Where does Friedman say that in his book on US Carriers? I have my local library's copy at home and have been through it several times, and he doesn't say much, if anything, about the IJN's carrier fleet...
Carriers in port at Pearl Harbor
- Thread starter Jasen777
- Start date
With two US carriers sunk or crippled, does Kido Butai stick around and launch a third strike on Monday morning?* Historically Nagumo had to worry about three US carriers whose whereabouts were unknown. Here, two of those carriers are not a threat, and US land-based airpower is still crippled. Kido Butai is still limited by the historic fuel oil supply, but a big juicy vulnerable target is sitting there. On the other hand, how vulnerable would Pearl Harbor be on a Monday morning? The second airstrike met much heavier opposition than the first one. The next morning will surely see even worse opposition.
* this may add a whole new meaning to "Monday mornings".
* this may add a whole new meaning to "Monday mornings".
Question, when the carriers were in port were their airwings aboard or did they fly off to the beach
The direct consequenses of the loss of both carriers in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor would be followed by other losses inevitably, most likely the stragic loss of Port Moresby, which would not be defended by USN carriers, as these were not pressent (Only USS Hornet and Yorktown available and Saratoga still in repair as historcially.) As USS Hornet would be detailed for the Doolittleraid, as in the OTL, only Yorktown would be left to operate in the vastness of the Pacific and on her own was not able to tackle the MO-Operation. Even if Yorktown survived the battle there, she could not block the invasion. Her losses in aircraft against a three carrier strong IJN force, with two and a half times the number of aircraft was too much for her. (Yorktown too still had not her complete airgroup in the Corral Sea Battle, missing a detatchment of SBD's. Only 33 were pressent at the start. Her Fighterwing was a bit short in aircraft too with just 25. Only the TBD's were fully equipped, but too weak and too old to be of much value.)
With Port Moresby lost, the way to Australia for the Japanese was open and they could operate freely in the Coral Sea, disrupting supply convoy's to Australia and New Zealand from the USA, knocking both Southern Allies effectively out of the war. There would be no Guadalcanal Campaign and no US operations in the South Pacific, as there were no bases left to launch from. (These were left inoperabel by the maurauding IJN forces in the area.)
Technically the USA could construct the same vast military force as in the OTL, but it would need bases to launch from, with a huge supplytrain to keep the troops and ships in the region. Pearl Harbor would be the most western base to start from, as the South Pacific was unavailable, due to the Japanese blockade of Australia. Peral Harbor is too far away from most Japanese territories to be a threat directly. It would be taking a lot of headaches to get a foothold in Japanese held territory, to start driving the Japanese back to were they came from.
Also a problem would be that the USN would have to face an unscatched IJN carrierforce, with the six big carriers, which attacked Pearl Harbor in the beginning, plus the OTL additions, which included the Tayho and the converted Junyo, Hiyo as large carriers, plus the smaller CVL's and CVE's. At its earliest in half 1944, the USN could be able to get on parity in numbers of carriers, if no disasters had struck the IJN before, or the USN for the matter. An IJN with nine large and six smaller fleet carriers, plus a number of CVE's and more on the way (six Unryu's and Shinano were already quite advanced in construction), would be problematic at best.
With Port Moresby lost, the way to Australia for the Japanese was open and they could operate freely in the Coral Sea, disrupting supply convoy's to Australia and New Zealand from the USA, knocking both Southern Allies effectively out of the war. There would be no Guadalcanal Campaign and no US operations in the South Pacific, as there were no bases left to launch from. (These were left inoperabel by the maurauding IJN forces in the area.)
Technically the USA could construct the same vast military force as in the OTL, but it would need bases to launch from, with a huge supplytrain to keep the troops and ships in the region. Pearl Harbor would be the most western base to start from, as the South Pacific was unavailable, due to the Japanese blockade of Australia. Peral Harbor is too far away from most Japanese territories to be a threat directly. It would be taking a lot of headaches to get a foothold in Japanese held territory, to start driving the Japanese back to were they came from.
