Can the Enabling Act be blocked? If so, what are the consequences?

[Vinization]

The Enabling Act of 1933 was the signaled the death of democracy in interwar Germany, by granting extensive powers to the cabinet (and therefore chancellor Adolf Hitler) over the Reichstag. With these new powers, Hitler and his allies silenced or exiled the rest of their opposition (the Communists having already been outlawed after the March 1933 election) and established their dictatorship.

The bill needed a majority of two thirds of all deputies present to pass. This was accomplished by stopping the KPD deputies from taking their seats and convincing or intimidating the remaining parties (except for the Social Democrats) into voting for it.

It seems to me that, besides the Social Democrats, the only other party whose deputies could've voted against the Act was the Centre Party, which had 73 seats in the Reichstag. Assuming the opponents of the Act won the debate within the party and its deputies voted against it, would it be enough to prevent its passage?

Assuming it is, how can things develop from that point onward? Hitler may not have absolute power, but he's still chancellor and has the powers granted to him by the Reichstag Fire Decree. Could we see another multi-party election a few months later, and what would happen then? I remember reading a long time ago that the NSDAP's finances were in a bad shape after campaigning in four elections (September 1930, July + November 1932 and March 1933) in less than three years. Could this translate into a collapse of their vote share?

 

[Winterwolf1]

The Enabling Act of 1933 was the signaled the death of democracy in interwar Germany, by granting extensive powers to the cabinet (and therefore chancellor Adolf Hitler) over the Reichstag. With these new powers, Hitler and his allies silenced or exiled the rest of their opposition (the Communists having already been outlawed after the March 1933 election) and established their dictatorship.

The bill needed a majority of two thirds of all deputies present to pass. This was accomplished by stopping the KPD deputies from taking their seats and convincing or intimidating the remaining parties (except for the Social Democrats) into voting for it.

It seems to me that, besides the Social Democrats, the only other party whose deputies could've voted against the Act was the Centre Party, which had 73 seats in the Reichstag. Assuming the opponents of the Act won the debate within the party and its deputies voted against it, would it be enough to prevent its passage?

Assuming it is, how can things develop from that point onward? Hitler may not have absolute power, but he's still chancellor and has the powers granted to him by the Reichstag Fire Decree. Could we see another multi-party election a few months later, and what would happen then? I remember reading a long time ago that the NSDAP's finances were in a bad shape after campaigning in four elections (September 1930, July + November 1932 and March 1933) in less than three years. Could this translate into a collapse of their vote share?

Even if the Center Party and other opposition parties had voted against the enabling law, this would not have been enough to prevent its passage. The law required a two-thirds majority of all representatives present in the Reichstag. The National Socialists had already taken measures before the vote to intimidate their opponents or prevent them from taking part in the vote.

However, hypothetically speaking, assuming that the Enabling Act had been rejected and Hitler had not had absolute power - in this case he would still remain Chancellor with the powers of the Reichstag Fire Ordinance. This regulation gave him extensive powers to suppress political opponents.

It is difficult to accurately predict or speculate on possible developments following such rejection of the law by other parties. It could be that there would have continued to be political tensions and that new elections could possibly even take place. As far as the NSDAP's finances are concerned, it was actually the case that they were financially burdened during this period due to their participation in several election campaigns within a few years (September 1930 to March 1933). This circumstance could theoretically have led to their share of the vote declining, but a decline in meaningful numbers? I doubt it.
However, there is also the possibility that new constituencies were mobilized or that they received support from other political groups.


If the Enabling Act of 1933 had been rejected and Hitler had not been given absolute power, the Nazis would likely have responded in a number of ways. It is important to note that these are hypothetical scenarios and it is difficult to make accurate predictions about their reactions.

A possible response by the Nazis could be to further inflame political tensions or even resort to violent measures(More than the "normal" street batlles between the sa and enemys of the nazis). This could mean that they would attempt to carry out a coup (this type of violent overthrow was actually carried out by the SA and the dominant revolutionary wing around Ernst Röhm has long demanded) or override the Reichstag. However, such actions would involve significant risks, both in terms of international consequences and in terms of how other parts of the German people (Exapecially Hindenburg)might react to them. So there i am feeling uncertain if such attempts would have been successful.

