Can the US win the Vietnam War

When the U.S. pulled out, victory along these conditions had been achieved. The Viet Cong were no longer a serious threat and the ARVN, with continued American support, was capable of standing up to and defeating the NVA. The problem came when Congress began to handicap the President's ability to continue this aid, and led directly to 1975.
 
I don't think having a perfect political system is a prerequisite for avoiding a communist takeover. It's not as if all the countries in SEA who survived communist insurgency were shining lights of transparency and good government. For example Indonesias military ruthlessly crushed the communist party and then General Suharto took over the country. Thailand had a bunch of coups and outlasted the communist threats.

This makes me think that a military solution to Sth Vietnams communist problems are possible, if not actually attractive and easy.

I agree to a certain point. I don't have much material to work off of, but from what I understand, South Korea had a coup de tat in the 60s and Park Chung Hee, originally an officer trained under the Imperial Japanese Army and served with the Manchuko army, multiple primary sources state that he essentially had the mentality of an IJA officer. He essentially became a dictator until he was assassinated in 1979. Just another example of an imperfect government holding against communism.
 
US largely pulls out of Vietnam under the 1973 treaty, but leave a few army units to act as a trigger. Does the NVA still go ahead with a 1975 invasion?

Probably yes. though the form and duration of the invasion may change. Remember, the North was expecting the '75 invasion to last until '76 before victory.

Also, remaining US units in Vietnam post-Paris peace talks means a vastly different progression of events leading up to the '75 invasion. Contrary to popular belief, the PAVN and AVRN were still fighting each other in South Vietnamese territory throughout 1973 and especially in 1974. There wasn't a period of actual peace and then it was broken by the North Vietnamese invasion. It was basically a continued stalemate/holding pattern until the North could ante up for another big strike a la the Tet and Easter offensives. Therefore, any US units remaining post-treaty would still basically be fighting the war, rendering the treaty essentially meaningless.
 
In the Indonesian Confrontation once the situation had established the Commonwealth forces began secret 'Claret' cross-border operations, firstly limited to 3km and then 10km, to take the war into the enemy's staging/base areas.

What was the cross-border ground raid situation like in Vietnam? Was there any sort of sustain secret campaign over the borders? Given that the US was bombing the north and then Laos what were the objections to cross-border incursions?
 

Tiburon

Banned
In the Indonesian Confrontation once the situation had established the Commonwealth forces began secret 'Claret' cross-border operations, firstly limited to 3km and then 10km, to take the war into the enemy's staging/base areas.

What was the cross-border ground raid situation like in Vietnam? Was there any sort of sustain secret campaign over the borders? Given that the US was bombing the north and then Laos what were the objections to cross-border incursions?

There seemed to be a bit of a double standard where communist forces crossing borders was seen as “justified fraternal aid against the fascist western capitalist running pigdogs” but US efforts to hamper that in any way were “imperialist crimes against humanity”
 
I don't think having a perfect political system is a prerequisite for avoiding a communist takeover. It's not as if all the countries in SEA who survived communist insurgency were shining lights of transparency and good government. For example Indonesias military ruthlessly crushed the communist party and then General Suharto took over the country. Thailand had a bunch of coups and outlasted the communist threats.

This makes me think that a military solution to Sth Vietnams communist problems are possible, if not actually attractive and easy.
I think part of the issue with South Vietnam was that there was a sense of Vietnamese ethnic identity that spanned north and south (although obviously excluding some minorities). This means that division was more "unnatural" than elsewhere and so was less likely to "stick". Vietnam was also different from elsewhere in East Asia in that the nationalist movement was communist from a very early stage, meaning there were few/no credible anti/non-communist nationalist leaders in Vietnam, unlike in the rest of East Asia. Combining these two facts a purely military "solution" is only possible on the basis of constant/recurrent low level warfare. After all, when has a purely military suppression of a genuinely nationalist uprising ever lead to peace?
 
I think part of the issue with South Vietnam was that there was a sense of Vietnamese ethnic identity that spanned north and south (although obviously excluding some minorities). This means that division was more "unnatural" than elsewhere and so was less likely to "stick".

