I'm sorry but it's just not feasible to me that the Germans want to invade. Even if they did, France and Russia plus the U.K could attack Italy and A-H would be neutral. The U.S Navy could hold off a good chunk of the HSF. Unless Germany can teleport across the Atlantic the U.S is going to know they're coming.
Can Spain Win The Spanish-American War?
- Thread starter Kung Fucious
- Start date
An attempt to take New York would have to go through coastal defenses, which would at least delay the Germans a bit. Then they have to face urban fighting because the US isn't going to give up New York without a fight. If you want a place where quality mattering is massively reduced, urban fighting is it.
A German siege of New York gives the US time to equip and train soldiers, not to mention open the Germans to partisan attacks. These might be pinpricks, but Germany's retaliation for them will solidify American resolve. If Pearl Harbor, the equivalent of somebody tripping you for the US, pissed off the US so much, then a massacre of US citizens in the mainland, a punch to the arm, will certainly give the US the resolve to hold out. If they don't attack New York, then they leave US economic power intact. They also leave Watervliet alone because they don't have a port nearby, or they get surrounded going after it. They can't take Springfield without Boston for similar reasons. Without getting into urban fighting to secure their supply lines, Germany has no serious capacity to occupy the US armories. They can wreck them, but that doesn't stop the industry in Pennsylvania and the Ohio region from producing. If Germany goes after those, it gets worse due to longer supply lines and more attrition. A German force of 8 divisions is simply too small to deal a knockout blow to a US that isn't incompetent.
Last edited:
Saphroneth
Banned
In 1898 the coastal defences of the US, while they do exist, are not very extensive. Here's the New York approaches:
Long Island Sound
Fort Griswold was an old Revolutionary War fort with smoothbores etc.
Fort Trumble was an old first system fort, placed under Fort HG Wright.
Fort H.G. Wright was commenced 1898:
1. Battery Butterfield (2x 12”) – 1901
2. Battery Barlow (2x 10”) – 1901
3. Battery Dutton (3x 6”) – 1901
4. Battery Hoffman (2x 3”) – 1904
5. Battery Hamilton (2x 6”) – 1905
6. Battery Hopcock (2x 3”) – 1905
7. Battery Marcy (2x 6”) – 1906
Fort Mansfield was commenced in 1898:
1. Battery Wooster (2x 8”) – 1901
2. Battery Crawford (2x 5”) – 1901
3. Battery Connell (2x 5”) – 1901
Fort Michie on Great Gull Island was commenced 1897:
1. Battery Palmer (2x 12”) – 1900
2. Battery North (2x 10”) – 1900
3. Battery Pasco (2x 3”) – 1905
4. Battery Benjamin (2x 6”) – 1908
5. Battery Maitland (2x 6”) – 1908
Fort Terry on Plum Island was commenced 1898:
1. Battery Steele (2x 10”) – 1900
2. Battery Kelly (2x 5”) – 1900
3. Battery Stoneman (8x 12” Mor) – 1901
4. Battery Bradford (2x 6”) – 1901
5. Battery Dimick (2x 6”) – 1905
6. Battery Dalliba (2x 3”) – 1905
7. Battery Greble (2x 3”) – 1905
8. Battery Campbell (2x 3”) – 1905
9. Battery Floyd (2x 6”) – 1906
10. Battery Hagner (2x 3”) – 1906
11. Battery Eldridge (2x 3”) – 1906
Fort Tyler on Gardiner’s Point Island was commenced, but never completed. As an expedient a 2x 8” Rodman battery was built here.