But there is also a possibility that the NSDAP could have participated in a government without exercising full control. In this case, they could have tried to implement their program gradually by making compromises. Here, too, it remains unclear how successful these strategies would ultimately have been as many party members within the NSDAP had radical views and showed little interest in compromise.

Another aspect would be the question of new elections. If further multi-party elections were actually to take place, this could lead to new groups of voters being mobilized. However, during this period it was already very difficult for opposition parties to gain a foothold against the rise of the Nazi Party. And although While financial burden may be a factor, election results cannot be influenced by this alone but depend on many other variables

I think that it would weaken and slow the rise of the nazis. But it does exactly that. It SLOWS it down but not break it. It would take way longer and myaby step for step, but in the end in the end the nazis would slowly win.

But i am no expert in that topic, and i realy was confused at how the nazis would have reacted, as i never thought about an Szenario where the nazis failed with the enabling act, so i wrote something quockly down,so if you have anything to criticize please inform me. Have a nice evening.

 

[Vinization]

Even if the Center Party and other opposition parties had voted against the enabling law, this would not have been enough to prevent its passage. The law required a two-thirds majority of all representatives present in the Reichstag. The National Socialists had already taken measures before the vote to intimidate their opponents or prevent them from taking part in the vote.

However, hypothetically speaking, assuming that the Enabling Act had been rejected and Hitler had not had absolute power - in this case he would still remain Chancellor with the powers of the Reichstag Fire Ordinance. This regulation gave him extensive powers to suppress political opponents.

It is difficult to accurately predict or speculate on possible developments following such rejection of the law by other parties. It could be that there would have continued to be political tensions and that new elections could possibly even take place. As far as the NSDAP's finances are concerned, it was actually the case that they were financially burdened during this period due to their participation in several election campaigns within a few years (September 1930 to March 1933). This circumstance could theoretically have led to their share of the vote declining, but a decline in meaningful numbers? I doubt it.
However, there is also the possibility that new constituencies were mobilized or that they received support from other political groups.


If the Enabling Act of 1933 had been rejected and Hitler had not been given absolute power, the Nazis would likely have responded in a number of ways. It is important to note that these are hypothetical scenarios and it is difficult to make accurate predictions about their reactions.

A possible response by the Nazis could be to further inflame political tensions or even resort to violent measures(More than the "normal" street batlles between the sa and enemys of the nazis). This could mean that they would attempt to carry out a coup (this type of violent overthrow was actually carried out by the SA and the dominant revolutionary wing around Ernst Röhm has long demanded) or override the Reichstag. However, such actions would involve significant risks, both in terms of international consequences and in terms of how other parts of the German people (Exapecially Hindenburg)might react to them. So there i am feeling uncertain if such attempts would have been successful.

But there is also a possibility that the NSDAP could have participated in a government without exercising full control. In this case, they could have tried to implement their program gradually by making compromises. Here, too, it remains unclear how successful these strategies would ultimately have been as many party members within the NSDAP had radical views and showed little interest in compromise.

Another aspect would be the question of new elections. If further multi-party elections were actually to take place, this could lead to new groups of voters being mobilized. However, during this period it was already very difficult for opposition parties to gain a foothold against the rise of the Nazi Party. And although While financial burden may be a factor, election results cannot be influenced by this alone but depend on many other variables

I think that it would weaken and slow the rise of the nazis. But it does exactly that. It SLOWS it down but not break it. It would take way longer and myaby step for step, but in the end in the end the nazis would slowly win.

But i am no expert in that topic, and i realy was confused at how the nazis would have reacted, as i never thought about an Szenario where the nazis failed with the enabling act, so i wrote something quockly down,so if you have anything to criticize please inform me. Have a nice evening.

I agree that it's very likely the Nazis still establish a dictatorship anyway, since Hitler was already chancellor and the Reichstag Fire Decree gave him quite a lot of power. However, just as you said, even a few extra months could change a lot of things. Someone could try to pull off a coup, the Nazis might go too far and alienate people they can't afford to at the moment, etc.

