Carriers in port at Pearl Harbor
- Thread starter Jasen777
- Start date
They get sunk.
Very unlikely that BOTH decks would be in port due to the effort going into reinforcing all the island bases with a few more fighters or scout bombers.
Even if the two decks get caught, all it does is move the Yorktown into the Pacific sooner, along with the Hornet as soon as she finishes working up her squadrons.
If both USS Enterprise and USS Lexington had been in Pearl, during the attack, they would have been lost, being primary targets for the Japanese. The longer term consequenses of this, would have resulted in far more difficulties for the Allies to regain controll over the Pacific War, if possible altogether.
With only USS Saratoga available for the first month and only Yorktown and Hornet following before March 1942, the USN would not have been able to do much more than defending the West Coast and Hawaii. There certainly would not have been a USN involvement in the Port Moresby operation, as this would have resulted in too much starvation of the already very weak resources of the Pacific Fleet. Operation Midway, if still launched by the Japanese, would have resulted in the most likley loss of the remaining USN carriers, as the full might of the complete First Strike Fleet of Nagumo, including the 5th CarDiv, would have been present then, since the MO operation would not have been resulting in losses of carrierstrength.
After this, only the late arival USS wasp would have been available. She was the weakest of the carriers and certainly not capable of dealing with the Kido Butai on her own. The USA and the Allies would most likely have been forced by the Japanese to make a deal on Japanese terms. Japan always wanted this, and the USA had to accept it, since it would not bve capable to counterstrike for a very long time. The earliest new additions to the Armed Forces would be available during 1943 and a counterattack would still not be possible before 1944, unless something was done avbout the Japanese dominance in the Pacific, most importantly, its carrierstrength.
With only USS Saratoga available for the first month and only Yorktown and Hornet following before March 1942, the USN would not have been able to do much more than defending the West Coast and Hawaii. There certainly would not have been a USN involvement in the Port Moresby operation, as this would have resulted in too much starvation of the already very weak resources of the Pacific Fleet. Operation Midway, if still launched by the Japanese, would have resulted in the most likley loss of the remaining USN carriers, as the full might of the complete First Strike Fleet of Nagumo, including the 5th CarDiv, would have been present then, since the MO operation would not have been resulting in losses of carrierstrength.
After this, only the late arival USS wasp would have been available. She was the weakest of the carriers and certainly not capable of dealing with the Kido Butai on her own. The USA and the Allies would most likely have been forced by the Japanese to make a deal on Japanese terms. Japan always wanted this, and the USA had to accept it, since it would not bve capable to counterstrike for a very long time. The earliest new additions to the Armed Forces would be available during 1943 and a counterattack would still not be possible before 1944, unless something was done avbout the Japanese dominance in the Pacific, most importantly, its carrierstrength.
No way, after Japan's terror attack on Peal Harbor the US will never surrender or even make a deal. The US people are totally pissed off and want to burn Japan to the ground. The US's industrial capacity dwarfs Japan's. They will ramp up their program to build Essex-class carriers, whatever naval assets are not needed in the Atlantic will be moved which is just about everything besides destroyers. They built two dozen of Essex carriers. Besides, Pearl Harbor is a shallow harbour so Enterprise and Lexington might well be refloated just like the BBs (except for Arizona and Oklahoma). This does mean that Roosevelt might have to pay less attention to Europe.
All three U.S. decks could have been in the Pacific by end of January. That would be bad news for Malta since Wasp managed to get two deck loads of fighters (47 Spitfire Mk V per trip) to the island, although the Luftwaffe managed to whittle them down with a couple nicely timed air raids, although it is likely that only Yorktown & Hornet would make the move.
Three active decks is what the U.S. had available for most of the war's first two years.
Wasp was also not decidedly inferior to the IJN carrier, although she was noticeably smaller than the full sized Yorktowns. She was very comparable to Soryu or Hiryu and she was capable of operating as many aircraft as the biggest IJN carrier the Kaga. Wasp carried 76 aircraft, which was less than her slightly larger sisters,all of whom carried around 90, but this was still quite a bit more than the IJN ships usually mounted.
