Can the Soviets screw up Khalkhin-Gol and have it end up looking like a Japanese local victory?

Can the Soviets come off as the losers at Khakhin-Gol?

  • Yes

    Votes: 28 70.0%
  • No

    Votes: 12 30.0%

  • Total voters
    40

raharris1973

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With any PoD after February 1, 1939, can Khakhin-Gol turn into a local fight that is considered a Japanese "win"?

You can change any command decisions or personnel appointments between Feb 1939n and the time of the battle on either the Soviet or Japanese side if it helps you get the result.

Or, is this too difficult a challenge? Even with a Budyenny or Voroshilov or Kirponos in charge instead of a Zhukov, the Soviet equipment is just so much better than the Japanese and basic troop skills at handling the weapons are sufficient to beat the Japanese even if there is operational command stupidity on the Soviet side?
 
There was an earlier discussion about this from last year. In my opinion it was theoretically possible, but only on the grounds of Tokyo being much more willing to escalate at Khalkhin Gol and the Soviets holding off for fear of starting a general war on the eve of the conflict with Finland:

@wiking , after a closer look through my materials (I haven't really debated much about this battle recently either and feel a bit rusty :D), it seems you may have been on to something. According to page 71 of Ed Drea's "Soviet-Japanese Tactical Combat," a big part of why Komatsubara was caught off-guard by Zhukov was because the existing logistics immediately available to the 1st Army Group (2,600 trucks, including 1,000 fuel tankers) were inadequate to meet the needs of an attack the size of the one actually launched, estimated at 5,000 trucks. To bridge the gap, Zhukov was sent an additional 1,625 from European Russia, which proved "barely adequate" to do the job. The concentration of these together with his existing motor pool was seen as "incomprehensible" to the Japanese, but it demonstrated that the other parts of the Soviet Far East were either unwilling or unable to help Zhukov and STAVKA had to tap the main body of the Red Army to settle the issue at Khalkhin Gol.

Had the Japanese commitment to Nomonhan been much larger from the beginning, it appears that the corresponding supply burden on the Soviet side to counteract it might indeed have been borne entirely by trucks from European Russia, which would have progressively weakened Soviet capabilities there on the eve of the premeditated war against Finland. Such a thing would have been unacceptable to Stalin and the top leadership, putting a hard cap on the extent to which the Red Army could send additional support to the battlefront.

Furthermore, going through the 1st Army Group TO&E (http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/battles/khalkhin_gol/Khalkhin_cut1.pdf), for the climactic battle in August the Soviets only had 262 towed artillery pieces of 76 mm to 152 mm in caliber, a total recently boosted by the 76 guns of the 57th Rifle Division that arrived that month (the majority of the 1st Army Group's reinforcements were compiled in July, not August). Adding up the combined total from both the Japanese forces that were defeated at Khalkhin Gol (82 field guns plus 16 regimental guns that could double as field artillery) together with the relief force (350 to 400 field pieces and regimental guns depending on some specifics) and the Soviets are suddenly horribly outgunned, even if their ML-20s had a range advantage. Looking back on it, Coox's claim that this grouping was "fatally deficient" in artillery seems totally absurd, considering it alone had half again the firepower of Zhukov's entire force. What was he thinking?

The only decisive advantage the Red Army would still possess would be the number of tanks, and the Japanese reinforcement group would have had up to 200 anti-tank guns and 276 AT Rifles with them as well. If the 23rd Division and the two regiments from the 7th Division were alone enough to knock out nearly 400 Soviet tanks and armored cars, I don't think even the entire combined armored strength of the Trans-Baikal Military District would have been enough to defeat them had they been there from the start. Frankly, under the circumstances of a "maximum effort" from the Kwantung Army out of the gate it's looking more and more like Zhukov might not have been able to achieve anything like the victory he historically won within the framework of Soviet political and military planning at the time, even allowing for more leeway from Stalin; instead 1st Army Group might have been stalemated and bled white. I may have to retract my initial claim that Soviet victory was inevitable under most all circumstances - in a vacuum, yes, but realistically I'm not so sure.

This supposed hesitance on Stalin's part has historical justification. Although the Soviet dictator was more relaxed than his counterparts in the IGHQ, his concerns that the Nomonhan "Incident" might spiral into an all-out war were palpable: according to Boris Sokolov, when the final offensive against the IJA's 23rd Division was being prepared in August 1939, it was proposed that additional Soviet and Mongolian troops attack across the border to the south in order to deepen and widen the encirclement operation. Stalin interjected: "You want to unleash a big war in Mongolia. The opponent, in response to our detours, will throw in more of his forces and in this way we will be forced into a long war. It is necessary to break the back of the Japanese [only] on the Tsagan River." (Original text: "Вы хотите развязать большую войну в Монголии. Противник в ответ на наши обходы бросит дополнительно свои войска, и, таким образом, мы вынуждены будем втянуться в продолжительную войну. Надо сломать японцам хребет на реке Цаган.") Sokolov also repeats the statement that Stalin's main focus was in Europe and that he was loathe to conduct any excessive draw-downs from that theater.

