Can the Japanese Get Luckier in the Pacific War?

Ok how about this for a best case Japan:

The Japanese are repulsed by U.S. marines invading Midway island itself but keep their carrier strike force intact.

The Japanese learn the correct lessons from this and don't try to push any further out but try to fortify what they have.

The U.S doesn't have the margin of superiority in carriers to try anything until late 1943 with the arrival of the Essex class carriers.

Japanese never commit their fleet, keeping it "in being", hoping the U.S. attrition themselves on the fortified ring and hoping the Americans eventually tire of this.

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Meanwhile in Europe, events happen that make the upcoming cold war much colder sooner. Perhaps the war goes differently so the Polish national uprising gets crushed by the Soviets and not the Germans, or the Soviet get a communist govermnent installed in Athens or overrun Denmark and install a communist government there.

So its July 1945 and wanting to shut down the Pacific war to prepare for the potential upcoming war with the Soviets. The U.S and Japan agree to a "conditional" surrender right when the U.S was close enough to start its bombing offensive against Japan, but before USSR can get in the conflict.

Terms are: Japan has to revert to 1913 boundries (U.S. keeps all the mandate islands taken from ther Germans in 1914 but Japan keeps Taiwan, Korea and the Kuriles). Japan will surrender its Navy and air force and submit to a U.S occupation of Tokyo until a democratically elected government can be installed. War criminals will be handed over and tried.
 

Rubicon

Banned
Terms are: Japan has to revert to 1913 boundries (U.S. keeps all the mandate islands taken from ther Germans in 1914 but Japan keeps Taiwan, Korea and the Kuriles). Japan will surrender its Navy and air force and submit to a U.S occupation of Tokyo until a democratically elected government can be installed. War criminals will be handed over and tried.

Short of ASB intervention, Japan is never going to agree to these terms, only after an artificial sunrise or two might they agree.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
When Japan was making its WW2 plans, Germany looked like it would conquer the Soviet Union. So if we want real luck, have the Soviet Union collapse in the Summer of 42 and make peace with Germany. Then the Japanese might be able to negotiate a peace with the USA. In a situation where the USA/UK have to defeat Germany alone, the right peace deal might be attractive to FDR. Now most likely, FDR crush Japan with the US Navy and even more infantry divisions than OTL, but he just might make peace if the deal was generous enough. The real problem for Japan is that the USA is stronger than Japan even using 20% of the US strength. In a war with Japan alone, I am not even sure the USA would need to have a draft to get enough men to win.
 

Hyperion

Banned
I point you to This link and the fact that between 1942 and 1943 the US produced over 80, count them 80 carriers. Yes most of these were CVE but these were still flight decks. In the same time period the Japanese produced 6 carriers of all types.

Yes, and, if, so. What is your point.

I am well aware of the industrial capacity of the US in WW2. Being able to build equipment, and having it used correctly on the battlefield are two different things.

I do not, and have never, in any thread, stated that Japan could win the war. That is, if not ASB, suspension of disbelief.

That being said, I do not find it impossible for Japan do something that could buy them a token amount of time, three to six months maximum.

One thing I would think of indirectly, how many US carriers, aside from the USS Block Island, ever had a real risk of being sunk by a U-boat skipper?
 
Any landings on Midway would have been attempted after the naval battle so there doesn't seem to be any chance of Midway falling while the carriers on both sides sit back and avoid combat...
 
One thing that is important to remember is that if Japan gets luckier early in the war, it does have an impact.

1) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to conduct carrier operations in 1942. Major losses of carriers during this year means it needs to learn those lessons in 1943 instead.

2) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to effectively use its radar and fire control during the naval battles of Guadalcanal. If the US does so poorly that those battles do not happen, they don't begin the learning curve into 1943.

3) If the Japanese don't experience huge pilot losses in 1942, that means they have much better pilots in 1943-1944 than they did IOTL. They also have a lot more carriers to size up.

So regardless of the US production capacity, the Japanese are likely to inflict defeats of varying scale in 1943 which they did not IOTL. It also means the US has a lot more islands to take before they get into safe B-29 range for any atomic bomb delivery.

In other words, I think there is a little too much assumption that the US will walk into Tarawa, Kwajelein, Guam, and Iwo Jima like they did IOTL. They are going to be some very severe battles, and the US is not likely to do as well there as they did during the Guadalcanal campaign since the Japanese will have much more of an advantage.

There are other potential butterflies as well.

4) More defeats likely means no Guadalcanal campaign, and possibly that the Japanese seize Port Moresby. While this does not mean that Australia will be invaded, it does mean that the US can't use it to build up forces which is going to impact global Allied strategy.

5) Without the need to keep sending forces into the SE Pacific, Japan will likely conduct operations into the Indian Ocean. Convoys there are unescorted and not protected. A spike in sinkings there will hurt the British war effort in Africa. The Japanese might also be able to seize Ceylon. Again, this is going to impact global Allied strategy.

