Can the Germans hold the Bocage indefinitely?

Lets say the Germans are able to add several good divisions (4 infantry, 2 panzer) to Normandy around July 1 1944 due to one or more of:

a) Germany uses more divisions from 15th, 1st, and 19th army areas earlier, held back OTL.
b) Germans correctly anticipate Soviet intentions for Bagration and the Soviet offensive is less successful. More reserves are available.
c) Germans evacuate 17th army earlier from Crimea creating reserves just now ready after refitting.
d) More rational defensive policy in the east September 42-June 44 just has more reserves available that can be sent east to west.

The front isn't that long and there is good defensive terrain. Can the Germans create a density of defense that is just hard to break through?
 
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Deleted member 1487

Lets say the Germans are able to add several good divisions (4 infantry, 2 panzer) to Normandy around July 1 1944 due to one or more of:

a) Germany uses more divisions from 15th, 1st, and 5th army areas earlier, held back OTL.
b) Germans correctly anticipate Soviet intentions for Bagration and the Soviet offensive is less successful. More reserves are available.
c) Germans evacuate 17th army earlier from Crimea creating reserves just now ready after refitting.
d) More rational defensive policy in the east September 42-June 44 just has more reserves available that can be sent east to west.

The front isn't that long and there is good defensive terrain. Can the Germans create a density of defense that is just hard to break through?
No. Not in 1944. The firepower the Allies were grinding with would blast a path, like the carpet bombing of Panzer Lehr that wrecked the division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cobra#Main_attack_and_breakthrough_25.E2.80.9327_July
 
No. Not in 1944. The firepower the Allies were grinding with would blast a path, like the carpet bombing of Panzer Lehr that wrecked the division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cobra#Main_attack_and_breakthrough_25.E2.80.9327_July

The carpet bombing of the Lehr wasn't actually that effective, partly because a number of bombs fell short and did friendly damage. It's why Eisenhower swore off using strategic bombers in such a role afterwards. The fact it took three days for the division to break reinforces that. What did matter was that the Panzer Lehr had already been heavily attrited by nearly two months of constant frontline combat and the Germans had no reserves.

That being said, under the conditions outlined by the OP, it does still likely make little difference. The German line was buckling so badly even by the start of July that the extra German forces would get thrown into the line and attrited away. At best they might prolong the breakthrough and inflict more damage on the WAllies, that gets replaced instantly, but indefinitely holding out simply isn't in the cards.
 

Deleted member 1487

The carpet bombing of the Lehr wasn't actually that effective, partly because a number of bombs fell short and did friendly damage. It's why Eisenhower swore off using strategic bombers in such a role afterwards. The fact it took three days for the division to break reinforces that. What did matter was that the Panzer Lehr had already been heavily attrited by nearly two months of constant frontline combat and the Germans had no reserves.

That being said, under the conditions outlined by the OP, it does still likely make little difference. The German line was buckling so badly that the extra German forces would get thrown into the line and attrited away. At best they might prolong the breakthrough and inflict more damage on the WAllies, but indefinitely holding out simply isn't in the cards.
It was just an example of what sort of lengths the Allies would go to to break the stalemate. It wasn't just the carpet bombing, but also use of fighter-bombers to hit pinpoint targets. Yes it was a flawed use of heavy bombers, but desperate times call for experimenting with extreme measures.

At least we can agree that the OP situation is not going to last that much longer than IOTL.
Do you think there is a reasonable scenario that isn't OTL 1944 that could see the bocage being held?
 
Indefinitely? Not with the minor changes proposed. They can delay the breakout a while.

But let's imagine they do stop (or more likely, unbearably slow down) the Allies up there. That might seem to be "indefinitely"... but it's actually for 15 days after Cobra, and some 40 days after Overlord. Because on August 15 there's Dragoon. That will put things in motion, or accelerate them, up North too.
 