Also a problem would be that the USN would have to face an unscatched IJN carrierforce, with the six big carriers, which attacked Pearl Harbor in the beginning, plus the OTL additions, which included the Tayho and the converted Junyo, Hiyo as large carriers, plus the smaller CVL's and CVE's. At its earliest in half 1944, the USN could be able to get on parity in numbers of carriers, if no disasters had struck the IJN before, or the USN for the matter. An IJN with nine large and six smaller fleet carriers, plus a number of CVE's and more on the way (six Unryu's and Shinano were already quite advanced in construction), would be problematic at best.
Given the northern Pacific campaign is what brought the bombers close enough to Japan to devastate the country conventionally--and with nukes when the time came--could the southern theater simply be ignored entirely?
having control of the Coral sea does nothing more than inconvenience the allies. Why do people keep saying 'if you control x you can blockade Australia'??? Its a bloody CONTINENT. Its BIG. All you do is make the allies move things a bit further. Same to the sea routes - the South Pacific is HUGE, you might have to take a more circuitous route. Or across the southern Indian Ocean. Its a nuisance, nothing more.
As I said before, sooner or later the allies and Japan will lock into an attritional campaign - with more carriers vs. the USN, it would probably happen a bit further out, but it will still happen. At which point, the allies aircraft and pilot production attrits Japanese air power into impotence.
One minor nitpick - Oklahoma was refloated too. It was too badly damaged to be repaired, and sank on the way for scrapping.
Blockading Australia would be impossible even if the Japanese took Port Moresby. Let's not forget that Australia's primary seaports and manufacturing centers - Adelaide, Melbourne/Geelong and Sydney - are still a thousand miles plus from Port Moresby. Invasion wouldn't work either - the Australian Forces would be easily supplied, but the Japanese supply situation would be an almighty bitch - probably why the Japanese never tried that.
Losing the two carriers at Pearl would make Midway not happen, but the US Navy would just speed up the Essex-class carriers, and perhaps convert one or two of the wrecked BBs into a carrier, along with Illinois and Kentucky. The massive battle will come later, but the Japanese will get hammered either way. If anything, since the bomb development wouldn't likely be effected as much, it might end up being Tokyo which gets nuked instead of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. More Japanese carriers is bad news for the USN, but ultimately the US drawfs Japan in resources and manufacturing abilities, so even that much larger carrier force will be comprehensively overwhelmed.
Hyperion
Banned
HMS Warspite, I feel that you have failed to take into account US reaction to loosing two carriers.
Given the loss if Enterprise and Lexington, the Saratoga may well be assigned one or more different tasks that would make the torpedo hit in January a non issue. This does not mean she will not suffer another, possibly worse, fate down the line, but that doesn't mean the torpedo hit is a given.
You also did not take into account a key piece of historical information in regards to the USS Hornet.
THere would not be a Doolittle raid, period.
Historically, the USS Enterprise was the flagship of the Doolittle raid taskforce, being that it was the only carrier between the two that could provide air cover with the B-25s setting on the Hornets flight deck.
Have you considered the possibility that if Hornet doesn't go on the Doolittle raid, and Saratoga isn't torpedoed in January, that Coral Sea might see the US fielding three carriers?
Given the loss if Enterprise and Lexington, the Saratoga may well be assigned one or more different tasks that would make the torpedo hit in January a non issue. This does not mean she will not suffer another, possibly worse, fate down the line, but that doesn't mean the torpedo hit is a given.
You also did not take into account a key piece of historical information in regards to the USS Hornet.
THere would not be a Doolittle raid, period.
Historically, the USS Enterprise was the flagship of the Doolittle raid taskforce, being that it was the only carrier between the two that could provide air cover with the B-25s setting on the Hornets flight deck.
Have you considered the possibility that if Hornet doesn't go on the Doolittle raid, and Saratoga isn't torpedoed in January, that Coral Sea might see the US fielding three carriers?
