Chapter 115: The Capuan Winter
Chapter 115: The Capuan Winter
4de665dc896062f8bdba270b81907e15.jpg

Hannibal Barka's rest in Capua and the other middle and southern Italian regions that had allied with the Carthaginians and Punic Forces. During Spring and the upcoming Winter, Hannibal knew that his army, as well as the Romans would not operate during the frozen Winter periot. On his orders, Hannibal encouraged the locals to train their own forces, to help protecting the towns and cities that had split up from Roman rule to become free inside of Italy. They were trained by some of his veteran soldiers and mercenaries, who knew what they were doing, even if they were not the very best trainers and professionals for such a task. Hannibal knew that to win the Roman War he had to remain mobile with the vast majority of his forces, instead of dividing them to garrison the majority of the forces, that had joined him after Cannae in Italy. Therefore he was sending these forces that were tired of the fight and exhausted, as well as the wounded to help out with garrisoning and defending this cities and towns alongside local forces and militia. This way the battle exhausted parts of his forces could use their skill and knowledge to train others, while at the same time curing their wounds and mental exhaustion while staying in true homes and houses, eating real food again, instead of camping with him in the field and eating whatever they could find, take or trade as supplies. During most of this, Hannibal used his fast cavalry forces to serve as a guard for trade routes between this fortified allied cities, or to accompany and scout ahead of his own military movements, as the possibility of Roman ambushes and assaults to attack parts of his forces when they were divided was one of his greatest fears during this stage of the fight in Italy. Capua alone would supply Hannibal with 30,000 foot soldiers and 4,000 cavalry.

The same however was true for the Romans, who feared the fast Carthaginian cavalry copying their quick raids and assaults into Roman territory, surprising their towns, cities and moving forces. Their main hope was to cut of Hannibals forces from one another, while at the same time reestablishing connections with the 2 Roman Legions surrounded by Punic Allies in Suessula and the western Capuan coast in the south and southwest of Campania, who were cut off from the Romans main territory incentral Italy by Hannibals main forces in Capua. This forces in Cumae and Nola however threatened Hannibal's western flank and Capua itself, while securing the coast in Neapolis, Herculaneum, Cumae, Liternum and Volturnum. They also guarded Beneventium further inland, the major gateway to central Italy in the area. Therefore this two Legions were threatening to attack Hannibal's main allies in central Italy, should he march south or east. Because of this Hannibal knew how important I was to defeat them and take Nola, Abella and Beneventum in the inland, or Neapolis, Herculaneum, Hamae, Misinum, Cumae Liternum or Volturnum at the coast. The defeat of this two main Legions in his flank was therefore Hannibal's main goal to open up Carthagian reinforcements from sea as well as to secure the Samnite regions in central Italy as his main center for operations against Romes remaining forces in the east to secure all of southern Italy for Carthage.

The same problem of Hannibal was true for the two Roman Legions in Brundusium, who were holding much of Apulia up until the Aquilo River and Calabria, securing the southeast for Roma. Besides Brundusium, they also held Tarentum that was connected to Brundusium by the End of the Via Appia. The Roman Fleets there alongside this Legiones posied a huge treat to Hannibal's eastern flank and also prevented any raids by Carthagian Fleets from the south, limiting their operations on the western Italian Coast for now, were a Fleet in the Roman harbor of Ostia and one in Olbia on Sardinia secured the remaining Roman Legions on Corsica and Sardinia, while also defending the Roman coast against Punic raids and reinforcements for Hannibal's main army. In the south of Bruttium, the Carthagian ally of Locri faced the Roman allied city of Rhegium, the last remaining Roman ally in Bruttium, directly across from Sicily, were two Roman Legions were facing against two Carthagian armies, as well as the Sicilian cities and tribes, that had allied themselves with Hannibal by now. Hannibal knew that Rhegium could be easily taken either by Punic forces from Sicily, ones they had retaken the islands, or some forces of himself send south, while he assaulted Tarrentum to take the main southern Roman harbor. Both campaigns however could only be started, once Capua was secured, meaning that the Campanian coast and Beneventum had to be secured before and this meant the two Roman Legions remaining in Campania had to be defeated by his forces before.
 
Last edited:
Chapter 116: Punic Mercanaries/ Merchenaries/ Mercentaries/ Merchentaries/ Mercentri
Chapter 116: Punic Mercanaries/ Merchenaries/ Mercentaries/ Merchentaries/ Mercentri
1280px-Troupes_carthaginoises_Arverniales_2012.JPG

While in the Second Roman War, Shophet Hannibal Barca realised, that the masses of mercanaries hired by the Punic Republic and the Carthagian Empire caused another problem. Hannibals goal was not to destroy Rome, but to shrink it's land, influence and power by liberating the Italian tribes ans states it had conquered before. By doing so however Hannibal would rob them of the ability to pay back the the expenses of the overall war, this meant that the talent payed for the war could not come from them, less alone the newly liberatet states and tribes Carthage would have to rely on to keep a blance of power in Italy by preventing anyone of them, including Rome to rise to a regional power that could challenge them ever again. The destruction and costs of the war however were not only focussed on Italy, but on Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Hisperia as well. This meant money was needed for rebuilding this areas as well, but this left very little money for repaying the mercenaries who fought for Carthage. Hannibal knew this could cause another Mercenary Rebellion, meaning all he had worked so hard to redo after the outcome of the First Punic/ Roman War, could be for nothing if he did not pay his cards right. To avoid this problem before it even could arise, Hannibal introduced the so called Mercanaries/ Merchenaries/ Mercentaries/ Merchentaries/ Mercentri (depending on if they were named in Punic, Latin, Greek or other languages). They were still the Mercanaries Carthage had ever used, but with one major new addition to their current payment and use.
th

After the war, much like Legion Legionaries, they were rewarded for their long service with their own land as settlers and hopefully future citizens and loyal subjects of Carthage. This way Hannibal hoped he could use them as defensive peasents, in regions where some tribes still unrested against Carthagian/ Punic rule, or endangered the border regions of their state and territory. There the conditions were hard and harsh for normal citizens and the Mercentaries ad defensice peasents seamed much more fitting to be settled and defending this regions. They even had to pay much lower taxes then normal citizens in the region (with the exceptions of Metoikoi emigrants from other areas), hoping they all would bound with Carthage and Punic culture, traditions and religions more over time. However in exchange for this they had to remain ready for a call to arms in the next wars, or rebellions and border skirmishes in the regions, they were settled in. The name for this new type of mercanaries and settlers (Mercanaries/ Merchenaries/ Mercentaries/ Merchentaries/ Mercentri) deviated from the word Mercenary and Merchant, as they were payed to fight for Carthage, but became much more connected to Carthage, like other Mercanaries before, as they were more kind of like the Metoikoi, who chosed to live, work and die for Carthage, even if they never were would be full citizens. Now however they had the opportunity to do so under Shophet Hannibal Barca, who allowed them to get full citizen rights, even if their votes and senatory parties were still heavily relying on the old, already established factions and groups within the Carthagian State, who all tried to get their vote and support to guide the decisions and politics of the Carthagian Republic and Empire in the future.
 
