Can the Tet Offensive be a "tactical success"?

ben0628

Banned
Although the Tet Offensive in 1968 can be considered a strategic success by causing American approval of the Vietnam War to almost completely vanish, the offensive can only be described as a tactical failure, even though there were numerous successes initially.

I'm definitely not an expert when it comes to the Vietnam War, but is there any way that the Viet Cong and NVA turn the Tet Offensive into a permanent tactical success?
 
If they could secure local support for their offensive then it's very much possible. Their attacks on the local civilian population (in certain areas) meant that once these groups of Viet Cong/NVA were engaged they had no communication of each other and the group could be picked off one by one by superior fire-power.
 
The problem is more significant success like NVA regulars and Vietcong overrunning a major US FOB probably means the gloves come off. It was a tailor made event to cause enough angst to break the back of the US will to fight, but most people only remember Cronkite declaring the war lost today and LBJ deciding if he lost Cronkite he lost America and the war.

They don't remember the actual polling showed an immediate spike for many weeks in support for much more aggressive action as the public was shocked and mad. Now just imagine if a much larger attack killed 10-15K Americans or more?

Any significantly greater tactical success also risks strategic failure.
 
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raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Tet was a success for the North Vietnamese Army because heavy casualties decimated their nearest rival: the Viet Cong.

people love to say that, but what are the best studies that back up that assertion of such a wide regional divide between the NLF and Hanoi regime? No doubt some surviving southern NLF were unsatisfied with the postwar order, but are we perhaps taking the accounts of a few people out of proportion by treating their experience as typical?
 
Let a Vietnamese answer this

Can Tet Offensive (the First Phase, took place on 30~31 January 31 1968) be a [military] tactical (and strategical) success? Possible:
  • I vaguely recalled that the US Intelligence said that (in 1967) there would be no major offensive conducted by the VPA (Vietnamese People's Army, including both NVA and VC). That explained the shock from US when the news of Tet Offensive reached shore. In OTL, the combat alert of US Armed forces was quite low - until the diversion in Khe Sanh. If the US commited more troops and support there, they would leave their back exposed, leading to an easier fight for the VPA
  • In OTL, the Armed forces of the SaiGon Regime was relaxing under unofficial cease fire (think about the "Christmas cease fire" on Western front of WW1). If the ARVN was even more relaxed in this scenario, they would be unable to form any coherent response in time
  • In OTL, considering SaiGon, VPA Commando force was unable to attack a few pre-selected positions due to limited time. If they were able to do so, they might be able to success. Even if they only attack the same positions as OTL, they only needed to took control of some key positions like Independence Palace of Radio Station, Tan Son Nhat Airport, their chance of success would rise significantly
  • In OTL, the attack (in SaiGon at least) failed because the "main force" was unable to penetrate the defence line of SaiGon Regime in time. With even a more relaxed attitude of their enemy and better preparation, the defence line would break
  • Better SpecOp teams from VPA would be a good idea. They would attack a few hours before the New Year's Eve to eliminate key targets (say enemy top commanders, mayors and such)
  • During this attack, Khe Sanh base would be put under a heavy artillery barrage, further distracting the focus of US Armed force

Tet was a success for the North Vietnamese Army because heavy casualties decimated their nearest rival: the Viet Cong.

...

No, the NVA and VC were NOT rivals. They share the same goal of uniting their Motherland
 
I think there were several reports by intelligence and by possibly ARVN spies within the Communist forces anticipating such an attack could come. So it wasn't like the Anti-Communist force weren't completely surprised by such an attack, I supposed removing that intelligence might make things worse for the US and allied forces.

Maybe being strengthed by the legions of PLA's regulars might make the intensity of the attack strong enough that the Americans and allies can't manage to put up an effective defense in time. A repeat of bug out fever from the Korean War basically.
 
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Maybe being strengthed by the legions of PLA's regulars might make the intensity of the attack strong enough that the Americans and allies can't manage to put up an effective defense in time. A repeat of bug out fever from the Korean War basically.

You mean sending regular Chinese troops into the fight?

Please, Vietnamese (I mean both north and south regions) would instantly fight against them. Then- (and late-) General Secretary of Vietnamese Communist Party, Le Duan, refused Chinese aid just because they would send 500 drivers to drive the trucks.

I'd say that regular troops of VPA (the "main force" of VC as well as the so-called NVA) would be enough, as long as the conditions are favourable (or more than the OTL)
 
It wasn't that bad at certain points. I believe there were many Chinese troops in and around Hanoi operating anti-aircraft equipment to repel American attacks. You just need a certain force multiplier to take the anti-Communist force even more off balance. Whatever that may be.
 
It wasn't that bad at certain points. I believe there were many Chinese troops in and around Hanoi operating anti-aircraft equipment to repel American attacks. You just need a certain force multiplier to take the anti-Communist force even more off balance. Whatever that may be.

There was already documents confirming of Chinese troops presence. They were certainly around the border area to build the railroad network (as well as their security details of anti-aircraft). However, by 1968, Chinese troops presence, if any, in Ha Noi, was in the form of military advisor (to control the SAM batteries). Their actions, by 1968, were quite limited, mostly because the VPA crews were capable enough to fight and stay alive.

And I wonder if the force multiplier I wrote above was enough...
 
If that is the case, possibly the easiest way for a greater success for a Tet Offensive is to remove ARVN forces from the urban areas. People seem to forget a lot of the fiercest fighting if not the most during the Offensive was taken up by ARVN. Hell, most of the troops fighting and winning in Hue were basically ARVN troops. It certainly helped that the cities were filled with Vietnamese ''bourgeois'' elements who weren't really friendly to the Communist cause, unlike the countryside.
I guess sending lot of the best ARVN units out into the countryside to find guerrilla units might be the tipping point that moves the Tet Offensive completely to the Communist's favor.
 
It certainly helped that the cities were filled with Vietnamese ''bourgeois'' elements who weren't really friendly to the Communist cause, unlike the countryside.

I'd say that the "political atmosphere" in the cities was more... diverse (for a lack of better words). There was supporters of SaiGon Regime, "neutral", communist-friendly, unificationists (doesn't care much about which flag, they only wanted the country to be united)... And that was before I mention VPA commando cells or religion groups.
 
I remember reading that the Communists complained that the ''ardent reactionaries'' in the cities were usually Vietnamese Kuomintang members and the Can Lao party members (Diem's party basically) which was technically banned after Diem's death but still had a notable amount of supporters left.
 
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