Carriers in port at Pearl Harbor

[HMS Warspite]

Is your last name Tojo? Just wondering.

Not at all...

Perhaps a more conservative mind in Europe, nothing more, or less. I do not believe in wonders, but see things more realistic, according to a ballance of power thinking. (If the USA were too powerfull for Japan, why attack it in the first place???)

 

[Hyperion]

Not at all...

Perhaps a more conservative mind in Europe, nothing more, or less. I do not believe in wonders, but see things more realistic, according to a ballance of power thinking. (If the USA were too powerfull for Japan, why attack it in the first place???)

They attacked in OTL anyway, smashed all opposition that the US, British, Dutch, and Australians and token forces from several other nations could throw at them for a period of several months.

They still lost in the end.

 

[CalBear]

Did you even bother to review the post I made on the IJN carrier construction? How are ships that is only constructed to the hanger deck in late November of 1944 ready for deployment in mid-1944?

Have you ever bothered to look at the time it took Japanese yards to build ANY ship? The Japanese yard were quite inefficient compared to U.S. or UK yards.

I would also point out that the U.S. had, by the end of 1943 well over 350 modern (1934 or later) destroyers and destroyer escorts in commission, with more coming off the ways literally every other day, which was more than sufficient to blanket the North Atlantic and support the Pacific. The IJN, on the other hand, never had more than 60 modern destroyers in commission at any time in the war

Hell, I'll even give the IJN the extra four decks. That leaves them out numbered in decks by 2-1 and in aircraft by slightly more than 2 to 1. It also leaves the U.S. with the same qualitative advantage in the actual aircraft involved. If anything, a more successful first year mean the Japanese are more likely to continue with their current designs and with their original pilot training system that only graduated a maximum of 650 men a year.

I would also point out, that even in the early days of the war, when the USN was operating the less capable F4F-3 and F4F-4, the American pilots had a 3-1 advantage in air-to-air engagements (see Lindstrom's First Team, Parshall's Shattered Sword, and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, as just a start of resources). In mid 1944, they will not be flying F4F's, but the far superior F6F, which was initially ordered in mid-1941 and had its first flight with the R-2800 engine in July of 1942.

Unlike Bill, I am not so foolish as to fly off the handle at you and earn a kick, although I can understand his frustration with your on-going, intentional, misrepresentation of the actual facts if they fail to support your position.

Fortunately, I have a higher troll tolerance, so I'll settle for pointing our the errors in your efforts to alter reality. (I did, after all, survive Bard32, whom you resemble more with every post.)

I see the majority here sees things the way it would be the US way, with no alternate opposition, which is doing the OTL thing. This is far from realistic, so the USN would act more or less following the OTL as well, since there still would be FDR to deal with and the Germany First Doctrine. The USA still needed time to built up strength for the counter offensive and this was secondary to the War in Europe anyway, or there would be a very difficult political issue to deal with as well, with both the UK and USSR. Japan had to wait, no matter what happened in the Pacific.

To look at things the Japanese way, the loss of the US Pacific Fleet as a fighting unit, including the loss of the two carriers at Pearl, would result in a more or less planed expansion of the fleet, including the construction of the new carriers of both Tayho and Unryu classes and less attention to ASW escorts, since the threath would be felt much later only, when the USN torpedoproblem would be solved. SO the planning of the Tahyho and its three slightly modified sisterships, as well as all six Unryu's, originally not intended for fleetbattles, but inevitably grouped with the battlefleet most likly, there would be at least four new large carriers ready in halfway 1944, unless there was some disaster.

These four were present in the OTL, but lacked aircraft in the case of the Unryu's, although the vessels were operational , more or less. an alternate line would shift attention fronm teh damagerepair of battledamaged ships to new construction and a slight increase in speed of construction would allow the IJN to have ten large carriers in hald 1944, besides some five lighweight ones and three large converted ones (Hiyo, Junyo and Shinano), all assuming none had been lost already.

In the same period, the USN would posses most likly the three surviving [prewar carriers, (Saratoga, Yorktown and Hornet) assuming non was already lost as well). Wasp would be questionable, but can be allocated as well to the Pacific. The first six Essex Class Carriers would be fully worked up and operational as well and all nine Independence class ships too, giving the USN in numbers paritywith Japan. Both posses some ten large fast carriers, and some nine lighter, or converted ones. The only difference would be in CVE's as the USA was already turning them out in great numbers. (All assumption on the base no further losses had occured.) Perhaps the USN could have abbandoned the Iowa clas and converted them into fast carriers as well, but most likely these would not be ready before late 1945.

So, before halfway 1944, the USN would be still struggeling to get the upperhand over the Japanese, no matter how war was fought in the Pacific.

Atternately, the help of the Germans in the war should not be underestimated as well. The U-Boote were still prowling the Atlantic and could theoretically disrupt shipping on the East coast seriously, preventint the USN to allocate vast numbers of supportvessels to the pacific to support the Carriers and invasionfleets. Especially ASW vessels would be hold back in the Atlantic, which would result in less destroyers in the Pacific to support the fleet. A lucky hit on a new carrier, transfering from Atlantic to Pacific was also a possibility.

