Carter doesn't let the Shah into America: How is the 1980 election affected?

Imagine for a minute that the Shah doesn't enter the US for medical treatment in late 1979. This could be because Carter and his people persuade him to go to Switzerland instead (the Iranians would be unlikely to fear a plot by the dastardly Swiss:rolleyes:), or the Shah dies of a heart attack while he's in the Bahamas or Mexico, or something.

Whatever the reason, the result is that come 1980 there is no Iranian Hostage Crisis to captivate the nation and eat away at Carter's approval. How would the presidential election be affected? Even with no hostage crisis, there would still be the economic problems of late 1970s America, and as President, Carter still gets the blame, no doubt. Reagan would still be able to use his "Are you better off now than 4 years ago" line in the debate. It would still be an uphill climb, but would Carter nevertheless have a shot at re-election?

Personally, I think Carter would still lose, but his loss might resemble more that of Bush Sr's loss in 1992 than the lopsided blowout of OTL 1980. Here is my thought about how the electoral map might look like in a "No hostage crisis" election:

1980

genusmap.php


Ronald Reagan/George H.W. Bush 49.3%, 369 EV
Jimmy Carter/Walter Mondale 43.0%, 169 EV
John B. Anderson/Patrick J. Lucey 6.1%, 0 EV

Regardless of whether Carter actually wins or just loses by a smaller margin, how would the congressional election be affected? Might Reagan's coat-tails be blunted enough that the Democrats would retain the Senate? After all, in both the '68 and '72 elections Democrats kept control of Congress despite the defeats of their presidential nominees.
 
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I'm more interested in how relations between the Iranians and Americans will develop in the decades to come. The lack of a hostage crisis will probably make both sides more friendly to the other. Maybe Iran will be less of a touchstone in future debates? I wonder if Iran-Contra goes off--and if it does, what the fall-out will be. After all, ITTL, there may very well be nothing particularly problematic about selling weapons to Iran (aside from any negotiating-with-terrorists bromides).
 
I'm more interested in how relations between the Iranians and Americans will develop in the decades to come. The lack of a hostage crisis will probably make both sides more friendly to the other. Maybe Iran will be less of a touchstone in future debates? I wonder if Iran-Contra goes off--and if it does, what the fall-out will be. After all, ITTL, there may very well be nothing particularly problematic about selling weapons to Iran (aside from any negotiating-with-terrorists bromides).

Yes, there is of course the wider repercussions in the Middle East and the world to consider. For one, Saddam might be dissuaded from invading an Iran that is still an ally (albeit tacitly) of the U.S. That in turn would cause all sorts of butterflies (no Iran-Iraq War, no invasion of Kuwait etc.). Iran and the U.S. could very well find common ground in opposing the USSR and "godless" communism, regardless whether the President is Carter or Reagan. That bit I added about the Senate possibly staying Democrat due to a narrower Reagan win was due to the consideration that Reagan might have more difficulty with getting his domestic agenda passed through a Democratic congress.
 
Yes, there is of course the wider repercussions in the Middle East and the world to consider. For one, Saddam might be dissuaded from invading an Iran that is still an ally (albeit tacitly) of the U.S. That in turn would cause all sorts of butterflies (no Iran-Iraq War, no invasion of Kuwait etc.). Iran and the U.S. could very well find common ground in opposing the USSR and "godless" communism, regardless whether the President is Carter or Reagan. That bit I added about the Senate possibly staying Democrat due to a narrower Reagan win was due to the consideration that Reagan might have more difficulty with getting his domestic agenda passed through a Democratic congress.

Well, most historians now believe that the mob that seized the embassy did so on their own initiative, with the Ayatollahs jumping on the bandwagon once the hostages had been taken. Said mob was convinced that the embassy was being used as a base by the CIA, and might well have taken it even if the Shah hadn't been admitted to the US. But lets say that the Shah not being in the US is enough to prevent the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. This would have major effects on the Iranian regime-while the 1979 Revolution is often thought of as Islamic, the Shah had managed to piss off most of the Iranian population, and the people who overthrew him came from many different political backgrounds-Khomeinists, Communists, other leftists, liberals, etc. Initially, all of these groups participated in the revolutionary government, but during the early 1980's the Khomeinists-largely enabled by the climate of fear generated by the Iran-Iraq war and the general international condemnation of Iran-were able to turn against the other factions, and gradually destroyed them as organized groups (culminating with the mass arrest of Communist party members in 1983). No Iran-Iraq war will make Khomeini's consolidation of power much more difficult, and he won't be able to turn against say, leftists without angering much of the population. This will likely lead to a much more fractured and unstable Islamic Republic, which collapses sometime in the early 1990's once Khomeini isn't around to hold it together.
 
Well, most historians now believe that the mob that seized the embassy did so on their own initiative, with the Ayatollahs jumping on the bandwagon once the hostages had been taken. Said mob was convinced that the embassy was being used as a base by the CIA, and might well have taken it even if the Shah hadn't been admitted to the US. But lets say that the Shah not being in the US is enough to prevent the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. This would have major effects on the Iranian regime-while the 1979 Revolution is often thought of as Islamic, the Shah had managed to piss off most of the Iranian population, and the people who overthrew him came from many different political backgrounds-Khomeinists, Communists, other leftists, liberals, etc. Initially, all of these groups participated in the revolutionary government, but during the early 1980's the Khomeinists-largely enabled by the climate of fear generated by the Iran-Iraq war and the general international condemnation of Iran-were able to turn against the other factions, and gradually destroyed them as organized groups (culminating with the mass arrest of Communist party members in 1983). No Iran-Iraq war will make Khomeini's consolidation of power much more difficult, and he won't be able to turn against say, leftists without angering much of the population. This will likely lead to a much more fractured and unstable Islamic Republic, which collapses sometime in the early 1990's once Khomeini isn't around to hold it together.


I wonder how the Soviets would react to a viable communist state in Iran (besides jumping for joy).
 
I wonder how the Soviets would react to a viable communist state in Iran (besides jumping for joy).

I doubt that would be the result-the Iranian government in a no Iran-Iraq war TL would still be led by Khomeini, but he would have less power than OTL and the whole thing would be a rather unstable mass of competing factions, that most likely would not outlive Khomeini by more than a few years. What would replace it would be open to question-could be a democracy, a secular dicatorship of some variety (probably most likely), or balkanization (rather unlikely).

As I said in my previous post, the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war were central to Khomeini's ability to consolidate the amount of power he did in OTL, and without them he won't do nearly as well.
 
I doubt that would be the result-the Iranian government in a no Iran-Iraq war TL would still be led by Khomeini, but he would have less power than OTL and the whole thing would be a rather unstable mass of competing factions, that most likely would not outlive Khomeini by more than a few years. What would replace it would be open to question-could be a democracy, a secular dicatorship of some variety (probably most likely), or balkanization (rather unlikely).

As I said in my previous post, the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war were central to Khomeini's ability to consolidate the amount of power he did in OTL, and without them he won't do nearly as well.

I doubt that Iran goes communist, but the government will still be heavily socialist-influenced. Iran probably will become a melange of competing factions (Khomenists, socialists, the army, and basically every other conceivable interest). And without any foreign pressure, well, sooner or later these groups are going to turn on each other. Personally, I wonder if it will even make it to Khomeini's death. If he plays his cards right, the republic may hold together for a while, but just as likely he decides to crack down, but without the hostage crisis and the war, he could very well spark a reaction against him.

One wonders if the Soviets step in, though. If it seems that their communist brethren in Iran are falling from power, and Iran hasn't already more or less defined itself in opposition to the United States, intervention becomes a very real possibility.
 
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