At Midway, Akagi had 60 aircraft embarked, Kaga, which had the largest hanger deck, had 72 (plus two disassembled Soryu D3A1), Soryu & Hiryu had 57 each). It is worth noting that 21 of these aircraft (A6M from 6th Air Group) were not part of the regular ship's complement but were meant for Midway. The Japanese had to deck park aircraft for the Pearl Harbor attack since they couldn't get 414 planes into the hanger decks of the SIX carriers they sent. American carriers had much greater hanger storage than any other carrier designs in service.
Wasp shared the weakness in underwater protection that plagued the Yorktowns (whose design she generally shared), a weakness that resulted in the loss of three of the four CV-5 class vessels to enemy torpedoes (the class seemed to be able to absorb bomb hits all day long).
Bearcat
Banned
1. The conversion of light cruisers to CVLs still happens, maybe with 12 instead of 9.
2. The Essex program might be accelerated slightly if possible.
3. Enterprise and Lexington are sunk in shallow water like the old BBs.
By 1944, both have been raised and rebuilt, and join the central pacific advance.
End result: Surprisingly, very little difference from OTL.
2. The Essex program might be accelerated slightly if possible.
3. Enterprise and Lexington are sunk in shallow water like the old BBs.
By 1944, both have been raised and rebuilt, and join the central pacific advance.
End result: Surprisingly, very little difference from OTL.
I wonder just how fast at three shifts a day 7 days a week could a reasonably fast passenger liner be converted to a CV?
It isn't quite as easy as it would appear. The Japanese tried it with the Hiyo & Junyo but the result was a disappointment. Civilian shipping just isn't the same as real warship. Even the Independences which were built on cruiser hulls, were something of a compromise (the hit that killed USS Princeton would have barely have taken a Yorktown or Essex off flight operations).
If anything, what would work is the truly ugly option of the CVE. These were slow, which reduced their striking power and offensive utility, but they were fairly quick to build (Casablanca was 1st in class and she 9 months from first steel to commission while the earlier Bouge class took around a year), cheap, and could carry a decent sting with 24 aircraft.
They had almost zero survivability (about the same as the Japanese Hiyo, which isn't much) and a lot of little decks is not as effective as a few big decks, but they would have been a decent stop-gap if push had come to shove.
In the 1930s, both the USN & the RN did quite a few studies on converting large, fast liners into carriers upon mobilization. These studies estimated that the conversions would take between 6 months to a year. The USN conversions, depending on the ship an plan used, would have carried about 40-70 aircraft. However, none of the suitable liners available to the US were really fast- about 18-22 knots; there was a planned Maritime Commission P4 variant supposed to be specifically designed with carrier conversion in mind and capable of 24-5 knots, but it was never built. Moreover, all of these ships were needed as troop transports; the British had some faster ships, but these too were needed as troopships and for other purposes- the Admiralty specifically earmarked for conversion were ultimately used as troopships or AMCs, although a similar ship was converted from an AMC into a CVE (HMS Pretoria Castle) during the war.
The Japanese, as 'shadow fleet' program (several merchant ships and fleet auxillaries specifically designed for carrier conversion upon mobilization as a way around treaty restrictions) heavily subsidized 2 fast liners (Idzumo Maru & Kashiwara Maru) for the NYK line specifically designed with carrier conversion in mind (similar to the US studies of the interwar years,) with some naval-spec machinery; they were taken over during construction and completed as the carriers Hiyo & Junyo, designed to carry 53 aircraft. However, the conversions were complex, difficult, had issues in service, the mix of naval & merchant-spec machinery limited their performance.
Friedman, in his book on US carriers, has a chapter on the liner conversion studies, notes that the issues with the Japanese conversions suggest that abandoning the liner conversion plans was a good idea, although the experience was invaluable to the CVE program.
Essentially, most of the possible liner conversions would have been nothing more than outsized CVEs which required more manpower and resources to operate, for maybe twice the airgroup. The only ship under US control that would have made for a conversion tactically compatible with the fleet carriers that I am aware of would have been the SS Normandie, seized by the US in 1940 after the French surrender. In a TL where Enterprise or Lexington were caught at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, the decision to convert Normandie into a troopship instead of a carrier might have been reversed, although as a carrier, she would have made for a big, not very manuverable target without the survivability features normally built into warships. I haven't seen anything about what sort of airgroup/stores capacity/defensive armament a carrier conversion of the Normandie would have had (she was much bigger than the ships looked at in the prewar USN studies), although if any amature naval architects here want to take a stab, there is a cutaway schematic available here. Of course, that would require somehow avoiding the fire and subsequent capsizing due to damage control errors made by the New York Fire Department and port director that destroyed the ship while being stripped for conversion in Feb. 1942.
