Canada buys Phantom II, impact into 1990s and beyond?

So for aircraft delivered between 1965 and 1968,

The RN was the first customer for the Phantom and it placed its order in 1965 for delivery from 1967, the delay I assume being for the development of mod specific to Britain. For Canada to get aircraft in 1965 they'd have to order in about 1963 and then compete with US and UK production in the years when McD was producing and average of 63 a month and peaking at 72 a month to re-equip US units fighting in Vietnam.

If Canada was to be the first export customer for the Phantom it would be offered the F4C, but then in later batches this version would be out of production so Canada would have to buy whatever was the latest production version. Thus Canada would end up with a couple of 'orphan' fleets of small numbers of aircraft and have to work something out about harmonising these fleets as much as possible, all of which drives up costs.

Also most armed forces compromise between platform numbers and available budget, so I seriously doubt Canada is getting the same numbers of Phantoms as it got F101, F104 and F5, particularly given the complex and convoluted method of the F101 buys and how it was tied to the BOMARC. That said if the RCAF got the Phantom it wouldn't need the same number of aircraft due to the Phantoms greater capability.
 
The RN was the first customer for the Phantom and it placed its order in 1965 for delivery from 1967, the delay I assume being for the development of mod specific to Britain. For Canada to get aircraft in 1965 they'd have to order in about 1963 and then compete with US and UK production in the years when McD was producing and average of 63 a month and peaking at 72 a month to re-equip US units fighting in Vietnam.

If Canada was to be the first export customer for the Phantom it would be offered the F4C, but then in later batches this version would be out of production so Canada would have to buy whatever was the latest production version. Thus Canada would end up with a couple of 'orphan' fleets of small numbers of aircraft and have to work something out about harmonising these fleets as much as possible, all of which drives up costs.

Also most armed forces compromise between platform numbers and available budget, so I seriously doubt Canada is getting the same numbers of Phantoms as it got F101, F104 and F5, particularly given the complex and convoluted method of the F101 buys and how it was tied to the BOMARC. That said if the RCAF got the Phantom it wouldn't need the same number of aircraft due to the Phantoms greater capability.

All very true. Probably what one's looking at is that (1) the buy takes until a little later, probably right at the end of the Pearson years and because he was farthest right (out of his grab-bag of political positions) on fiscal policy especially during fits of pique Trudeau would like to cancel the contract, but too many people in the party, American pressure, and possibly some kind of industrial workshare where Canadair puts in the Speys (les plus porc des porcs for Quebec right at the height of the separatist movement) means that the project follows through. This could have additional ripple effects through defense (sorry, defence ;) procurement, like with the Iroquois-class build or with getting and keeping any parts of the Army (Land or Mobile Command at the time? I forget the terminology of that whole clustershag) mechanized other than 4 CMBG. But the buy goes ahead, and really it comes in the very start of the Seventies (like beginnings of delivery in 1970 or so) and it's the -E line, maximal Phantom capability, which Canada gets. (To the OP, those images in the first post are just gorgeous, pure hardware porn :p) That does indeed mean a reduction in numbers, probably something on the lines of:
  • Ten front-line squadrons of 12 each, with four for 1st Air Division at Solingen, West Germany where they can share a common maintenance and parts pool potentially with the USAF and Luftwaffe, and three each basically pointed east and west within home air defense
  • One, possibly 16-jet squadron for training and weapons-integration testing
  • A decent number of spares, 34 would be the equivalent of 25% of the in-service fleet and probably a maximal result on that based on what HMCG is willing to lay out
So that's a total of 170 airframes for the fleet, all F-4Es, with an emphasis on ground-attack capabilities for 1st Air Division and emphasis on long-haul AAM trucking for the home-based aircraft. Sounds like an entirely plausible outcome.

