Can The Axis Reach the Urals by late 41

Kongzilla

Banned
I was wondering if it was possible for the Axis to reach the Ural Mountains by late 41 with no meddling from Hitler and the Generals in complete control. And what would need to happen.

Would troops needed to be pulled from Africa, Greece and other places and would this help

Would taking leningrad help and would the Finnish helping allow this to happen

Would reaching the Urals force Stalin to move the factories again, and the effect this would have and where they would move them.

Would the fact Stalin has lost a third of his country motivate him to begin a second purge of those he deemed incompetent.

Would the Red Army be crippled and how long would it take to rebuild for a major offensive.

So what do you all think?
 

sharlin

Banned
Its a huuuuuuuuuuuuge distance to cover and it would probably require stripping western europe of every soldier, tank, gun and plane the Germans have which would put even more strain on their logistics and any collapse due to one of the coldest winters on record hitting could be potentially more devastating as you've got to supply even more men and equipment with a very weak logistics tail.
 
Hitler dies in 1920. Someone else capable of common sense takes control of Germany. That someone foments various rebellions in the USSR which not only gives the Germans an excuse to intervene but also pushes the front further east.

Afterwards, Russia somehow collapses so the Germans can just drive eastwards. Of course, the Germans are going to have to put a puppet regime in place, so none of that Lebensraum horseshit, but there you have it.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
What about Hitler dies a couple days after Barbarossa, could that do it with Goring taking power.

What if they used all the train tracks from the Concentration camps and any other unnecessary places.

With a POD getting Goring to beleive that the eastern Europeans can be useful tool in crushing bolshevism and so incites rebellion but does not cause internal collapse
 
Once Barbarossa starts, Germans are almost irrevocably committed to war to the end of either systems. Integral to Barbarossa was the Hunger Plan, conceived as a consequence of OKW realizing there is no way to supply the Wehrmacht with both war material and food. Thus, any German attempt to foment rebellion or organize an alternative form of government in occupied areas is probably doomed to fail.

Besides, as Sharlin said, distances are huge. Germans planned Barbarossa in stages and they recognized that 600 km is the farthest they could advance before logistic strain caught up with them. They would then need to stop and reorganize in order to resume advance. By the time they reached Moscow they were at the farthest edge of their logistical chain. Reaching Urals without drastic reductions of many different aspects of war production is not possible. Distances involved are huge and manpower and steel supply was limited. In 1941 almost 50% of steel was dedicated to munitions program.
 
What about Hitler dies a couple days after Barbarossa, could that do it with Goring taking power.

What if they used all the train tracks from the Concentration camps and any other unnecessary places.

With a POD getting Goring to beleive that the eastern Europeans can be useful tool in crushing bolshevism and so incites rebellion but does not cause internal collapse
Too late for that.
In OTL Germans managed distance from Brest Litovsk to Moscow (as close as app. 20 km from the gates), app 1000 km in 5 months (app 150 days). It makes their advance speed app. 6.6 km per day.
From Moscow to Pervouralsk on Ural - actually on the Border of Europe and Asia it is app 1380 km.
1380+ 1000=2380 km. From start of Barbarossa to end of the year we got app 190 days. They need to advance 12.5 km per every day. So basically Germans need somehow double their average advance speed. ;)

Problem is logistic, different railway gauges. I am wondering if Germany was preparing for that different way. But they need to start early. Let say undercarriage of German railway stock (engines and the cars) would be able expand to Russian gauge when slowly moving in special built points from European standard into Russian. That would save a lot of time otherwise used for building new tracks or reloading. And of course menpower which could be used in expending, not just adjusting the tracks. But for that you need to prepare German rolling stock maybe from start of WWI or start of the century.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
Is it possible to take moscow in 41, and then continue an advance to the Urals the following year when the Red Army is still weak.
 