Not at all...

Perhaps a more conservative mind in Europe, nothing more, or less. I do not believe in wonders, but see things more realistic, according to a ballance of power thinking. (If the USA were too powerfull for Japan, why attack it in the first place???)

Because, quite simply, they miscalculated.

They had also seen the American building plans for the next three years and KNEW, unlike yourself, that they had no hope of matching them. They tried for a first punch knock-out. Unfortunately for Japan, featherweights rarely knock out the Heavyweight campion with a single punch.

 

[Markus]

First we need to take into consideration that Lex and Enterprise might not be lost but be put out of action for some time like all but two of the BB. The USN will certainly work 24/7 raising them if possible. Were did they usually drop anchor? In the shallow or deep waters?

Second the US considered securing the sea lines of communications to Australia second only to securing PH. Thus the Doolittle Raid would not happen.

Third, there is always the possibility of an accelerated build up in northern Australia and New Guinea. Curtiss-Wright was making P-40 fighter-bombers at a rate of 300 per month in December 41. A few fast deliveries of P-40F and A-20 by carrier –Ranger would be useful for that- and New Guinea is suddenly a lot harder to conquer. Especially if the Australian government can be convinced to send more militia.

Forth, CV are most important for a Guadalcanal campaign but the Allies could make do without one. They could react to the construction of an airfield on GC but greatly increasing their air- and land offensive on New Guinea. That would be a direct threat to the key base of Rabaul and make the Japanese concentrate on defeating it.

 

[Douglas]

In the end, it's difficult to get past Coral Sea with any ATL, because Coral Sea is the first major battle featuring naval units which now no longer exist. It seems that we can say that the Doolittle Raid is scratched, as well as some of the raiding efforts the US carriers made in late '41/early '42. Then you get to Coral Sea...and then what? The Americans could have from one (in this case, is the battle even fought?) to three carriers present at Coral, depending on butterflies, and then one needs only to look at Midway to see how unpredictable relatively evenly-matched carrier battles can be. *Coral Sea could be this TL's Midway, a crushing victory for the Americans, or it could be a reverse Midway, with American air power in the Pacific obliterated. And, more likely, it could be something interesting in between with all sorts of knock-on effects which effect the entire course of the war.

 

[Douglas]

This seems helpful, Markus. You can see from this picture that the carriers get moored on the northwestern side of Ford Island, and that fits well with what I remember about Utah's destruction in OTL: that her planked-over deck and location made the Japanese assume she was an aircraft carrier.

The NW side of Ford Island is the bottom side in this picture.

EDIT: And judging from the fact that Utah's capsized hull is still visible above water from Google Map's satellite imagery, I'd have to classify the water as being shallow enough for a rebuild, provided the carriers don't capsize or explode.

 

[Markus]

This seems helpful, Markus. You can see from this picture that the carriers get moored on the northwestern side of Ford Island, and that fits well with what I remember about Utah's destruction in OTL: that her planked-over deck and location made the Japanese assume she was an aircraft carrier.

I´m afraid the "mixed up with a carrier" is a myth.

http://www.maritimequest.com/warship_directory/us_navy_pages/uss_utah_bb31_page_4.htm

 

[T3h_shammy]

Not at all...

Perhaps a more conservative mind in Europe, nothing more, or less. I do not believe in wonders, but see things more realistic, according to a ballance of power thinking. (If the USA were too powerfull for Japan, why attack it in the first place???)

That's a great question. Why did they attack it? You are assuming Murphy's law is true and it is applicable for the United States only.

 

[Douglas]

I´m afraid the "mixed up with a carrier" is a myth.

http://www.maritimequest.com/warship_directory/us_navy_pages/uss_utah_bb31_page_4.htm

I actually looked at that today and realized my mistake.

 

[burmafrd]

I wonder if HMS Warspite and 67th Tigers are related?

 

[stevep]

Guys

I agree that Japan would still get stomped, possibly not much later than OTL. Possibly earlier as less opposition might mean the Japanese get even further over-extended.

On the question of re-floating would it be that practical with carriers? Their a lot less heavily armoured and loaded down with explosives and fuel so I would have thought there's a good chance that damage is far too extensive to make re-floating and repair practical.

Steve

 

[CalBear]

I wonder if HMS Warspite and 67th Tigers are related?

I doubt it. 67th Tigers is very Euro-centric, but I have found most of his data to be accurate, even if the follow on analysis tends to be skewed. HMS Warspite is simply a demi-troll in the tradition of Bard32.

 

[CalBear]

Guys

I agree that Japan would still get stomped, possibly not much later than OTL. Possibly earlier as less opposition might mean the Japanese get even further over-extended.

On the question of re-floating would it be that practical with carriers? Their a lot less heavily armoured and loaded down with explosives and fuel so I would have thought there's a good chance that damage is far too extensive to make re-floating and repair practical.

Steve

The Enterprise is probably the more questionable of the two. Lexington's overall structure was quite a bit more "capital ship" than her younger cousin.

