Can Prague Spring succeed?

In my little research on the topic, it seems that in the beginning the USSR was hesitant to intervene. Is it possible that Dubček can handle foreign relations better, at least so there is no intervention? It may be that the USSR does not think the reforms will have as drastic effects, and decide not to invade in order to gain more support from communist movements worldwide. Either way, what will be the effects of a multiparty democracy in the Eastern Bloc?
 
In my little research on the topic, it seems that in the beginning the USSR was hesitant to intervene. Is it possible that Dubček can handle foreign relations better, at least so there is no intervention? It may be that the USSR does not think the reforms will have as drastic effects, and decide not to invade in order to gain more support from communist movements worldwide. Either way, what will be the effects of a multiparty democracy in the Eastern Bloc?

The thing USSR feared was a defection of Czechoslovakia to the NATO, not a multiparty democracy. Some guarantees need to be offered for that - reaffirmation of Warsaw Pact by the new Czechoslova government, a new alliance treaty or some such. Soviets were just fine with multiparty Finland as long as it toed their line in foreign politics.
 
Not sure. Finlandising the CSSR is not that attractive a prospect. It might encourage others, and Brezhnev isn't that safely enscopnced yet. He might well remember Khrushchev's story and crack down. In terms of foreign and defense polic<y, it's not a big deal - the Warsaw Pact at the time could have afforded a kind of limited democracy in its member states. But look at it from the POV of domestic power politiucs and internal security and the story becomes very different. The Kremlin did not gladly reliquish control of anything it has, and nobody did paranoia like the Politburo.

I can#t see it,not because it wouldn't have been a good idea but because it would have required Moscow to trust someone they hadn't chosen first.
 
Yes, there were several meetings between Dubček and Soviet leaders and each left Brezhnev and Co more and more suspicious to Dubček's intentions. As altamiro said, USSR feared Czech's defection to NATO, and, I suppose, Dubček could not dissuade their fears. Maybe because it was true at least partially. I don't really know.

If Czechoslovakia allowed to continue and really leave Soviet block, renounce communism, and joins NATO to boot, there will be likely similar movement in all eastern europe, but at this time it would not be peaceful. Regardless of outcome it will weaken USSR more then OTL, it even may collapse in more violent way eventually, though about what time I cannot say.

On the other hand, if Czechoslovakia really only wished to reform and not defect, it could do some good to communist block. At this time in USSR Kosygyn initiated large economical reforms which, some believe, could transform USSR in something like modern China - a real economocal powerhouse, but still with communists in power. After suppressing Czechoslovakia, this reforms were severely truncated, and ended nowhere.
 
Could a compromise been met where the country split into the Western-aligned Czech Republic and a Soviet-aligned Slovakia?

Namaste

I doubt that would be acceptable to the Soviets. For one thing Bohemia is much bigger and has considerable industry. For another its move to the west, or even to neutrality, would greatly weaken the Soviet ability to threaten western Europe.

Even neutrality for the Czechs, which is probably more than Dubcek would have gone for, is probably unacceptable to the Soviets. Apart from the obvious temptation for other nations to urge similar reforms it removes any realistic threat to southern Germany and Austria/N Italy. Also splits the Warsaw Pact position into two groupings north and south of the country which can't easily support each other.

Steve
 
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