At least we can agree that the OP situation is not going to last that much longer than IOTL.
Do you think there is a reasonable scenario that isn't OTL 1944 that could see the bocage being held?

Not with the Eastern Front absorbing so much of Germanies ground power. Now if the Sovs go down in '41-mid '43, or aren't attacked at all, then that's a different story.
 
Add the reinforcements as the author suggests, retain Ike's ire at carpet bombing, and butterfly away the Cullen device and 37mm shrapnel (all sent to the Pacific, maybe), lengthens the struggle. Think "indefinitely" might be the wrong word...
 
Indefinitely? Not with the minor changes proposed. They can delay the breakout a while.

But let's imagine they do stop (or more likely, unbearably slow down) the Allies up there. That might seem to be "indefinitely"... but it's actually for 15 days after Cobra, and some 40 days after Overlord. Because on August 15 there's Dragoon. That will put things in motion, or accelerate them, up North too.

With a 1 month delay:

a) Dragoon would be interesting with the Americans still in Normandy. Within a few days the Allies are driving up the Rhone, would almost force a pull out of western France to the Seine. Would sort of change the historical viewpoint of the operation to a battle winning clever necessity, we meant to do that all along, hold the Germans in Normandy and then..., sort of thing vs. the OTL "why did you do that instead of the Adriatic" afterthought, since the Germans were already beaten.

After August 15th I would figure the Germans would want to try to stick a strong blocking Force in the Rhone valley and hold the line of the Seine. Being forced to withdraw from western France like this, one would think involve much less losses than OTL.

b) a longer V1 attack time period, probably only 2-4 weeks, maybe V2 bases held a little longer, Keeping Allies air power attacking ski sites and such longer would help the Germans. Little real effect but might add to historical and military interest of such weapons post war.
 
a) Germany uses more divisions from 15th, 1st, and 19th army areas earlier, held back OTL.

Which ones? Germany had a lot of rear echelon units held in France. But does their combat capacity match a frontline crysis like the one that Avranches' breakthrough represented?

b) Germans correctly anticipate Soviet intentions for Bagration and the Soviet offensive is less successful. More reserves are available.

Oh but they anticipated such offensive. It was lack of air recon that kept them blind about where to commit their reserves. In fact, by summer 1944, army groups in the eastern front were strengthened to their highest watermark regarding men, guns and tanks. But Luftwaffe's presence declined so decisevely because of Defence of the Reich campaign that suck strengthening of the eastern front became relative.

c) Germans evacuate 17th army earlier from Crimea creating reserves just now ready after refitting.

If an evacuation of 17th Army was to be done earlier, it would had to be by august 1943. It would have freed reserves for Manstein in the Dniepr crysis, but would have also freed reserves for soviet exploitation. It is know that Manstein was a brilliant tactician and probably much more wiser than Vatutin regarding modern warfare. But in any case, a real possitive effect of evacuation of 17th Army could only be mastered if Hitler gave up Heer command and let Manstein act on his own initiative. Manstein knew the danger of letting the soviet armies reinforce their bridgeheads around Kiev and Kanev. He already had presented a plan to switch forces from south to north to Hitler and go for a second 'Backhand bow'. 17th Army wasn't a very good army indeed. Despite it's german component and some romanian elite brigades it had plenty of 2nd and 3rd class romanian troops. That kind of troops weren't suited for eastern front. And if deployed in Normandy... Well they can be used as rear echelon reserves, but you can't expect them to fight very consistently, neither Antonescu would have allowed them to be deployed in France.

d) More rational defensive policy in the east September 42-June 44 just has more reserves available that can be sent east to west.

Again: this implied Hitler giving up command of the Heer. If that was the case, von Brauchistch was mentally exausted after Barbarossa. So any commander would have been picked by Hitler anyways, and would be an obsequent one. But as this is a what if, let's say that by miracle, Hitler picked a modern warfare battle hardened commander like Rundstedt, Guderian or Manstein (not necessarily one of them, just skilled enough). In that case, the 1942 campaign wouldn't probably ended in the loss of Germany's best sons: the 6th Army. 6th Army represented a lethal loss for Heer. The entire post Barbarossa German strategy depended on combat formations 'capable of withstanding a crysis'.

