanish infantry on his right flank, whilst the same number of Gallic infantry was located on the left. Hannibal placed the remaining infantry (a mixed group of Italians, Carthaginians, Gauls, and Spaniards) in the middle, where he himself was located, and he had his five thousand cavalry evenly split, guarding both flanks. Nero set up his thirty thousand man army in the typical Roman fashion, except for one part: he grouped nearly all of his cavalry onto his right flank, while he himself was on the other flank with a small contingent of allied horse.

The battle started as most battles during the time period did with skirmishers, and little damage was done to either side after both sides retreated back to their own lines. Nero then did a very bold, and a widely recognized foolish move shortly after this took place. He took his small group of horsemen out in front of the Roman lines, hoping to entice a rash Carthaginian charge towards him. However this did not happen; instead, several of the Balearic slingers who still had ammo from the skirmishing round turned around and whipped a few rocks out towards the trotting cavalry, and nearly all of them missed. Nearly. One of them hit Caius Claudius Nero’s head, which was protected by a helmet, very hard, and gave him a concussion, causing him to fall off his horse and being knocked out.

To be fair to Nero, he assumed that his men were too far away for javelins and slingers to reach, not recognizing the Balearic Slingers’ skill. He thought it was a clever and bold ploy that might make Hannibal make a big mistake, and boost his men’s morale at the sight of their brave commander. But, even if Hannibal was about to act on a sudden burst of aggressiveness to kill the Roman consul, I doubt he would’ve acted on it. Hannibal was methodical, and stuck to his strategy, which always served him well. He wouldn’t have risked anything on such an unlikely endeavor. And it certainly did not improve the Nero’s men’s morale by watching their commander get knocked out by a rock.

After Nero had been knocked out, the twenty or so cavalry that accompanied him out into the open plane hurried to grab their leader, fearing that Hannibal would be completely merciless with, what they thought, was their leader’s dead body. Hannibal marched his infantry forward at a rapid pace, and his both of his cavalry contingents charged, one for the Roman horse, and the other for the Romans’ left flank. The Roman equites charged bravely for Hannibal’s men, apparently shouting “For Nero!” However, once it was obvious the Numidians were going to outlast Nero’s men, they fled, fulfilling their own stereotype on barbarians and their lack of discipline.

Nero and his bodyguard had managed to escape this onslaught, and they went to the middle of the formation. The bodyguards then checked to see that Nero was still alive, and, seeing that he was, arranged for the back legion to fight solely around his body and to protect it with their lives. Nero’s praetors would take over the battle until Nero awoke, which they decided would probably be very quickly – who could stay unconscious during an important battle?

However, Nero did not wake up in time to see Hannibal’s cavalry secure the edges against his horse and alae, or to see his infantry be met with Hannibal’s barbarian mercenaries. Hannibal’s Numidians rained javelins down on to the middle legions during the fight, taunting them to come within their range for their pila to strike.

This was unsuccessful, and the Numidians charged, leaving the Iberians behind, which Hannibal planned to keep in abundance for the final charge for the last two legions. Hannibal’s Iberians fought the left two legions, and his Gauls fought the right two, with his center infantry fighting on both sides. The Numidians charged the legions outer flanks, and they (the legions) tired easy after losing their commander, and routed. However, most of them did not escape. Hannibal had minimal casualties after the first bout of fighting.

Hannibal regrouped his men, and reinstated discipline upon them. He knew that the final third of the Roman forces remaining would be tougher than the first two thirds. Again he lined his men, except this time he split his remaining Africans on the far edges, hoping that they would keep the Spanish and Gauls in check, both in the same place as they were at the beginning. Once they were adequately rested, he sent his men out, himself again in the center block of infantry.

Once his infantry were just out of pila range, he sent his remaining cavalry at the weak center of the Roman line. Nero’s bodyguard was nearly destroyed in the subsequent clash. Hannibal then pulled back his cavalry, not wanting them to take too heavy of losses, and sent forwards his infantry. Gaul, Spaniard, Libyan, Carthaginian, and even Italian alike fought very hard against the legions, who were desperately trying to stay alive at this point.

It is here that Nero reawakes, and, with a burst of energy at seeing their consul still alive, a huge burst of energy came from the legions. However this spark cost them a great amount of energy, and, with the next infantry charge, the Romans fled, primarily out of exhaustion. Nero also tried to escape, but, having just been knocked out, and still having a concussion, he was slow, and he was captured by Hannibal. He gave him a choice: Do you want to be a humiliated prisoner, or do you wish to commit suicide? Hannibal had no reason to really keep him alive, he already had far more Roman prisoners then they had Punic, doubted he’d get much extra for him, and he didn’t think he’d get any information out of him that he didn’t already know. So, he gave him the honorable chance of suicide over capture, and Nero graciously took suicide. He promptly killed himself the next morning.

The Punic army lost approximately three thousand men in the battle, whilst the Romans lost around fifteen thousand. The remainder of the army regrouped a ways in the distance, where a letter from Salinator reached them, telling Nero to come straight to Praeneste for a final battle with Hannibal. The remainder of Nero’s army proceeded to march there.

This battle is often referred to as “a gift for Hannibal” because the battle went so extraordinarily perfect for him. Many of his detractors state that it took little skill for anyone to win this battle, and state that two of his great victories were ambushes and one was utter luck. Indeed, most see it as by far the weakest victory of Hannibal’s great five, however, it was not his fault that the Roman consul had been so foolishly brave and unlucky, and so I tend to appreciate the fact that Carthage killed or captured five times more of the enemy then they lost themselves, and Hannibal showed that he could still slaughter legions with ease. However, this battle is often overlooked compared to the Battle of Praeneste and the Battle of Cannae, and this is rightly so, both of those battles showcased Hannibal’s ability far more than Grumentum did, but one cannot fault Hannibal for a lucky victory. He took advantage of the situation in front of him, which is what all great generals do.

After this, Hannibal’s march to Umbria went very well, and he made decent time. His army reached towards the end of July. From there, Hannibal and Hasdrubal devised a route to Rome, and planned on trying to siege the city if no army crossed them on their route. If an army did block them from Rome, they would highly consider bidding for peace with Rome, assuming they win a subsequent battle, as their numbers would likely be too depleted to attempt a siege on such a large and imposing city. If Rome was stupid enough to refuse, they would pay dearly.

**

Too corny? Too long? Too anti-Rome!?!? :eek:
If anyone has a constructive piece of criticism or a nice comment, please feel free to post! I'm all for making this as good as possible.

Oh, and here's the link to the old one, in case anyone's interested: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=163314
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