Canaris not picked as head of the Abwehr

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Deleted member 1487

What if in 1935 when the Abwehr chief stepped down someone else got the job, say an army candidate as nearly happened before Admiral Raeder backed off on his opposition to Canaris. I can't seem to find who that candidate would have been (maybe Rudolf Bamler, OTL's head of counterintelligence until 1939, Nazi party member, and later Stasi officer), but let's say it isn't someone as opposed to Hitler as Canaris later became (he was an enthusiastic Nazi for a while until the grim realities of the regime were exposed).

Based on the chapter in the book "Myths and Legends of the Second World War" by James Hayward about Canaris it seems that there is a lot of evidence, though as yet no smoking gun due to the classification of British intelligence records, that Canaris was likely working with British intelligence during WW2 to stop Hitler. Based on a number of other articles and books I've read about him it is likely Canaris actively sabotaging the war effort and may well have been doing it in some level of coordination with the British.

So what if there was someone in charge of the Abwehr who, though not a committed Nazi was at least not interested in sabotaging his organization to defeat the regime? Canaris built the Abwehr from nearly the ground up (going from a staff of 150 to thousands before WW2 started) so what existed IOTL was his baby. Might there have been a better performance of military intelligence without someone actively working against the regime in charge?
 

Marc

Donor
So, what you are asking essentially, was Canaris one of the great heroes of World War 2? Apparently so, if we speculate that sans that great man, the Abwehr would be more useful to the horror on Earth called the 3rd Reich.
 

Ian_W

Banned
The biggest military intelligence coup was the Germans concealing the move from an attack on France based around Belgium to an attack via the Ardennes.

I don't really see any replacement for Canaris being more successful than that.

Yes, Canaris did provide aid and cover for anti-Hitler conspirators, but given that effort was fundamentally a failure, I don't see how it changes the war much.
 
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The biggest military intelligence coup was the Germans concealing the move from an attack on France based around Belgium to an attack via the Ardennes.

I don't really see any replacement for Canaris being more successful than that.

Yes, Canaris did provide aid and cover for anti-Hitler conspirators, but given that effort was fundamentally a failure, I don't see how it changes the war much.
I think not that was Canaris work?
The next question is regarding Spain where he really might have opposed an alliance. Sure, it could only happen in June 1940, but thats when he worked against it.
 

Ian_W

Banned
I think not that was Canaris work?
The next question is regarding Spain where he really might have opposed an alliance. Sure, it could only happen in June 1940, but thats when he worked against it.

Germany can't feed Spain in 1940, let alone later in the war. Without being able to replace that grain and fuel, a sane Franco isn't going to come into the war (and he was pretty sane).

And Gib really doesn't matter, because with Italy in the war the Med is closed to British commercial shipping anyway, and Axis plans in North Africa are crippled by the terrible logistics they need to deal with.

The long term butterfly of that particular lunacy is whether the Return to Europe starts in Spain rather than North Africa ...
 
Germany can't feed Spain in 1940, let alone later in the war. Without being able to replace that grain and fuel, a sane Franco isn't going to come into the war (and he was pretty sane).

And Gib really doesn't matter, because with Italy in the war the Med is closed to British commercial shipping anyway, and Axis plans in North Africa are crippled by the terrible logistics they need to deal with.

The long term butterfly of that particular lunacy is whether the Return to Europe starts in Spain rather than North Africa ...
It could only happen when the war was believed to end soon -for the reasons you mention, but it could happen then.
Axis Spain provides a platform for reconnaissance, refit, resupply and repairs to really hurt southern Atlantic.
Thats were the shipping have to go after the Med was closed.
In the Med it makes it so that Malta would likely fall, which has a number of butterflies in Africa.
It is true that if everything else stays the same, landings might occur in Spain.
 

Ian_W

Banned
It could only happen when the war was believed to end soon -for the reasons you mention, but it could happen then.
Axis Spain provides a platform for reconnaissance, refit, resupply and repairs to really hurt southern Atlantic.
Thats were the shipping have to go after the Med was closed.
In the Med it makes it so that Malta would likely fall, which has a number of butterflies in Africa.
It is true that if everything else stays the same, landings might occur in Spain.

