Can it Carry Bombs?

A “What If” Messerschmitt had said “no” to both Goring and Hitler’s question “Can it carry bombs?” With the Me-262 being produced as a pure fighter not a bomber or a fighter-bomber, the Ar-234 being developed as the first jet bomber and reconnaissance aircraft.

I have had to “work around” various battles in 1944 and 1945 to “fit in” with this story and to extend WW2 into late 1945.

Enjoy.

Please Note - I will be adding to this TL infrequently.

Can it Carry Bombs?

1.

Me 262 Origins

In late 1938, a Messerschmitt design team under Dr. Waldermar Voight had drawn up concepts for an interceptor fighter with twin turbojet engines. The preliminary designs for “Project 1065”, as it was designated, went through an iteration or two and finally resulted in a proposal submitted to the RLM in May 1940.

Messerschmitt’s dream fighter had the turbojets mounted in nacelles under the middle of the wings. The wings were slightly swept to ensure proper centre of gravity, and had an unusually thin chord, or ratio of thickness to width, for good high-speed performance. As the wing’s features for high-speed performance compromised low-speed handling, a “slat” was added to the front of the outer wings, this slat was automatically extended to improve handling at low speeds.

The fuselage had a triangular cross section and substantial fuel capacity to feed the thirsty engines. The aircraft was a “tailsitter”, with fully retractable landing gear. In July 1940, the RLM ordered three prototypes, under the designation “Messerschmitt 262 or Me-262”, to be powered by BMW-003 engines.

Airframe development far outpaced engine development, and so the first prototype, the “Me-262-V1” (“V” standing for “Versuchs” or “Experimental”), was fitted with a single Jumo-210G piston engine with 710 horsepower and a two-bladed propeller for preliminary test flights. First flight was on the 18th April 1941. The RLM was becoming more interested in the aircraft, ordering five more prototypes in July 1941, to follow the initial order for three.

The Me-262-V1 was finally fitted with a pair of BMW-003 turbojets, each with 550 kilograms (1,200 pounds) thrust, in November 1941. The Jumo 210G piston engine was retained, which was fortunate, since the turbojet engines were hopelessly unreliable. On the 25th March 1942, Messerschmitt test pilot Fritz Wendel took off and suffered immediate failures of both engines. He managed to make a go-round on the piston engine and land, damaging the aircraft but suffering no injury himself.

Development of the BMW-003 engine was progressing slowly, while work on the Junkers Jumo-004 seemed more promising, and so the third prototype, the “Me-262-V3”, was fitted with two Jumo-004A pre-production engines with 840 kilograms (1,850 pounds) thrust each. Wendel took the V3 into the air on the 18th July 1942 and found the aircraft extremely impressive. Unfortunately, the V3 prototype was wrecked on its second test flight, three weeks later.

The Me-262V-2 prototype, also powered by Jumo-004As, was not delivered until 2nd October 1942. Despite all the delays and problems, the RLM had already ordered 15 pre-production Me-262s in May 1942, and added 30 more to the order in October 1942. The He-280 was clearly inferior in performance and the Me-262 was clearly the better option, but there was still no commitment to put the Me-262 into full production. RLM was waffling between committing to production of the Me-262 and the Me-209, an improved version of the piston-powered Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter. The head of the RLM, Erhard Milch, was conservative and favoured the Me-209 over the much more radical Me-262.

First Steps

However, in the spring of 1943 the tide began to shift towards the jet fighter. The Luftwaffe’s General of Fighters, Adolf Galland, flew the recently delivered “V4” prototype on the 22nd May 1943. He enthusiastically endorsed the type and suggested that the Me-209 be cancelled. A few days later, the RLM placed an order for 100 production Me-262s.

Apparently even this decision did not clear away all the bureaucratic obstacles, Willi Messerschmitt himself was also causing problems, because he kept on lobbying to produce both the Me-209 and the Me-262, partly this seems to be a ploy in bureaucratic empire-building, and it wasn’t until November 1943 that the Me-209 was dropped for good.

Even then, the Me-262’s political troubles were far from over, and in fact were just about to take a very odd turn. Hitler, alarmed by the success of Allied amphibious landings in Africa and Italy, was very concerned about developing a fast fighter-bomber (“Jagdbomber” or “Jabo”) to pin down invasion forces on the beaches until reinforcements could arrive to drive them back into the sea.

On the 2nd November 1943, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goring, head of the Luftwaffe, and Milch visited the Messerschmitt plant in Augsburg. Goring asked Willi Messerschmitt if the new jet fighter could carry bombs. Messerschmitt answered without hesitation that the Me-262 could not carry bombs and a lot of work would need to be done to make the Me-262 in a “Jabo”. Willi Messerschmitt goes on to state that the Me-262 was designed from the onset to destroy enemy bomber and fighters Goring seemed satisfied with Messerschmitt’s answer.