And again, with the general parsimoniousness of the Defence budget and the fact that there were some pretty decent upgrades available for Phantoms going on into the Eighties (particularly if you tried to draft the coattails of the Germans, Israelis, or South Koreans to keep per-unit prices down) the airframes probably soldier on into the mid-Nineties, with duty in the Gulf and Bosnia starting to show their age, on the lines of "they're rugged, outstanding bomb trucks when you have total air superiority, but the airframes themselves are wearing thin." That pushes you on past the Mulroney window of opportunity (if Joe Clark had gotten a majority I'd have said that for Canada IOTL sans this Phantom purchase, what made the most sense was not trying to have champagne on a beer budget with -15s or -18s when you were still competing for slots with the USN/USMC and paying development costs, but by getting in on the great F-16 license-build fire sale and getting the -16s assembled by Canadair in the bargain, more bribing La Belle Provence with defense contracts) this puts you in the middle and later Nineties with a beloved but shagged-out fleet in need of replacement. At that point you can either get in on however the Eurofighter project is going or, given that this is exactly the wrong moment to try and get in line for Superbugs, all of a sudden the Gripen starts to look a lot more attractive. You can probably get more of them, and in multi-role configuration rather than the "Tranche 1" Typhoons which were pretty much pure interceptors/dogfighters with hefty bills for upgrades later, and since Saab can only churn out so many at once you can probably, again, get a workshare agreement up and running where Saab builds the key components and assembly, particularly if you want to steal a march on the Gripen-NG with an early engine upgrade, by Bombardier. In that case you're probably comfortably home to at least six squadrons and maybe, just maybe, as many as eight. But definitely six plus the OCU/Eval unit, probably at least 110 airframes, up to 120 if they're lucky which would be quite a decent haul (on the principle of a minimum of four squadrons at all times for home air defense, and a maximum capacity to surge two squadrons simultaneously for short- to medium-term overseas operations.)

As I said in passing above, one of the interesting things is, what does this mean for other defense procurement choices? Spending the very end of the Sixties and most of the first half of the Seventies paying off acquisition of the all-Phantom fleet and affiliated weapons systems is going to have a real effect on both shipbuilding and on the army. The famed and key AVGP purchases (Cougar and Bison and the rest) might not happen because in stagflated times the Trudeau government would argue the cupboard was bare, and that home forces would just have to make do in the name of keeping 4 CMBG in shape (although that might have some side benefits for 4 CMBG since it's a small-batch procurement project, perhaps more ATGM bulk purchases and maybe late-model Chieftains with Stillbrew armor instead of Leo 1s for the cavalry regiment in residence just to show Land Command wasn't being abandoned totally because of shiny jets.)
 

Nick P

Donor
Would it be plausible for Canada to set up a production line for the F-4 Phantom? With a planned purchase of 400+, an aviation industry that is recovering from the CF-105 cancellation and the desire to keep the money and jobs in Canada it makes sense.

Having this extra factory allows McDonnell-Douglas to concentrate on producing US Navy and USAF Phantoms. The Canadian plant could become the overseas sales factory with time to focus on mods for the UK market and others.
When Vietnam kicks in this extra capacity will be welcomed. The economic impact will be quite large.
 
Until the F35 started gaining admirers here in Canada, the RCAF had always insisted on twin engine fighter for NORAD.
That puts in doubt any purchase of the F16 or Gripen.As was mentioned, I think the government would be looking at replacements, at the latest, in the mid 80's, for delivery NLT 1990.
I think any discussion in this TL should focus primarily on what is available as a twin engine, multi-role fighter available in the mid 80's.
A further headache for the brass at the time would be "what do we do with all those back seaters from the F4 now?"
 
I suppose the most economical multi-role fighter would be the HAL Tejas. It used the same engine as the IOTL Hornet, but politically that'd be a strange buy.

It's taken HAL forty years to build twenty fighters. And the naval variant turned out after decades of research to be overweight for carrier ops.
 
Would it be plausible for Canada to set up a production line for the F-4 Phantom? With a planned purchase of 400+, an aviation industry that is recovering from the CF-105 cancellation and the desire to keep the money and jobs in Canada it makes sense.