Again, Germany is brutally short of grain, and can't feed both Spain and the Heer's horses.

Pick one.

Spanish bases wouldn't be able to be used until after Gib is secured, so probably not before October 1940 - and that puts you past the Sealion window that is so worrying the British.

Presumably Malta gets reinforced from the Suez direction, because it's an obvious next step.

Spring '41 sees the Germans deciding whether to feed Spain or build up a grain reserve to attack Russia with.
 

Deleted member 94680

One could argue Canaris’ management of the Abwehr was deliberately lackadaisical and as such never developed an effective counter to Double Cross, for instance. Something as simple as fresh spy drops or attempts to verify turned agent’s reports through Soviet sources was never seriously contemplated. By effectively losing the intelligence war by ‘41, you could argue the Abwehr sped the end of the War in their own way.
 

Deleted member 1487

Germany can't feed Spain in 1940, let alone later in the war. Without being able to replace that grain and fuel, a sane Franco isn't going to come into the war (and he was pretty sane).
They could with different choices, like not invading the USSR to keep up those food shipments from them.

And Gib really doesn't matter, because with Italy in the war the Med is closed to British commercial shipping anyway, and Axis plans in North Africa are crippled by the terrible logistics they need to deal with.
It very much did as a naval base, for the Tiger convoys, and to Malta, which played a critical role in the Battle of the Mediterranean, especially the logistics of the North African campaign.

The long term butterfly of that particular lunacy is whether the Return to Europe starts in Spain rather than North Africa ...
That might well be worse than Italy.

Again, Germany is brutally short of grain, and can't feed both Spain and the Heer's horses.

Pick one.
In terms of invading the USSR yes, it would be either or.

Spanish bases wouldn't be able to be used until after Gib is secured, so probably not before October 1940 - and that puts you past the Sealion window that is so worrying the British.
How do you figure that? Once Spanish coastal guns open up Gibraltar is useless as a base for the Brits and can do nothing to impede Spain or German basing there. In 1940 especially at most the Brits can do is invade the Canaries with some delay.

Presumably Malta gets reinforced from the Suez direction, because it's an obvious next step.
Not really possible given that supply convoys would have to take a LONG detour; that's why IOTL all the resupply convoys that successfully made it to Malta came from Gibraltar.

Spring '41 sees the Germans deciding whether to feed Spain or build up a grain reserve to attack Russia with.
Indeed. If they're in Spain Barbarossa is impossible unless they renege on promises to supply Spain.

One could argue Canaris’ management of the Abwehr was deliberately lackadaisical and as such never developed an effective counter to Double Cross, for instance. Something as simple as fresh spy drops or attempts to verify turned agent’s reports through Soviet sources was never seriously contemplated. By effectively losing the intelligence war by ‘41, you could argue the Abwehr sped the end of the War in their own way.
Some have.
They didn't know about Double Cross until after the war (I doubt even the Brits let Canaris know), but the way agents were recruited, inserted, and supported was so bad that it almost defies description unless it was in conjunction with British intelligence.
Apparently there was at least one Abwehr agent in Britain that was never part of the Double Cross system though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Willem_Ter_Braak

A big part of the problem was working through Arthur Owens, who was at least a double if not triple agent, and laid the foundations of Double Cross, because he passed info on to British intel about incoming agents:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Owens

In terms of the Soviets they weren't trusted, which was reasonable, but some of their British agents did try to pass intel to the Germans, but ended up getting caught by the Brits.
 
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Ian_W

Banned
They could with different choices, like not invading the USSR to keep up those food shipments from them.

OK. Lets assume the Germans abandon Barbarossa 1941, and go for a Churchill-style peripheral campaign in the Med.

Gib falls in late 1940, Malta in early 1941. The logistics of supplying the Afrika Korps are still terrible, and the British probably make more of an effort in Crete. But OK, by late 1941 the British are pushed back to near Alexandria and Suez.