Thus, faced with a large-scale IJA commitment from the beginning it was very possible that the Battle of Khalkhin Gol might have unfolded differently.
 
Given that the “relief” force consisted only of a one brigade from one of the stated divisions (the 7th) and a few regiments from another plus some non-divisional hanger ons, none of which were actually up to their established strength like Bob is pretending they were (Coox’s numbers indicate that they only had a maximum of 114 artillery pieces, not the rediculious 350-400 number posited above), and it took weeks for the Japanese to scrape up and transport those forces, and this was after the Japanese had proved themselves incapable of logistically supporting even the 23rd Division despite only operating a third of the distance from their railheads as the much larger Soviet Forces...

You’d probably have to screw things up on the Soviet side.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Perhaps the Japanese actually act on the intel they had about Zhukov's build up:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#August:_Soviet_counterattack
Japanese intelligence, despite demonstrating an ability to track the build-up of Zhukov's force accurately, failed to precipitate an appropriate response from below.[47]
  1. Coox, pg. 578

With say 3 full divisions detailed for border defense rather than the historical 1 + additional reinforcements I don't see how Zhukov could have pulled off his offensive with his historical forces. Perhaps actions by the Japanese forces just at the division level, like pulling back earlier and requesting reinforcements before getting trapped and counterattacking with more support might have worked.

Alternatively perhaps the Japanese get lucky in July and defeat Soviet forces that were building up or commit more troops and aircraft due to intel about the Soviet build up and as a result are able to nip the Soviet build up in the bud.
 
Given that the “relief” force consisted only of a one brigade from one of the stated divisions (the 7th) and a few regiments from another plus some non-divisional hanger ons, none of which were actually up to their established strength like Bob is pretending they were (Coox’s numbers indicate that they only had a maximum of 114 artillery pieces, not the rediculious 350-400 number posited above)...

The various units in the reinforcement group received final notice to move after the 23rd Division's failed counterattack on August 24th (in other words, from August 27th or so); they arrived by September 8/9, too late to participate in the fighting. They consisted of the 2nd Division (11,800 men), the 4th Division (8,315 men), the remainder of the 7th Division (10,308 including those troops already present - living or dead), elements of the 1st (4,980) and 8th (???) Divisions, the 5th Tank Regiment, 12 anti-tank batteries, a motorized mountain artillery regiment, 17 mountain artillery platoons, the 4th and 9th heavy field artillery regiments, 9 AA batteries, three engineer platoons, 21 transport companies, and the Manchukuo Motor Rail Unit. In terms of manpower these units were at peacetime strength but had their full complement of heavy equipment. Given this, the summary of their major weaponry would be as follows:

2nd Division (Type A) - 148 pieces, incl. 36 x 70mm battalion gun, 24 x 75mm regimental gun, 12 x 75mm field gun, 24 x 105mm howitzer, 12 x 150mm howitzer, 40 x 37mm AT gun
4th Division (Type A) - 148 pieces, same as above
12 AT batteries - 48 x 37mm AT gun
Mot. Mt. Arty Regiment - 24 x 75mm mountain gun
17 Mt. Arty Platoons - 34 x 75mm mountain gun
4th Hvy. Field Arty Regiment - 24 x 150mm howitzer
9th Hvy. Field Arty Regiment - 24 x 150mm howitzer
9 AA batteries - 36 x 75mm AA gun

Here is where things get a bit more ambiguous - from the figure of 4,980 men of the 1st Division transferred, we don't know if that included any of the field artillery regiment. Eye-balling it (Coox says this is half that Division), it looks about like 2 peacetime infantry regiments; the 1st being a Type A unit, that equates to 24 battalion guns, 16 regimental guns, and 24 anti-tank guns. We don't know how many men from the 8th Division were actually transferred, but it was certainly less than the 1st Division, probably only 1 regiment - 32 artillery pieces in total, excluding 50mm mortars. The 7th Division's effective forces included 2 more infantry regiments and its artillery regiment. Thus, from all this, we have a total of approximately 694 pieces, of which 354 are either regimental, mountain, or field artillery - a role which the Type 88 AA could fulfill as well. Depending on the status of each unit at a given time that total might have been higher or lower, but not by much.

