Can WW1 be avoided?

Deleted member 1487

Nonsense; it was completely avoidable. Here are several Point of Divergences:

I. Czar Nicholas II stands firm against his military officers to not mobilize the Russian forces.
They coup him then and replace him with his uncle as was the not-so-subtle threat if he back downed by his generals.


II. Kaiser Wilhelm II stands firm against his military officers to not mobilize to the Western front (as Moltke stated that they couldn't possibly do so because it would be a logistically impossibility). The bought time helps to reduce tensions between Germany and Russia.
Why would he really want to? His generals in fact engineered the situation so that he couldn't do this because they wanted war; couping wasn't really an option, but he could be pushed around quite easily, you'd need a different man to stand up to the generals.


III. Kaiser Wilhelm II agrees with Czar Nicholas II to submit the July crisis to the Hague for a peaceful yet decisive resolution.
This is against what Germany was interested in and against the entire notion of settling scores with the Serbs and heading off Russian ambitions in the Balkans. No way this would happen.
 
WELP.

I got the TL bug. I've picked up several books on the subject and will tap out the TL premise in a week or so. Right now I'm somewhat stuck on calling it "A Year Late and a War Short" or "A Day Late and an Archduke Short".

Hm. I was thinking another idea for a title of a story where the premise involves avoiding World Wars would be "Stepping Between Two Bullets". Good luck with the timeline, whatever you wind up naming it.
 
Food for thought, an Anglo-German Alliance was fairly in the works under Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain for quite sometime. Perhaps if the Germans had supported British protests to Russian seizure of Manchurian ports or if Lord Landsowne had been more active in branching an alliance. Maybe if Wilhelm had not forced the Morocco Crises.
 
Food for thought, an Anglo-German Alliance was fairly in the works under Balfour and Joseph Chamberlain for quite sometime. Perhaps if the Germans had supported British protests to Russian seizure of Manchurian ports or if Lord Landsowne had been more active in branching an alliance. Maybe if Wilhelm had not forced the Morocco Crises.

It would have taken more than these points for the British to consider an alliance, yet alone and understanding, with Germany.
 
It would have taken more than these points for the British to consider an alliance, yet alone and understanding, with Germany.

It is actually not that inconceivable when you consider the fact that the British managed to come to a understanding with the hated French who in 1914 the British had been at war with on and off for 123 of the last 712 years, and the last war that the two of them fought was less then a century ago.....
 
It would have taken more than these points for the British to consider an alliance, yet alone and understanding, with Germany.

The germans did not threatened India, persia, far east trade and they were a mere nuisiance in Africa. The russians, best buddies with the french, themselves quite a problem in africa on the other hand...

Not to mention russian ambitions on the balkans.
 
It would have taken more than these points for the British to consider an alliance, yet alone and understanding, with Germany.

The pretext of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was a result of British interest in keeping the Russians under wraps in the Pacific, they tried to push for it to cover India but the Japanese wouldn't take. What's interesting is that the treaty seemed to have stipulated if either nation had been attacked by ONE third party the othe promised to remain neutral but if TWO or more nations attacked then the two were obligated to come to the other's defense.
 
It is actually not that inconceivable when you consider the fact that the British managed to come to a understanding with the hated French who in 1914 the British had been at war with on and off for 123 of the last 712 years, and the last war that the two of them fought was less then a century ago.....

The creation of the Entente was assisted by the defeat of France in 1871, they began a long process of courting the British. Tho some ground work was laid down by Napoleon III. The fact that the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, was a Francophile was also a bonus.

Really, the whole - continued - argument about the 'hated French' post-Napoleon (1815), is overblown. They are colonial and commercial rivals primarily. Military rivals not so much.
 
The creation of the Entente was assisted by the defeat of France in 1871, they began a long process of courting the British. Tho some ground work was laid down by Napoleon III. The fact that the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, was a Francophile was also a bonus.

Really, the whole - continued - argument about the 'hated French' post-Napoleon (1815), is overblown. They are colonial and commercial rivals primarily. Military rivals not so much.

And Britain was keen to remain aloof as much as possible and foster opposing power blocs that would cancel each other out. Between 1898 and 1901 the British very nearly joined the Triple Alliance.
 