Chapter 117: Mago Barca and the Numidian Numbers in Libya
Chapter 117: Mago Barca and the Numidian Numbers in Libya
fcb7dade42725107c8b5ab4a772fd30a.png

In Libya, the original Carthagian numbers were slowly going down, as troops were sent to Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Italy and Hesperia, while at the same time some forces from there came to Libya to fight the local Numidians. Carthago's originally 78,000 men were now partly made up by mercenaries and libyan troops, numbering 41,000 to 52,000 additional forces, who stood against 26,000 to 47,000 Roman allied numidians made up by the remnan forces of the Kingdom of Syphax (Masaesyli), mercenaries, Maurii, Garamantes and other southern tribes. The Romans tried to copy Hannibal's strategy against Mago here, by promising this nomadic tribes Punic land they did not own and had no interest in, while in exchange getting their forces and lure them in to fight the Punic Empire for them, as long as Roman forces would be occupied outside of Africa. Mago Barca however was no fool and ordered 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20 elephants to be send as reinforcements from his troops to Hannibal in Italy. Mago Barca, son of Hamilcar Barca, brother to Hannibal and Hasdrubal, and brother-in-law to Hasdrubal the Fair had supported Hannibal by commanding the Libyan Front, sending reinforcements to Hannibal in Italy, fighting with him in Cannae and other places, supporting the rebelling Hellenistic southern Italian provinces as before bringing the news of thos victories back to Carthage, fight against the Numidians once more and raise more forces to secure Libya or be send to Hannibal. Luck, fortune and the blessings of Baal prevented that Mago died during one of this expeditions or transports between Libya, Hesperia and Italy. His idea to use Froúrio (castles) and Agroikia Ochyrí (fortified farms) as fortified garrisons, to protect nearby Quart/Polis (City), Epílysi (small settlements and towns), Víla (Mansions) or even Quart-Metic/Quart-Paroikoi, captured enemy cities under now carthaginian rule and new Apoikía (Colonies) was brilliant and would lead to his later recognition by many historians as one of the most important Punic civil and military leaders, politicans and people of all time during the Second Great War and in Libya overall. The so called Monopáti (fortified boarder walls) however were his most brilliant idea, because while new roads speed up the Carthaginian/ Punic forces in Libya and Hesperia overall, this walls, gates, watchtowers and fortifications of all kind heavily limied the movement and strategic abilities of the nomadic tribes, to a future degree, where they no longer posed any significent threat to Carthage/ the Punic Empire/ Republic in Libya and could be easily kept in check and controlled by a small amount of garrison forces.
aIY3iq1.jpg

This brilliant strategy, tactic and idea of Mago was originally dictated by a simple fact; Hannibal needed as much forces as possible in Italy against Rome directly and while the masses of soldiers and mercenaries out of Hesperia were great, the skilled and numerous numidian/ Libyan cavalry was still the best all of Carthage had to offer in the eyes of most Punic people. Because of this Mago strategized that he had to use one of the western Fleets to bring in 10,000 infantry and cavalry forces from Carthage to support Hannibal. His own idea for a future invasion however involved 30 Carthaginian quinqueremes to escaort his sail for a invasion to Italy. His army would later sail over Corsica and Sardinia right to northern Italy unmolested by the Roman Navy, where Mago would capture Genoa and enforce Punic control over the region, warring with mountain tribes, gathering more troops and fighting against local tribes and Roman legions. Later during the Third Roman War, Mago would help to rise up the Etruscans and Ligurians against Rome with the support of 15,000 of his soldiers as garrison forces to defend their cities. During this time he would use his contacts from Genoa and northern Italy from the Second Roman/ Punic War before. While most Carthagians, Punics, Hesperians and Libyans remember Magi Barca for his role in Libya and alongside Hannibal, but the majority of Etruscans, Ligurians and Gauls in northern Italy would later remember him for his role he played in liberating their homelands and the Po Valley from the growing Roman influence and imperialism.
 
Last edited:
Chapter 118: The Third Battle of Nola
Chapter 118: The Third Battle of Nola
1024px-Campania_bellum_Hannibalicum_215_aC.png

While Hannibal had tried to capture Nola and the coastal regions before to connect him with the tribes and cities rebelling gainst Rome further East, or give him secure, fresh reinforcements from Carthage and Hesperia itself, the Romans did not stand by and just watched. Instead they raided the Hannibal allied towns and cities in the north (Treblia, Combuleia and Telesia) to shrinken his influence in the region before turning south and doing the same to Saticula, outflankng Hanibals position in Mons Tifata. However, when Hannbal turned east to support uprisingsin Sarguntum and help out against the Romans in Bruttii were fresh Carthagian reinforces helped out the locals against the Roman Legions and the Romanloal city of Rhegium. In the rest of south Italy (Magna Graecia) the Roman loyal cities of Tarentum and Brundisium prevented full pro-Punic control and even reinforcements from Macedon this year (who had attacked the Roman colonis of Apollonia and Oricum on their side of the Mare Hadriaticum), so Hannibal knew this southern Roman Holdouts had to go. The same was true for Beneventium, Canusium, Neapolis and Nola in central Italy, that prevented all of Capua an Samnium to join his sides. Two Roman Legions in Brundusium and Canusium and the two in Neapolis, Beneventium and Nola prevented his ull rule over southern Italy and with it the ability to finally march north on Rome to take the city and end this war. Luckily for Hannbal the Punic foces in Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily tied down four more Roman Legions, as did the Gauls in the Po Valley who'se raids forced the Romans to increas the number of their Legions there from four to five.
zpage210.gif

Hannibal knew this gave him precious time and while four more Legions threatened the north of his po-Carthagian allies in South Italy he knew he could make it if he just managed to take out the last Roman Remnants in the South First. The major problem with this strategy was even these allies, mainly the powefull Capua who needed his support to not fall bck to the Romans. Should such a major ally fall back into the Roman hands, who under Fabius Maximus and Marcus Claudius Marcelus once again raided nearby pro-Punic towns and cities like Combulteria and Telesia, the safety of the other Italian allies and their remaining loyallity was more then qustionable. Followed by Tiberius Gracchus, Hannibal rushed ahead with the fastest parts of his forces (only fast-moving light infantry and mounted cavalry troops) to secure Capua, leaving the rest under Hanno to march on Beneventium and take it. Hannibal Barca however outflanked the Roman stronghold to the north along the Calor river over Mons Tifata diectly onto Capua in forced march. The Fortress Casilinum in the north, guarding the Volturnus had fallen, but the Romans turned east to outflank Hannibal, giving him time to qickly march south over the Via Campana to the coast, whre he raided Hamae, Cumae, Misenum and Puteoli in hope of weakening the Roman defences there and tried to take Neapolis, but without heavy siege equipment could only raid the surrounding land of the besieged southern cities. So Hannibal turned east, to one again try to take Nola and by doing so secure a direct land access between his Capuan poition and his southern Italian allies.
4dfe600a728c6f7ebfcf80b02db92e24.jpg

The Thid Battle of Nola saw Marcus Claudius Marcellus trying once again to pevent the town's capture, by tryin to out-Hannibal Hannibal himself. To do so Marcellus ordered Nero ith a picke force of avalry and light troops on a night march to circle around Hannibal and fall on the Puni's rear. Then Marcellus marched out of Nola and faced Hannibal with his two Legions, however Nero and his forces never showed up, so Marcellus withdrew with his to the city. Hannibal knew that the situation would get better as a fresh Carthagian Army was coming from to Italy over Gaul and there were nes from Sicily that the Syracuse tyrant had allied with the Punic forces there. Together thy could drive the Romans out of the island hoped Hannibal and this would free new Carthagian fores for southern and central Italy. Until then however he had to do is part keeping the Roman Legions occupied and weakening them in Battle. So Hannibal layed a small siege to the city of Nola, knowing that Hanno's main Punic army heading towards Beneventium would have the full Roman attention for now. Without heavy siege equipment Hannibal questioned if he should tunnel underneath the defences, but then decided to use the mobility of his forces for a quick and fast assault.
hannibal-barca.png

During the third night of Hannibal's small sige of Nola, betrayal of some pro-Carthagian Italians opened the gates of the city, Italians who had followed Marcellus Italian Auxillary undetected into the city, believed to be arts of Nero's foces, who never showe up because Hannibal had spotted and defeated them shortly before the main Battle against Marcellus. Hannibal's fast forces rushed the city of Nola during the night trought the opened gate, totally surprising the majority of the Roman defenders. Marcellus and some other Romans could flee the onslaught as no new defence could be established this fast dring the chaotic battle of Nola. Marcellud fled east to Abella and then towards the Roman fortifiations in the city of Beneventium. Hanno meanwhile brought his 1,200 Numidian horsemen along with 17,000 Bruttians and Lucanians up the Via Appia from Bruttium. Hanno had been ordered down there on a previous occasion to stir up the southern cities of Magna Graecia against Rome and to recruit fresh soldiers, which he had done. Over the now surrounded city of Suessula that capitulated before Hannibal and along the city of Caudium, Hannibal's forces joined with those of Hanno.
 