Having this extra factory allows McDonnell-Douglas to concentrate on producing US Navy and USAF Phantoms. The Canadian plant could become the overseas sales factory with time to focus on mods for the UK market and others.
When Vietnam kicks in this extra capacity will be welcomed. The economic impact will be quite large.

I like the way you're thinking, and it is just possible that, if Canada orders c. 175-80 aircraft, they might get a license build deal as Mitsubishi did with nearly all the JASDF's Phantoms particularly if you're putting in a different engine. But five words stand between that and doing something like an "export line factory" with Canadair: Stuart Symington and Thomas Eagleton. Keeping "Phantom Town USA" (St. Louis) rolling at maximum output, especially as the export orders rolled in, was a major American political investment and not one brushed aside easily particularly when the fate of the F-15 was still up in the air until 1973-74 (really 1974, the USAF nearly overplayed their hand with Schlesinger by asking for an all-F15 fleet with some A-10s to keep the Army happy and nearly ended up with an almost-all-F16 fleet with possibly a handful of F-14B wings for long range intercept, which would've driven them round the bend because despite the obvious quality of the Phantom and its role as a USAF mainstay the light blue brass *hated* having to accept a "Navy aircraft" and wanted its own super fighter or they would throw all the toys out the pram tyvm.) But it is possible the Canadians might've wangled a build-your-own deal if they were savvy enough.
 
Until the F35 started gaining admirers here in Canada, the RCAF had always insisted on twin engine fighter for NORAD.
That puts in doubt any purchase of the F16 or Gripen.As was mentioned, I think the government would be looking at replacements, at the latest, in the mid 80's, for delivery NLT 1990.
I think any discussion in this TL should focus primarily on what is available as a twin engine, multi-role fighter available in the mid 80's.
A further headache for the brass at the time would be "what do we do with all those back seaters from the F4 now?"

Fair point -- with the exception of what the rest of the world called the CF-5 that's quite true. But per myself and IIRC @Riain above, given the rate of production in St. Louis during the Sixties, the tri-service demands of the US Armed Forces, and the initial export orders to the UK and West Germany, I doubt Canada sees an airframe much less IOC before about 1969, and at that point it's worth soldiering on for a year or so to get in on the ground floor with an all-E fleet for maximum capability. So then you're looking at starting the clock on wear and tear at about 1970/71 rather than the mid-Sixties. So taking the advice upthread, adding twenty years to that, and then probably another couple of years of fudging before the government can be pushed to say "look, if we leave this any longer we're going to have serious fleet problems in the second half of the Nineties" then you're looking at what's out there and what can be done in the period. Of course Tornado ADV is already fully developed at that point but it's a one-trick pony and there's only one chance to go to the well with the budget line on this so you need multi-role. The F-15E is still too Gucci in terms of price at this point (it's the enormous lobby-plus-Foreign Military Sales credits-plus-supplying top end equipment to encourage an absence of preemptive strikes on the neighbors that got the Israelis F-15Es in this time frame) unless you want to shrink the fleet to the very bottom edge of viability. (It was at least less of a one-trick hangar queen than the original -A/C series F-15s, which while they were very high performance dogfighters, were also one-trick hangar queens, their policy/budgetary opponents in the Seventies had a good point there.) Other than going single engine and getting in on the ground floor with Gripen, things would need to be moving much more smartly along ITTL than IOTL with both Rafale and Typhoon for them to be good purchases (Rafale would do it but the French will be prickly about things like license build and are still trying to pay off R&D at this point, and Typhoon Tranche 1 was to say again a "pure" interceptor with expensive upgrades to true multi-role capability.)