The 5th Tank Regiment would have had a paper strength of about 60 tanks, but it's unclear how many of those were operable. The various divisions also sometimes had small tank units, but again I'm not sure about these divisions at this exact time.

There was some waffling on the part of IGHQ over whether or not to send the 5th and 14th Divisions from general reserve as well, but if the above were too late, they would have been too late^2.

..and it took weeks for the Japanese to scrape up and transport those forces...

Shown false by the above. Even with the various ditherings of the Japanese intelligence - battlefield reports generated an atmosphere in Tokyo HQ that was initially way more relaxed than it should have been, thus delaying any emergency orders - the reinforcement group was assembled in about 2 weeks.

...and this was after the Japanese had proved themselves incapable of logistically supporting even the 23rd Division despite only operating a third of the distance from their railheads as the much larger Soviet Forces...You’d probably have to screw things up on the Soviet side.

Correction - after the limited efforts of the 6th Army had proven incapable. The reinforcement group's transport companies and Rail Motor Unit alone had 1,500 trucks between them, 500 more than Komatsubara's entire force. Neither the Kwantung Army nor IGHQ had any intention of releasing more to the 6th Army, and orders to prepare the 23rd Division and its attachments for a long stalemate by stockpiling supplies for winter was sapping a large amount of what motorized strength they had.

If the Japanese headquarters in Tokyo had been more forthright about settling the issue at Khalkhin Gol by re-deploying some or all of the above units prior to August, unrestrained by fear of Soviet escalation elsewhere, it's possible they could have surpassed Stalin's "sunk costs" threshold in view of his overarching concerns in Europe and had their way with the border demarcation.
 

Deleted member 1487

So let's say that Zhukov's offensive fails at it's stated goal, the encirclement of the 23rd division, and the Japanese are able to pull back in enough order that escalation and counterattacks are on the table. What happens next? Does the Japanese government pull the plug? Does Stalin consent to a further action to get a decisive victory? Do we even see a non-aggression pact even without a decisive result one way or the other?
 
The various units in the reinforcement group received final notice to move after the 23rd Division's failed counterattack on August 24th (in other words, from August 27th or so); they arrived by September 8/9, too late to participate in the fighting. They consisted of the 2nd Division (11,800 men), the 4th Division (8,315 men), the remainder of the 7th Division (10,308 including those troops already present - living or dead), elements of the 1st (4,980) and 8th (???) Divisions, the 5th Tank Regiment, 12 anti-tank batteries, a motorized mountain artillery regiment, 17 mountain artillery platoons, the 4th and 9th heavy field artillery regiments, 9 AA batteries, three engineer platoons, 21 transport companies, and the Manchukuo Motor Rail Unit. In terms of manpower these units were at peacetime strength but had their full complement of heavy equipment. Given this, the summary of their major weaponry would be as follows:

2nd Division (Type A) - 148 pieces, incl. 36 x 70mm battalion gun, 24 x 75mm regimental gun, 12 x 75mm field gun, 24 x 105mm howitzer, 12 x 150mm howitzer, 40 x 37mm AT gun
4th Division (Type A) - 148 pieces, same as above
12 AT batteries - 48 x 37mm AT gun
Mot. Mt. Arty Regiment - 24 x 75mm mountain gun
17 Mt. Arty Platoons - 34 x 75mm mountain gun
4th Hvy. Field Arty Regiment - 24 x 150mm howitzer
9th Hvy. Field Arty Regiment - 24 x 150mm howitzer
9 AA batteries - 36 x 75mm AA gun

Here is where things get a bit more ambiguous - from the figure of 4,980 men of the 1st Division transferred, we don't know if that included any of the field artillery regiment. Eye-balling it (Coox says this is half that Division), it looks about like 2 peacetime infantry regiments; the 1st being a Type A unit, that equates to 24 battalion guns, 16 regimental guns, and 24 anti-tank guns. We don't know how many men from the 8th Division were actually transferred, but it was certainly less than the 1st Division, probably only 1 regiment - 32 artillery pieces in total, excluding 50mm mortars. The 7th Division's effective forces included 2 more infantry regiments and its artillery regiment. Thus, from all this, we have a total of approximately 694 pieces, of which 354 are either regimental, mountain, or field artillery - a role which the Type 88 AA could fulfill as well. Depending on the status of each unit at a given time that total might have been higher or lower, but not by much.

The 5th Tank Regiment would have had a paper strength of about 60 tanks, but it's unclear how many of those were operable. The various divisions also sometimes had small tank units, but again I'm not sure about these divisions at this exact time.

There was some waffling on the part of IGHQ over whether or not to send the 5th and 14th Divisions from general reserve as well, but if the above were too late, they would have been too late^2.