Last edited:
It looks like the moment is coming decisive battle
Some major battles will come, even a Siege of Rome later to force them into submission, but TTL war is not won by Hannibal alone but also the other Carthagian commander's and Punic Allies across the Med who beat the romans, send new reinforcements while Hannibal has the main job in keeping them busy and weakening them in Italy itself. ;D
 
Chapter 119: The new Tyrant of Syracuse
Chapter 119: The new Tyrant of Syracuse
233172369d0cd8f2a022527d15a6a4c1.jpg

Sometimes a single man can change history, Hannibal was prove of it, but so were Archimedes and Hieronymus, the new youngest tyrant ruling over Syracuse. He had recently succeeded his grandfather, Hiero II, in 215 BC. Hieronymus was at this time only fifteen years old, and he ascended the throne at a crisis full of peril, for the Battle of Cannae had given a shock to the Roman power, the influence of which had been felt in Sicily. Though it had not shaken the fidelity of the aged Hiero, yet a large party at Syracuse was already disposed to abandon the alliance of Rome for a new one with Carthage. The young prince had already given indications of weakness, if not depravity of disposition, which had alarmed his grandfather, and caused him to confide the guardianship of Hieronymus to a council of fifteen persons, among whom were his two sons-in-law, Andranodorus and Zoippus. But the objects of this arrangement were quickly frustrated by the ambition of Andranodorus, who, in order to get rid of the interference of his colleagues, persuaded the young king to assume the reins of government, and himself set the example of resigning his office, which was followed by the other guardians. The young king now sent ambassadors to Hannibal, and the envoys of that general, the two brothers Hippocrates and Epicydes, were welcomed at Syracuse with the highest honors. In this heated political climate now arrived Epicydes or Epikudês a Carthaginian general of Syracusan origin, who was born and educated at Carthage as the son of a Carthaginian mother. His grandfather, after having been banished by Agathocles, had settled at Carthage. Epicydes served, together with his elder brother Hippocrates, in the army of Hannibal, both in Hesperia and Italy. When, after the battle of Cannae, Hieronymus of Syracuse sent to make overtures to Hannibal, the Punic Shophet selected the two brothers as his envoys to Syracuse. They soon gained over the wavering mind of the young king Hieronymus and induced him to desert the Roman alliance in favor of a new one with Carthage. This way Hieronymus became a mere tool in the hands of his two uncles, both of whom were favorable to the Carthaginian alliance and Thrason, the only one of his counselors who retained any influence over his mind, and who was a staunch friend of the Romans, was soon got rid of by a charge of conspiracy.

At the same time, the deputies sent by Appius Claudius, the Roman praetor in Sicily, were treated with the utmost contempt and it was evident that Hieronymus was preparing for immediate hostilities. He sent ambassadors to Carthage, to conclude a treaty with that power, by the terms of which the river Himera was to be the boundary between the Carthaginians and Syracusans in Sicily but he quickly raised his demands, and, by a second embassy, laid claim to the whole island for himself. The Carthaginians readily promised every thing, in order to secure his alliance for the moment, and he assembled an army of fifteen thousand men, with which he was preparing to take the field, having previously dispatched Hippocrates and Epicydes to sound the disposition of the cities subject to Rome. Nearly all of southern Italy, mainly the Greek speaking part joined Syracuse in it's anti-Roman rebellion and while not siding with Carthage directly, at least allied them against a common enemy. This new situation gave Carthage and Hannibal new great opportunities, as Rome, already nearly backed against the defensive wall of it's own city faced a new powerful enemy in Sicily with Syracuse as well. The southern Roman Army in Sicily was thereby cut off from most supplies and reinforcements from the north of Sicily as well as the Rest of Italy and the Roman Empire, soon pinned between the Carthagian Southern Sicily Army in the west and the fifteen thousand Syracuse forces in the east, who wished to crush them in a attempt to end Roman rule in Sicily. Freshly reinforced from Libya and Hesperia, the Carthagian armies and forces on Sicily aimed to destroy the Roman Army in the south, before turning north and then crushing the remnant of Roman resistance on the island. Afterwards one of these two Carthagian armies could be send to reinforce Hannibal in Italy, while one would remain to secure Carthage's position in Sicily. That was why the Carthagians had so quickly agreed to all of Tyrant Hieronymus demands, as Hannibal knew if they won the war, they would dominate Syracuse and Sicily either way and if they lost it, those promises weren't worth much either.
 
Chapter 120: The Battle of Beneventum
Chapter 120: The Battle of Beneventum
1024px-Campania_bellum_Hannibalicum_214_aC.png

The Battle of Beneventum occurred when Marcellus flew from Nola east over Abella towards the Roman fortifications of the city of Beneventum. Hanno marched onto the city from the east with a army of 17,000 Bruttians and Lucanians as well as 1,200 Numidian horsemen in hopes of bringing the Samnites and the southern cities of Magna Graecia into a full out, proper offensive alliance with Hannibal and Carthago. Meanwhile Hannibal and his partly Capuan army of 20,000 soldiers and 4,000 cavalry followed Marcellus northeast over Caudium coming from Nola to meet up with Hanno. By doing so Hannibal had been leaving one third of his army behind to secure Capua, as he needed to show Uxuntum, Bruttia, Lucaria, Picentes of Salernia, Harpini and most of Samnium had to be shown that Hannibal could protect them from Rome, as from the mouth of the Vulturnus river to the peninsula of Mons Garganus and south, only a string of Roman forts held out against Hannibal and his allies. The Roman Republic only had 18,000 Legionaries and cavalry at their fortifications of the city of Beneventum Hannibal knew that the Roman commander Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus would try to deny Hannibal the joining of both Carthagian forces to defeat in detail, so that afterwards the Romans could start their campaign to subdue the southern Italian city-states that had dared to join with Hannibal after Cannae. After capturing the city of Nola, Hannibal specifically had ordered Hanno to march to Campania over Beneventum. The consul Fabius had ordered Gracchus, a praetor, to march from Lucercia, where he had been wintering, on to Beneventum. Fabius' son, the Q. Fabius Maximus, was in command of a separate force, and was ordered to take possession of Lucercia. Fabius ordered Gracchus to Beneventum with the idea of cooping up Hannibal in Campania, he had failed to do this previously in 215 BC, and perhaps with the scheme in mind of preventing reinforcements from reaching him. However Fabius had any idea that reinforcements were on their way.

Hanno and Gracchus reached the city about the same time, but Gracchus got actual possession of the city due to the fact that there was a Roman garrison within it. He encamped about a mile outside of the city, astride Hanno's path. Hanno encamped roughly three miles from the city. It was at this time that Gracchus received permission from the senate to promise the two legions that consisted of slaves, that were the battle won, and they brought him the head of an enemy, they would be granted their freedom. It was not until the next day that the armies lined up in order of battle. The two sides arrayed their respective forces in a fashion typical of the day. Hanno, with his right wing on the Calor river, placed his cavalry. Next to these, in his center, came his infantry. To the left of these, was the other half of Hanno's cavalry, that was not protected by any topographical feature. The Roman line was longer than that of the Carthaginians. The Roman left was similarly arrayed, except that the Roman cavalry was stationed on the left. Traditionally, the Roman cavalry was weaker in number than the allied cavalry. To the right of the Roman cavalry were the legions. Traditionally, a Roman army consisted of four legions, the two Roman legions "Proper", made up by actual Romans, were on the inner part of the Roman line and the two allied legions were placed to the left and right of these respectively. To the right of the infantry was where the majority of the Roman cavalry was stationed.
c7056dd075cf0e2977b3b4b25489825a.jpg

The ensuing battle was a bloody slogging match. Gracchus' proclamation almost proved to be the Roman's undoing. As not only were the slaves stopping to decapitate the slain, but they were carrying them around the battle field with them, thus hampering them down. Realizing what was happening, he declared no man would be freed unless the enemy were completely defeated. While this was going on, Gracchus ordered his cavalry to attack Hanno's flanks, where the Numidian cavalry was stationed. The Numidian cavalry, fought skillfully against this cavalry charge, and for sometime the combat on the flanks was in doubt. However, Gracchus again sent word through his orderlies to the rank and file that unless the enemy were quickly defeated, they would not win their freedom. Being thus motivated, the slave legions made one last desperate push, and forced the Carthaginian army to retreat back to their camp, where they were swiftly followed by the legionaries themselves. Upon arriving in the camp, the Carthaginians found that some of their Roman prisoners had armed themselves with weapons. Hanno was completely surrounded it seamed, when suddenly Hannibal arrived with his army, just in time to pose a treat to the Roman flank, forcing their main army to retread on their left flank. This gave Hanno and his forces time to defeat the Romans at their camp, either slaughtering them, or taking some prisoners once again. As the Carthagian forces now greatly outnumbered the Roman ones two to one, Gracchus ordered a retreat to the fortifications of Beneventium. Around 2,000 Romans had been killed during the battle and 4,000 soldiers under Gracchus had displeased him so much, that he would later order them to eat their meals standing during the siege of Beneventum and the rest of their service in this Legions, a gesture clearly meant to dishonor them for a perceived lack of courage during the battle. Hanno not even knowing how barely he and his army had been saved by Hannibal's arrival joined Hannibal in the siege camp they now placed around Beneventum. Hanno used the victory to raise fresh forces in Lucania, Bruttium and Samnium itself against the Romans. These forces would help him in his siege of Beneventum, giving Hannibal a free hand to conduct a successful campaign in Campania and the south.