Prior to Midway the NORMAL fight contingent on American carrier was 18. The experiences in the early engagements during the Marshall raids had indicated a need for more fighters, so the ships at Coral Sea had extra fighters aboard, not fewer than normal. At Midway the carrier fighter groups were increased to 27 from the normal 18 (as noted by Admiral Nimitz in his after action report to Admiral King) but neither of the U.S. carriers were short of fighters at Coral Sea. Yorktown was also short only THREE SBD (normal was two squadrons of 18 aircraft, one designated as Scouting (VS) and one Bombing (VB), for a total of 36)
Why would only ONE carrier be sent on the Doolittle Raid when at least TWO were needed since the ship carrying the B-25's couldn't conduct ANY normal flight operations?
For that matter why would the various bases be devastated by Japanese carrier strikes when, starting in mid 1942, American ground based fighters were superior to anything the Japanese had to offer? Going after Hawaii wasn't going to be a profitable experience by March of 1942, by September it would have been pure suicide. By mid 1943, especially in this scenario, every Allied base in the Pacific would be equipped with P-47s, to augment the USAAF P-38s and Marine F4Us as well as solid nose B-25 and B-26 strike bombers to support the SBD, SB2C & TBF tactical bombers.
If the six Unryu were so advanced (an amazing prospect considering that the fist in class was not even laid down until 8/1/42 and not completed until 8/6/44, although never commissioned since she was sunk in December 1944 before ready for commissioning) why did Amagi never make it into pre-commission trials at all? Why was Kasagi, the 4th ship of the class (that was far along, but only 85% completed when construction was halted in late October 1944) and both of her sisters (Aso, Ikoma)construction halted when 60% complete (to the hanger deck)? Why was Shinano, NEVER completed? When she was sunk by Archerfish on 11/29/44 she had not even begun fitting out, to the point where the rubber grommets and gaskets had not been installed in the bulkheads. The ONLY fleet carrier the IJN got into actual combat service was the Taiho, who was lost in her first action in June of 1944.
By way of comparison between 1/1/42 and 6/19/44 (when Taiho was sunk) the U.S. commissioned 10 Essex Class ships, and launched four more. There were also 9 Independence class ships launched in 1943, if needed additional hull were readily available to be diverted (the Independence class CVL carried only 8 fewer aircraft than the Taiho CV of the IJN (and 12 fewer than the Hiryu class).
To recap, the U.S brought 19 "fleet" carriers, with a total capacity of 1,205 aircraft into service between 6/19/44. The IJN brought one into service, with a 52 aircraft capacity, in the same time period. This means in the IJN had not lost a single carrier prior to mid 1944, the IJN would have been out numbered better than 3-1 in carriers(IJN 7 ships vs. USN 23 (four existing decks and 19 new construction, assuming that neither CV-2 nor CV-6 were salvaged) and nearing 4-1 in combat aircraft (IJN 450 vs. USN 1,550)
I have not brought the number of escort decks into consideration, but the IJN brought five into service in the same time period that the U.S. commissioned 61 (this figure omits the 39 ships immediately transferred to the RN under lend-lease).
These figures also do not take into consideration that, by late 1943, the USN was operating vastly superior aircraft to the IJN across the board, with ever more advanced designs (or improvements tot the existing, already superior, designs) being introduced in 1944 and beyond.
Please do some actual research before posting these almost always erroneous statements about the Pacific Theater.
Why would only ONE carrier be sent on the Doolittle Raid when at least TWO were needed since the ship carrying the B-25's couldn't conduct ANY normal flight operations?
For that matter why would the various bases be devastated by Japanese carrier strikes when, starting in mid 1942, American ground based fighters were superior to anything the Japanese had to offer? Going after Hawaii wasn't going to be a profitable experience by March of 1942, by September it would have been pure suicide. By mid 1943, especially in this scenario, every Allied base in the Pacific would be equipped with P-47s, to augment the USAAF P-38s and Marine F4Us as well as solid nose B-25 and B-26 strike bombers to support the SBD, SB2C & TBF tactical bombers.