So I think there is at least some element of doubt whether the US will have secure airbases close enough to Japan to ensure safe delivery of any atomic bombs by the time they become available in summer 1945. They might still be safely deliverable, but it is by no means ensured. If not, it means a delay to the end of the war until much later which has all sorts of butterflies for the postwar world (the Chinese Nationalists likely have a better army once the Burma Road is open, and you have the Red Army in much of China and all of Korea). With the increase activity of the USSR against Japan, it will be very hard politically for the US to not give an occupation zone to the USSR when Japan does surrender.
 
In Robert Cowley's What If series there is one essay that postulates that if the Japanese had taken Hawaii.

Yeah, and if Japan had taken all of the US up to the Rockies, the US would have had even more troubles reaching the home islands.

I like the What If series, but that's a heck of an if.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
One thing that is important to remember is that if Japan gets luckier early in the war, it does have an impact.

1) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to conduct carrier operations in 1942. Major losses of carriers during this year means it needs to learn those lessons in 1943 instead.

2) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to effectively use its radar and fire control during the naval battles of Guadalcanal. If the US does so poorly that those battles do not happen, they don't begin the learning curve into 1943.

3) If the Japanese don't experience huge pilot losses in 1942, that means they have much better pilots in 1943-1944 than they did IOTL. They also have a lot more carriers to size up.

So regardless of the US production capacity, the Japanese are likely to inflict defeats of varying scale in 1943 which they did not IOTL. It also means the US has a lot more islands to take before they get into safe B-29 range for any atomic bomb delivery.

In other words, I think there is a little too much assumption that the US will walk into Tarawa, Kwajelein, Guam, and Iwo Jima like they did IOTL. They are going to be some very severe battles, and the US is not likely to do as well there as they did during the Guadalcanal campaign since the Japanese will have much more of an advantage.

There are other potential butterflies as well.

4) More defeats likely means no Guadalcanal campaign, and possibly that the Japanese seize Port Moresby. While this does not mean that Australia will be invaded, it does mean that the US can't use it to build up forces which is going to impact global Allied strategy.

5) Without the need to keep sending forces into the SE Pacific, Japan will likely conduct operations into the Indian Ocean. Convoys there are unescorted and not protected. A spike in sinkings there will hurt the British war effort in Africa. The Japanese might also be able to seize Ceylon. Again, this is going to impact global Allied strategy.

So I think there is at least some element of doubt whether the US will have secure airbases close enough to Japan to ensure safe delivery of any atomic bombs by the time they become available in summer 1945. They might still be safely deliverable, but it is by no means ensured. If not, it means a delay to the end of the war until much later which has all sorts of butterflies for the postwar world (the Chinese Nationalists likely have a better army once the Burma Road is open, and you have the Red Army in much of China and all of Korea). With the increase activity of the USSR against Japan, it will be very hard politically for the US to not give an occupation zone to the USSR when Japan does surrender.

No Solomons Campaign only matters to the Southwest Pacific Theater. It impacts the Central pacific Theater ony in that all the major fleet actions occur in the Manadates/Marianas. With out the Solomons you would likely see Tarawa on roughly the same schedule as IOTL, maybe with a significant fleet action, maybe without, depending on the location of the Kido Butai in the altered T/L. After the Gilberts the next decision would be Wake yes/no? Without a Solomons campaign. Wake II may happen. From there it is either straight to the Marianas or Marshalls followed by Marianas. Once the Marianas are in hand, there is then the huge political decision of returning to the Philippines via the Pelieu or going stright to Iwo Jima and Okinawa.


Essentially you get the USN ( Admiral King) Option instead of the MacArthur and King options.
 
One thing that is important to remember is that if Japan gets luckier early in the war, it does have an impact.

1) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to conduct carrier operations in 1942. Major losses of carriers during this year means it needs to learn those lessons in 1943 instead.

Yes, although many of these lessons were really learned in 1943 any way. The USN couldn't really start working with large carrier groups until they had large carrier groups.

2) The US benefitted greatly from learning how to effectively use its radar and fire control during the naval battles of Guadalcanal. If the US does so poorly that those battles do not happen, they don't begin the learning curve into 1943.

Unless the Japanese sink all the USN ships there will be some point of contact and combat during 1942. It may not be Guadalcanal, but if Japan wins at Midway (for values of win) they were going to push things and try for New Caledonia or push harder toward Australia. Either one of which will provoke a reaction from the US.

3) If the Japanese don't experience huge pilot losses in 1942, that means they have much better pilots in 1943-1944 than they did IOTL. They also have a lot more carriers to size up.

The problem is even in victory the Japanese tend to loose many more aircrew than they train. Yes they may have more and better pilots than they did in 1943/44 but even getting luckier this is reaching hard to have many more survive unless they somehow loose the victory disease after winning at Midway. Which is #$^%()#@ unlikely - one more victory is going to make them more likely to overreach not less.