After interrogating the Roman prisoners, Hannibal also heard more about how Rome had used slaves in their Legions, with the promise of freeing them. This showed Hannibal that his campaign was a success, that Cannae had been a huge victory and that the Romans now fearing another open field battle with him were running out of manpower and allies in Italy, meaning that this war could be won. Nearly immediately Hannibal took two actions, one was sending a letter about the situation to Carthage, ensuring that with a little more money and fresh reinforces together with his new Italian allies who wished for liberation from Roman tyranny and oppression, the victory was in his grasp. The other message would be directed at the now in Beneventum besieged Romans themselves. Hannibal declared that he had not come to kill any Italians and that even all Roman civilians were free to leave who wished to do so. The Roman Legionaries meanwhile for that to happen had to become his prisoners alongside Marcellus and Gracchus in exchange for that to happen. Hannibal further promised that all Roman slaves inside the city would be freed from Roman rule and oppression, but unlike under Gracchus they would not have to fight and possible die for that dream. All they had to do according to Hannibal's words was simply opening the gates to the city and surrender the army with their commanders, everyone else was free to go wherever they wanted to.
M-Scipio-1.jpg

Hannibal knew that the Roman commanders would not accept this, but this wasn't his plan. He also knew how shocked the public would be about hearing that the times were so dire they now armed slaves to fight for them. Marcellus now was truly trapped as he could not simply disarm the slaves during the beginning siege as he needed their numbers, nor outright deny them their freedom and back off from his promises. At the same time the armed slaves would cause tensions inside the already besieged Roman population of the town. After his siege camp around the city of Beneventum was established Hannibal, still lacking proper siege equipment and engineers hoped that either Macedon or Syracuse could send him the needed supplies to Beneventum. At the same time Hannibal left Hanno in charge of the siege while he was recruiting fresh troops from nearby areas, especially Samnites who were all to eager to free their capital and join Hannibal's side as a once again freed Samnite people, reclaiming the independence they had lost in three Samnite Wars against Rome. Soon Beneventum was besieged by Hannibal's allies under Hanno, among them many Samnites wishing to free their capital, while Hannibal marched with the rest of his once again combined armies away. Hannibal knew that the Roman forces at the coast in Neapolis, Herculaneum, Cumae, Liternum and Volturnum still prevented any real Carthagian reinforcements coming from the west Coast. But he also knew that Hanno's forces together with those left in Capua, when combined were enough to besiege Beneventum and secure Capua from any Roman counter-attacks. While Hanno strengthened the siege walls and defenses around Beneventum and started to build smaller siege weapons to even further lower the Romans morale, Hannibal looked at his cards. In the south he could turn towards Tarentum and secure that important harbor for his supplies, knowing that the Roman Legion in Luceria, Canusium and Brundisium who were securing the provinces of Apulia and Callabria for now were the last major resistance against his dominance in all of southern italy, but would not be able to outright support a besieged Tarentum as that would mean abandoning their own cities defenses, unsure where Hannibal would truly arrive. All in one they were still one or two Legions and a Roman fleet there. They were however totally cut off from any reinforcements and supplies from the north and also had to defend the Roman colonies of Apollonia and Oricum at the border region towards Macedonia that was now allied with him, so they were quit occupied by now.

The same was true for the Roman Legions in Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, where Syracuse had just allied and sided with him, completely cutting off their secure ways back to the Italian peninsula and maybe even annihilating them. Because of that Hannibal thanks of the knowledge of Romans severe soldier situation, because of their use of slaves, decided to turn westwards. On his way there he could take the small town of Abella, maybe even without any siege as it had no true garrison and could not withstand his now once again powerful, unified army. Then the path to Tarentum and a link to his southern Italian and Greek allies was secured. However there were still one or two Roman Legion north of the Voltumsi river, securing the via Appia crossing there with their retaken fortifications at Casilinum, thereby endangering Capua. One or two additional Legions, so three to four in total, remained at Neapolis, Herculaneum, Cumae, Liternum and Volturnum on the Campanian coast. They therefore were Hannibal's next target. If he could defeat them, Capua and the siege of Beneventum would be secure and undefeated Punic victories. Further more if he attacked Casilinum and threatened their escape route north, or marched directly onto the coast with his forces in Capua covering his flanks, Hannibal could force the Romans to a difficult decision. Either their western forces fought for one another, or either looked how he would destroy them like so many before one by one, or they could march eastwards trying to relieve the siege around Beneventum. Either way Hannibal before surrounded in Capua and Campania was suddenly once again master of the situation as he forced the Romans to make a move on him with three Legions, while his two to three armies (Capua reinforcement/ garrison, his own troops and that of Hanno) were placed ideal in their middle, taking their time to watch their next move, ready to strike them as long as they were still separated.
 
Last edited:
Chapter 121: The Sicilian Campaign
Chapter 121: The Sicilian Campaign
chapter_121__the_sicilian_campaign_by_sheldonoswaldlee_ddbvwdl-fullview.jpg

Map: Sicily after Cannae/ Sicily during the Greek rebellion and Syracuse siding with Carthage/ Sicily after the Punic and Syracuse campaign to push the Romans out of the Island

In Sicily the Roman position was dire, when fresh Carthaginian reinforcements under Hippocrates arrived, 10,000 soldiers and 500 horses in total to reinforce the northern and southern Carthage Armies for their march on Agrigentum (Acragas) and Himera. Even worse for the Roman Commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus and the Roman Preator Appius Claudius faced a open rebellion of Greek cities and the newly formed alliance between Carthage and Syracuse. The south Roman Legion in Sicily was suddenly completely cut off from the northern one and the Romans had to use their blockade fleet to supply both Legions, leaving the coast not blockade any longer, thereby allowing further Punic reinforcements to land. Despite massive Punic reinforcements from Libya and Hesperia the main Roman concern was suddenly the greek, anti-roman rebellions and the fact that the Tyrant of Syracuse, Hieronymus was marching with his own army of 15,000 Hoplites onto the Roman positions to aid the Greek cities rebelling against Rome. Cut from most supplies and without many local allies and reinforcements left, the Roman rule on Sicily looked like it had come to a End. Hanno the Short had already build siege equipment to take Acragas (Agrigentum) but with the Greek cities rebelling against Rome and the Syracusean Army incoming he waited patiently, knowing the majority of the Romans had to head out of the well defended and important city to subdue the rebelling Greek cities, or they would be completely surrounded and Tyrant Hieronymus force would most likely even grow. The best option the Romans had, believed the Roman Commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus was to defeat the Syracusean Army and by doing so destroy all Greek-rebells hope of resisting Rome in Sicily any longer. Afterwards he could turn west again and deal with the Punic Forces who were not seeming to attack as it looked like. The Greek anti-roman rebellion had prevented any plans of attacking the Punic forces in Heraclea, where Hanno had fortified his positions in the last months.