Your claims do not at all match with what Coox lays out, up to and including making units up (There was no such thing as a "Mountain Artillery Platoon", or at least no such small unit appears in the US Armies handbook on Japanese forces). He quite clearly lays out Japanese artillery strength dispatched on page 848. Taking a moment to discount Japanese AT and AA strength as you did for the Soviets, those 17 batteries that you pretend were "Mt. Arty Platoons"? Coox indicates those are among the divisional artillery batteries and that's an average of only two guns per battery, which is radically understrength for 75mm field gun batteries. This is further reinforced by the specific example of the Mountain Artillery Regiment: those were supposed to have 36 guns, not 24 so it's about 2/3rds understrength. Finally, the US Army Handbook gives the strength of Japanese 150mm Heavy Artillery Regiments as 8 guns, not 24, divided into two batteries of 4 guns (the handbook calls them "companies", but that's the equivalent to a battery to begin with). For some reason, a Japanese medium artillery regiment does dispose of 24 150mm guns, which seems to indicate the naming scheme is somewhat backwards to me but that must be where the source of your confusion on this matter stems from. On the whole, even the more generous estimate indicates that the Japanese were operating in excess of a 2:1 inferiority in artillery guns.

Shown false by the above. Even with the various ditherings of the Japanese intelligence - battlefield reports generated an atmosphere in Tokyo HQ that was initially way more relaxed than it should have been, thus delaying any emergency orders - the reinforcement group was assembled in about 2 weeks.

How does saying the Japanese took weeks to get those forces assembled show false that the Japanese took weeks to assemble those forces?

Correction - after the limited efforts of the 6th Army had proven incapable. The reinforcement group's transport companies and Rail Motor Unit alone had 1,500 trucks between them, 500 more than Komatsubara's entire force. Neither the Kwantung Army nor IGHQ had any intention of releasing more to the 6th Army, and orders to prepare the 23rd Division and its attachments for a long stalemate by stockpiling supplies for winter was sapping a large amount of what motorized strength they had.

In other words, they were still operating at a gross inferiority in motorized transport compared to the Soviets and were mismanaging what motorized resources they did have to boot.
 
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Deleted member 1487

In other words, they were still operating at a gross inferiority in motorized transport compared to the Soviets and were mismanaging what motorized resources they did have to boot.
Soviet logistics were stretched to the max to transport over nearly 400 miles one way. The Japanese by your own admission were much closer to their rail heads so the addition of a small amount of trucks doesn't mean they were inferior in overall capacity of transport given that they could transport four times as much as a Soviet truck to the front due to being 1/4th the distance from their rail lines.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#August:_Soviet_counterattack
Zhukov, using a fleet of at least 4,000 trucks (IJA officers with hindsight dispute this, saying he instead used 10,000 to 20,000 motor vehicles) transporting supplies from the nearest base in Chita (600 kilometres (370 mi) away)[8]
.....
In comparison, at the point of contact, the Kwantung Army had only General Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with various attached forces was equivalent to two light-infantry divisions. Its headquarters had been at Hailar, over 150 km (93 mi) from the fighting.

Per this huge map Hailar was a major rail line stop:
https://kjc-sv013.kjc.uni-heidelberg.de/evaluation/lytton/Map_02_appeal_web.jpg

For a relative comparison (not sure why the Soviets are represented having a rail line to the border here):
2qn5gyc.jpg


From Bob originally:
https://forums.spacebattles.com/thr...-japans-logistics.370508/page-6#post-20385827
But in fact, according to Coox pg. 848 by September 8-9 the Kwantung Army actually dispatched not only the 7th Division (a good portion of which was there to start with) but also the 2nd and 4th Divisions, half of the 1st and part of the 8th Division, the unscathed 5th Tank Regiment, 47 37mm AT guns, a motorized mountain artillery regiment of two battalions (24 guns) plus 17 platoons (34 guns) 'to be employed as infantry regimental guns,' two 150mm howitzer regiments, three engineer platoons, and 21 transport companies plus some auxiliary railway units (1,500 vehicles). These did not participate in the fighting but were to be committed in a planned counteroffensive to throw back Zhukov's corps. The Japanese, while still outmatched in tanks, trucks, and artillery, had greater ability for rapid redeployment when they wanted to than we had previously suspected. Bear in mind, this was at a time when the whole Kwantung Army had just 9,000 trucks in its entire TO&E. And while, yes, the Soviets eventually became far better than the Japanese at supporting continental operations, a comparison of their overall ability to support long-distance operations cannot be without mention of Japan's large merchant fleet, something the USSR lacked.
 