But the Nationalism wasn't really there, as Vietnam had only been 'unified' in the way that Wales and England had been unified in the way that Edward had done it, but in the 19th Century, and with French assistance, Filibuster style, after the Chinese Qing had attempted the same more directly a few decades before.

When not occupied by the Chinese,there was a split between Annam, between Tonkin and Hue, with the Nguyen and Trihn Clans, not far from the DMZ was later drawn, with the remains of the old Cham empire to the west
 
But the Nationalism wasn't really there, as Vietnam had only been 'unified' in the way that Wales and England had been unified in the way that Edward had done it, but in the 19th Century, and with French assistance, Filibuster style, after the Chinese Qing had attempted the same more directly a few decades before.
When not occupied by the Chinese,there was a split between Annam, between Tonkin and Hue, with the Nguyen and Trihn Clans, not far from the DMZ was later drawn, with the remains of the old Cham empire to the west

Italy, as just one example amongst many, was also only unified in the nineteenth century, it didn't mean there wasn't a sense of national identity in the 1940s, and in any case I don't remember mentioning national identity. Also, calling what France did "assistance" is a euphemism and a half.
 
Also, calling what France did "assistance" is a euphemism and a half.

That's what it was, at first.
Then more aid, till finally took over the place slowly, Treaty Port by Treaty Port, Concession by Concession, mostly in the name of protecting Missionaries.

After 60 years controlled the South and Center, and 25 more, the North after a brief war with China over the North, while Cambodia and Laos a bit before that time.

But there was far more urge for Nationalism to unify in Germany and Italy, than had ever been in what we call Vietnam today.

Vietnam is much close to the UK, unified by force over generations, than a desire for unity. Over 50 ethnic groups, all with languages and customs far different from a Prussian to a Bavarian, or Lombard, Neapolitan or to a Sicilian in Italy
 
I think part of the issue with South Vietnam was that there was a sense of Vietnamese ethnic identity that spanned north and south (although obviously excluding some minorities). This means that division was more "unnatural" than elsewhere and so was less likely to "stick". Vietnam was also different from elsewhere in East Asia in that the nationalist movement was communist from a very early stage, meaning there were few/no credible anti/non-communist nationalist leaders in Vietnam, unlike in the rest of East Asia. Combining these two facts a purely military "solution" is only possible on the basis of constant/recurrent low level warfare. After all, when has a purely military suppression of a genuinely nationalist uprising ever lead to peace?

While there was considerable local support for the VC in SthV, there was little shortage of people on the other side and those in the middle who go along to get along. US intervention pretty much stabilised the government and contained the VC in the early years, which is a required basis for victory, but simply doing this won't bring about victory.

However this was powerfully backed by entire infiltrated NVA units, and these are the one's I'd being going for to achieve victory with the Vietnam War version of 'Claret' operations over the border. Nothing to drastic, no armored divisions striking deep into Cambodia or anything, simply small elite forces conducting ambushed along the Ho Chi Minh trail oon a sustained basis. If nothing else it will make the NVA have to guard the HCMT, and these guards and strong-points will be a target for air attacks in the secret bombing war. The Vietnamisation period and secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos would be the perfect time for this.
 
However this was powerfully backed by entire infiltrated NVA units, and these are the one's I'd being going for to achieve victory with the Vietnam War version of 'Claret' operations over the border. Nothing to drastic, no armored divisions striking deep into Cambodia or anything, simply small elite forces conducting ambushed along the Ho Chi Minh trail oon a sustained basis. If nothing else it will make the NVA have to guard the HCMT, and these guards and strong-points will be a target for air attacks in the secret bombing war. The Vietnamisation period and secret bombing of Cambodia and Laos would be the perfect time for this.
Since it seems unlikely that the North will stop sending units south altogether in response to small quantities of US troops in Laos & Cambodia, does this mean that we're in agreement that that "a purely military "solution" is only possible on the basis of constant/recurrent low level warfare"?
 