 

[Bloodraven]

For the Zentrum to oppose Hitler you need a much earlier POD than 1933. Under Ludwig Kaas, party chairman since 1928, Zentrum had been steadily drifting towards the authoritarian right. Zentrum supported Brüning’s anti-democratic government and Kaas had been advocating for an authoritarian transformation of the Weimar since 1932 at the latest. There is little indication that a majority within Zentrum was potentially persuadable to oppose Hitler at this point in time.

To get the Zentrum to oppose Hitler you IMO need a POD in 1928 and get the Zentrum to elect another party chairman: maybe Kaas doesn’t stand for election and either Joseph Joos or Adam Stegerwald is elected as party chairman. Joos would definitely oppose Hitler and the Nazis and while Stegerwald was involved in coalition talks with Hitler in early 1933, he also advocated voting against the Enabling Act. IMO even with a different party chairman elected in 1928 you could still get roughly the same March 1933 situation as IOTL:
- Zentrum wasn’t the reason for Müller’s Grand Coalition to fall in March 1930
- even under a different party chairman Zentrum will likely support Brüning (otherwise he risks permanently alienating the party’s right wing and splitting the party), though Brüning may have to make some concessions if the Left is stronger within Zentrum, like a less strict austerity policy and Brüning cannot move as strongly towards the right as he did IOTL after October 1931
- Zentrum had zero influence on von Papen’s government and little, if any, influence on the decision to make Hitler chancellor

That isn’t to say that a different Zentrum party chairman couldn’t significantly change things between 1930 and 1933 (for example if Brüning moves towards the right after October 1931, Zentrum withdraws it support and Brüning falls in October/November 1931 to a no confidence motion and is succeeded by someone different than von Papen, some just as right-wing authoritarian, but more politically adept and who works hand in hand with Schleicher and Hindenburg to build a right-wing conservative authoritarian Germany without Hitler), but it is also very much possibly that this doesn’t change much.

IOTL the Nazis guaranteed passage of the Enabling Act through a trick of parliamentary procedure: two thirds of MPs had to be present for the vote, however in order to to make sure that SPD MPs and other MPs privately opposed to the bill couldn’t simply boycott the vote and thus deprive the Reichstag of a quorum (SPD and KPD had 201 MP’s together, it would have only 15 or 16 MP’s boycotting the vote to prevent a quorum) all MP’s not officially excused were counted as present (including all KPD MP’s as being arrested didn’t count as ‘officially excused’) plus to thirds of the present MP’s had to vote for the bill.
If Hitler sees Zentrum as an enemy who will oppose him, he will change his strategy and try to push through the Enabling Act another way. Formally expelling all KPD MP’s from the Reichstag before the vote (Hindenburg wouldn’t have a problem authorizing it), would reduce the Reichstag to 566 and Hitler would only need to peel away a couple of right-wing Zentrum MP’s to get his quorum and the needed majority to pass the bill (assuming the composition of the Reichstag stays the same, which isn’t a given).

If somehow SPD and Zentrum manage to hold ranks and inspire a couple of other MPs to vote against the bill (perhaps some BVP MP’s or the liberals of the DStP join them) and Hitler is unable to push through the Enabling Act for the moment), it is still unlikely that this would prevent the Nazis from turning Germany into a one-party dictatorship:
- Hitler’s already had been given almost dictatorial powers by the Reichstag Fire Decree
- Hindenburg still supports Hitler and since he didn’t do anything to prevent Hitler form using dictatorial powers IOTL after making him chancellor he is unlikely to do so IATL
- the NSDAP-DNVP coalition holds a stable majority in the Reichstag after the March 1933 elections (even more stable if the KPD MP’s were to legally be excluded from the Reichstag) and Hugenberg isn’t leaving the coalition, so there won’t be any new elections
- Hitler still has the support of the Reichswehr and conservative elites
- Hitler knows that he merely has to be patient and continue chipping away at the constitution (if he can arrest KPD MPs, he can also arrest SPD MP’s after manufacturing a pretext) and if all else fails he simply has to wait for Hindenburg to die and succeed him as president and permanently dissolve the Reichstag by decree; no reason for Hitler do act rashly or even contemplate a coup by the SA