Really the best possible outcome for Canada, at that point in time (getting the government off its duff around '92-93, moving towards actual purchase in the '95-96 time frame and IOC in a year or two after that, which is pushing the time frame hard but we're assuming a normal, fallen world here in which things take longer than they ideally should and large organizations have to be shoved bodily into taking action, writing new requirements and procedures, and spending money) would be the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The Superbug was a vastly better airframe than the original F/A-18s, which was really a "not quite enough of any particular thing" jet but twin-engined and affordable for a variety of customers on a budget (including Canada IOTL !) But the Super Hornet was likewise with two engines, had payload and range comparable to the Phantoms going out of service in this scenario, plus contemporary avionics and power. Just about perfect. Trouble is this is exactly when USN and USMC are doing their "fleet renewal" buys and hogging all the assembly line slots. That might get some kind of license deal worked out if Canada was willing to buy enough (100-120) airframes to put it in the neighborhood of profitability. Particularly if we're moving into the bold new world of NAFTA ITTL. In that case the Superbug would be essentially ideal and good advertising for McDonnell Douglas that there was an export customer already on top of the big Navy/Marine orders. But getting the airframes built and delivered to Canada in a timely fashion as the F-4Es (CF-144Es perhaps?) reached the real end of their viable lives would be the trick.
 
I like the way you're thinking, and it is just possible that, if Canada orders c. 175-80 aircraft, they might get a license build deal as Mitsubishi did with nearly all the JASDF's Phantoms particularly if you're putting in a different engine. But five words stand between that and doing something like an "export line factory" with Canadair: Stuart Symington and Thomas Eagleton. Keeping "Phantom Town USA" (St. Louis) rolling at maximum output, especially as the export orders rolled in, was a major American political investment and not one brushed aside easily particularly when the fate of the F-15 was still up in the air until 1973-74 (really 1974, the USAF nearly overplayed their hand with Schlesinger by asking for an all-F15 fleet with some A-10s to keep the Army happy and nearly ended up with an almost-all-F16 fleet with possibly a handful of F-14B wings for long range intercept, which would've driven them round the bend because despite the obvious quality of the Phantom and its role as a USAF mainstay the light blue brass *hated* having to accept a "Navy aircraft" and wanted its own super fighter or they would throw all the toys out the pram tyvm.) But it is possible the Canadians might've wangled a build-your-own deal if they were savvy enough.
Japan produced their own Phantoms, even after the USA plant closed in the 1970s. Canada produced the CF-104 and CF-116. I see no political reason we can't make Phantoms.
 
Superbug was a vastly better airframe than the original F/A-18s, which was really a "not quite enough of any particular thing" jet but twin-engined and affordable for a variety of customers on a budget (including Canada IOTL !)

In the early 80s the F/A18A was a complete aircraft but most certainly was not cheap; it started off at 35 million a pop and we ended up paying 54 million a pop. Australia bought it because unlike the F16 and Tornado IDS it was an all-weather BVR fighter, unlike the F15 it had a full air to ground and stand-off anti-ship capability and unlike the Mirage 2000 is was twin engine, longer ranged, US interoperable and immune from 'concerns' about being used operationally in Vietnam.
 
An interesting article on the real-world debates and logic that went into OTL's purchase/build of the CF-5, as a base of comparison for what alternate logic might lead instead to a Phantom purchase (other than the idea of roasting Paul Hellyer and Duncan Sandys on the same spit in Hades):
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no3/stouffer-eng.asp

And my apologies in the previous comment -- I had forgotten that really the principal distinctive of the CF-5 from its American cousin was being twin-fired (otherwise I would say poor Northrop missed a wonderful chance to get the F-20 going in the Eighties with Canada, with the nippy flight qualities, reasonable price, and better radar linked to medium-range AAMs it was practically made for Canadian requirements -- aside from the Taiwanese and South Korean requirements for which it was actually first designed -- except for that single engine.) Mea culpa.
 
In the early 80s the F/A18A was a complete aircraft but most certainly was not cheap; it started off at 35 million a pop and we ended up paying 54 million a pop. Australia bought it because unlike the F16 and Tornado IDS it was an all-weather BVR fighter, unlike the F15 it had a full air to ground and stand-off anti-ship capability and unlike the Mirage 2000 is was twin engine, longer ranged, US interoperable and immune from 'concerns' about being used operationally in Vietnam.