The distance between the nearest Axis port and Alexandria is at least 600 km. The British fleet concentrated in Alexandria is still a thing. British convoys have to go around Africa, but they did anyway because Pedestal and similar were for emergencies, not for routine resupply.

Then the Americans are in the war, which at minimum means the British don't lose.

You've then got a German war economy that is entirely reliant on Soviet trade, and they are running out of things to trade to them.

It's a peripheral strategy. It doesn't knock the British out of the war.
 

Deleted member 1487

OK. Lets assume the Germans abandon Barbarossa 1941, and go for a Churchill-style peripheral campaign in the Med.
Not exactly given that the British empire hinged on the Mediterranean. Peripheral to the Home Isles in the short run, but at the heart of the Empire, which Churchill's Mediterranean strategy was certainly not for Germany.

Gib falls in late 1940, Malta in early 1941. The logistics of supplying the Afrika Korps are still terrible, and the British probably make more of an effort in Crete. But OK, by late 1941 the British are pushed back to near Alexandria and Suez.
Given that Malta strangled Rommel's logistics in late 1941, they are vastly improved. Malta had managed to drop shipments to Libya from a peak of 126k tons in June 1941 to a bottom of 25k tons as of December 1941 and was instrumental in the defeat of Axis forces during Crusader (in November they sank a 5 ship convoy) that pushed them back to their start position in January 1941. As the supplies coming in without interruption would mean Rommel has the supplies to launch a prepared assault on Tobruk well before Crusader is launched, that would change the entire tenor of the North African campaign.

The distance between the nearest Axis port and Alexandria is at least 600 km. The British fleet concentrated in Alexandria is still a thing. British convoys have to go around Africa, but they did anyway because Pedestal and similar were for emergencies, not for routine resupply.
How did they let Rommel get to and maintain his position for months less than 60km from Alexandria in 1942? Also Bardia is a only about 300km from Alexandria, while IOTL in 1942 ports in Egypt were used as well and even limited rail supply was in use after the lines bogged down at Alamein.

Then the Americans are in the war, which at minimum means the British don't lose.
If the USSR wasn't invaded then the chain of events resulting from Barbarossa doesn't happen, which means it is unlikely the US is in the war as of December 1941. They could well come in later, but it is unlikely they'd come in when they did IOTL.

You've then got a German war economy that is entirely reliant on Soviet trade, and they are running out of things to trade to them.

It's a peripheral strategy. It doesn't knock the British out of the war.
Germany had plenty to trade without Barbarossa. Even if the US was in something like 65% of the German war effort was spent in the East in 1942. It wasn't until 1943 that things were 50-50 and by 1944 had shifted a majority to the 'western' front overall. So missing something like 45-65% of OTL's war expense means there is a LOT more to trade with the USSR, vastly more than they owed the USSR IOTL as of 1941.

Preventing Barbarossa and maintaining Soviet supply means the European Axis at least has saved the vast majority of their ground forces and labor force, which is a huge advantage for them over OTL, while going after the Empire creates a lot of political pressure on the Churchill government (losing Tobruk in 1942 caused a vote of no-confidence, which to be fair Churchill won with flying colors, but losing Gibraltar, Malta, Tobruk, and with some bad luck Egypt would be a very different scenario especially if the Soviets aren't in the war) which probably would pressure him to do stupid things that could wreck British ability to fight the war; British morale wasn't bottomless and with repeatedly defeats and no hope to win they might well cut a deal, especially if it looks like without Soviet help British men will have to do the dying in the millions to actually win. After all the British goal isn't simply to survive, but liberate Europe and if the cost of that is judged to be too high by the public, what is the point of continuing to fight the war?
 

Ian_W

Banned
How did they let Rommel get to and maintain his position for months less than 60km from Alexandria in 1942? .

And then were not able to sustain the attack, because the Axis logistics were unable to get supplies from the port to a fighting front that far away.

Yes, Rommel's habit of 'Get some supplies, ATTACK !' didn't help, meaning the supplies he did get were frittered away in a series of individually successful attacks that added up to not defeating the British ... but getting supplies that far across the desert required truck numbers and logistics expertise the Axis didn't have.
 