Correct. As bad as the Vietnam War OTL was, I shudder to think about WWIII.

On top of this, and I may be mistaken, but by the late 1960s, there seems to be a board consensus that we've moved out of the Cuban Missile crisis scenario where the USA gets hit, but is still there, and Europe and the USSR are gone. By the late 1960s, the USSR had pretty much achieved their side of mutually assured destruction.
 
Since it seems unlikely that the North will stop sending units south altogether in response to small quantities of US troops in Laos & Cambodia, does this mean that we're in agreement that that "a purely military "solution" is only possible on the basis of constant/recurrent low level warfare"?

Personally I think the best way to win the war by military means is a massive ground spoiling offensive into NthV; armoured divisions over the DMZ, Marine Division into Haiphong, Airborne Division dropped onto Hanoi and really smash the bejesus out of the NthV base areas and cripple their war effort for years to come and then pull out using scorched earth tactics. But that's impossible for political reasons.

In my mind the next best thing is to supplement the OTL bombing campaign with discreet incursions with ground forces, as large as can be without provoking a Chinese or Soviet reaction. This could be done virtually the entire time the US is in theatre.

This is an escalation from OTL, but I don't know if is considered 'constant/recurrent low level warfare'.
 
On top of this, and I may be mistaken, but by the late 1960s, there seems to be a board consensus that we've moved out of the Cuban Missile crisis scenario where the USA gets hit, but is still there, and Europe and the USSR are gone. By the late 1960s, the USSR had pretty much achieved their side of mutually assured destruction.

Warhead count
Year USA USSR
1964 31,308 5,221
1965 32,135 6,129
1966 32,193 7,089
1967 31,411 8,339
1968 29,452 9,399
1969 27,463 10,538
1970 26,492 11,643
 
On top of this, and I may be mistaken, but by the late 1960s, there seems to be a board consensus that we've moved out of the Cuban Missile crisis scenario where the USA gets hit, but is still there, and Europe and the USSR are gone. By the late 1960s, the USSR had pretty much achieved their side of mutually assured destruction.

I looked into the CMC at Uni, apparently SAC could destroy some 90% of the ~340 warheads that could hit CONUS and totally ruin the Soviet Union into the bargain, leaving a 'mere' ~34 to hit targets in CONUS. Kennedy seemed to think that was sufficient to make avoiding war in October 1962 pretty important!

I know it's going off on a tangent, but lets keep in mind the Soviets had just lost 26-32 million people in the Great Patriotic War and survived as a Super-power with continually improving living standards in the 50s. The sure knowledge that your country can survive the loss of tens of millions of people gave the Soviets a very different perspective than the Americans.
 
The sure knowledge that your country can survive the loss of tens of millions of people gave the Soviets a very different perspective than the Americans.

It did. You need to remember that the USSR selected political and command roles on the basis of observant atheism, and the USA selected the same on the basis of observant christianity. A second GPW experience was viewed as untenable by the Soviet elite, which accounts for prepositioning assets in Central Europe and ensuring political hegemony in Central-Eastern Europe. They continued this policy to great economic detriment that they were well aware of: from the 1930s to the 1980s the only industrial sector which really mattered, in terms of pay and productivity was military production. Despite the mixed consciousness of the nomenklatura, their motivating ideology placed them in a position of responsibility towards all humanity in an immediate and economic sense; the chief responsibility being of course the control of the nomenklatura over Central and Eastern European workers. Even prior to the GPW, the civil war placed the soviet nomenklatura in a position of foreign policy risk aversion.

But regarding "small scale" incursions, what unit force are you looking at, because IIRC 1964-1968 the USA engaged in company level direct incursions historically, and battalion incursions with US controlled indigenous forces.

yours,
Sam R.
 
But regarding "small scale" incursions, what unit force are you looking at, because IIRC 1964-1968 the USA engaged in company level direct incursions historically, and battalion incursions with US controlled indigenous forces.

That's what I was asking about, because I don't know anything about it.

Were these ad hoc, hot pursuit incursions or planned operations?
 
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