The biggest question for both ships would be the number of torpedo hits the hulls absorbed.

 

[HMS Warspite]

In the most likely scenario, the two carriers, when at Pearl during the attack, get most attention and are likely CTL, as their hullintegrety is lesser than that of a battleships, while also being vulnerable to secondary fires, because of their AVGAS storages. When combatting very large fires on a carrier, something like USS Franklin Experienced, lots of water is pumped in for the firefighting, causing topheaviness and risk of capsizing. Historically, carriers hit in port tend to capsize in most cases (OTL Amagi, Aqualia.)

Assuming Japan augmented its prodiction to the new situation in the war and also acted tactically more in line with the new situation, it still seems debatable whether the USN in the Pacific could hold its own in 1942. Until the new breed came along in serious numbers and there would be no further losses for both, it would be halfway 1944, untill parity was achieved at sea with the IJN.

Japan could boost production of carriers, such as the already laid Tayho, by dropping the batlteship construction, as well as the refitting and rebuilding of ships in the "Shadow program" from Pearl Harbor on, most dominantly the conversion of the Seaplane carriers Chitose and Chyoda. Only those ships already started, such as the Hiyo and Junyo, would be completed. Building of Shinano and Nr.111 would be stopped, while Shinano would either be dismantled, or converted as historically. Tayho and her planned sisters would be laid down, replacing the canceled battleships, while the Unryu class would also be started as historically, taking material from the canceled conversion of the Ise class battleships and the scrapped Ibuki class cruiser. If no other urgent needs arose, the IJN could continue to produce steadily and have the flattops ready by half 1944, as suggested before.

Aircraft production and training of pilots and aircrews would ne boosted too, which combined with the fewer losses, due to lack of combat, would be resulting in the formation of more airgroups, while also better trained than historically, given the still present veteran crews on the still active carriers of the prewar period.

After the destruction of Pearl Harbor as a base, the IJN coud roam free in the Pacific. It only needed to divert its attention during the actual attack from the ships, to the base installations and fueldepots, while the possible damage the AVGAS laden USS Neosho could do, could boost the damage as well. With Pearl Harbor closed for a crucial number of months, the Japanese could manouvre themselves into a good possition to prepare for the expected counterattack, if such a thing would still come, much later. Diplomates would likely seek out a more peacefull sollution, depending on the US Politicians, wether or not they could go in with. In the end, it is money that counts, so i it is not completely out of the question.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

HMS Warspite, there is no possibility of a negotiated settlement.

At best this buys Japan a few more months assuming the US doesn't change production and military priorities and decide to treat the Pacific War as something other than a war to be fought on the cheap. If the US shifts, say, a tenth of the resources for Europe to the Pacific that increase would surpass Japan's entire output.

 

[burmafrd]

Quite often a lot of the AV gas would be unloaded while in port as regards the Carriers. Though that would depend on whether they were on alert or not. And our carriers had the avgas tanks deep inside the hull, less likely to rupture. The Lex had the avgas leak due to what is believed to be a freak occurance at Coral Sea, and then the idiot control flunkie decided to open the vents and spread it all over. Had that not happened the explosion would have been much less damaging and there is every chance she would have been saved. Counter flooding saved the West Virginia from capsizing; there is no reason to think that the carriers would not have been able to do the same. Oklahoma got hit and was apparently almost as unbuttoned as the California was (which also did not capsize due to counter flooding). Its more of a case that the Oklahoma was the exception rather then the rule. So capsizing was less likely then thought (the Japanese ships were in bad shape and barely occupied at the time they were hit in port). Overall Its quite likely the carriers would have been raised if they had been sunk. And they would not have needed to go to the West Coast for refitting.

IF after the incredible success of the first 6 months was not enough to make the IJN drop battleships and concentrate on carriers, what makes you think anything would? Your rational for thinking so is full of holes. There is no reason that the IJN would have gotten any more carriers any faster then the OTL. As has been mentioned the IJN shipyards were extremely slow and ineffecient.

 

[Markus]

Wasn´t WV hit later than Oklahoma giving damage control more time to react? If so the location of the CV would have been most important. If they had been anchored where Utah was they would have been hit before any of the BB.

In California´s case counterflooding was not required as all hatches were open for an inpection allowing the water to flood all of her right away.

 

[Hyperion]

HMS Warspite is, I must say, dishonest to a certain extent.

When in port, unless they are about the deploy, most AVGAS is emptied from the carriers.

 

[burmafrd]

The California is open to some debate about how unbuttoned she was but there was counterflooding.

I am trying to remember from what direction the attack came- not sure but did they not come in paralell to battleship row or was it a 90 degree?

 

[CalBear]

Wasn´t WV hit later than Oklahoma giving damage control more time to react? If so the location of the CV would have been most important. If they had been anchored where Utah was they would have been hit before any of the BB.

In California´s case counterflooding was not required as all hatches were open for an inpection allowing the water to flood all of her right away.

The California was, of course, actually a failed attempt at alternate damage control methods.