Not exactly given that the British empire hinged on the Mediterranean. Peripheral to the Home Isles in the short run, but at the heart of the Empire, which Churchill's Mediterranean strategy was certainly not for Germany.


Given that Malta strangled Rommel's logistics in late 1941, they are vastly improved. Malta had managed to drop shipments to Libya from a peak of 126k tons in June 1941 to a bottom of 25k tons as of December 1941 and was instrumental in the defeat of Axis forces during Crusader (in November they sank a 5 ship convoy) that pushed them back to their start position in January 1941. As the supplies coming in without interruption would mean Rommel has the supplies to launch a prepared assault on Tobruk well before Crusader is launched, that would change the entire tenor of the North African campaign.


How did they let Rommel get to and maintain his position for months less than 60km from Alexandria in 1942? Also Bardia is a only about 300km from Alexandria, while IOTL in 1942 ports in Egypt were used as well and even limited rail supply was in use after the lines bogged down at Alamein.


If the USSR wasn't invaded then the chain of events resulting from Barbarossa doesn't happen, which means it is unlikely the US is in the war as of December 1941. They could well come in later, but it is unlikely they'd come in when they did IOTL.


Germany had plenty to trade without Barbarossa. Even if the US was in something like 65% of the German war effort was spent in the East in 1942. It wasn't until 1943 that things were 50-50 and by 1944 had shifted a majority to the 'western' front overall. So missing something like 45-65% of OTL's war expense means there is a LOT more to trade with the USSR, vastly more than they owed the USSR IOTL as of 1941.

Preventing Barbarossa and maintaining Soviet supply means the European Axis at least has saved the vast majority of their ground forces and labor force, which is a huge advantage for them over OTL, while going after the Empire creates a lot of political pressure on the Churchill government (losing Tobruk in 1942 caused a vote of no-confidence, which to be fair Churchill won with flying colors, but losing Gibraltar, Malta, Tobruk, and with some bad luck Egypt would be a very different scenario especially if the Soviets aren't in the war) which probably would pressure him to do stupid things that could wreck British ability to fight the war; British morale wasn't bottomless and with repeatedly defeats and no hope to win they might well cut a deal, especially if it looks like without Soviet help British men will have to do the dying in the millions to actually win. After all the British goal isn't simply to survive, but liberate Europe and if the cost of that is judged to be too high by the public, what is the point of continuing to fight the war?

And what happens when the Allies invade France and Stalin decides The Time is Now and T-34's start to roll over the border with Poland?
 

Deleted member 1487

And what happens when the Allies invade France and Stalin decides The Time is Now and T-34's start to roll over the border with Poland?
Stalin probably would wait until things would be as easy as possible and then roll. Landing in France would be an ideal opportunity to let both sides really bleed each other and such in their reserves so that he could eventually attack, but until say France has been liberated it wouldn't be a good time to attack.
Question is what then do the Allies do when they get hit by T-34s that don't stop in Germany?

And then were not able to sustain the attack, because the Axis logistics were unable to get supplies from the port to a fighting front that far away.
Except IOTL they repeatedly did when Malta was suppressed and supply convoys were able to arrive unimpeded?

Yes, Rommel's habit of 'Get some supplies, ATTACK !' didn't help, meaning the supplies he did get were frittered away in a series of individually successful attacks that added up to not defeating the British ... but getting supplies that far across the desert required truck numbers and logistics expertise the Axis didn't have.
I'm not sure what version of the North African campaign you're talking about, but the British were very badly defeated a number of times and were either saved by Malta interdicting his supplies, Tobruk tying down his forces in a siege (at least the first time), or the enormous desert strategic depth gave the Brits time to recover. The Axis had the expertise, what their problem was was being a secondary front to Russia, so relatively secondary in terms of supplies and equipment (though they were favored relative to their size more than any other corps in the German military given the situation they were expected to deal with on the cheap), while the Brits had North Africa as their primary front and main focus of supply. That doesn't mean it couldn't be done with some changes, like Malta not being a factor at the time when things were most relatively even in manpower (though not supply), Autumn-Winter 1941.