If the six Unryu were so advanced (an amazing prospect considering that the fist in class was not even laid down until 8/1/42 and not completed until 8/6/44, although never commissioned since she was sunk in December 1944 before ready for commissioning) why did Amagi never make it into pre-commission trials at all? Why was Kasagi, the 4th ship of the class (that was far along, but only 85% completed when construction was halted in late October 1944) and both of her sisters (Aso, Ikoma)construction halted when 60% complete (to the hanger deck)? Why was Shinano, NEVER completed? When she was sunk by Archerfish on 11/29/44 she had not even begun fitting out, to the point where the rubber grommets and gaskets had not been installed in the bulkheads. The ONLY fleet carrier the IJN got into actual combat service was the Taiho, who was lost in her first action in June of 1944.
By way of comparison between 1/1/42 and 6/19/44 (when Taiho was sunk) the U.S. commissioned 10 Essex Class ships, and launched four more. There were also 9 Independence class ships launched in 1943, if needed additional hull were readily available to be diverted (the Independence class CVL carried only 8 fewer aircraft than the Taiho CV of the IJN (and 12 fewer than the Hiryu class).
To recap, the U.S brought 19 "fleet" carriers, with a total capacity of 1,205 aircraft into service between 6/19/44. The IJN brought one into service, with a 52 aircraft capacity, in the same time period. This means in the IJN had not lost a single carrier prior to mid 1944, the IJN would have been out numbered better than 3-1 in carriers(IJN 7 ships vs. USN 23 (four existing decks and 19 new construction, assuming that neither CV-2 nor CV-6 were salvaged) and nearing 4-1 in combat aircraft (IJN 450 vs. USN 1,550)
I have not brought the number of escort decks into consideration, but the IJN brought five into service in the same time period that the U.S. commissioned 61 (this figure omits the 39 ships immediately transferred to the RN under lend-lease).
These figures also do not take into consideration that, by late 1943, the USN was operating vastly superior aircraft to the IJN across the board, with ever more advanced designs (or improvements tot the existing, already superior, designs) being introduced in 1944 and beyond.
Please do some actual research before posting these almost always erroneous statements about the Pacific Theater.
Of course the South could be ignored. It wasn't IOTL because it could be tackled with the forces available at the time, because the Japanese advance was a threat to easy communication with Australia, and because it was the logical route back to the Philippines (can't EVER forget the Islands as long as MacArthur is in the picture). The Marshalls and Marianas were considered to be too well defended to attack in the summer of 1942
There's a few references to Unyo, Junyo, and a couple other of the conversion at the end of the chapter that deals with the liner conversion studies of the interwar era- IIRC, the chapter's called 'The ORANGE Mobilization Carriers,' or something close to that (I don't have my copy of the book handy at the moment)
Pilots, transport ships
Unless the Japanese expanded their pilot training program early on they would still run out of their excellent prewar pilots and have to send poor quality pilots against the US by late 1943/early 1944.
Knocking out the carriers might even lead to an even more rampant case of 'victory disease' on the part of the Japanese, and the grabbing of even more stuff, which would further overtax their already overtaxed transport ships. In any case, Japan still finds its economy sputtering due to lack of shipping to get raw materials to the home islands, while the US outproduces them by ever larger margins.
Unless the Japanese expanded their pilot training program early on they would still run out of their excellent prewar pilots and have to send poor quality pilots against the US by late 1943/early 1944.
Knocking out the carriers might even lead to an even more rampant case of 'victory disease' on the part of the Japanese, and the grabbing of even more stuff, which would further overtax their already overtaxed transport ships. In any case, Japan still finds its economy sputtering due to lack of shipping to get raw materials to the home islands, while the US outproduces them by ever larger margins.
I see the majority here sees things the way it would be the US way, with no alternate opposition, which is doing the OTL thing. This is far from realistic, so the USN would act more or less following the OTL as well, since there still would be FDR to deal with and the Germany First Doctrine. The USA still needed time to built up strength for the counter offensive and this was secondary to the War in Europe anyway, or there would be a very difficult political issue to deal with as well, with both the UK and USSR. Japan had to wait, no matter what happened in the Pacific.