Fair point about the cost -- AusMoD did get burned on that, more so since they were in addition to your very cogent points "water in the desert" because like the Nineties Canadian Phantoms of the OP, the Mirage IIIs were hitting the wall on their useful lifespan. And yes that was the downfall of the F-16s' first ten to fifteen years in service, the all-weather BVR issues that a "naval" fighter like F/A-18 was conversely designed around (another of those reasons why, really, in a rational world, it was better to buy a few wings of F-14Bs and a whole lot of F-16s (and work out the all-weather issue with the 16s) and A-10s for the 1970s USAF rather than hurling themselves bodily at the F-15, but it is a thing universally observed of intra-service dynamics in air forces the world over that the true fighter jocks want their magnificent Gucci dogfighters or else, in some numbers at least.) And though they were "tainted" by association (not directly for the RAAF of course who had used Canberras instead) those F-111Cs were glorious birds, really the US should've accepted that, the peculiar issues that led to the FB-111 "SACvark" aside, the F-111C was essentially the perfected form of the aircraft and should've bought those rather than the solid but measurably inferior (to the -C models) F-111D/Fs. The latter did very well in the Gulf War (with absolutely no press, few aircraft have gotten less of the positive press they actually deserved than the 111s) but more Cs would've done better, and with longer legs to boot. It's a shame the time frame was as it was for the RAAF, waiting long enough to get the Superbug in numbers would've been a good thing, rather than together with the EA-18Gs as "sports" within a larger OG Hornet fleet when the 111s were done. And a Tornado buy -- another good approach if one got both types -- would've needed the ADV to be "fully cooked" in time which it was not
 
Canada did consider the F-4 in @. McDD went as far as producing a model of a Canadian marked Phantom for an official delegation.
I have read that it fell through on the grounds that McDD did not have enough capacity at the time. However I have also read that any Canadian Phantoms would have been built in Canada.

I suspect the reason the deal fell through was simple - cost.
 
Japan produced their own Phantoms, even after the USA plant closed in the 1970s. Canada produced the CF-104 and CF-116. I see no political reason we can't make Phantoms.

Well, within the logic of your second sentence -- a single-country license build, or one plus a little extra order or two (ex. Fokker license-assembled Norway's F-16s as well as the Netherlands') -- that was my point too. Make a decent sized order and you can build your own CF-144s (my guess on type designation but YMMV) just not other people's. They're not going to get a full blown export line for the product, building for a wide variety of customers. McDonnell Douglas and the state of Missouri more largely needed that line to keep running for as long as possible because it took a while for the F-15s to start cranking out and for McDonnell Douglas to usurp Northrop's original role with F-18 development. And, like another commenter said above, because Paul Hellyer. Lots of problems with Canadian defense procurement strategy can be answered "because Paul Hellyer", much like many problems with British defense procurement strategy (the ones that aren't answered "because James Callaghan" when Sunny Jim was at the Treasury before Wilson essentially brought the grownups in with Roy Jenkins to do devaluation and at that point everything was on the chopping block) can be answered "because Duncan Sandys."
 
Australia's own experience with the Phantom was a key reason why the Mirages were done by 1985, it was decided that if Australia were to keep the leased Phantoms it would interfere with the Mirage replacement. So the result was that it was decided to hand back the surviving Phantoms and engineering decisions were made from the early 70s that the Mirages would be replaced from the early not late 80s. For example the wings were not strengthened to last until 1990 so were not strong enough to accept the AIM9L so we were 'forced' to accept the Magic instead.

However none of this was even though of back in 1960 when the decision to buy the Mirage was made, nor would similar things be thought of if Canada decided to get the Phantom instead of other planes. They'd be acquired and all this sort of thing would be sorted out years later by different governments and ministers in different strategic and financial circumstances.
 
If C
Canada did consider the F-4 in @. McDD went as far as producing a model of a Canadian marked Phantom for an official delegation.
I have read that it fell through on the grounds that McDD did not have enough capacity at the time. However I have also read that any Canadian Phantoms would have been built in Canada.