What is crysis withstanding capability' in eastern front terms? According to Earl F. Ziemke it's the ability of german formations to hang tough against daily artillery barrages, keep cohesion under multiple attacks and remain both moraly and disciplinary strong even if surrounded by large concentration of enemy forces. 6th army was that: the best german drafts of the lastest ten years were there.

Your last point is very interesting because if the germans kept avoiding their armies to be encircled they would have preserved a great potential for bold counter-attacks and possible new large encirclements of soviet armies. History shown us that even in the desperate days of fall 1943, german panzer divisions were still capable of piercing through soviet formations and attempting 'kessel' formations.

But then there's another issue to your what if: casualty rate in elastic defense was high even if it was lesser than in static or stubborn defense. If the line was to be held, then Germany would keep losing his sons. The key was in returning to Barbarossa 1st objective: destruction of the bulk of the Soviet Army. If by a continuation of smart maneuvers, the germans could continue pocketing soviet formations (perhaps not as large as they did in 1941, but pockets as the Don pocket in fall blau account 50,000 men) and destroying them by remaining caplable of counter-attacking, then the soviets would eventually run out of reserves. If such was accomplished by fall 1943, Germany could have spared their 'crysis withstanding capable' battle formations to face Operation Overlord.

No. Not in 1944. The firepower the Allies were grinding with would blast a path, like the carpet bombing of Panzer Lehr that wrecked the division:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cobra#Main_attack_and_breakthrough_25.E2.80.9327_July

This quote comes handy: by 1944 the composition of elite german units was diverse. He could be a 4-5 seasoned veteran, or a boy. 4-5 seasoned veteran psichology was bullet-proof. He was way beyond fearing death. He had seen everything. He knew what to do in any combat situation and he was ruthless, merciless and inmune to to any kind personal or sentimental loss (eg: a friend succumbing in combat or news of a raid killing his family back home). The boy was anxious, eager to prove himself before the veterans, he had received a tough training but also a brainwash about nazi fanatism. The boys of 12th PanzerGrenadier Division 'Hitlerjugend' are a good example of this.

If Germany deployed this kind of troops in France, a victory in any phase (dissembark, bocage or inland) is probably secure for them because their men would have been ralentless killing machines. I want to leave clear that by no means I'm talking about a 'superhuman' advantage on the german side. But the mind of the german veteran was way beyond the american or brittish veteran mind in terms of ruthless warfare.

But such deployment, exposed to allied air power... Well, it would have been similar to sacrifying 6th Army in Stalingrad. So bravo por your example wiking.

Do you think there is a reasonable scenario that isn't OTL 1944 that could see the bocage being held?

If germans had defeated or agreed terms with Soviet Union and could spare entire Luftwaffe for Defence of the Reich it is still doubtfull they can hold the bocage. Everything depended on it. Heer had really good battle formations on the eastern front, but deploying them right below allied bombers was madness.

Indefinitely? Not with the minor changes proposed. They can delay the breakout a while.

But let's imagine they do stop (or more likely, unbearably slow down) the Allies up there. That might seem to be "indefinitely"... but it's actually for 15 days after Cobra, and some 40 days after Overlord. Because on August 15 there's Dragoon. That will put things in motion, or accelerate them, up North too.

If the germans have either dealt or negociated with Soviet Union by fall 1943, and again had at least enough interceptors to force a 'fair' battle in the skyes... Well any crack battle formation from the eastern front would have eaten Dragoon for breakfast. Allies already had commited their best units in Normandy, so the quality of Dragoon invaders would have not been the best.