Vojislav Tankosic was one of the founding members of the Black Hand. Even if he wasn't exactly taking orders from Apis, they were certainly working together most of the time. And Ciganovic was just a simple railway worker who got his part of the job done, not a decision-maker.

According to the Austrian dossier on Sarajevo, a railway worker was common cover for Norodna Odbrana - it gave plausible reason why the agent would be moving all over Serbia for a reason other than recruitment and intelligence gathering. So the fact that Ciganovic was a railway worker is highly suspicious.

Tankosic was both a founding member of Black Hand as well as a Serbian army officer in charge of arming and training insurgents. It is not clear in what capacity he acted - as Black Hand, as an army officer, or as a terrorist.

Yes, though the irredentism covered all Serbian regions, Bosnia was just the focal point. And the Serbian government, much as it would have liked to magically double its territory, knew better than to attack or intentionally provoke Vienna,

The calculus saying that war was practically inevitable is straightforward - Serbia wanted Bosnia and it was prepared to fight a war to get it. The Entente was prepared to fight Austria in that circumstnace, and Austria was prepared to fight Serbia.

To change the outcome, one of those facts has to change, but none of them was likely to have. The most likely to be revised was the collective Entente fighting for Serbia, but even the chances for that were slight with Grey at the helm of policy in London. (Germany could probably have restained Austria in July 1914, but that is not certain, and in each succeeding crisis Austria was more likely to deliver a fait accompli to Berlin like, 'we are marching. If you adandon us then you will be destroyed in turn.'

while many in A-H's government were practically looking for an excuse to go to war.

Yes, killing the leader of the peace party often can have the effect of allowing the war party to dominate.
 
The creation of the Entente was assisted by the defeat of France in 1871, they began a long process of courting the British. Tho some ground work was laid down by Napoleon III. The fact that the Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, was a Francophile was also a bonus.

Really, the whole - continued - argument about the 'hated French' post-Napoleon (1815), is overblown. They are colonial and commercial rivals primarily. Military rivals not so much.

The point is up until 1904 the German's had much more going for them with regards to securing a potential alliance with the United Kingdom then France did who was always a potential thorn in the side of the Empire. Sure the two-power standard and the superior British industry prevented the French from being a actual naval rival, but Germany had a big enough army that she could keep both France and Russia in line on the continent.

It also doesn't hurt that Edward VII was also related to the Kaiser.
 
According to the Austrian dossier on Sarajevo, a railway worker was common cover for Norodna Odbrana - it gave plausible reason why the agent would be moving all over Serbia for a reason other than recruitment and intelligence gathering. So the fact that Ciganovic was a railway worker is highly suspicious.

Tankosic was both a founding member of Black Hand as well as a Serbian army officer in charge of arming and training insurgents. It is not clear in what capacity he acted - as Black Hand, as an army officer, or as a terrorist.

Tankosic wasn't acting as an army officer, his side-projects regarding the Black Hand never had the approval of the government or the generals. In fact, the government tried to force both Tankosic and Apis into retirement in 1913, but some of the ministers were threatened and blackmailed so the order was immediately pulled back.
The calculus saying that war was practically inevitable is straightforward - Serbia wanted Bosnia and it was prepared to fight a war to get it. The Entente was prepared to fight Austria in that circumstnace, and Austria was prepared to fight Serbia.

To change the outcome, one of those facts has to change, but none of them was likely to have. The most likely to be revised was the collective Entente fighting for Serbia, but even the chances for that were slight with Grey at the helm of policy in London. (Germany could probably have restained Austria in July 1914, but that is not certain, and in each succeeding crisis Austria was more likely to deliver a fait accompli to Berlin like, 'we are marching. If you adandon us then you will be destroyed in turn.'

I agree that the war was almost inevitable.
But the Serbian government was not, in fact, looking to fight a country five times larger, which is why in July they took all steps they deemed even remotely acceptable to forestall such a war. Even after heavy encouragement from the Russian ambassador Hartwig and Poincare's support, they only went as far as accepting "only" 9 out of 10 of Austria's requests.
Yes, killing the leader of the peace party often can have the effect of allowing the war party to dominate.

Discounting Franz Ferdinand's dubious credentials as the "leader of the peace party" (I believe that, other than Istvan Tisza, few in A-H's leadership can be called that), I was actually talking about how the Chief of Staff was heckling the government for a "preemptive" war against Serbia as early as 1907, while Ferdinand was still alive and kicking.
 
