Canada and the Cuban Missile War

I've read through the TL that AV proposed and thought that an appraisal of Canada's effort (done right) might prove out as a valuable, (or at the least interesting) addition to the timeline he created.
Thoughts?

Canada and the Cuban Missile War.



ABSTRACT: While much has been written over the last 45+ years with regards to our country’s role in the conflict, recent declassification of operational records from combat units involved now make an academically supported appraisal possible. This shall be the focus of this paper.

CONTEXT: As history has recorded, the 2 week period which starts 16 October and concludes on 31 October is commonly accepted as the “Cuban Missile War”. Our intent is to examine the combat preparations/operations of Canada’s military during this period, with a view towards any lessons that may be gained through such an exercise.

BACKGROUND: As has been amply described in earlier works, the timing of the onset of this operational reality caught us literally “with our pants around our ankles”. Conversion of the NORAD assigned squadrons proved to be the bright spot in an otherwise “inconvenient” situation.

As the full scale draw down of the CF-100 equipped units was recent and the re-equipped units with the F-101B were all at operational (nominal) capacity, this allowed for a significant, immediate, boost in the number of operational interceptors available to commit to the NORAD mission. The lack of integration or provision for the use of the AIR-2 capability with the Voodoo units was a serious drawback and the AIM-4A/B’s failure rate saw an immediate reversion to the proven 2.75 FFAR. Critical to the NORAD “problem” was the availability of a large number of Mk 5 CF-100’s and crews to man them. This ability to “surge” the number of frontline interceptors at such a critical point was to prove invaluable.

The extant situation in the NATO (1 CDN) Air Division at the point of the conflict is another matter.

Whole scale re-adjustment of the operational role for these units was only just getting underway, when things went “pear-shaped” in Europe.

CF-104 production was in full swing at Cartierville and the OTU in Cold Lake had already generated a couple of squadron’s worth of nominally “operational” pilots. Again, they had no weapons to fly the missions that they were training for (tactical nuclear delivery). The first of these units (421) was in the process of establishing itself at RCAF Grostenquin when the crisis arose.

The wholesale disbandment of the existing all weather (CF-100)/day fighter (CL-13 MkV) capability proved to be a very inconvenient circumstance once things got hot in the European theatre.
 
AIM-4A/B’s failure rate saw
While it was joked that each missile came with a tech from Hughes to tweak and cajole them into working, in Vietnam their hit rate was not so different from the Sparrow, and those SEAsia conditions are far worse for electronics(such as they were in the early '60s) Both were around 9% hit

Those IR Falcons (4D)were set to be more maneuverable than the earlier 2A, and many of them, were factory rebuilt into the D. Generally, if the SARH missile ignited, it work work against a Bear or Bison sized target.
 
Unfortunately the improved IR version (GAR-2B/AIM-4D) did not see IOC until Q2, 1963 and was not available during the emergency. The problem with the SARH GAR-1D was the lack of a proximity fuse. This required a direct contact hit on the target aircraft and proven rates during the conflict were abysmal, largely due to the inexperience of the RIO/"Scope Dopes" in the rear seat of the CF-101's. This interceptor platform had only just reached IOC with the 5 RCAF Squadrons at the time and most of the crew were still adjusting to the "leap forward" after their time spent on the CF-100.

Up next? The Argus goes hunting for bad guys...
 
I’ve always assumed Canadian infastrucutre outside of the major cities and bases would be pounded pretty bad, unless we got the Crowley Cuban Missile Crisis: Second Holocaust scenario
 
I’ve always assumed Canadian infastrucutre outside of the major cities and bases would be pounded pretty bad, unless we got the Crowley Cuban Missile Crisis: Second Holocaust scenario

I want to create a separate thread but it doesn’t quite seem important enough; as a cold water ports, how important are Hudson Bay ports?
 
I want to create a separate thread but it doesn’t quite seem important enough; as a cold water ports, how important are Hudson Bay ports?

Churchill and Mosonee are the only ports with rail access so the other ports are almost totally useless unless you want to barge everything downriver.
 
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Wednesday, 26 October, 1962

Ottawa is in a chaotic state following receipt of a message that SAC has moved to DEFCON 2.

In response, Diefenbaker issues a statement implying that Canada’s military should not raise alert levels.

By and large this is ignored and the units most impacted (RCN, RCAF [NORAD], [1 Air Div.]) set forward planning and begin operations as per their mandate.

Greenwood, N.S.

As per receipt of an immediate operational emergency from CINCLANT, 26 Argus Mk1/Mk2 aircraft were allocated to the formation of an impassible line covering the GIUK gap. This was established within 4 hours, using infrastructure at RNAS Prestwick as a turn-around point.

Following the instruction from CINCLANT, with regards to the destruction of major USN elements in an unprovoked manner, 404, 405, and 415 Squadrons all moved to a war footing and began to prosecute attacks against all unidentified surface and sub-surface units within the area of responsibility.

By the 29th of October it was clear that we were in a war. Argus had killed at least (confirmation was difficult) 14 Soviet boats. Most were diesels, killed while “snorting”.

“Special Weapons” (B57 depth charges; by explicit request of the RCAF) were in the process of being expedited to Greenwood. Ottawa was not informed. The (Mk 1) Argus had been built from the ground up with the systems in place to deliver these.
Much of what occured falls outside of the purview of the "nominal" Government of Canada.
In reality, the military people actually earned their money.

The claims and their co-relation with the loss records are at odds. It's safe to say that the Argus CLOSED the GIUK gap to anyone but a suicidal Soviet sub commander.
Over the following week the Argus killed everything else coming west (6-8 boats).\
You can't beat this platform at the mission; at the time.
I do not think the projected results are unrealistic.
You're welcome America...your PV2's were crap compared to Argus.
 
The RCAF:

The three days between the first shots and the acceptance of the existing “war situation” were a veritable whirlwind of activity within the RCAF. Primary was the immediate crash program to provide the 60+ CF-104’s at RCAF Cold Lake’s OTU with a couple of missions simulating interception profiles and AIM-9D missiles (thank you ADC, flown in on a VERY volatile C-133 from California).

The F-101 units (upon realization that we were at WAR) sent urgent requests for AIR-2A rockets, however these were never released for Canadian operation as production was unable to keep pace with demand.
The Air Division in Europe was raised to a heightened alert level and recently "retired" Sabre 6 airframes were now saved from the cutting torches at Prestwick, should they be required in 1 Air Division.

The RCN:

Canada's Navy had seen a huge growth (particularly in ASW capability) and was more than ready to hold the line on the Greenland front. Additionally, we were able to provide a flotilla to escort a further Canadian Army Group to French ports. Due to a disgraceful lack of attentiveness by the Diefenbaker Government, this need was only half met and it was late arriving.
One must understand the widespread level of "chaos" during this period before casting aspersions at any Government.
Tough times for all.

NEXT? Boots on the Ground in Germany.
 
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