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Soviet logistics were stretched to the max to transport over nearly 400 miles one way.

Yes, and? The point is that they were able to do so.

The Japanese by your own admission were much closer to their rail heads so the addition of a small amount of trucks doesn't mean they were inferior in overall capacity of transport given that they could transport four times as much as a Soviet truck to the front due to being 1/4th the distance from their rail lines.

The gross supply shortages suffered by the 23rd at Nomonhan indicate otherwise. The Japanese man:truck ratio at Nomonhan was approximately 40:1. The relief force was, per Coox, three times that strength... but so was the number of trucks dispatched with said relief force. The ratio hasn't changed at all. Furthermore, it is not merely a matter of distance or physical transport capacity, but also of the capability of organization and planning of the quartermasters in charge of logistical management. In other words, it is about skill. Without skill, the theoretical advantages of shorter distance and/or larger transport capacity can be squandered as said capacity is wasted through oversight or mismanagement. And the Japanese lack of skill when it came to their logistical apparatus is well documented, not just at Nomonhan.

Per this huge map Hailar was a major rail line stop:

With no indication of capacity or context. Historically speaking, the fact that the Japanese took weeks to move brigade and regiment-sized units down these very same rail lines does not speak very well of that.

For a relative comparison (not sure why the Soviets are represented having a rail line to the border here):

Because they did? The Trans-Siberian connection into the Manchurian railnet was completed back in 1917. The problem for the Soviets was that Khalkin Ghol was in Mongolia, even further off to the south, so the trucks had to loop around west to avoid crossing the border. I'm more curious as to where the apparent spur into Mongolia came from...

But in fact, according to Coox pg. 848 by September 8-9 the Kwantung Army actually dispatched not only the 7th Division (a good portion of which was there to start with) but also the 2nd and 4th Divisions, half of the 1st and part of the 8th Division, the unscathed 5th Tank Regiment, 47 37mm AT guns, a motorized mountain artillery regiment of two battalions (24 guns) plus 17 platoons (34 guns) 'to be employed as infantry regimental guns,' two 150mm howitzer regiments, three engineer platoons, and 21 transport companies plus some auxiliary railway units (1,500 vehicles). These did not participate in the fighting but were to be committed in a planned counteroffensive to throw back Zhukov's corps. The Japanese, while still outmatched in tanks, trucks, and artillery, had greater ability for rapid redeployment when they wanted to than we had previously suspected. Bear in mind, this was at a time when the whole Kwantung Army had just 9,000 trucks in its entire TO&E. And while, yes, the Soviets eventually became far better than the Japanese at supporting continental operations, a comparison of their overall ability to support long-distance operations cannot be without mention of Japan's large merchant fleet, something the USSR lacked.

I'm aware of these movements, I'm also aware that their pathetic from a logistical standpoint. Taking two weeks to move parts of divisions and some non-divisional hanger ons, mostly by rail, is not remotely a feat of legendary maneuver and even then these were inadequate compared to the forces arrayed before them, as Coox extensively details. As the reply to Bob's quote notes (with another reference to the poor logistical support provided affecting the Japanese planning for the counterattack):

You need to read that chapter more carefully. Coox writes that entire section with an almost mocking overtone. The battle for Nomonhan ended on 31 August. By 9 September - three weeks after Zhukov's offensive begun, and more than a week after the fighting was concluded - the Japanese had gathered the designated forces, but it is quite clear that despite their too-late arrival they were still outmatched. Coox comments that the increased strength was "impressive by Japanese standards... in practice, there was still a fatal inferiority in firepower vis-a-vis the Russians, especially in armour and artillery." Coox further details that despite the delay the Kwangtung Army's logistic support had been unable to stockpile sufficient materiel to take the well supported Soviets head on, and so the plan was for stealthy attacks only at night, with the troops defending in the day.

Coox makes no bones about his opinion on the Japanese chances for success, calling their planning simplistic, and their forces insufficient. In this he echoes the opinions of Japanese contemporaries; "I personally did not think the offensive would solve things," and "a couple of divisions meant nothing - like a drop of water in a vast ocean," to quote a couple of Japanese officers [p.851]. So you're giving points to the Japanese for belatedly gathering an outmatched force to wage a battle that had already been lost. The fact that the Kwangtung army took so long to gather so little is a direct result of their limited logistic backbone - on top of poor intelligence and insufficient contingency planning.

And if you want Japanese opinion of Soviet logistics compared to their own, see page 579-580 of the chapter "Zhukov's Masterpiece." Coox writes that the Soviet logistical operation was conducted on a scale the Japanese considered impossible, and in particular; "Soviet truck usage dwarfed IJA capabilities and thinking at the time." Coox concludes the section with the words, "IJA intelligence experts remain awed to this day by the amount of men and materiel moved so ruthlessly."[p.580] The conclusion is inescapable - the Japanese were logistically badly outmatched.