Still, Zentrum opposing the Nazis would mean that the Nazi dictatorship would unfold differently:
- if the Enabling Act fails, Hitler has to appease his right-wing coalition partner a bit more and longer than IOTL in order to keep the DNVP onboard until Hitler, but as the DNVP shared Hitler’s hostility to democracy and rule of law, this won’t change too much, especially as Hugenberg is totally outclassed politically by Hitler
- the Nazi dictatorship will appear to be less stable and less absolute in the beginning
- Zentrum will be counted among the Nazi’s foremost enemies, which will make relations with the Catholic Church more complicated: even if Hitler still negotiates the Reichskonkordat and promises to reduce the pressure on Zentrum’s members and Catholic politicians in general (the Nazis will exclude leading Zentrum’s politicians from that promise and won’t be restricted too much by it in general), there will be more hostility within the German Catholic Church towards Nazism than IOTL, not necessarily open resistance but less support for the regime plus more Catholic politicians gravitating towards resisting Hitler

This could have fascinating consequences for West Germany after 1945: the German Catholic Germany is seen as resisting Hitler compared to the Protestant Churches and this might prevent the formation of the CDU/CSU (Catholic politicians having no reason to ally with the Hitler-supporting protestant politicians and Zentrum likely surviving in exile while being persecuted in Germany), also Adenauer was arrested IOTL in 1934 for two days, here he is likely permanently arrested and possibly killed or dies in a KZ or forced to flee into exile. West Germany without Adenauer or with an Adenauer returning from exile and stridently opposing those who persecuted him and his fellow Zentrum members, would make for a very different West Germany.

 

[Vinization]

For the Zentrum to oppose Hitler you need a much earlier POD than 1933. Under Ludwig Kaas, party chairman since 1928, Zentrum had been steadily drifting towards the authoritarian right. Zentrum supported Brüning’s anti-democratic government and Kaas had been advocating for an authoritarian transformation of the Weimar since 1932 at the latest. There is little indication that a majority within Zentrum was potentially persuadable to oppose Hitler at this point in time.

To get the Zentrum to oppose Hitler you IMO need a POD in 1928 and get the Zentrum to elect another party chairman: maybe Kaas doesn’t stand for election and either Joseph Joos or Adam Stegerwald is elected as party chairman. Joos would definitely oppose Hitler and the Nazis and while Stegerwald was involved in coalition talks with Hitler in early 1933, he also advocated voting against the Enabling Act. IMO even with a different party chairman elected in 1928 you could still get roughly the same March 1933 situation as IOTL:
- Zentrum wasn’t the reason for Müller’s Grand Coalition to fall in March 1930
- even under a different party chairman Zentrum will likely support Brüning (otherwise he risks permanently alienating the party’s right wing and splitting the party), though Brüning may have to make some concessions if the Left is stronger within Zentrum, like a less strict austerity policy and Brüning cannot move as strongly towards the right as he did IOTL after October 1931
- Zentrum had zero influence on von Papen’s government and little, if any, influence on the decision to make Hitler chancellor

That isn’t to say that a different Zentrum party chairman couldn’t significantly change things between 1930 and 1933 (for example if Brüning moves towards the right after October 1931, Zentrum withdraws it support and Brüning falls in October/November 1931 to a no confidence motion and is succeeded by someone different than von Papen, some just as right-wing authoritarian, but more politically adept and who works hand in hand with Schleicher and Hindenburg to build a right-wing conservative authoritarian Germany without Hitler), but it is also very much possibly that this doesn’t change much.

