Can Italy win the First Italo-Ethiopian war?

[machine3589]

Considering how massively outnumbered the Italians were, is there any way the Italians can win the war against Ethiopia?

 

[Falecius]

For a given value of "win", like, say, actually having war aims and committing forces to achieve them, I would say it's quite possible.
As for wholesale conquest of entire Ethiopia, it would have to be a very different war with a noticeably different Italy.

 

[katchen]

So realistically, Italy could, with more of an army, win the Battle of Adwa, take Aksum and Tigre and maybe Gonder, then realize that the whole of Ethiopia is more than it can chew and invite it's ally France to take over the rest of Ethiopia from Djibouti, moving west to Fashoda and the Ubangi and maybe defeating the Mahdi while they are at it., achieving their trans-Africa Sahel belt, so that they can start building their Railroad Trans-Afrique. Maybe the French even get Uganda while they are at it.
The Italians are then in position to make Eritrea and Tigre a viable colony and possibly expand to Yemen and Asir when they get involved in the Balkan Wars against Turkey.

 

[Namayan]

Yes, Italy can win the war but at a very high cost and of course if Italy is willing to pay that very high cost in lives, resources and cash.

Ethiopia had the benefit of modern weaponry and Russian participation. So conquering Ethiopia will not be an easy task compared to Non-western nations who had no western weaponry nor training.

 

[lukedalton]

Italy objective in the first Ethiopian war is not an all out conquest with military occupation like the second, but more make her a protectorate...or from the italian PoW of the time, make her abide to 'our interpretation' of a pregress treaty. So win at Adua mean basically end the campaign as the great bulk of the Ethiopian army (king included) was here and so Crispi can dictate some term, enlarging Eritrea a little and declare a win so keeping his goverment afloat (who is the principal reason for the war)

 

[Falecius]

Italy objective in the first Ethiopian war is not an all out conquest with military occupation like the second, but more make her a protectorate...or from the italian PoW of the time, make her abide to 'our interpretation' of a pregress treaty. So win at Adua mean basically end the campaign as the great bulk of the Ethiopian army (king included) was here and so Crispi can dictate some term, enlarging Eritrea a little and declare a win so keeping his goverment afloat (who is the principal reason for the war)

I agree. Problem is, Adua was not a winnable battle in OTL. An Italian win iin the war requires a strategy that leads to a different engagement in favorable conditions for Italy that were not there at Adua, or, at least, a competent enough Italian leadership during the campaign (that, again, amounts to a very different battle).

 

[LordKalvan]

Italy objective in the first Ethiopian war is not an all out conquest with military occupation like the second, but more make her a protectorate...or from the italian PoW of the time, make her abide to 'our interpretation' of a pregress treaty. So win at Adua mean basically end the campaign as the great bulk of the Ethiopian army (king included) was here and so Crispi can dictate some term, enlarging Eritrea a little and declare a win so keeping his goverment afloat (who is the principal reason for the war)

The first Ethiopian war presents a number of the traditional mistakes which handicapped the history of the kingdom after unification: the political objectives were unclear to the army command (or were possibly ignored), the chain of command was shaky, the Italian EF moved across the Eritrean border without a clear strategy, resources were probably insufficient for a quick campaign. Even more important, the political spadework inside Ethiopia (which was anything but a unitary state) was clearly insufficient and failed to raise the local revolts which would have handicapped the mobilization of the Ethiopian army. For comparison, look at the Ethiopian campaign successfully handled by Napier and his Anglo-Indian EF in the 1860s: the political objectives were very clear, there was a unitary and undisputed chain-of-command, resources were adequate and the political penetration among the tribes dissatisfied with the Negus authority was very effective.