I suspect the reason the deal fell through was simple - cost.
I'd say it was timing. By the time the F-4 was available we already had both the CF-101 (1961) and CF-104 (1962). That's why I've suggested we need a POD that keeps the CF-100 and CL-13 Sabre in service into the mid-1960s. But yes, cost will be a factor, especially moving from the single seat CL-13 (or CF-104) to the twin seat Phantom.
 
If C
I'd say it was timing. By the time the F-4 was available we already had both the CF-101 (1961) and CF-104 (1962). That's why I've suggested we need a POD that keeps the CF-100 and CL-13 Sabre in service into the mid-1960s. But yes, cost will be a factor, especially moving from the single seat CL-13 (or CF-104) to the twin seat Phantom.

Surely that's right (cost may have played a role too, but because the money had already been laid out on the Voodoos and 104s. It is likely that the personnel saving will be from lower numbers (squadrons of 12 for example would be meaningfully less in size than the typical Cold War squadrons, but would help absorb the second-seaters at the same "going rate" as the older, larger squadrons full of single-seat pilots) on grounds that the Phantoms were much more loaded and versatile than the "alternate" aircraft of OTL (101s and 104s) and certainly than the 100s and Sabres. But that would be the likeliest necessary tradeoff. Personnel costs are, together with maintenance, the classic hidden cost of procurement and while the Phantom had a good overall maintenance record it does take two to tango :)
 
Cost certainly played a role. Money was laid out for Bomarc, and the Voodoos were obtained by barter. The Starfighters won out on cost plus benefits, although the Thud was the optimum aircraft for the role. In the case of the Freedom Fighter deal, the Phantom was the best choice, and the choice of the RCAF, but not Hellyer's. He said the numbers for available funding only suited the F-5. In a similar move, the F-18 was chosen over the F-15 based on fixed expenditure. At no time was consideration given to the best available aircraft, but rather the greatest number of aircraft that sort of fill the requirement of filling the air.
 

Archibald

Banned
I still think Canada would go for F-18 Hornet, except a decade later, so the C/D variant in the early 90's. The Hornet (with the Mig-29) is the only "light" fighter with two engines. Just like Australia, I can see Super Hornets completing the standard Hornets two decades later.

The F/A-18C and D models are the result of a block upgrade in 1987[12] incorporating upgraded radar, avionics, and the capacity to carry new missiles such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile and AGM-65 Maverick[8] and AGM-84 Harpoon air-to-surface missiles. Other upgrades include the Martin-Baker NACES (Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seat), and a self-protection jammer. A synthetic aperture ground mapping radar enables the pilot to locate targets in poor visibility conditions. C and D models delivered since 1989 also have improved night attack abilities, consisting of the Hughes AN/AAR-50 thermal navigation pod, the Loral AN/AAS-38 NITE Hawk FLIR (forward looking infrared array) targeting pod, night vision goggles, and two full-color (formerly monochrome) multi-function display (MFDs) and a color moving map.[8]

In addition, 60 D-model Hornets are configured as the night attack F/A-18D (RC) with ability for reconnaissance.[93] These could be outfitted with the ATARS electro-optical sensor package that includes a sensor pod and equipment mounted in the place of the M61 cannon.[94]

Beginning in 1992, the F404-GE-402 enhanced performance engine, providing approximately 10% more maximum static thrust became the standard Hornet engine.[95] Since 1993, the AAS-38A NITE Hawk added a designator/ranger laser, allowing it to self-mark targets. The later AAS-38B added the ability to strike targets designated by lasers from other aircraft.[96]

Production of the C- and D- models ended in 2000. The last F/A-18C was assembled in Finland and delivered to the Finnish Air Force in August 2000.[58] The last F/A-18D was delivered to the U.S. Marine Corps in August 2000.

Finland has weather pretty similar to canada, I can see a joint buy.
 
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