IOTL the Nazis guaranteed passage of the Enabling Act through a trick of parliamentary procedure: two thirds of MPs had to be present for the vote, however in order to to make sure that SPD MPs and other MPs privately opposed to the bill couldn’t simply boycott the vote and thus deprive the Reichstag of a quorum (SPD and KPD had 201 MP’s together, it would have only 15 or 16 MP’s boycotting the vote to prevent a quorum) all MP’s not officially excused were counted as present (including all KPD MP’s as being arrested didn’t count as ‘officially excused’) plus to thirds of the present MP’s had to vote for the bill.
If Hitler sees Zentrum as an enemy who will oppose him, he will change his strategy and try to push through the Enabling Act another way. Formally expelling all KPD MP’s from the Reichstag before the vote (Hindenburg wouldn’t have a problem authorizing it), would reduce the Reichstag to 566 and Hitler would only need to peel away a couple of right-wing Zentrum MP’s to get his quorum and the needed majority to pass the bill (assuming the composition of the Reichstag stays the same, which isn’t a given).

If somehow SPD and Zentrum manage to hold ranks and inspire a couple of other MPs to vote against the bill (perhaps some BVP MP’s or the liberals of the DStP join them) and Hitler is unable to push through the Enabling Act for the moment), it is still unlikely that this would prevent the Nazis from turning Germany into a one-party dictatorship:
- Hitler’s already had been given almost dictatorial powers by the Reichstag Fire Decree
- Hindenburg still supports Hitler and since he didn’t do anything to prevent Hitler form using dictatorial powers IOTL after making him chancellor he is unlikely to do so IATL
- the NSDAP-DNVP coalition holds a stable majority in the Reichstag after the March 1933 elections (even more stable if the KPD MP’s were to legally be excluded from the Reichstag) and Hugenberg isn’t leaving the coalition, so there won’t be any new elections
- Hitler still has the support of the Reichswehr and conservative elites
- Hitler knows that he merely has to be patient and continue chipping away at the constitution (if he can arrest KPD MPs, he can also arrest SPD MP’s after manufacturing a pretext) and if all else fails he simply has to wait for Hindenburg to die and succeed him as president and permanently dissolve the Reichstag by decree; no reason for Hitler do act rashly or even contemplate a coup by the SA

Still, Zentrum opposing the Nazis would mean that the Nazi dictatorship would unfold differently:
- if the Enabling Act fails, Hitler has to appease his right-wing coalition partner a bit more and longer than IOTL in order to keep the DNVP onboard until Hitler, but as the DNVP shared Hitler’s hostility to democracy and rule of law, this won’t change too much, especially as Hugenberg is totally outclassed politically by Hitler
- the Nazi dictatorship will appear to be less stable and less absolute in the beginning
- Zentrum will be counted among the Nazi’s foremost enemies, which will make relations with the Catholic Church more complicated: even if Hitler still negotiates the Reichskonkordat and promises to reduce the pressure on Zentrum’s members and Catholic politicians in general (the Nazis will exclude leading Zentrum’s politicians from that promise and won’t be restricted too much by it in general), there will be more hostility within the German Catholic Church towards Nazism than IOTL, not necessarily open resistance but less support for the regime plus more Catholic politicians gravitating towards resisting Hitler

This could have fascinating consequences for West Germany after 1945: the German Catholic Germany is seen as resisting Hitler compared to the Protestant Churches and this might prevent the formation of the CDU/CSU (Catholic politicians having no reason to ally with the Hitler-supporting protestant politicians and Zentrum likely surviving in exile while being persecuted in Germany), also Adenauer was arrested IOTL in 1934 for two days, here he is likely permanently arrested and possibly killed or dies in a KZ or forced to flee into exile. West Germany without Adenauer or with an Adenauer returning from exile and stridently opposing those who persecuted him and his fellow Zentrum members, would make for a very different West Germany.

Now that would be very interesting! I assume the West German right would be more fragmented ITTL, at least during the short term. Could this lead to Kurt Schumacher becoming chancellor in 1949? I wonder how he'd do on the job - the only that is certain is that his tenure would be a short one.

It would be poetic, that's for sure, for (West) Germany's first democratically elected leader after the end of Nazi rule to be a man who spent a decade years enduring some of the worst things said regime had to offer. Not that Adenauer's own tenure wasn't poetic in its own, rather unfortunate way, considering how much influence Hans Globke possessed.