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During the height of the Guadalcanal campaign, when a damaged Enterprise was the only operational fleet carrier in the theater, the Navy actually rejected the idea on the grounds that because Ranger lacked any sort of armor protection and much-reduced defensive armament and compartmentilzation as a consequence of trying to make her as small as possible and still be capable of operating with the faster Lexington & Saratoga and carrying a similar airgroup (Ranger being an unsuccessful experiment to make the smallest possible large fleet carrier to get the most decks out of the tonnage limits imposed by the naval treaties,) she wasn't survivable enough (I've seen references to a couple studies on other sites suggesting that a couple good bomb hits or a torpedo would inflict catstophic damage on Ranger) to be subjected to the risks of Pacific carrier actions, and 2 Sangamon-class CVEs were sent out instead.
How likely would it be for the Royal Navy to send HMS Formidable and Indomitable to Pearl Harbor if the USN had lost both of their carriers at Pearl Harbor.
Presumably it would be a huge loss of face to the public if the USN needed help after a disaster but I wonder how much harder the road would have been for the losses suffered by the Japanese at the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal might not have been as bad which might have brought about a fleet action in 1943 as it almost did.
Presumably it would be a huge loss of face to the public if the USN needed help after a disaster but I wonder how much harder the road would have been for the losses suffered by the Japanese at the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal might not have been as bad which might have brought about a fleet action in 1943 as it almost did.
A link from Nihon Kaigun.
Probably as applicable, probably just a proportionately longer war.
Really illustrates how badly outmatched Japan is no matter what.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Probably as applicable, probably just a proportionately longer war.
Really illustrates how badly outmatched Japan is no matter what.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
I still believe in the US fighting spirit, but you need tools to fight with. Bare handed, it is glorious, but useless, as the opponent will massacre any understrength attack, most likely.
The USN could in theory have all its carrier in the Pacific in early 1942, but at a great price, namely a disturbed Alliance with the UK especially. The USA were not prepared to allianate themselves from both the UK and also the USSR, as this would mean war against them too in the future (especially the USSR) FDR would never allow this to happen, being a supporter of the great Alliance against "evil" Axis powers. The Pacific war would have to wait until 1944 at least, since the production and training of both equipment and personell needed time to be created.
With the CV-2 and CV-6 lost at Pearl Harbor, only CV-3, CV-5 and CV-8 were directly available, of whom CV-8 was not trained and still being fitted out. Her airgroup was as green as grass and lacked the basical experience of operating from an aircraft carrier, let alone go into war with one. CV-7 was badly needed in Europe and was not available for transfer to the Pacific, even if the US citizens wanted to do so, the President would veto it off.
So basically only two carriers would be operational in the first part of 1942, as USS Hornet would need time to get used to her equipment and this left only USS Saratoga and USS Yorktown, who were both in good condition, but were not equipped well with aircraft, that could threaten the Japanese. (Both had a reduced outfit of F4F-3's innitially and lacked a part of the Divebomberforce, as thiese aircraft were also deployed on landbases. The TBD was too old to be of much use and badly needed a more hard hitting longer ranged successor.) USS Saratoga was soon in trouble and needed time in the repairyard, due to a torpedohit from a submarine, leaving only Yorktown in the Pacific. (assuming, she still got damaged, as in the OTL.) One carrier is too little to do much in the vastness of the Pacific. The USN would not dare to wasist her on a suicide mission, so USS Yorktown adn USS Saratoga, with the untrained USS Hornet, would remain close to US bases in the East Pacific and not in the warzone.
The USN could in theory have all its carrier in the Pacific in early 1942, but at a great price, namely a disturbed Alliance with the UK especially. The USA were not prepared to allianate themselves from both the UK and also the USSR, as this would mean war against them too in the future (especially the USSR) FDR would never allow this to happen, being a supporter of the great Alliance against "evil" Axis powers. The Pacific war would have to wait until 1944 at least, since the production and training of both equipment and personell needed time to be created.