Also, Tokyo decisively decided against any war with the Soviets in 1941. While some in the Kwangtung army obviously dreamed otherwise, once the decision to strike south was made, their opinions were overridden.

Basically I think you're trying to put as rosy a spin as possible on events, but direct quotes from Coox fully support my statements.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Yes, and? The point is that they were able to do so.
No, the point is that their delivery capacity was limited by the distance, so it required the vast use of tracks to the detriment of the rest of the Soviet Far East Force and European Red Army forces to deliver the necessary supplies, while the Japanese simply didn't need that many trucks to achieve the same delivered tonnage due to their proximity to their rail hubs.

The gross supply shortages suffered by the 23rd at Nomonhan indicate otherwise. The Japanese man:truck ratio at Nomonhan was approximately 40:1. The relief force was, per Coox, three times that strength... but so was the number of trucks dispatched with said relief force. The ratio hasn't changed at all. Furthermore, it is not merely a matter of distance or physical transport capacity, but also of the capability of organization and planning of the quartermasters in charge of logistical management. In other words, it is about skill. Without skill, the theoretical advantages of shorter distance and/or larger transport capacity can be squandered as said capacity is wasted through oversight or mismanagement. And the Japanese lack of skill when it came to their logistical apparatus is well documented, not just at Nomonhan.
Per Bob the Japanese had diverted their supply apparatus to build up supply dumps for winter; they thought the fighting was over so didn't need stock piles near the front to defeat a major offensive; per a quote I drew from Coox earlier the division commander in charge of the situation didn't even prepare his forces for a major attack and thus was surprised by the massive Soviet offensive and unable to react until too late. The problem wasn't the lack of logistics, it was what the logistics were doing. The Soviets build up for several weeks for a massive offensive, while the Japanese were building up winter supplies away from the front and their units in the area were effectively returned to border defense duty...which in August already defeated all Soviet probes, so was already feeling like what they were doing was more than enough to control the situation. If the supply apparatus is instead preparing to fight they actually have supplies, rather than dumps too far away in warehouses and only prepared for winter distribution. As it was until August 20th the supply situation had proved adequate for the tasks conducted and the diversion of logistics to prepare for winter shows that they had enough to continue with their existing situation.

None of that is actually about skill, so why are you even talking about something as irrelevant as that? Distance and amount of lift capacity is what is hugely important; efficiency certainly helps in the use of equipment, but saying that distance, number of trucks/lift capacity, and what units are actually tasked with doing doesn't matter?

With no indication of capacity or context. Historically speaking, the fact that the Japanese took weeks to move brigade and regiment-sized units down these very same rail lines does not speak very well of that.
How long do you think it actually takes to prepare for a major offensive? Zhukov was building up from June-August before his offensive on the 20th. It took him 10 weeks at a minimum to build up for his decisive offensive. That is with 'superior logistics' as you keep claiming.

Because they did? The Trans-Siberian connection into the Manchurian railnet was completed back in 1917. The problem for the Soviets was that Khalkin Ghol was in Mongolia, even further off to the south, so the trucks had to loop around west to avoid crossing the border. I'm more curious as to where the apparent spur into Mongolia came from...
I was referring to the spur in Mongolia, not the Manchuria-Siberian rail link.
 
was there a tactic or weapon that Japanese might have tried during this conflict, that while not altering the outcome might have encouraged the Japanese as to its effectiveness?

(know this was posed as "looking like a Japanese local victory" but the audience could be Japanese command rather than public perception?)
 

Deleted member 1487

was there a tactic or weapon that Japanese might have tried during this conflict, that while not altering the outcome might have encouraged the Japanese as to its effectiveness?

(know this was posed as "looking like a Japanese local victory" but the audience could be Japanese command rather than public perception?)
If they knew about the offensive coming (the scale and imminency of it) they might well have prepared for it properly. IOTL it seems they didn't really prepare for more than limited border raids, which they were able to defeat handily in early August.
 
No, the point is that their delivery capacity was limited by the distance, so it required the vast use of tracks to the detriment of the rest of the Soviet Far East Force and European Red Army forces to deliver the necessary supplies, while the Japanese simply didn't need that many trucks to achieve the same delivered tonnage due to their proximity to their rail hubs.

And yet the Japanese couldn't do it.