In the north of Sicily the Romans had build fortifications alongside the Eleutherus river in preparation of the next Punic assault before it reached Solos. A third of their army thereby was left as a garrison along this walls, towers and forts, with the rest waiting in Solus or nearby camps to quickly support them should the Punic Army in the north make a move. However the Greek anti-roman rebellions, the sudden complete surrounding of the southern Roman Army by Greek rebels, Syracuse and Punic Forces and the march of a smaller, Syracuse Army northeast to free the greek rebelling settlements of Catane and Naxos, while marching further north to besiege Tauromenium and Messana lead to a retread of the northern Roman Army out of Himera east, only to receive news that the Greeks had already managed to take eastern Sicily with Syracuse forces of their smaller army and local greek rebels. The Roman Legion in the north already at Cale acte half the way to Messana knew their best chance was to return westwards to Himera again, but they were to late as the Greek Mercenary Commander Proxiancos had defeated their river defenses in detail and afterwards dealt with the small remaining garrison in the city itself afterwards, taking Himera for Carthage. The northern Roman Army now, similar to the remaining Roman city in southern Italy, Rhegium heavily depended on the Roman Sicilian Navy that had escaped to Lipara in the northern Liparian isles to escape the now dominating Punic and Syracuse fleets around Sicily.

In southern Sicily, the Roman Army under Commander Tiberius Sempronius Longus meanwhile faced against the Syracusean Army under Tyrant Hieronymus. While in the northeast his forces would face only little, local Roman resistance Tyrant Hieronymus himself would face some problems in the south as he tried to reinforce many of the rebelling Greek cities in hoop to further boost his numbers before taking Agrigentum (Agragas). Using this to his very own advantage, Commander Longus used his remaining fast cavalry to ambush the Syracuse infantry and slow them down so he could reach and fight them one after the other. After a few skirmishes and battles like this, Syracuse under his Tyrent was shrinking in numbers, realizing that following this strategy would only lead to their destruction and annihilation. Because of this Hieronymus searched a preferable battle field, where his Phalanx and Spears could crush the Roman Army and afterwards not only liberate Agrigentum, but also reinforce and secure the rebelling, southern Greek cities of Sicily under his protection. At first the battle looked like a easy Syracusean victory, but the Roman Commander Longus used his Legionares pila as javelin to thin out the enemy spear lines before they could even reach his forward formations and positions. When the Romans then used their small cavalry force to nearly surround and break one of the Syracuse flanks, the Greek army routed, forcing Hieronymus to retreat into the territory in the east of Sicily he had until then secured. Normally Tiberius Sempronius Longus would have followed him to crush the Tyrant and end the Syracuse power in a siege, but he was still out of reinforcements and many supplies and still had to worry about the Punic Army in his back, so he rushed westwards again, hoping to reach Agragas/ Agrigentum refresh his forces and then beat the Punic Forces like he had beaten the Syracuse army before.

Hanno the Short however had used the time he had meanwhile and left only a small garrison at Heraclea Minoa where he had prepared siege engines for Agrigentum (Agragas) to lead the bulk of his forces northeast along the Halycus river further inland. There they reached the road that linked Thermae Himeraerae south of Soloeis but before Himeria with Agragas/ Agrigentum in the south and Enna in the east via the mountains. Thanks to local scouts and mercenaries from the region Hanno knew that when the Roman Legion had dealt with the Syracus Army and some of the rebelling Greek cities they would be exhausted and massively weakened and had to take this or the southern road following the coast from Agrigentum to Inycum at the Ecnomus river. When the Romans showed up, Hanno ambushed the exhausted army with his own, fresh forces and nearly annihilated them, only a few Romans managed to escape to Agragas that was then besieged by the Punic force. Without any reinforcements and supplies running low in the south of Sicily many Greek rebelling cities openly rioted against Roman rule once again, but this time sided not with the Tyrant of Syracus who had lost a battle against Rome and abandoned them directly after this setback, but with Hanno the short, who had beaten the Romans and taken Agrigentum shortly after when his siege equipment finally arrived. Knowing about Hannibal's deal with Tyrant Hieronymus, Hanno the short accepted tribute as a thanks from this now free and autonomous Greek cities on Sicily and like Syracuse before promised them Carthage/ Punic protection from Rome without outright annexing the region into the Carthagian Empire. He also knew however that should Carthage win this war, they were much more powerful then Syracuse and with this local support their position on Sicily would be cemented once and for all after centuries of fighting with the Greeks over the island, a opportunity Hanno and the Magonid faction in the Punic Senate would not let go to waste if they had a chance. Thsi action secured western Sicily up to the Hymera River for Carthage.
 
Chapter 122: Corsican Skirmishes and Roman retreat
Chapter 122: Corsican Skirmishes and Roman retreat
c4f19b06f3674eba414d3df04e01e8b3.jpg

Naval raids piracy and skirmishes around Corsica increased, not only involving Punic and Roman Fleets (the Roman one operation from Ostia in Italy and Olbia in Sardinia) that tried to supply and reinforce their own forces on Corsica and Sardinia. The southern Punic Fleets in Sicily and Sardinia heavily limited Roman supplies and operations for Sicily and Sardinia in the south, but north in Corsica, things were now as easily, as Olbia was close to Aleria (Alalia) and the short naval distance could be covered and traveled more easily. Carthage tried to stop this reinforces by using their own fleet as well as pirates to raid their supply lines and coasts. The Roman Legion on Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, meanwhile hoped that at least reinforcements for the Punic forces could be stopped, denied or at least slowed down. Because of this situation, Mahar the Skilled, the Punic commander in Corsica had gained some reinforcements from Hesperia, still relied on local Corsican tribes and managed to do so by promising them some autonomy in their regions. Mahar traded the Corsican the promise of more autonomy under Carthaginian protection and bought wood from them for new Punic ships, as well as tribal warriors in exchange for Punic trade goods like Hesperian silver, wine, oil, wool, horses, fish and grain. This gave Mahar the opportunity to loosely ally himself with the northern Corsican tribes of Cilebensi and Venacini, that had finally openly rebelled against Roman rule after Cannae. This allowed the pro-Carthagian forces on Corsica to kind of directly control (or at least ousted Roman control) from northern Corsica all up to the Gocola River and the city of Marana, where the Romans had garrisoned some of their forces.
Facts_Carthage_Army_Ancient_6-min.jpg

This move meant that the Romans had to weaken their central and southern flank, the ideal starting position for his Punic forces, mercenaries and local Corsican tribal warriors to strike against the southern Roman held territories. This meant that their forces skirmished with the Romans in the South and allied themselves with the local tribes of the Belatoni and Subasani tribes, who raided up the Ticasius River all up to Mount Incudine. At the same time Mahars forces managed to repel the Romes from the south in skirmishes, as they feared to be cut off from Aleria because of the Belatoni and Subasani tribal warriors at his northwestern flanks. This forced the Romans to retread further leading to the fall of the towns and cities of Marianum (Bonifatio), Palla, Pontus Syracusanus, Rubra up to Portus Favonii (Favone), where the Romans maintained a defensive position and stopped the current Punic and Corsican assaults. Still Mahar the Skilled had managed to drive back the Romans in Corsica massively and greatly strengthen the Punic position on the Islands, even further as he knew his own increasing reinforces would rise soon once again, while the Romans could spare not as many forces for Corsica as long as Hannibal tied their forces up in Italy.
ddevrpb-07bb2beb-31d5-46f1-aac2-825abeccad40.png

Mahar however was not willing to stop there and tried to even gain the alliance of the eastern Corsican tribes of Macrini and Opini that would have allowed him to control the region between the Govola river and the Rothanus river to break the Roman influence in the north of Corsica. This would have meant that the Roman garrison in Marana would have been cut off from the remaining Roman Legion and reinforces in Aleria, maybe even forcing them to surrender to the Punic forces because of it. However Mahar's gamble failed and the Roman commander in Corsica, Gaius Samnion Pulcher managed to convince both Corsican tribes that siding against the Romans and their skilled Legions, who had two strong garrisons at the coast sandwiching their tribal lands in between would be a move they would regret all to soon. This allowed the Romans to at least hold onto some territory in eastern Corsica for now, despite the fact that they had lost some territory and would only increase to loose ground and numbers in Corsica against the Punics on the long run as it looked right now.
 