A lot of carriers is a relative term if they manage to get to 1944 w/o loosing any carriers at all and have full flight decks then they are only out numbered by about 7 to 1 by USN carrier aircraft in any straight up fight. Plus by this point the planes are better, the US has better radar (but probably less experience at air intercept if they lost their carriers in 1942), OTOH the US probably is carrying more fighters because they did loose their carriers in 1942 so they know that carriers sink.

So regardless of the US production capacity, the Japanese are likely to inflict defeats of varying scale in 1943 which they did not IOTL. It also means the US has a lot more islands to take before they get into safe B-29 range for any atomic bomb delivery.

Yes they will.

There were bases in China in 1942 that were in safe B-29 range of Japan. Not optimal for Bomb delivery but they are there. Also it takes a lot of defeats to keep the US out of range of Japan, remember by the time the bomb was ready iOTL there were 10-12 bases that were within range and more coming online all the time - it only takes one by August 1945.

In other words, I think there is a little too much assumption that the US will walk into Tarawa, Kwajelein, Guam, and Iwo Jima like they did IOTL. They are going to be some very severe battles, and the US is not likely to do as well there as they did during the Guadalcanal campaign since the Japanese will have much more of an advantage.

There are other potential butterflies as well.

They only actually need Guam. Iwo is a nice to have, Taraway and Kwajelein were practice.

4) More defeats likely means no Guadalcanal campaign, and possibly that the Japanese seize Port Moresby. While this does not mean that Australia will be invaded, it does mean that the US can't use it to build up forces which is going to impact global Allied strategy.

Unlikely they get Port Moresby, they might, they might not. They would need some time after Midway to get their aircrews put back together again even with a victory. With a lose at Midway the US will likely redirect maybe 10-15% of what is headed for Europe to the Pacific in the way of Aircraft, Divisions and Transport ships which will be headed mostly for the SW pacific and Australia because that's where the contact is right now.

5) Without the need to keep sending forces into the SE Pacific, Japan will likely conduct operations into the Indian Ocean. Convoys there are unescorted and not protected. A spike in sinkings there will hurt the British war effort in Africa. The Japanese might also be able to seize Ceylon. Again, this is going to impact global Allied strategy.

Except they still have to worry about the s/w pacific and you have them trying more in Australia. They are going to focus on New Caledonia and the Solomon islands which was their plan iOTL before they try anything in the Indian Ocean. Trying Ceylon is way out there, they just don't have the logistics to pull that off. I doubt they would even try.

So I think there is at least some element of doubt whether the US will have secure airbases close enough to Japan to ensure safe delivery of any atomic bombs by the time they become available in summer 1945. They might still be safely deliverable, but it is by no means ensured. If not, it means a delay to the end of the war until much later which has all sorts of butterflies for the postwar world (the Chinese Nationalists likely have a better army once the Burma Road is open, and you have the Red Army in much of China and all of Korea). With the increase activity of the USSR against Japan, it will be very hard politically for the US to not give an occupation zone to the USSR when Japan does surrender.

Delaying the US even through 1943 doesn't keep them from taking the Marianas in 1944, maybe delays them until late 1944 - maybe as much as 3 months, maybe if everything (and I mean everything) goes completely right for the Japanese as much as 6 months. That still leave 8 months to build airfields and bomb with the B-29 before the A-Bomb is ready.
 
Yes, and, if, so. What is your point.

I am well aware of the industrial capacity of the US in WW2. Being able to build equipment, and having it used correctly on the battlefield are two different things.

I do not, and have never, in any thread, stated that Japan could win the war. That is, if not ASB, suspension of disbelief.

That being said, I do not find it impossible for Japan do something that could buy them a token amount of time, three to six months maximum.

One thing I would think of indirectly, how many US carriers, aside from the USS Block Island, ever had a real risk of being sunk by a U-boat skipper?

Well we seem to agree on the 3-6 months time frame.

I think there was one other CVE that came close but I can't remember off the top of my head and it might have been a RN CVE rather than a USN CVE.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Put it another way. Are there any events of the war that could have delayed the inevitable, not so much with the Japanese being lucky, so much as the US having worse luck than OTL.

Off hand, one thing that comes to mind would be the West Loch disaster in 1944. Perhaps the US personnel at Pearl Harbor don't respond as fast or as well as they should to the disaster, and other ships and crew that survived the explosion in OTL are lost as well. I would imagine at this stage of the war the US loosing a couple dozen more LSTs loaded with supplies and the loss of a number of smaller craft would be somewhat problematic in the short term at least.

A big issue in 1942 would be if the Saratoga is sunk while torpedoed in January. Saratoga was critical at Eastern Solomons, the only other carrier being the Enterprise, and the USS Wasp having the bad luck of being sent south to refuel and not being able to join the battle.

If Saratoga is gone, Nimitz will either have to send the Hornet to support the initial Guadalcanal landings and have no reserve carriers, or keep the Hornet back and only have two carriers for the invasion support.

If Hornet is held in reserve and doesn't arrive in the South Pacific until OTL arrival date, this means it's Enterprise on her own against the Japanese fleet, possibly with the Ryujo still afloat which may or may not come in helpful later on.
 
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