Per Bob the Japanese had diverted their supply apparatus to build up supply dumps for winter; they thought the fighting was over so didn't need stock piles near the front to defeat a major offensive; per a quote I drew from Coox earlier the division commander in charge of the situation didn't even prepare his forces for a major attack and thus was surprised by the massive Soviet offensive and unable to react until too late. The problem wasn't the lack of logistics, it was what the logistics were doing. The Soviets build up for several weeks for a massive offensive, while the Japanese were building up winter supplies away from the front and their units in the area were effectively returned to border defense duty...which in August already defeated all Soviet probes, so was already feeling like what they were doing was more than enough to control the situation. If the supply apparatus is instead preparing to fight they actually have supplies, rather than dumps too far away in warehouses and only prepared for winter distribution. As it was until August 20th the supply situation had proved adequate for the tasks conducted and the diversion of logistics to prepare for winter shows that they had enough to continue with their existing situation.

The Japanese themselves stated that the supply situation had not proved adequate for the tasks conducted, which it is worth noting had largely been failures, and preparing for winter and even those logistical preparations for winter were, according to the Japanese High Command, inadequate (Coox, Page 562). That Japanese intelligence was dysfunctional was undoubtedly also a factor that compounded their logistical failure, but again that is a function of systemic failures that cannot be corrected without a root-and-branch overhaul of the Japanese military system that would have called into question whether Khalkin Ghol could even happen. As it was, however, the Kwantung Army on July 31st did expect a major Soviet offensive at Nomonhan by mid-August (Page 563-564) which runs rather contradictory to your claims, yet still failed to do anything. And Coox further quotes a Japanese staffer observing that among the reason the Japanese ignored intelligence signs about the imminent attack (pg 578) was because of an inability to do anything about it.

None of that is actually about skill, so why are you even talking about something as irrelevant as that? Distance and amount of lift capacity is what is hugely important; efficiency certainly helps in the use of equipment, but saying that distance, number of trucks/lift capacity, and what units are actually tasked with doing doesn't matter?

To quote the same thread you've already linked too:

Proper use of logistics requires sound planning, and this is even more critical when you have very limited resources and outsized tasks. The Japanese consistently failed to perform this logistical planning, which made a bad situation immeasurably worse.

The Japanese failed to plan, even as a contingency, and so they planned to fail.

How long do you think it actually takes to prepare for a major offensive? Zhukov was building up from June-August before his offensive on the 20th. It took him 10 weeks at a minimum to build up for his decisive offensive. That is with 'superior logistics' as you keep claiming.

Zhukov didn't begin serious preparations for his offensive until mid-July and that was with him operating vastly further from his rail lines then the Japanese were and over worst infrastructure. That he was able to do at all is very much a function of superior logistics.

I was referring to the spur in Mongolia, not the Manchuria-Siberian rail link.

Ah... fair enough. I'm wondering where it came from as well.
 
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was there a tactic or weapon that Japanese might have tried during this conflict, that while not altering the outcome might have encouraged the Japanese as to its effectiveness?

(know this was posed as "looking like a Japanese local victory" but the audience could be Japanese command rather than public perception?)

If they knew about the offensive coming (the scale and imminency of it) they might well have prepared for it properly. IOTL it seems they didn't really prepare for more than limited border raids, which they were able to defeat handily in early August.

thanks, but my post was probably unclear, my reading on the Japanese gear is limited, was wondering if they were working on anything circa 1939, anti-tank, mines, otherwise? or even field modifications
 
So let's say that Zhukov's offensive fails at it's stated goal, the encirclement of the 23rd division, and the Japanese are able to pull back in enough order that escalation and counterattacks are on the table. What happens next? Does the Japanese government pull the plug? Does Stalin consent to a further action to get a decisive victory? Do we even see a non-aggression pact even without a decisive result one way or the other?

Both sides would probably sit and spar with each other over winter like the Japanese predicted. If the Soviets could find extra troops after the division of eastern Europe with Germany they might weigh their options about coming back in the spring with an even bigger force in response.

Your claims do not at all match with what Coox lays out, up to and including making units up (There was no such thing as a "Mountain Artillery Platoon", or at least no such small unit appears in the US Armies handbook on Japanese forces). He quite clearly lays out Japanese artillery strength dispatched on page 848. Taking a moment to discount Japanese AT and AA strength as you did for the Soviets, those 17 batteries that you pretend were "Mt. Arty Platoons"? Coox indicates those are among the divisional artillery batteries and that's an average of only two guns per battery, which is radically understrength for 75mm field gun batteries. This is further reinforced by the specific example of the Mountain Artillery Regiment: those were supposed to have 36 guns, not 24 so it's about 2/3rds understrength. Finally, the US Army Handbook gives the strength of Japanese 150mm Heavy Artillery Regiments as 8 guns, not 24, divided into two batteries of 4 guns (the handbook calls them "companies", but that's the equivalent to a battery to begin with). For some reason, a Japanese medium artillery regiment does dispose of 24 150mm guns, which seems to indicate the naming scheme is somewhat backwards to me but that must be where the source of your confusion on this matter stems from. On the whole, even the more generous estimate indicates that the Japanese were operating in excess of a 2:1 inferiority in artillery guns.