Chapter 123: Hannibal marches south trough Lucarnia
Chapter 123: Hannibal marches south trough Lucarnia
800px-Lucania_da_The_Historical_Atlas%2C_by_William_R._Shepherd%2C_1911.png

In the End Hannibal decided to march south an take Tarentum, knowing that with the harbor secured and Sicily soon falling he would receive additional forces from Libya and Sicily soon. The two Roman Legions there were securing the provinces of Apulia and Callabria, stationed in Luceria, Canusium and Brundisium. With their resistance gone Hannibal would dominate southern Italy and had a secured back to march on Rome to enforce a peace. Hannibal knew Tarentum could not be relieved without weakening other cities defenses, something the Romans would hardly dare now that Hanno had a second army. While Hannibal marched south towards Lucarnia the Romans did not stood by Idle, the two Roman Legions there eyed the city of Arpi who had switched sides to Hannibal, to retake it and show that doing so, even in southern Italy was a dangerous move. Hannibal had chosen Lucarnia, because besides the Romany eyeing for Arpi, one of the two southern Legions marched west, clearly to link their Roman territory to that in Capua and the west Italian coast, to cut off his the pro-Hannibal uprising regions into two. By marching over Lucarnia instead of the faster, smaller route down from Beneventium, Hannibal allowed himself to freshly recruit new Samnites and Lucarnians for his cause to directly oppose this threat and if everything went as he hoped, cut the remaining Roman forces in the southeast in half. This would not only provide a huge moral boost for the southern Greek cities and former Roman Federati. So Hannibal used a small contingent of his army, to besiege the Roman city of Paestum at the south-western coast of Oentriaans along his way, while at the same time promising the Lucarni that they would gain all Roman lands and colonies there if they helped him take the city, while promising the same to the Brutii in Croton regarding the southern cities of Magna Grecia, Locri and Rhegium. Yes Hannibal even suggested to them to call for Punic and Syracusean help from Sicily if needed.
800px-Grab_der_Granat%C3%A4pfel_heimkehrender_Ritter.jpg

The Romand heard of this outrageous plans and send one of their Legions as reinforcements from Brindusim over Tarentum westwards into Lucarnia to reinforce the small, besieged Roman garrison in Paestum, hoping to subdue the Lucarnians along the way and thereby secure the majority of southern Italy once again for Rome. What they did not know, was that Hannibal had not been interested in taking those cities outright and directly, but rather had hoped to once again force the Romans into a move towards him, a move that would allow him a open Battle in the Field, a Battle during which he would be able to once again annihilate a Roman Army. Afterwards he could threaten Tarentum, Luceria, Canusium and Brundisium much easier with the Roman defensive and offensive capacities there crippled. The Romans meanwhile did not wait for his move, but tried to retake Casilium at the Volturnus river. The fortified town itself helped the Punic forces and their allies to stop all Roman trade and supplies upwards the Volturnus river. This meant that Casilium was not only a possible way towards Capua directly itself, but also a barricade to the more northern towns and cities like Combulteria and Telesia who had joined the Carthaginians. Under Fabius Maximus the Roman Forces besieged Combulteria with superior forces. The Romans even managed to break the fortified defenses and swarm into the city itself. However too many Roman forces were now pouring in at once and became too crowded in the tiny streets, quickly even getting outflanked by the numeral inferior Punic and Capuan forces as well as local civilians up in arms. As the Romans were flanked and slaughtered by a far inferior force who seamed to have surrounded them panic spread and their Legionaries fled out of the city in fear. While Combulteria would rebuild it's defenses to their best abilities, despite their own losses the Romans under Fabius Maximus would head northwards and raid the pro-Punic cities of Combulteria and Telesia as a example to all who had joined Hannibal what would await them if they would not return to Roman rule and hegemony by their own free will. The move was also intended to lure Hanno northwards, so that he would break the siege of Beneventium, but he did not fall for such a obvious trap.
chapter_123__hannibal_marches_south_trough_lucarni_by_sheldonoswaldlee_ddfwm6o-pre.jpg
 
Chapter 124: Sardinian Raids and Skirmishes
Chapter 124: Sardinian Raids and Skirmishes
c5639c3ec6f0cf83ac6b8b017fda196b.jpg

While the loss of Carales/ Karales and the Roman Commander Quintus Mucius Scaevola was a heavy blow for the Roman position on Sardinia, Luckily for the Romans, they still had a Fleet in Olbia and the mountain passes and roads between Olbia and Tibula, the two main cities still under their control, favored their now more defensive strategy. That was mainly due to the fact that the Punic forces from the west and the south had long roads to march until they would reach the Roman held cities, but at the same time the Roman roads allowed them to not only block these mountain passes, but to switch between them and the defended cities on roads that were only one forth, or one seventh of those that the Punics had to march back over to try a different approach. So all things considered, the Romans still found themselves in a pretty secure, easily to defending position, even if they had been pushed to the northeastern tip of Sardinia. This meant that Hasdrubal the Bald had to use the Nurrensi and Nuragici (Barbaria) tribes of Iolei and Balari to further boost his forces against the Romans with mercenaries and tribal warriors in a attempt to outflank them. At the same time, the Romans used the Longonesi and Lestriconi tribes still loyal to them, or at least living in Roman controlled territory, to recruit their own native tribal forces. The best idea in Hasdrubals mind was to use a Carthaginian Fleet to defeat the Roman one in Olbia and deny them any retreat or further reinforcements, but doing so would endanger his own abilities to gain fresh forces as reinforcements from Hesperia and Libya, should they loose such a naval battle. Because of this Hasdrubal the Bald remained patient and waited for a better opportunity, but with Punic victories in Corsica, Sicily and even Italy itself, he did not wish to stand by and wait any longer while others gained fortune and glory. So Hasdrubal crafted a plan where his native, tribal Corsican allies would march onto Rome over the northern coastal road, endangering Tibula and over the eastern coastal road, endangering Olbia, while he and his Carthaginian army would march across the island to the northeast on a third path.

The Romans were no fools and realized how dangerous this could be for their position in Sardinia, so they came up with a strategy to counter the Punic one. They tried to slow down the native Sardinia tribal warrior forces on the East Coast of Corsica, by employing their fleet to stop their advance northwards. This way they could focus on dealing with the Punic army, while hoping that the northern tribal warriors of Sardinia would either be dealt with before or after the Punic army itself, depending on whose forces would arrive first before the nearest Roman city. The Roman ambush at the coast meanwhile worked like a charm and managed to not only slow down, but rout and lead to their whole group fleeing southwards, as they believed the Roman forces landing from their ships at the beaches and coast to be a entirely new Roman army, fresh from Italy. So just in the chase this was true, they returned to their mountain towns and strongholds. At the same time the northern forces of Sardinians reached the first farms and small towns of Romans and Longonesi. However the Romans did not react as hoped, as they knew this tribal force would only become truly dangerous when it had reached the city of Tibula itself. So the Romans focused on the main Punic army heading to them over the mountain passes. Splitting their own forces into two smaller groups, the Romans hoped to catch the Punics by surprise, to outflank them over the three passes in the area, to surround and destroy their forces. The Cathaginians meanwhile had no idea if the Romans had not preemptively blocked one of the mountain passes to slow them down, or force them onto another route, so Hasdrubal the Bald had ordered his forces to split up as well. This lead to a few skirmishes, as well as Battle of the Three Mountain Passes in the Sardinian mountains. With losses to both the enemy and the terrain and weather, both armies retreated back, but the Roman skirmishers and cavalry in small groups harassed the Punic army all the way back to Carales/ Karales. This left the remaining northern tribal forces without any reinforcement when the Romans redirected their attention north to defend Tibula before they could reach it. In the Skirmish of Tibula in the outskirts of the city, the better trained, better equipped and better organized roman forces defeated the tribal Corsican warriors and routed them, with nearly half of their warriors dying during this battle, while Roman losses overall remained medium.
 