Eastern New York (via Long Island Sound)
Fort Schuyler was an old third system fort, which they started to modernise in 1896:
1. Battery Hazzard (2x 10”) – 1898 (commenced 1896)
2. Battery Gansevoort(2x 12”) – 1900
3. Battery Bell (2x 5”) – 1900
4. Battery Beecher (2x 3”) – 1900
Fort Slocum on David’s Island was commenced 1892:
1. Battery Haskin and Battery Overton (16x 12” Mor) – 1897 (commenced 1892)
2. Battery Practice (2x 8” Rodman smoothbores) – 1896
3. Battery Fraser (2x 5”) – 1901
4. Battery Kinney (2x 6”) – 1904
Fort Totten was a third system fort modernised:
1. Battery Graham (2x 10”) – 1897 (started 1896)
2. Battery Sumner (2x 8”) – 1899
3. Battery Stuart (2x 5”) – 1899
4. Battery King (8x 12” Mor) – 1900
5. Battery Mahan (2x 12”) – 1900
6. Battery Baker (2x 3”) – 1900
7. Battery Burnes (2x 3”) – 1904
Southern New York
Fort Jay is a disused first system fort.
Fort Lafayette is a disused second system fort.
Fort Tomkins is a disused second system fort.
Fort Hancock on Sandy Hook:
1. Battery Dynamite (1x 8” and 2x 15” Air-Torpedo launchers) – 1896
2. Battery Potter (2x 12” on gun-lifts) – 1898 (finished building in 1894)
3. Battery McCook and Battery Reyonds (16x 12” Mor) – 1898 (finished building in 1894)
4. Battery Granger (2x 10”) – 1898 (commenced 1896)
5. Battery Engle (1x 5”) – 1898 (started 1897)
6. Battery Alexander (2x 12”) – 1899
7. Battery Bloomfield (2x 12”) – 1899
8. Battery Halleck (3x 10”) – 1900 (commenced 1896)
9. Battery Peck (2x 6”) – 1903
10. Battery Urmston (6x 3”) – 1903
11. Battery Richardson (2x 12”) – 1904
12. Battery Morris (4x 3”) – 1904
13. Battery Gunnison (2x 6”) – 1905
Fort Hamilton has:
1. Battery Spear (3x 10”) – 1898
2. Battery Gilmore (4x 10”) – 1899
3. Battery Griffin (2x 4.72”) – 1899 (expanded with 2 more 3” in 1902, then another 2x 3” in 1903)
4. Battery Doubleday (2x 12”) – 1900
5. Battery Neary (2x 12”) – 1900
6. Battery Piper (8x 12” Mor) – 1901
7. Battery Harvey Brown (2x 12”) – 1902
8. Battery Johnston (2x 6”) – 1902
9. Battery Burke (4x 6”) – 1903
10. Battery Livingstone (4x 6”) – 1905
11. Battery Mendenhall (4x 6”) – 1905
Fort Wadsworth has:
1. Battery Upton (2x 10”) – 1897 (building completed 1895)
2. Battery Duane (5x 8”) – 1897 (commenced 1895, completed 1897)
3. Battery Barbour (2x 4.72” and 2x 6”) – 1898 (commenced 1898)
4. Battery Hudson (2x 12”) – 1899
5. Battery Richmond (2x 12”) – 1899
6. Battery Barry (2x 10”) – 1899
7. Battery Bacon (2x 3”) – 1899
8. Battery Mills (2x 6”) – 1900
9. Battery Ayres (2x 12”) – 1901
10. Battery Turnbull (6x 3”) – 1903
11. Battery Dix (2x 12”) – 1904
12. Battery Catlin (6x 3”) – 1904
So the eastern approach has 4 10" and 2 8" guns, along with 16 12" mortars. The southern approach has more at 7 10" and 2 12" and 6 8", along with 1 5", 2 4.72", 2 6" and 16 12" mortars.
Neither of these is anything like what the US considered it actually needed, as you can see from all the forts that were still being built.