That's incorrect. "A motorized mountain artillery regiment, plus 17 platoons to be employed as regimental guns" is clearly referring to Type 41 75mm weapons - unless the artillery regiment used Type 94s, which superseded the Type 41 in 1935. The Type 41 was the only weapon the Japanese ever used as regimental artillery, and it came in platoons of 2, or 4 per standard regimental gun company. Thus, 34 guns in 17 platoons is TO&E strength. That Coox mentions these companies independently and states that they were 'to be used' as regimental artillery indicates they were separate from the divisions.

A Japanese independent mountain artillery regiment (and most such independent regiments), furthermore, only had two battalions in their organization. 24 guns is full wartime strength, though the personnel in this specific case may have been less. As an interesting note, of the 200-series "mobile" divisions in the Japanese Home Islands during 1945 that had a mountain artillery regiment in place of regular field artillery, these had 24 guns as well, given that they were originally independent units cannibalized into the divisions. (More info on those here: https://forums.spacebattles.com/thr...ting-operation-downfall.519799/#post-42467494)

Lastly, like the mountain artillery regiment, the Japanese "Field Heavy Artillery Regiment" had two battalions that varied in number and type of weapon depending on the classification of the regiment. If the regiment was "Type B," then it had 2 battalions of 8 Type 92 105mm cannon (16 total); if "Type A," then it had 2 battalions of 12 Type 96 150mm howitzers (24 total). The 4th and 9th Regiments were Type A, and so were equipped with the latter. Other similar organizations included the standard "Independent Field Artillery Regiment" (12 x 75mm field guns*) and the "Heavy Artillery Regiment" (8 x 240mm howitzer) - distinct from the above "Field Heavy Artillery Regiment." The 4th and 9th Regiments were assigned to the 3rd Corps of the Kwantung Army in August 1941.

The Japanese Army also had a variety of separate artillery battalions whose strength and composition varied according to their "Type" designation. The Type "C" Heavy Artillery Battalion had 6 280mm howitzers - ancient weapons dating back to the Russo-Japanese War, the Type "D" Heavy Artillery Battalion had 4 305mm howitzers, either short or long-barreled, and the Type "E" had 8 Type 89 150mm cannon.

*This figure is suspect, considering that "Field Artillery" regiments incorporated into artillery brigades during the China War were all Division-level in strength. In the Japanese Homeland during 1945, on the other hand, there were a few instances of artillery "regiments" possessing this number of guns.

How does saying the Japanese took weeks to get those forces assembled show false that the Japanese took weeks to assemble those forces?

You spoke as if the Japanese laboriously struggled to get those forces into position only for them to miss out on the show. They were too late, but the process was not excessively slow, especially given that practically all of them came from the other side of Manchuria and that the redeployment process was incremental based on the judgments of Kwantung Army and IGHQ.

In other words, they were still operating at a gross inferiority in motorized transport compared to the Soviets and were mismanaging what motorized resources they did have to boot.

In other words, had those trucks been there to begin with the Japanese wouldn't have operated at a gross inferiority compared to the Soviets. It's also pretty telling that you ignored my conjecture that "If the Japanese headquarters in Tokyo had been more forthright about settling the issue at Khalkhin Gol by re-deploying some or all of the above units prior to August, unrestrained by fear of Soviet escalation elsewhere, it's possible they could have surpassed Stalin's "sunk costs" threshold in view of his overarching concerns in Europe and had their way with the border demarcation..."

Under those conditions, such a conclusion seems valid.

I was referring to the spur in Mongolia, not the Manchuria-Siberian rail link.

The map is wrong (I think it's a mislabeled road). The nearest rail-head was at Borzya.
 
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thanks, but my post was probably unclear, my reading on the Japanese gear is limited, was wondering if they were working on anything circa 1939, anti-tank, mines, otherwise? or even field modifications
Not sure why you would expect they would as the 37mm AT gun of the time was enough to knock out any Soviet tank yet in service at normal combat ranges.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Japanese_military_equipment_of_World_War_II#Anti-tank_guns
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_...II#Anti-tank_weapons_(besides_anti-tank_guns)

They also used Molotov cocktails:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov_cocktail#Khalkhin_Gol
 
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