Plus Rommel's aggressive behavior was in part dictated by his own intelligence coups:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonner_Fellers#Italians_and_Germans_access_Fellers'_reports
And SigInt force:
http://armchairgeneral.com/radio-kills-rommels-621st-radio-intercept-company.htm

Thanks to that excellent intel he was able to take advantage of British weakness and win despite the odds.
 
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The Germans could easily continue to purchase grain and other raw resources from the Soviets for years (by basically not producing tanks shot up on the eastern front, see below).

Spain would use 200 tons of that grain herself, probably more later as Spain would be cut off from fertilizers, it would be tricky to get that grain to Spain with the one rail line and switching gauges at the frontier.

Not sure Spain is worth it for Germany. Not attacking the Soviet Union would be a good idea, but I am thinking it would be best for Germany to do a long game, avoiding bad economic situations like Spain, and avoiding attritionally unfavorable situations, like the OTL battle of Britain, basically hoping the British tire and make peace eventually, even if it takes some years (likely if no USA or USSR enter the war). Not sure if Spanish bases are worth the costs.

https://books.google.com/books?id=S...&q=spanish consumption of grains 1940&f=false

Basically the Germans / Soviets had a deal where they were trading 650 million Reichsmarks annually

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nazi–Soviet_economic_relations_(1934–41)

According to this article, the cost of a Panzer III is 96,163 RM.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Cost

So the the entire cost can be paid with 6759 Panzer IIIs not built to make products the Soviet Union wants.

In 1943 the Germans produced 11601 tanks, presumably mostly lost in wastage on the eastern front. So Germany can easily pay for the plethora of economic good received under the agreement (see table), far more than she received by invading and looting the place

upload_2019-4-5_16-12-0-png.451576
 

Deleted member 94680

Some have.
They didn't know about Double Cross until after the war (I doubt even the Brits let Canaris know), but the way agents were recruited, inserted, and supported was so bad that it almost defies description unless it was in conjunction with British intelligence.
Apparently there was at least one Abwehr agent in Britain that was never part of the Double Cross system though

A few months and no real intel. Not groundbreaking, is it?


In terms of the Soviets they weren't trusted, which was reasonable, but some of their British agents did try to pass intel to the Germans, but ended up getting caught by the Brits.

I meant using their sources in the Soviet apparatus - the Abwehr had quite a few agents in the Soviet spy agencies, apparently. By getting their agents in the USSR to confirm what their ‘agents’ in the UK were telling them would be a useful check to the supposedly fantastic sources they’d turned up.
 
So, what you are asking essentially, was Canaris one of the great heroes of World War 2? Apparently so, if we speculate that sans that great man, the Abwehr would be more useful to the horror on Earth called the 3rd Reich.
Well it's difficult to call Canaris a hero outright. Though he did undermine parts of the Nazi war effort, his Abwehr still contributed to the Anschluss, the suppression of Czech resistance and drew up the lists of names for several mass executions including Operation Tannenberg. For several months before the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Abwehr was key in deception operations set up to convince the British and the Soviets that Great Britain was under threat of imminent invasion, an undertaking which helped soften the eastern territories for Operation Barbarossa.
 

Deleted member 1487

A few months and no real intel. Not groundbreaking, is it?
Define 'real'. He was transmitting back intel and traveling freely to scope out what he was asked to. According to one intelligence historian his information was likely used in Luftwaffe raids in 1940-41 and for post-bombing damage assessment.

I meant using their sources in the Soviet apparatus - the Abwehr had quite a few agents in the Soviet spy agencies, apparently. By getting their agents in the USSR to confirm what their ‘agents’ in the UK were telling them would be a useful check to the supposedly fantastic sources they’d turned up.
Do you have any info about that? I haven't seen anything about that, rather the reverse as a number of Soviet spies were eventually rolled up in Germany. Schellenberg in his book, though to be taken with some caution, wrote about several instances of Soviet penetration of Germany before the invasion, including a number of failures to catch them before they exfiltrated back to the USSR.
 
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