Of course, the Germans don't have to ram themselves into the most prepared defences they can find. Here's the coastal forts protecting Philadelphia:
Delaware River
Fort Delaware was a third system fort on Pea Patch Island modernised thus:
1. Battery Dodd (2x 4.72”) – 1899 (commenced 1898)
2. Battery Torbet (2x 12”) – 1901 (commenced 1894, complete 1900)
3. Battery Alburtis (2x 3”) – 1901
4. Battery Allen (2x 3”) – 1901
5. Battery Hentig (2x 3”) – 1901
Fort DuPont started in 1897:
1. Battery Read (2x 12”) – 1899 (commenced 1898, simple barbette mount)
2. Battery Gibson (2x 8”) – 1899
3. Battery Rodney and Battery Best (16x 12” Mor) – 1900
4. Battery Richie (2x 5”) – 1900
5. Battery Elder (2x 3”) – 1904
Fort Mott is the same:
1. Battery Arnold (3x 12”) – 1899 (commenced 1896)
2. Battery Harker (3x 10”) – 1899 (commenced 1896)
3. Battery Krayenbuhl (2x 5”) – 1900 (commenced 1896)
4. Battery Gregg (2x 5”) – 1901
5. Battery Edwards (2x 3”) – 1902
So nothing in 1898.
And the Washington approaches:
Potomac River
Fort Hunt
1. Battery Mount Vernon (3x 8”) – 1898
2. Battery Porter (1x 5”) – 1901
3. Battery Robinson (1x 5”) – 1901
4. Battery Sater (3x 3”) – 1904
Fort Washington is the old fort, modernised as:
1. Battery Water (1x 10”) – 1898 (simple barbette hastily made)
2. Battery Decatur (2x 10”) – 1899
3. Battery Emory (2x 10”) – 1899
4. Battery Humphreys (2x 10”) – 1899
5. Battery White (2x 4”) – 1899
6. Battery Meigs (8x 12” Mor) – 1902
7. Battery Wilkin (2x 6”) – 1902
8. Battery Smith (2x 3”) – 1903
9. Battery Many (2x 3”) – 1905
Chesapeake Bay
Fort Monroe is an old fort modernised as:
1. Battery Humphreys (1x 10”) – 1897
2. Battery Bomford (2x 10”) – 1897
3. Battery Anderson and Battery Ruggles (16x 12” Mor) – 1898 (commenced 1896)
4. Battery Barber (1x 8”) – 1898 (simple barbette mounts)
5. Battery Parapet (4x 8”) – 1898 (barbette)
6. Battery Gatewood (4x 4.7”) – 1898
7. Battery Eustis (2x 10”) – 1901
8. Battery Church (2x 10”) – 1901
9. Battery Irwin (4x 3”) – 1903
10. Battery DeRussy (3x 12”) – 1904
11. Battery Montgomery (2x 6”) – 1904
12. Battery Parrott (2x 12”) – 1906
Fort Wool is opposite and similar:
1. Battery Hindman (2x 3”) – 1905
2. Battery Lee (4x 3”) – 1905
3. Battery Claiborne (2x 6”) – 1908
4. Battery Dyer (2x 6”) – 1908
5. Battery Gates (2x 6”) – 1908
If Fort Monroe can be run - not as hard as it may sound, it has three 10" guns, 5 8" guns and some mortars in place - then all that's protecting Washington is a pair of small batteries.
Note the main lesson here - the US was frantically building lots of naval defences. They felt they needed them, and they did not yet have them; if they did not need them, they wasted a vast amount of money, while if they did need them then they don't have them yet and are vulnerable.
Saphroneth
Banned
If they're supposed to put together an army that can beat the 1900-era German one from a standing start while being invaded, they better be efficient.And the US government would never waste money on the military nossir.
How does the American Revolution and the Civil War not count? Both occurred when enemy troops started out positioned on the continent and involved battles (at least in the latter example) between peer competitors. In both cases the US had to build up their army from practically nothing, and in the former they were fighting professional armed forces combined with loyalist militia. In both cases the supply lines are much shorter for the opposition, considering that they began with arms, munitions, and food on the continent and within the theater, along with a source of manpower. The Germans have none of those advantages, and have to ship everything from Europe (granted, some food could likely be purchases in theater, but actual weapons and supplies would have to be brought over).