Is it possible to take moscow in 41, and then continue an advance to the Urals the following year when the Red Army is still weak.
Well, they need much better logistics, they need their engines to be able to run in cold weather, they need different type of oils and lubricants for their weapons - ones which does not freeze at -30 C. And they need more men. It was not just Moscow, where Soviets counter attacked in November/ December. On their Southern flank Soviets counter attacked from around Rostov area and pushed Germans back too.
 
Germany reaching the Volga in '41 is implausible, but not impossible. Germany reaching the Urals, on the other hand, is approaching USM levels.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
So the Germans reach the Volga taking Moscow hopefully, Goring knowing its going to take a lot switches the economy to full on war time economy instead of waiting until 1944. I know very little about economics so I'm not sure what difference it makes.

So the build up their armed forces and begin an offensive in 42 and send the Red army reeling behind the Urals. Germany takes a defensive stance and goes fortress europe. They prepare to weather a 45 Russian offensive and D-Day.

Is that possible.
 
Some would argue that Germans taking Moscow in 1941 is beyond their capability. The trouble is the Barbarossa was planned on the assumption that effective Soviet resistance will stop after Red Army was defeated in the border battles and Dneper-Dvina line reached. When this failed to materialize, Germans started improvising things and some already started arguing war is lost at that point.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
But would they stop fighting. would it be seen as a life or death struggle because if they don't crush them then and there they won't have another chance and Russia will attack them with unbeatable numbers.
 
But would they stop fighting. would it be seen as a life or death struggle because if they don't crush them then and there they won't have another chance and Russia will attack them with unbeatable numbers.

They kept fighting precisely because of this. No other acceptable alternative was possible. Besides, most of the others kept chasing elusive 'Final Decisive Battle' not realizing that such was not possible and there would be no deisive battle, short of taking Moscow, capturing Stalin and other top Bolsheviks. Even this, if at all possible, would not in itself guarantee an end, but may just be an intro into long term low intensity warfare a'la 'Fatherland'.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
Could Goring and Heydrich see the final decisive battle is on a psychological level. With the support of the people etc etc they can finally crush Bolshevism.

What would the effects of a wartime economy have on Nazi Germany, also what if they actually used Czech, French and Belgian industry instead of just having it sit there.
 
Could Goring and Heydrich see the final decisive battle is on a psychological level. With the support of the people etc etc they can finally crush Bolshevism.

What would the effects of a wartime economy have on Nazi Germany, also what if they actually used Czech, French and Belgian industry instead of just having it sit there.

The trouble to Germans is less the availability of industrial facilities. What they lacked were the resources to effectively employ existing facilities and skilled manpower to employ in those facilities. They chronically lacked coal, and steel and then, as war dragged on and blockade tightened nickel, chrome, tungsten, rubber and most critically oil. It all adds up that Germany could not make war against Soviet Union and Great Britain, let alone US simoultaneously and yet they tried to do it.

If we conclude that German victory in 1941 is impossible, than their chances of winning against USSR in given set of circumstances and in 1942 are slim to vanishingly improbable, unless some catastrophic blunders on Soviet part.
 
Practically?

From nowhere. Once fighting in USSR starts, there are no attractive alternatives for Germans. Extending war to, say Iberian peninsula or Turkey is possible but further waters down German strength, while imports are impossible. For obvious reasons. Even this nets them only chrome and tungsten (if successful) but they'll still lack rubber and oil.

The only other alternative is they win against UK before Barbarossa and come to an arrangement British supply their war effort with critical resources. So...
 
What would the effects of a wartime economy have on Nazi Germany, also what if they actually used Czech, French and Belgian industry instead of just having it sit there.
Well, as for Czech industry goes. Aircraft factories were used for part production for different German airplane manufacturers.

As to others. For example Pzkpfw 38 - app 1414built. Hetzer 2827 built.
Not small number at all.
 
Germany invades Russia in summer 1940, maybe they can make it to the Urals by the end of 1941 :p
 
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