Chapter 125: The Battle of Tarentum
Chapter 125: The Battle of Tarentum
22lotta-ponte.jpg

When Hannibal marched south to Tarentum, the Romans believed the time was right to strike at Capua, the Campanian capital that had revolted against them after Cannae. The city had served as Hannibal's winter quarter and his proximity deterred the Romans and endangered nearby still pro-Roman cities like Beneventum were Hanno besieged their forces. They had managed to take Casilinum a major part to secure their crossing of the Volturnus river to march further south onto Capua itself. Hannibal meanwhile had marched south, ready to take Tarentum in hope that this richest city in all of southern Italy. With Tarentum in his hands Punic Fleets could easily bring in fresh reinforces from Libya and Hesperia defeating the Romans once and for all. Secretly Hannibal hoped for a success big enough to risk the loss of Capua for a short time. Marching trough Lucania, Hannibal made the Roman Legions in Brundusium and Tarentum, connected over the Via Appia unsure if eh would strike at them or turn southwards towards Rhegium and taking the city there, allowing his Punic Army and their Syracusae allied to pass over the Sicilian Strait into Southern Italy, directly aiding him against Rome. Either was possible, either outcome as a victory for Hannibal could change the tide of this Second Roman/ Punic War in favor of the Carthaginians and their Allies. Hannibal was sure of his victory in Tarentum, as he had been in communication with a party of Tarentine citizens who were unhappy with Roman rule. A previous attempt had been made by the people of Tarentum to rid themselves of the Romans. However, it was thwarted by the precautions that the Roman commander of Brundisium had taken. He took effectual means for the defense of the city and sent some of the possible malcontents to Rome to serve as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest of the population. These hostages were later caught trying to escape, several of whom were then convicted by the quaestores parricidii and sentenced to be flung from the Tarpeian Rock. This act infuriated the people of Tarentum, who renewed their communications with Hannibal, more determinate then ever to get rid of the Romans once and for all.
1024px-Tarentum_assedio_213-212_BC.png

The Roman governor of the city Marcus Livius, was said to be a good soldier, but also be a man of indolent and luxurious habits. On the night appointed by Hannibal for the attack he was feasting with friends and retired to rest, heavy with food and wine. In the middle of the night he was awakened when the conspirators blew the alarm on some Roman trumpets and found Hannibal and 10,000 of his soldiers already within the city. Many of the Roman soldiers were asleep or drunk and were cut down by the Carthaginians as they stumbled out into the streets. Hannibal kept control of his troops to the extent that there was no general looting. Committed to respecting Tarentine freedom, Hannibal asked the Tarentines to mark houses where Tarentines lived. Only those houses not so marked and thus belonging to Romans were looted. Marcus Livius managed to bring his surviving troops to the citadel fighting, where they held off the Carthaginians for the duration of the initial assault. However, the city was lost. All the Greek towns in Southern Italy with the exception of Rhegium were now under Hannibal's control. Thanks to this Southern Italy provided Hannibal with a powerful foothold on the peninsula. However, when he heard news that the Romans were besieging Capua he turned his army around and only days after capturing Tarentum he would be outside of Capua. In the First Battle of Capua the besieging armies were temporarily driven off. At this point in history Hannibal looked invincible, having allies in southern Gaul, and owning Southern Italy and Iberia. Cities in Sicily such as Syracuse had revolted against the Romans in favor of Hannibal as well. Hannibal was also promised the support of the powerful army of King Philip V of Macedon across the Adriatic. This help soon came in form of some engineers from Syracuse and Macedon send to Tarentum, where they helped the small Punic Garrison and the local militia to aid them in their assault on the last held Roman fortifications atop of the Acropolis of Tarentum. There the Romans held their ground for now, hoping to get reinforcements from nearby Brundusium and control the entrence to the port to deny the Punic Fleets bringin in any reinfocements.
 
Last edited:
Chapter 126: Siege of the Tarentum Acropolis
Chapter 126: Siege of the Tarentum Acropolis
04navalbattle.jpg

With all of Tarentum, but the Acropolis and fortress in Tarentum and Punic hands, the Roman governor of the city Marcus Livius, was facing problematic times. He already had lost the majority of his Legion during the surprising Punic assault and it was unlikely that the Roman Legion in Brundusium was sending the besieged forces in the Acropolis and Fortress of Tarentum relief over the Via Appia. After all it was very likely that Hannibal and his forces waited for them in Ambush along the way, anticipating such a move and had only assaulted Tarentum to lure them out of the security of their fortified cities, to force them into another battle in open terrain, where Hannibal would dictate the fight and it's outcome once more. To prevent that from happening, Marcus Livius himself did not openly call for any reinforcements of Tarentum just now as long as he could hold the Acropolis and the Fortress against the remaining Punic Garrison and the pro-Carthaginian Tarentine citizen militia. To prevent any Punic Forces from arriving in Tarentum, the Roman Fleet from Brundusium, originally needed to secure the eastern Adreatic Roman Colonies from Macedon by shipping the Roman Legion in Brundusium over there in times of needs, was send south to blockade the harbor of Tarentum and to force any Punic Navy back trying to bring in reinforcements into the city. This naval skirmishes in the Gulf of Tarentum wold continue over the duration of the Second Punic War. Meanwhile the Macedon and Syracusae engineers send to help the Carthaginian and Tarentine forces helped build a bridge from the other side of the peninsula between the Gulf of Tarent and the Small Sea inland. Now the Acropolis looked like it was besieged from two sides, four if the Tarentine and Punic forces would bring in their naval ships from the Gulf of Tarent and the inland Small Sea as well during a direct assault on the city itself. The Romans already short on overall forces inside the Acropolis now had to dispatch guards and reinforces all over the Acropolis to ensure their watch for the upcoming Punic and Tarentine assault, as well as to make sure that they were no further enemy infiltration's, spies and other incursion from inside too.

What made the Roman defenders even more nervous was that over the next months they could not only see how a few Punic reinforcements made it trough, but also how the enemy constructed siege engines outside of the Acropolis to breach their fortified fortress position atop of the hill above the city itself. Onager, scorpions siege towers and battle ramps had been build and were moved towards the Acropolis for the siege battle. The Romans knew they had to do something, or would be defeated and killed like the Romans already thrown out of the main city of Tarentum. The Romans tried to fire down upon the siege weapons and even set them to fire with arrows, amphorae filled with oil, but not many of their attempts worked out as the attackers heavily defended enough of their siege weapons to the upper walls around the Acropolis. The Punic forces and their Tarentine allies quickly tried to climb the walls and take over the Acropolis. Heavy fighting took place all over the hill above the city and it was a close battle, but in the End the Tarentines and their Carthaginian allies managed to liberate all of the city of Tarentum from the remnants of the Roman garrison and killed nearly every defending Roman Legionarie in the Acropolis, those few that had survived were send as slaves back to Libya, where they would work on Punic plantations and in Punic mines. With Tarentum in Punic hands and now governing itself, the chances of Hannibal receiving reinforcements from the south thanks to the Punic Navy had grown massively, at the same time this new strong Carthaginian position directly threatened nearby Brundusium all by itself without the need of Hannibal's or another Punic Army down in South Italy. The tides had once again turned in Hannibal's favor thanks to the genius of Hannibal and his skilled fellow Carthaginians and allies alike.
 
Chapter 127: Lucarnian Skirmishes
Chapter 127: Lucarnian Skirmishes
U3ontzy.png

While Hannibal Barca besieged and took all of Tarentum, the Roman forces in Brundusium had not simply stood around either. Three whole cavalry groups called Celeres (Swift Squadron) of around 300 men each rode out to harass Hannibal's supply lines in Lucarnia, followed by some Roman Legionaries and other local garrison forces supporting them. Their plan was to harass and destroy the long supply line of Hannibal and cut off his forces from supplies and reinforcements. To do so these Roman forces headed out into Lucarnia and raided the countryside. However unsuspected to them and also the Punic Forces under Hannibal, the Lucarnian region of Southern Italy feared that the return of Roman power would mean once again Roman colonization and enslavement, as Hannibal had freed many Roman slaves in the region and gave away roman lands to the local towns and people. Therefore many of the freed local forces and even some formally Roman auxiliary forces opposed their raids and burning down of farms and small towns. The also hoped that this would force Hannibal to end his siege of Tarentum, by forcing him to come to the aid of the terrorized Lucarnians. While the Romans first raids were successful and lead to Hannibal rushing north, their next assaults on Lucarnian farms and towns were met with quit some resistance as the local Lucarnians had managed to gather a small force of their own and defend their home region against the returned Roman invaders. Fearing Roman retaliation and revenge, they headed out to fight together instead of waiting for the Roman Legions to come to them and defeat them one after another. This meant that they openly opposed the Romans, or at least tried to do so by setting up ambushes and blocking off pathways, trying to lure them into a region were their superior armor, shields and tactics could hopefully be neglected.
Spartacus-0718.jpg