Tankosic wasn't acting as an army officer, his side-projects regarding the Black Hand never had the approval of the government or the generals. In fact, the government tried to force both Tankosic and Apis into retirement in 1913, but some of the ministers were threatened and blackmailed so the order was immediately pulled back.


I agree that the war was almost inevitable.
But the Serbian government was not, in fact, looking to fight a country five times larger, which is why in July they took all steps they deemed even remotely acceptable to forestall such a war. Even after heavy encouragement from the Russian ambassador Hartwig and Poincare's support, they only went as far as accepting "only" 9 out of 10 of Austria's requests

Furthermore, with an increasingly-modernised Russia, by 1917 I would say that both Germany and Austria-Hungary would be too cautious to try and launh a war against Serbia and the now-modernised juggernaut of the Russian army. So in this respect, I don't see a World War One happening between Serbia and Austria, if it even happens at all.
 
I am not so sure Russia would on its own last that long. It was rather hit the hardest by the Anarchist Wave of the early 20th century. It's army was in pretty bad shape still from the 1907 Japanese War and was in debt up to their eyeballs. Nicholas was doing a lot to make sure no constitutional changes could be made and frustrations between the left and right and democratic and autocrats were mounting.

I think even without a war A-H and Russia would explode.
 
Furthermore, with an increasingly-modernised Russia, by 1917 I would say that both Germany and Austria-Hungary would be too cautious to try and launh a war against Serbia and the now-modernised juggernaut of the Russian army. So in this respect, I don't see a World War One happening between Serbia and Austria, if it even happens at all.

The increasing power of the Russian army should make an Austro-Serbian war more and more likely. Seems to me that the Russians and Serbians would be chomping at the bit to find any excuse to give it to Austria, with the better they rated their chances meaning the further they'd go to find the excuse.
 
No matter how tactfully and harmlessly the Serbian government is willing to behave, there will still be a risk of incidents like Sarajevo as long as Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis with his Black Hand remains active and independent of the government.

we'll never know, since the Serb government never tried to be either tactful or harmless. The Serbian government was neck deep in revanchist activity and propaganda even aside from Apis.
 
Tankosic wasn't acting as an army officer, his side-projects regarding the Black Hand never had the approval of the government or the generals.

I'm unaware of there being hard evidence in what capacity Tankosic acted. He could have done so either as a terrorist or as an army officer. Tankosic himself never said which hat he thought he was wearing at the time, and it really doesn't matter anyways - no professional army officer can ever take off their army hat.

Acting as an army officer would be his personally safest bet - if Tankosic had supported Sarajevo as a terrorist, he was more likely to face a firing squad. So the real question is, did Tankosic have the authority to act in May 1914 as an army officer?

I agree that the war was almost inevitable.
But the Serbian government was not, in fact, looking to fight a country five times larger,

The Serbians were biding their time until Austria and Russia were at war, at which point I have but no doubt Serbia would have attacked Austria. Vienna must have realised this and decided to attack Serbia before Russia could give Belgrade the luxury of attacking Austria from behind.

which is why in July they took all steps they deemed even remotely acceptable to forestall such a war.

Then show me the police report the Serbian minister filed with the chief of police in Vienna on June 6th, 1914 naming Princip, detailing his band's armaments, and their probable intentions in Sarajevo.

Even after heavy encouragement from the Russian ambassador Hartwig and Poincare's support, they only went as far as accepting "only" 9 out of 10 of Austria's requests.

The French minister reported on 24 July that in the first draft the Serbians had practically swallowed the whole note without reservation. Somehow, from that, the Serbians managed to get within 24 hours to a note where they had rejected or evaded 7 out of 10 Austrian demands.

Discounting Franz Ferdinand's dubious credentials as the "leader of the peace party" (I believe that, other than Istvan Tisza, few in A-H's leadership can be called that),

Franz Ferdinand was the leader of the peace party and Conrad led the war party. Killing Ferdinand had the predictable effect of giving the power to guys like Conrad.

I was actually talking about how the Chief of Staff was heckling the government for a "preemptive" war against Serbia as early as 1907, while Ferdinand was still alive and kicking.

Maybe Princip should have had the brains to kill Conrad instead.
 
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