With the CV-2 and CV-6 lost at Pearl Harbor, only CV-3, CV-5 and CV-8 were directly available, of whom CV-8 was not trained and still being fitted out. Her airgroup was as green as grass and lacked the basical experience of operating from an aircraft carrier, let alone go into war with one. CV-7 was badly needed in Europe and was not available for transfer to the Pacific, even if the US citizens wanted to do so, the President would veto it off.
So basically only two carriers would be operational in the first part of 1942, as USS Hornet would need time to get used to her equipment and this left only USS Saratoga and USS Yorktown, who were both in good condition, but were not equipped well with aircraft, that could threaten the Japanese. (Both had a reduced outfit of F4F-3's innitially and lacked a part of the Divebomberforce, as thiese aircraft were also deployed on landbases. The TBD was too old to be of much use and badly needed a more hard hitting longer ranged successor.) USS Saratoga was soon in trouble and needed time in the repairyard, due to a torpedohit from a submarine, leaving only Yorktown in the Pacific. (assuming, she still got damaged, as in the OTL.) One carrier is too little to do much in the vastness of the Pacific. The USN would not dare to wasist her on a suicide mission, so USS Yorktown adn USS Saratoga, with the untrained USS Hornet, would remain close to US bases in the East Pacific and not in the warzone.
You are projecting a conservative mindset that the U.S. did not possess.
The U.S. sent two decks within 600 miles of the Home Islands in April of 1942. For that matter it sent the Wasp to Malta twice, the second time being AFTER the Germans had demonstrated that they had very good intel sources regarding movement near that island fortress.
This was not a navy that hid in the shadows. It was sometimes expensive, but it was, in the end, the way to win.
BlairWitch749
Banned
Japan is still screwed. Maybe another couple of months before they really get nailed but thats all. Even without Midway battle the US can build an immense fleet of carriers that will crush Japan. They still get nuked big time
The effects on Malta are interesting. Those landing spitfire ops were critical (at least according to Churchill, although I myself find the assertion dubious because the Germans shot them all up very shortly after)... Malta was starving and abandonment was considered at the highest levels at around that time.
It might also make the US rethink the Europe first strategy and or reduce lend lease to some degree to make up for naval weakness (reduced lend lease makes the capture of Stalingrad more of a possibility depending on the degree)
The effects on Malta are interesting. Those landing spitfire ops were critical (at least according to Churchill, although I myself find the assertion dubious because the Germans shot them all up very shortly after)... Malta was starving and abandonment was considered at the highest levels at around that time.
It might also make the US rethink the Europe first strategy and or reduce lend lease to some degree to make up for naval weakness (reduced lend lease makes the capture of Stalingrad more of a possibility depending on the degree)
While it would make life a bit easier for the Japanese in 42, it wouldnt make much differnec to the war as a whole.
From 1943, the Essex carriers and some CVL come on stream. There are also RN carriers available then (unless the Med has deteriorated somehow to need them badly). As Calbear has pointed out, the USN, like the RN, considered ships as valuable, but expendable if needed, assets, not as things to be preserved at all costs.
Sooner or later, even if they get carriers at Pearl, and possible a better Miday, the Japanese are going to run into a meatgrinder of a campaign SOMEWHERE in the Pacific which will detsroy their air power. It might be in a different place, but its going to happen sooner or later.
From 1943, the Essex carriers and some CVL come on stream. There are also RN carriers available then (unless the Med has deteriorated somehow to need them badly). As Calbear has pointed out, the USN, like the RN, considered ships as valuable, but expendable if needed, assets, not as things to be preserved at all costs.
Sooner or later, even if they get carriers at Pearl, and possible a better Miday, the Japanese are going to run into a meatgrinder of a campaign SOMEWHERE in the Pacific which will detsroy their air power. It might be in a different place, but its going to happen sooner or later.
Oh, I realize that they would compromises at best, abortions at worst. But as a stopgap measure I think they are a viable what if. And from the stand point of troop transports you really can't or don't want to ship large number of troops overseas with out some measure of control over your sea lanes. And for that you are going to need decks and destroyers for ASW work