 

[Falecius]

The first Ethiopian war presents a number of the traditional mistakes which handicapped the history of the kingdom after unification: the political objectives were unclear to the army command (or were possibly ignored), the chain of command was shaky, the Italian EF moved across the Eritrean border without a clear strategy, resources were probably insufficient for a quick campaign. Even more important, the political spadework inside Ethiopia (which was anything but a unitary state) was clearly insufficient and failed to raise the local revolts which would have handicapped the mobilization of the Ethiopian army. For comparison, look at the Ethiopian campaign successfully handled by Napier and his Anglo-Indian EF in the 1860s: the political objectives were very clear, there was a unitary and undisputed chain-of-command, resources were adequate and the political penetration among the tribes dissatisfied with the Negus authority was very effective.

Quite a good summary.
Actually, the Italian military defeat was the consequence of a political self-defeat. Italy had failed to secure allies both within and without Ethiopia: by the way, Italy at that point was competing with France, not cooperating with her, in the area and more in general in Europe; Crispi was pretty much the most pro-German and anti-French you could get in the way of Italian prime minister. Then, French Djibouti was quite busy happily providing modern rifles to the Negus while Italy used older models).
At same time, amateurish diplomacy had made any British or German support for Italian ambitions in the area shaky at best - Britain was actually concerned of Italian encroachment in the upper course of the Nile, that was perceived as critical to British interests. Russia was bound to support Ethiopia no matter what, of course.

This diplomatic failure was in turn the consequence of a deeper failure; the Italian government didn't know what it wanted out of Ethiopia, and was then unable to assess what means could be used (policies, resources, alliances, troops, etc. ) for lack of any defined end.
Even worse, Italian objectives, if made explicit, happened to be at cross-purpose (e.g. trying to win the Ethiopians' allegiance while scheming to carve settler colonies out of their land) and pursued simultaneously anyway because the government was a nest of cross-purposes in its own right.

 

[LordKalvan]

Quite a good summary.
Actually, the Italian military defeat was the consequence of a political self-defeat. Italy had failed to secure allies both within and without Ethiopia: by the way, Italy at that point was competing with France, not cooperating with her, in the area and more in general in Europe; Crispi was pretty much the most pro-German and anti-French you could get in the way of Italian prime minister. Then, French Djibouti was quite busy happily providing modern rifles to the Negus while Italy used older models).
At same time, amateurish diplomacy had made any British or German support for Italian ambitions in the area shaky at best - Britain was actually concerned of Italian encroachment in the upper course of the Nile, that was perceived as critical to British interests. Russia was bound to support Ethiopia no matter what, of course.

This diplomatic failure was in turn the consequence of a deeper failure; the Italian government didn't know what it wanted out of Ethiopia, and was then unable to assess what means could be used (policies, resources, alliances, troops, etc. ) for lack of any defined end.
Even worse, Italian objectives, if made explicit, happened to be at cross-purpose (e.g. trying to win the Ethiopians' allegiance while scheming to carve settler colonies out of their land) and pursued simultaneously anyway because the government was a nest of cross-purposes in its own right.

Diplomatic isolation was another traditional curse, which had already handicapped Italy during the congress of Berlin and the resulting French protectorate on Tunis, and then again created the premises for an absurd commercial war with France. Talking about working at cross-purposes let's not forget Italian refusal to intervene in Egypt (as a junior partner of the British, admittedly, but still better than nothing) which made a lot of sense considering the already existing Italian colony in Eritrea and the presence of a sizable Italian business community in Alexandria. However it has to be said that the Italian diplomatic mismanagement of the preparation of their colonial adventure in Ethiopia was clearly well above average.

I would not however consider this as the main point of failure: it's true that the Negus received a limited amount of modern weapons, and some Russian advisers were on his side, but it really should have made little or no difference on the outcome. Provided that someone really knew what Italy truly wanted, I mean.

 

[Namayan]

I believe commitment of Italy should be also considered. In the second Italian Ethiopian war, Ethiopia only had at most 3 to 1 advantage in military manpower. In the first war however, Ethiopia had 10 to 1 odds. Numbers were very important since Italy was losing one soldier per one Ethiopian soldier in the first war. Technological difference should also be a factor for the second war since Italy did not have the force multiplier of better tanks and better aircraft which was non existent factor during the first war.