But unlike the Lucarnians had planned, the Roman Legionaries were no fools and neither were their commanders, even if Hannibal had made them look like such before. So when the Lucarnians faced them, they used their shield formations to block their arrows, spears and slung stones, hiding behind a tide formation and marching onto the enemy who clearly laced a overall unifying commander or general structure in his defensive line, as many of his forces were thrown together hastly and each rather listened to their own commander. This was in parts also as the Lucarnians could not settle on a unified supreme leader for the battle, as such a position would have indicated that this individual would have great authority over them once their independence was secured too. Having only been subjected to Rome for 56 years by now the wish for autonomy and independence in Lucarnia and other parts of southern Italy (like the Samnites and Greek settled regions) was quit strong and growing every day thanks to Hannibal's victories, propaganda and diplomacy. Even some Campanian, Samnites and Brutian mercenaries and warriors had therefore joined the Lucarnians in their struggle, but their diversity was not a support like under a brilliant commander and leader like Hannibal, but only further confused the overall command and strategy. Thanks to this the Lucarnian Ambush failed to break the Roman lines and defenses, while the Roman counterattack crushed the rebels lines, slaughtered most of them and forced the rest of them to flee. This was why Hannibal had demanded to use most of this forces as local garrisons only and just incorporate those inside his own mobile army he deemed to be fit, well trained and obedient enough to do so. Now the Romans have had a chance to rampage trough Lucarnia, kill many troops that could have otherwise secured local villages, towns and cities and threatened Hannibals supply lines. However once news of Hannibals forces heading home and the fall of Tarentum arrived, the Romans retreated back to Brundusium as quickly as they could, avoiding a open field battle with him if they could, especial as it would most likely have meant the loss of parts of the Legion still remaining there.
 
Chapter 128: Slaughter of Arpi
Chapter 128: Slaughter of Arpi
4d90738c8ee79a03202ed1e040d5ddfc.jpg

In northern Apulia, Arpi had not switched sides with Hannibal Barca after this victory over the Romans in Cannae, but remained faithful to the Romans. However Roman Consul Quintus Fabius Maximus who had also ordered the Lucarnian raids from Brundusium, son of former Roman dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus headed out to attack and conquer it for his very own goals and ambitions in the region. Laying on a by-road from Lucernia to Sipontum, Verrucosus intended to capture it and redistribute the land among himself and his loyal fellow soldiers. Intending to defend themselves, the Arpani settled out with 6,000 foot soldiers and 500 horses to defeat the Roman expedition before it would reach and besiege them. Unlike in Lucarnia, where the Romans faced a bunch of unorganized and not heterogeneity groups, the Arpani forces were organized and had a unified leadership to oppose the Romans in battle. They tried to stop the Roman Legionaries heading to their city south of it before they would reach it and manage to set up a camp and build siege equipment. The Arpani lines stretched out far an tin to not get overwhelmed by the slightly bigger Roman Legion numbers, securing their lands in northern Apulia from this aggressive, unprovoked assault onto their still loyal Roman city. Outraged that the Romans dared to assault them and claim their poor city, that had done nothing wrong to cause such a reaction and aggression in the first place. The battle would went on for several ours during winch the Arpanti tried to use a kind of Cannae on the Romans once again, as some of them had heard of the strategy during this battle by now. They therefore allowed the Romans to penetrate into their center line and force it back, while their flanks closed in on them, hoping that the cavalry would help with a decisive blow from the back, closing the encirclement for good. However unlike Hannibal at Cannae, the Arpanti tried to speed up the process by retreating back to quick, not only warning the Romans by this movement itself, but also allowing them to have some space between their ranks and lines.

This however prevented a too crowded situation inside of the planned Arpanti trap to tight their Roman Legionaries so close together that they could move anymore, unlike in Cannae. Therefore the Roman Legionaries had more room to navigate and use their weapons, allowing for their main shield lines to break trough the Arpanti formations at the center and turn their trap back on them. By breaking trough their line, the Arpanti forces started to rout and flee, leaving their two flanks now wide open for the Romans in the middle and at their own, new flanks in the front and the back. Trying to desperately save the situation, not realizing that the battle was already lost, some of the Arpanti forces still tried to crush the Roman Legionaries between their now two army groups, but only ended up losing more forces as they now themselves were getting encircled. What little force remained of them and managed to flee back to Arpi had to watch helplessly as the Romans under Consul Quintus Fabius Maximus started to build a camp, surround the city and lay siege to it. Within only two month the Romans would have managed to take Arpi and declare it to one of their new Colonies, partly opposing Hannibal's anti-Roman anti-Colonial strategy and tactic by doing the exact opposite; encouraging Roman colonists to form defensive communities all over the rebelling Southern Italian Peninsula in hope that this would strengthen their hold in the region and further force Hannibal's forces to be restricted to certain areas, luring him out in the open on a battleground they had chosen in advance this time, or simply force him to become cut off from trade and supply routes slowly weakening his forces and starving out his army otherwise.
 
Chapter 129: Siege and Second Battle of Beneventum
Chapter 129: Siege and Second Battle of Beneventum
torredeasalto.jpg

When Hannibal and his forces headed north towards Brundusium again to meet up with Hanno's besieging forces there. Untill now the Roman defenses had partly increased until then. But Hannibal wasn't without surprises either and he brought with him some of the Macedon and Syracuse engineers that hat already helped the Punic Forces of Carthage during the Siege of the Tarentum Acropolis. As a open field battle with Hannibal had proven disastrous, the new Roman strategy was to prepare well defensible fortified positions like cities for long sieges, together with torched land politics playing with the idea that Hannibal would be unable to supply his forces for long times out of the destroyed land, grinding down his numbers and moral. But with the engineers now in his army, Hannibal had a secret weapon, the Romans were not aware about. Hannibal knew that Sarguntum would switch to his side, once the capital Beneventum was freed from Roman oppression and all Samnite lands would be freed by Hannibal, once the Samnites rallied behind him in large enough numbers too. To decrease the moral of the defenders Hannibal's Carthaginian, Numidian, Gallic, Bruttian, Lucasian and Greek forces started building their siege engines in their well fortified siege fortifications around the city of Brundusium, so that those besieged could see the weapons of doom that would soon come over them. While the Punic Commander could not use his horsemen and cavalry in this siege battle, mostly his infantry and they would have to storm the well fortified walls and barricades streets of the besieged city. More then 25,000 soldiers under Hannibal would besiege around 18,000 Romans inside the city, many only quickly armed militia, so that about 6,000 to 8,000 were badly trained, unreliable or so badly equipped that they were only poor light troops compared to Hannibal's forces, even if the later ones often used mostly captured enemy equipment for many of their forces. Meanwhile Hannibal's cavalry, was send to secure his supply and reinforcement lines to Capua, partly for their own supply, partly to deter any Roman attempt to attack Capua, were one third of his Army remained as a front garrison against the Roman Legions in the Campania.
800px-Grab_der_Granat%C3%A4pfel_heimkehrender_Ritter.jpg

The Romans in Beneventum had well prepared for Hannibal's attack, but while they could arm more militias, prepare barricades and hoped for further Roman reinforcements to arrive in time and be able to lift the siege the Punics had erected around the city. They even tried to head out and destroy the siege weapons during construction, but Hannibal's siege fortification proved to strong. Knowing this danger as well Hannibal rushed his siege weapons building and attacked as soon as everything was ready. Knowing that the Romans would have to split up their forces, not knowing where he would attack their walls, Hannibal even had a few decoy siege weapons build, not even fully functional and constructed normally, just well enough to fool the defenders that there was more to come, then he truly had. With this tactic, he managed to trick them into believing he would assault a few places of the walls at once, while in reality he only would truly focus most of his forces on a small part of the walls and their towers to overwhelm and surround the Roman defenders in this positions as quickly as possible, giving him a food in the door towards the city. With this towers and walls taken, Hannibal could bring in further reinforcements. Still his fake siege weapons prevented the Romans from sending in all of their reinforcements at once. Knowing the Romans had barricaded parts of the city to force him into certain choke-points. Therefore Hannibal approached slowly trough the streets, utilizing his captured wall positions to rain down javelin, slinger or archer fire on those defensive positions his light and heavy infantry then targeted mainly. In the End of the siege Hannibal had lost around 4,000 of his soldiers, with 5,000 more being injured or wounded in a way, but he had managed to successfully besiege and take his second major city after Tarentum and destroy the Roman position in central Samnia and central Southern Italy. The siege also send a shock throughout the Roman Republic, as suddenly a direct siege of Rome seamed to be possible too.
 
Top