1812 also begins with very little standing army or navy versus a naval power that was entering into the prime of its capacity, and when the population differences were not enough for the US to overcome. Say what you will, but in the worst possible situation that the US could have experienced, which was 1812, they still lasted in the war for 2 1/2 years against an enemy that could completely blockade them and occupied large portions of its territory. Here? the Germans have just invaded and have no chance for conquering more unless they commit even more forces then the 10% that you pull out of a hat. Either they all try to conquer one single port and make it their point of focus, or they try to raid up and down the coast, conquering as many harbors in possible, and in which cases it becomes even easier for each of those operations to be defeated in detail.
And it's an absurdity to divorce results from the actual chances of it occurring. Politics and warfare are wedded to each other; considering one without the other deprives others of perspective. Is there any historical record of the US bowing out of a war in the immediate aftermath of an invasion or attack by an enemy power on the metropole, or has one ever forced them to negotiations after a single, great shocking attack? After all, the Japanese intention in WW2 was the attack and conquest on what was a colonial province in the Philippines and carried out attacks on the US in order to prevent them from reinforcing, while large amount of US PoWs were left overseas with no chance in the near term of reinforcement. And, at that point, the Japanese navy was the strongest in the world, especially after the destruction of Battleship Row. It was a large, well-trained professional force. In this example here, you have the large, well-trained German army being put at the end of a long supply line in hostile territory where the enemy can safely and almost at its leisure build up a large force beyond of the range of coastal guns. Time is on the US's side, and everyone should know it.
That's not to take the amount of time to declare war, organize the troops required, set sail across the Atlantic, reinforce Puerto Rico land troops in Cuba, defeat what US troops remain while at the same time defeating what parts of the US navy that do not scatter, and finally consider invasion into the continent itself. Any further commitment of troops hampers Germany at home (say, 10% is a drop in the bucket, but what if that number starts to run low? Will more be called up? Reservists called out?) and, sooner or later, some conflict at home will break out and Germany's attention will change or the US trains up a critical mass of troops that it can push back against the German forces.
I do believe that all of these situations might shed some light on the bearing of the US. During a major war or invasion, whether it is on the continent or from outside it, the US has never bowed out in the weeks that follow the conflict's start. And, as ginned up as the country had become leading up to the Spanish-American war, it seems quite out of character for the US to simply bow out.
The most important question I find is what is the scale of Germany's merchant marine at this point, and could they even support a single landing of such a scale at this juncture? A small amount could be carried onboard the combat ships, but the majority would be placed onboard standard merchant craft.
RodentRevolution
Banned
On January 1. 1898, the date of the last official statistics, she had 1,171 sea-going steamers of 969.800 tons, and crews numbering 28,266 men.
Source San Francisco Call 17 April 1900
Saphroneth
Banned
Because in neither case was it an invasion - both were civil wars against rebels with a regional support base.
But the US did negotiate with enemy troops still on its land in 1812. Maine.
10% of the regulars is still 80,000 fully professional men - which is the kind of thing that could beat four or five times the number of half-trained poorly-equipped militia. (In the Spanish-American War period the US has maybe 250 modern artillery pieces in the entire country, half smokeless, and many of them went to Cuba; by contrast 80,000 Germans will have approaching 400 smokeless Krupp pieces by TO&E.)
In any case, the US took months from their own declaration of war to their actual setting sail - other powers who didn't have to improvise everything about moving troops could move faster.
The German merchant marine roughly doubled in size 1900-1914, and in 1914 was north of five million tons. We can safely assume about one million tons of shipping, which is enough for that scale of landing fairly easily.
Thank you. I looked, but couldn't find it.
Which means that those are much more likely to actually succeed than a trans-oceanic invasion.