With a 1 month delay:

a) Dragoon would be interesting with the Americans still in Normandy. Within a few days the Allies are driving up the Rhone, would almost force a pull out of western France to the Seine. Would sort of change the historical viewpoint of the operation to a battle winning clever necessity, we meant to do that all along, hold the Germans in Normandy and then..., sort of thing vs. the OTL "why did you do that instead of the Adriatic" afterthought, since the Germans were already beaten.

After August 15th I would figure the Germans would want to try to stick a strong blocking Force in the Rhone valley and hold the line of the Seine. Being forced to withdraw from western France like this, one would think involve much less losses than OTL.

b) a longer V1 attack time period, probably only 2-4 weeks, maybe V2 bases held a little longer, Keeping Allies air power attacking ski sites and such longer would help the Germans. Little real effect but might add to historical and military interest of such weapons post war.

If allies retained air superiority, any scenario was doomed for germans, even deploying elite veterans from eastern front. In fact, the only thing that kept Heer alive in Soviet Union for three years was the capacity of Luftwaffe to contest VVS' air superiority and thus allowing germans to recon and plan accordingly their moves.
 
The underlying problem for the German 7th Army was the quantity of supply denied by air attack. In general the 7th Army received about 10 percent of requirements. So once the local depots were exhausted collapse was inevitable.
 

Deleted member 1487

The underlying problem for the German 7th Army was the quantity of supply denied by air attack. In general the 7th Army received about 10 percent of requirements. So once the local depots were exhausted collapse was inevitable.
What's the source on that? I'd like to read more.
Makes one shutter to think what they could have done with closer to 100% requirements.
 
Hastings gives that in his 'Overlord'. Tho it is a general figure, he does not break it down. Note that the 7th Army was operating off its local depots, so the opening weeks of the battle they were not far from 100%. Perhaps over stocked in some items. The 10% Hastings describes as resupply from Germany, or other depots in France. Also the 21st AG was below requirements in some critical classes. Artillery ammo expenditure out ran expectations and supply by a significant margin through june and part of July. My take is the disparity in resupply became significant sometime around mid July. That is Rommels expectations for counter attacks don't seem to be affected by material shortages in June, or up until he was wounded & dropped out of the battle.

'The Germans in Normandy' has something on this subject, but I've not picked through it in detail and don't have the book at hand.
 

Deleted member 1487

Hastings gives that in his 'Overlord'. Tho it is a general figure, he does not break it down. Note that the 7th Army was operating off its local depots, so the opening weeks of the battle they were not far from 100%. Perhaps over stocked in some items. The 10% Hastings describes as resupply from Germany, or other depots in France. Also the 21st AG was below requirements in some critical classes. Artillery ammo expenditure out ran expectations and supply by a significant margin through june and part of July. My take is the disparity in resupply became significant sometime around mid July. That is Rommels expectations for counter attacks don't seem to be affected by material shortages in June, or up until he was wounded & dropped out of the battle.

'The Germans in Normandy' has something on this subject, but I've not picked through it in detail and don't have the book at hand.
I do know that one of the posters that is interested in the Normandy Campaign on Axis History Forum did say that a number of the supply dumps were destroyed from the air due to lack of proper camoflauge or were too far away from the fighting to be drawn on due to aerial interdiction (Sheldrake).
Rommel's counterattacks were disrupted by command issues and aerial interdiction of panzer units moving to the front, supply probably wasn't as big an issue as the delay of moving reinforcements forward.


Sheldrake's claims here:
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=213283&start=60
Look at the German army in Normandy 1944 to see how much of a blind spot the germans had to logistics. The Germans had years to prepare for the allied invasion, which would be the point of main effort in 1944. They formed powerful mobile troops such as 1st and 2nd SS panzer Corps based around then latest well armed and well motivated troops. Yet the artillery logistic support was feeble.

There was little logistic planning for the battle that was fought. When Rommel, the logistic ignoramus par excellence decided that the battle would be won or lost on the waters edge, there were no plans to support a battle inland. He was only interested in the day's worth of ammunition his fortified coastal. As far as he was concerned the rest was irrelevant.