To look at things the Japanese way, the loss of the US Pacific Fleet as a fighting unit, including the loss of the two carriers at Pearl, would result in a more or less planed expansion of the fleet, including the construction of the new carriers of both Tayho and Unryu classes and less attention to ASW escorts, since the threath would be felt much later only, when the USN torpedoproblem would be solved. SO the planning of the Tahyho and its three slightly modified sisterships, as well as all six Unryu's, originally not intended for fleetbattles, but inevitably grouped with the battlefleet most likly, there would be at least four new large carriers ready in halfway 1944, unless there was some disaster.
These four were present in the OTL, but lacked aircraft in the case of the Unryu's, although the vessels were operational , more or less. an alternate line would shift attention fronm teh damagerepair of battledamaged ships to new construction and a slight increase in speed of construction would allow the IJN to have ten large carriers in hald 1944, besides some five lighweight ones and three large converted ones (Hiyo, Junyo and Shinano), all assuming none had been lost already.
In the same period, the USN would posses most likly the three surviving [prewar carriers, (Saratoga, Yorktown and Hornet) assuming non was already lost as well). Wasp would be questionable, but can be allocated as well to the Pacific. The first six Essex Class Carriers would be fully worked up and operational as well and all nine Independence class ships too, giving the USN in numbers paritywith Japan. Both posses some ten large fast carriers, and some nine lighter, or converted ones. The only difference would be in CVE's as the USA was already turning them out in great numbers. (All assumption on the base no further losses had occured.) Perhaps the USN could have abbandoned the Iowa clas and converted them into fast carriers as well, but most likely these would not be ready before late 1945.
So, before halfway 1944, the USN would be still struggeling to get the upperhand over the Japanese, no matter how war was fought in the Pacific.
Atternately, the help of the Germans in the war should not be underestimated as well. The U-Boote were still prowling the Atlantic and could theoretically disrupt shipping on the East coast seriously, preventint the USN to allocate vast numbers of supportvessels to the pacific to support the Carriers and invasionfleets. Especially ASW vessels would be hold back in the Atlantic, which would result in less destroyers in the Pacific to support the fleet. A lucky hit on a new carrier, transfering from Atlantic to Pacific was also a possibility.
To look at things the Japanese way, the loss of the US Pacific Fleet as a fighting unit, including the loss of the two carriers at Pearl, would result in a more or less planed expansion of the fleet, including the construction of the new carriers of both Tayho and Unryu classes and less attention to ASW escorts, since the threath would be felt much later only, when the USN torpedoproblem would be solved. SO the planning of the Tahyho and its three slightly modified sisterships, as well as all six Unryu's, originally not intended for fleetbattles, but inevitably grouped with the battlefleet most likly, there would be at least four new large carriers ready in halfway 1944, unless there was some disaster.
These four were present in the OTL, but lacked aircraft in the case of the Unryu's, although the vessels were operational , more or less. an alternate line would shift attention fronm teh damagerepair of battledamaged ships to new construction and a slight increase in speed of construction would allow the IJN to have ten large carriers in hald 1944, besides some five lighweight ones and three large converted ones (Hiyo, Junyo and Shinano), all assuming none had been lost already.
In the same period, the USN would posses most likly the three surviving [prewar carriers, (Saratoga, Yorktown and Hornet) assuming non was already lost as well). Wasp would be questionable, but can be allocated as well to the Pacific. The first six Essex Class Carriers would be fully worked up and operational as well and all nine Independence class ships too, giving the USN in numbers paritywith Japan. Both posses some ten large fast carriers, and some nine lighter, or converted ones. The only difference would be in CVE's as the USA was already turning them out in great numbers. (All assumption on the base no further losses had occured.) Perhaps the USN could have abbandoned the Iowa clas and converted them into fast carriers as well, but most likely these would not be ready before late 1945.
So, before halfway 1944, the USN would be still struggeling to get the upperhand over the Japanese, no matter how war was fought in the Pacific.