That was in mid 1814, two years after the war began.
Germany moved nearly a hundred thousand troops, not including supporting men and material, to destinations overseas on a regular basis? The combined German overseas commitments by the beginning of WW1 are roughly that same 80k, but only the detachment in China were solely European. The vast majority of its colonial troops were a few hundred/thousand Europeans supported by native enlistees.
Saphroneth
Banned
Sorry. In the war of 1812.
Germany has more experience moving troops around, including overseas, than the US of 1898 - which last moved more than a regiment at once by rail (let alone by sea) some time in the 1860s. The US spent months recruiting their regulars up to strength; the Germans have formed divisions ready to go.
Which was my point. In the worst invasion crisis in American history, it took two years of warfare, a complete blockade by the strongest navy in the world, and a string of defeats including the burning of the capital to bring the US to the table.
And Germany hasn't engaged in any war against a peer competitor since 1871 either; it certainly hasn't been engaging in major colonial warfare. They've not the experience in transporting large armies overseas at all; the Boxer Rebellion was the first large reinforcement of Germany's mission in China, which comprised the majority of its overseas forces.
Historically, the US had the first expansion of its army begin in April 22, calling for 125,000 volunteers in addition to expanding the main army. This was later expanded. By August, just shy of four months after the initial expansion, the Army had grown to roughly 300,000 including the regulars. Under threat of imminent invasion (or even German intervention), this would grow larger by sheer requirement. Most of the volunteers did sit in the forts, drilling and waiting for the Spanish invasion that never came. Material shortages would be a problem, as the US had no need of the heavy/modern weapons before the start of the war.
But, when the war drags on into 1899, US Volunteers will have their numbers continue to rise and material shortages, while present, will begin to narrow that gap. Even if a linear trajectory is assumed for troop expansions, the US could outfit roughly 250k troops in 4 months and outfit them with (outdated) weaponry
Saphroneth
Banned
But the US did come to the table despite foreign troops occupying US land, which rather contradicts the point I was trying to contradict.
Note that only the regulars actually got deployed, with a few volunteers they babysat; the rest of the army cannot be counted as anything like the same quality. That's sort of the point I was making by highlighting how the German army is entirely formed out of the better units from their prewar regulars, while the US army is largely formed of what are essentially green troops - and it takes a long time to make green troops as efficient as long-service professionals (which is what the Germans are). WW1 and the ACW suggest it takes about two years, unless you have plenty of cadre (which the US does not).
Admiral Beez
Banned
Attack before the US is at strength. For starters, avoid war with post US revolutionary war Britain. Do not ally with France. Then when war of 1812 starts, invade US.
I actually believe that there is a pervasive pro-U.S. ideology across the AH.com. As evidenced by the people arguing here. And one side has brought up facts in this debate. That side is the "anti-U.S." side.
It's always hilarious to me how the requirements of a transatlantic invasion and supply in the pre-1900 period are always handwaved away. Sure, supplying a force of over 100k for sustained combat with no local base of supply at thay distance was only ever done by the US in WW2 after lengthy buildup and with virtually no naval opposition, but hey why not pre-1900 Germany. Supplying the shells, bullets, food, fodder, and replacements at that distance is not a trivial thing. And if even a fragment of the US Navy survives, it's going to be completely impossible. NEVER MIND that this same German Navy is expected to also carry out active blockades and engagements and support landings by forcing coastal defenses. The US is massive. By itself considerably larger than the whole of Western Europe just in CONUS. There is no way, none, that any force of less than millions can keep enough US territory tied down to prevent theme from forming and drilling army after army.