As a result the nearest supplies of 17cm and 21cm ammunition were in Metz, a two day round trip with unit transport rendering the Ist SS corps heavy artillery battalion useless for much of the time.

The command structure of the German army in the west left the Germans logistically weak. For nearly two months after D day the Germans fought under two controlling headquarters: Seventh army and an ad hoc grouping called "Panzer Gruppe West." But Panzer Gruppe West didn't have any logistic or signals assets of its own. These things matter a lot and handicapped the strongest elements of the Wehrmacht.

.....

FMS B832 1 SS Corps Artillery in Normandy SS General Leutnant Walter Staudiger. It is consistent with the FMS interviews with Eberbach who ordered the cannibalisation of 16th LW Division after Op Goodwood to provide logistics command and control in the rear area of pz Gruppe West, which probably led to the formation being upgraded to a Panzer Army. Until then almost all German forces in Normandy were drawing on 7th Army's overloaded logistic system.

Staudiger also claimed that much of 7th Army's ammunition in the Caen area was stored in the open where it was destroyed by enemy action. He claims that with a little forethought the mines between Caen and Falaise would have been a secure ammunition store. He blamed Rommel for the lack of a plan B for what the artillery of 1st SS Corps were to do in the event of an invasion.

What is your source for the 7th Armee logistic situation? The German supply situation interests me.

18,000 tonnes of ammunition and fuel sounds impressive, but there were a lot of artillery pieces in the 7th Army sector from the Dives to the Loire. IIRC a unit of fire was around 132 rounds per gun per day which works out at some 2 tonnes per 10.5 cm FH18. Multiply that by, say, twenty for the number of divisions (including the reserve formations) and add in stocks for Anti aircraft, anti tank, medium and heavy guns, ignoring the coastal guns, and daily consumption of artillery ammunition is around 3,000 tonnes; less than a week of ammunition - and that is before we subtract the tonnes of fuel for tanks and motor transport.

7th Army operated 40 different artillery equipments in seventeen different calibres from five different countries of origin, so stocks of 10.5 cm lFH18 were useless if the unit was equipped with 10.5cm LG40/1.

A response to him by another poster:
Indeed, and that 18,645 metric tons is all munitions, not just artillery. We also know the rough consumption levels for part of the period averaging (without looking it up, so IIRC) around 500-1,000 tons per day, which was a fraction of the allies. However, a paucity of ammunition available and the problems the Germans had getting additional ammunition forward to the AML from factories in Germany did not mean they simply ignored the problems of logistics...it means they were unable to solve them with the means they had, given the Allied concentration of attacks on German logistics.

It does on into a series of arguments that are hard to post here with coherence, check the link.
 
Not with the Eastern Front absorbing so much of Germanies ground power. Now if the Sovs go down in '41-mid '43, or aren't attacked at all, then that's a different story.
If the Soviets get defeated allowing the Reich to shift massive numbers of troops and tanks to France (among other benefits) simply establishing air supremacy and attempting a landing would be near impossible for the WAllies to pull off any time soon, let alone getting out of the Bocage once they actually succeed.
 
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If the germans have either dealt or negociated with Soviet Union by fall 1943, and again had at least enough interceptors to force a 'fair' battle in the skyes... Well any crack battle formation from the eastern front would have eaten Dragoon for breakfast. Allies already had commited their best units in Normandy, so the quality of Dragoon invaders would have not been the best.

"Not with the minor changes proposed".

You are not just transferring 6 German divisions in Normandy. You also want the Luftwaffe's fighter force not to be in the process of getting slaughtered in the German skies that very summer, and on top of that, other, crack (and, one supposes, full-strength: the two seldom went hand in hand) German divisions to be also moved to the South of France.
 
Agreed, Allied superiority by this point is overwhelming. At best the German's can create a short delay, nothing will stop the advance towards Berlin on either front...
 
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