Atternately, the help of the Germans in the war should not be underestimated as well. The U-Boote were still prowling the Atlantic and could theoretically disrupt shipping on the East coast seriously, preventint the USN to allocate vast numbers of supportvessels to the pacific to support the Carriers and invasionfleets. Especially ASW vessels would be hold back in the Atlantic, which would result in less destroyers in the Pacific to support the fleet. A lucky hit on a new carrier, transfering from Atlantic to Pacific was also a possibility.
Hyperion
Banned
There remains another strong possibility here that could very well come about.
With Enterprise and Lexington out of action, this means that the Doolittle raid will never happen.
Two carriers where required at minimun to carry out that attack, as Hornet could not launch her own aircraft with the B-25s setting on her deck the whole time.
This sets up the possibility of the US actually being in a better position for a Coral Sea battle.
Yorktown goes down there as originally. Saratoga takes the place of Lexington. While Hornet makes up the third group.
I see something on the order of the US being able to sink the light carrier Shoho as in OTL, and the additional aircraft being enough to sink the Shokaku, while the Zuikaku looses a couple dozen extra aircraft.
With Enterprise and Lexington out of action, this means that the Doolittle raid will never happen.
Two carriers where required at minimun to carry out that attack, as Hornet could not launch her own aircraft with the B-25s setting on her deck the whole time.
This sets up the possibility of the US actually being in a better position for a Coral Sea battle.
Yorktown goes down there as originally. Saratoga takes the place of Lexington. While Hornet makes up the third group.
I see something on the order of the US being able to sink the light carrier Shoho as in OTL, and the additional aircraft being enough to sink the Shokaku, while the Zuikaku looses a couple dozen extra aircraft.
In these details, there are lot's of if's.
All USN carriers should be available as mentioned, which include the OTL battledamaged USS Saratoga, who was undergoing a refit, to augment her AA capacity at the same time. USS Hornet should be battleready as well, asuming her airgroup was fully trained, which in the OTL she was not. Only USS Yorktown was battleready on the OTL timeframe, so she was the only effective carrier left.
In an Alt history scenario, the USS Saratoga gets lost, replacing USS Lexington of the OTL, while USS Yorktown gets hit hard, as historically. USS Hornet is present, but fails to make much impression, being untested and with rooky pilots. Japan looses IJN Shoho as in the OTL, but both Shokaku, although hit hard and Zuikaku, undamaged, but with a greatly reduced airgroup, withdraw. USN losses in aircraft are severe, with USS Saratoga loosing her enitre airgroup, sinking with the ship. USS Yorktown looses fewer aircraft, but mainly suffers in fighters lost. USS Hornet looses all het TBD's and most SBD's, due to accidents in navigation (as at Midway in OTL), while loosing lots of fighters as well. This is a far more realistic scenario, as the IJN heavy carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku could only be sunk by torpedoes and these were not of the wanted qualtity yet in the USN stocks. (Shokaku had a 6.5 inch armored lower hangardeck, unable to be penetrated by the USN bombs in use.)
The result would be that the IJN would hi Midway as historically, but facing only two carriers there, as Saratoga was gone already. With Hornet in a poorly trained state, with a mostly new and untrained airgroup again, only the damaged Yorktown was left to fight the Nagumo Force. At the end of the battle, the IJN rules the waves, and the USN is reduced to a couple of PT boats only in the Pacific.
Hyperion
Banned
That or Nimitz realizes that sending his only available carrier up against four and change(the four light jobs) would be suicide.
That or he takes a gamble and sends Yorktown and a damaged Hornet, with survivors of Saratoga's airgroup, to attack the Aleutians.
That and HMS Warspite in his lacking research has failed miserably to note that there has been an astounding invention called a submarine.
That or he takes a gamble and sends Yorktown and a damaged Hornet, with survivors of Saratoga's airgroup, to attack the Aleutians.
That and HMS Warspite in his lacking research has failed miserably to note that there has been an astounding invention called a submarine.