And with their home soil invaded they won't surrender. 1812 resulted in a negotiation because the British agreed to a status quo peace that in reality favored the Americans due to destruction of Tecumseh. They conceded nothing. Just as they would concede nothing here, where they would be in a vastly superior position vs 1812. And many of the German advantages in European theater are gone. And, oh yeah , they have to mobilize first. Or just send their standing army. Leaving their homeland completely undefended. And of course, despite their largest ever such operation being a mere 14k troops to their existing territories in Africa. But nope. As always, the European supersoldiers will just roll over the hapless and weak willed Americans who will quickly surrender in defiance of all historical precedent and strategic reality.
But then again, this is basically the theme of pre-1900 wars against the US in this wforu. It won't be fully invested in an invasion of it's own territory, it'll somehow be unable to become a peer opponent militarily (being compared to QING CHINA and African tribal groups for extra absurdity) and in fact will be so laughably outmatched that it'll basically be a colonial war. That comparison truly struck me with how the US was viewed. That European performance against small pre-industrial armies equipped with spears (Africa) or large pre-industrial militia equipped with polearms were being used as a metric of performance.
And with their home soil invaded they won't surrender. 1812 resulted in a negotiation because the British agreed to a status quo peace that in reality favored the Americans due to destruction of Tecumseh. They conceded nothing. Just as they would concede nothing here, where they would be in a vastly superior position vs 1812. And many of the German advantages in European theater are gone. And, oh yeah , they have to mobilize first. Or just send their standing army. Leaving their homeland completely undefended. And of course, despite their largest ever such operation being a mere 14k troops to their existing territories in Africa. But nope. As always, the European supersoldiers will just roll over the hapless and weak willed Americans who will quickly surrender in defiance of all historical precedent and strategic reality.
But then again, this is basically the theme of pre-1900 wars against the US in this wforu. It won't be fully invested in an invasion of it's own territory, it'll somehow be unable to become a peer opponent militarily (being compared to QING CHINA and African tribal groups for extra absurdity) and in fact will be so laughably outmatched that it'll basically be a colonial war. That comparison truly struck me with how the US was viewed. That European performance against small pre-industrial armies equipped with spears (Africa) or large pre-industrial militia equipped with polearms were being used as a metric of performance.
Last edited:
Napoleonrules
Banned
OMG
What facts? Those posts remind me of Karl Rove's quote- "It doesnt have to be true, I just have to say it enough times that people assume it is". And I'm not saying that is a US Republican Party doctrine, that is a politics doctrine, and it is universal. See- Brexit "rhetoric" before the UK vote.
Facts such as those not present in this post, instead resorting to an attack on the poster who have done nought to offend you.
And Saphroneth has brought up specific stats and examples of things he is arguing for, the other side has not. And Saphroneth has even conceded that the intervention is unlikely. I am not sure why your argument is focusing on the implausibility of the premise when the opposition has covered said point.
RodentRevolution
Banned
https://ia802702.us.archive.org/6/items/PAM27-23/PAM27-23.pdf
https://ia802702.us.archive.org/6/items/PAM27-23/PAM27-23.pdf
The above is a link to a text which can be downloaded in various formats or read on line. Published in 1954 by the US Army it details some of the issues involved with recruiting and training men for US Army service including the Spanish-American conflict which can be found from page 143 in document
https://archive.org/details/notesandstatist00deptgoog
Link to a US War department intelligence assessment of other nations armies published in 1896, the German Army can be found on page 91 in document. Again you can download it in various formats.
Just for those who are interested in such details.
https://ia802702.us.archive.org/6/items/PAM27-23/PAM27-23.pdf
The above is a link to a text which can be downloaded in various formats or read on line. Published in 1954 by the US Army it details some of the issues involved with recruiting and training men for US Army service including the Spanish-American conflict which can be found from page 143 in document
https://archive.org/details/notesandstatist00deptgoog
Link to a US War department intelligence assessment of other nations armies published in 1896, the German Army can be found on page 91 in document. Again you can download it in various formats.
Just for those who are interested in such details.
A couple things to consider: The Spanish thought of Cuba as a province of Spain; this was fundamentally different from how they thought of their other colonies, partly because Havana had been the seat of their power in the western hemisphere for almost five centuries. In order to preserve that and their martial honor I think they would have cut a deal with the Kaiser.
If you look at the needs of Spain and Germany at the time, they dovetail well enough that a defensive alliance in the western hemisphere could have been worked out. Germany needs bases and Spain needs money and to save face by decreasing her colonial commitments.
This might make France & Britain go a little nutty in Europe (being flanked by Spain in the Pyrennees and Gibraltar), but bear with me:
1) Spain sells the Phillipines and/or Puerto Rico to Germany (similar to Louisiana Purchase).
and/or
2) Spain leases Gauntanomo Bay to Germany for 99 years.
3) Germany promises to send its fleet to the defense of Cuba in the event of invasion. This could be an overt basing of German ships, or a secret defensive alliance triggered by war.
4) Spain uses money from sale of colonies to fund their army in Cuba and to modernize their navy with German technical support / dockyards.
5) Solves Germany's desire for a coaling station in the Caribbean in order to deploy their fleet there, and provides for the defense of Cuba.
6) Rids Spain of the Phillipino rebellion and gives Germany a major naval base in Asia.
Such an alliance would have prevented the quick 100 day victory of OTL.
Granted, USA would have likely joined the dreadnought arms race as a result, and gotten drawn into WWI sooner since we'd have real strategic goals to achieve. Similar to the Japanese, we would have had a lot of low hanging fruit to pluck in 1914.
However, there's no reason to believe that Kaiser Bill wouldn't have made a hyper-extension to gain power, or that Spain wouldn't have taken the deal if her honor as a nation was upheld.
If you look at the needs of Spain and Germany at the time, they dovetail well enough that a defensive alliance in the western hemisphere could have been worked out. Germany needs bases and Spain needs money and to save face by decreasing her colonial commitments.
This might make France & Britain go a little nutty in Europe (being flanked by Spain in the Pyrennees and Gibraltar), but bear with me:
1) Spain sells the Phillipines and/or Puerto Rico to Germany (similar to Louisiana Purchase).
and/or
2) Spain leases Gauntanomo Bay to Germany for 99 years.
3) Germany promises to send its fleet to the defense of Cuba in the event of invasion. This could be an overt basing of German ships, or a secret defensive alliance triggered by war.
4) Spain uses money from sale of colonies to fund their army in Cuba and to modernize their navy with German technical support / dockyards.
5) Solves Germany's desire for a coaling station in the Caribbean in order to deploy their fleet there, and provides for the defense of Cuba.
6) Rids Spain of the Phillipino rebellion and gives Germany a major naval base in Asia.
Such an alliance would have prevented the quick 100 day victory of OTL.
Granted, USA would have likely joined the dreadnought arms race as a result, and gotten drawn into WWI sooner since we'd have real strategic goals to achieve. Similar to the Japanese, we would have had a lot of low hanging fruit to pluck in 1914.
However, there's no reason to believe that Kaiser Bill wouldn't have made a hyper-extension to gain power, or that Spain wouldn't have taken the deal if her honor as a nation was upheld.
Yes, they did come to the table, two years after the fact, not in the weeks after the invasion started and enemy forces landed. Those two years are the same as those that the US would need, by your reckoning, to turn troops into professional level soldiers.
Although, my other point is the same: the Germans may be better drilled, but they are just as green as the US, as neither side has faced large-scale conflict in 33 years for the US, or for 27 years for the Germans. All of their combat experienced troops would have become officers now, but none of the rank and file have ever seem combat before.
I've cited the level of the troop build-up for the US, along with US actions during prior wars. Those are provable; I'm arguing over what those facts would imply and the projections that can be drawn from them. The Germans have the initial qualitative advantage, but the numerical one is against them and both would become more extreme on the North American continent the longer a conflict draws out.
So please desist with the ad hominem attacks that I am not providing any facts at all.