Hitler’s Order, November 1943

On the 26th November 1943, Hitler inspected the Me-262 at Insterburg, and asked the same question “Can it carry bombs?” Messerschmitt gave him the same answer that he had given Goring. Hitler seemed satisfied with Messerschmitt’s answer and ordered that the Me-262 to be built as a fighter to destroy bombers, and the Ar-234 to be built primarily as a bomber with a limited number going to the reconnaissance role, both would be for use against the possible allied landings that would take place in France, in 1944. There is little record of anyone contesting his decision, nonetheless, Messerschmitt completely agreed with the will of the Fuehrer about the Me-262 and busily worked to put the machine into production as a fighter.

Milch, on reading intelligence reports that the Americans were getting ready to field new bombers such as the Boeing B-29 that would be a handful for existing interceptors, also pressed on with production of the Me-262 as a fighter, ignoring the Ar-234 needs at the same level of priority. Though Milch made agreeable noises about building Ar-234, little or nothing was done to make the Ar-234 as a bomber, though work was commencing to use the Ar-234 in the reconnaissance role.

Things would be set to come to head with Hitler in May of 1944, as Hitler had assumed that the Me-262 and Ar-234 were at the same levels of development and priority, but Hitler was wrong, no one had thought to inform Hitler that the Ar-234 was well behind the Me-262 in development. Hitler was pinning his hopes on the Ar-234 to hold the Allied invasion on the beaches until the German Army arrived to drive the allies into the sea.

Hitler’s decision regarding the Me-262 would have long term consequences for the defence of German airspace in late 1944 and early 1945, this decision would also have a significant influence on the outcome of the war, in a most unusual way regarding Hitler’s military decisions on all the front that the various forms that these two types of Jets would serve.

Me-262 into Production!

Whatever the political issues surrounding the Me-262 program, the real difficulty was that the aircraft was still a long way from being able to be built in any significant numbers. At the time (early 1943), there was only one Me-262 flying, the “V4” prototype. The previous three prototypes had been wrecked one way or another, and the “V5” prototype was being rebuilt to use tricycle landing gear, at the suggestion of Adolf Galland. Given the aircraft’s long nose, the “tailsitter” landing gear configuration made forward visibility on the ground extremely poor, and the downward-pointing jets also tore up the ground.

The V5 had a fixed nose wheel, but was followed by the “V6” in October 1943, which had fully retractable landing gear and was close to production specification, and then the last test prototype, the “V7”.

By April 1943, 13 pre-production “Me-262A0s” had been completed of an ultimate total of 45 built, out of the initial 45 ordered, though the pre-production “Me-262A0s” would continue to be produced until the production Me-262A1as were available in May 1944. These aircraft were close to production specification, but some had specialized test fits. For example, the “V12” was modified as a high-speed test article with a smaller canopy and other changes, and was clocked at 1,005 kph (624 mph), substantially faster than a standard Me-262.

Some of the pre-production machines (Me-262A0s) where being sent on to the Luftwaffe for operational evaluation by a group organized in February 1944 for the task, designated “Erprobungskommando (Proving Detachment) 262”. It seemed like the Me-262 was coming into service at precisely the right of time, since now the US Army Air Force (USAAF) had adequate numbers of long-range P-51D Mustang fighters to escort bombers on daylight raids over Germany, greatly complicating the air defence of the Reich. The Me-262 might well tilt the balance back to the defenders if enough of them could be produced.

That was also easier said than done, Messerschmitt was straining to keep up with demands for production of existing aircraft types, a difficulty compounded by a devastating Allied air raid on the company’s plant at Regensburg on the 17th August 1943. Production had to be relocated to Oberammergau, near the Bavarian Alps. Delivering the temperamental Jumo-004 turbojets was even more troublesome.

In early January 1944 it was decided to keep the Me-262A0 limited production line (what would be referred to as initial low rate production today) running until full production of the Me-262A1a variant could enter production, this order proved to be very useful, as it allowed Erprobungskommando 262 to achieve full operational strength by February 1944. This limited production run of Me-262A0 would only be able to produce limited numbers of Me-262A0’s, but even these limited numbers would allow Erprobungskommando 262 throughout the first three months of 1944 to set-up a crude training program for the Me-262.

The production rate of the Me-262A0’s is very low, with only 5 aircraft being delivered every week (seven days), the Erprobungskommando 262 would take a while to set-up at this rate of delivery, but with the Me-262A1a due to enter full scale production in March 1944 (this was delayed by the bombing raid on Regensburg), the limited numbers being produced was not seen as a problem, as these aircraft would be used to train or re-train pilots until full production of the Me-262A1a was up and running.

Jet Engines

The initial 004A engines built to power the Me-262 prototypes had been built without restrictions on materials, and they used scarce raw materials such as nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum in quantities, which were unacceptable in production. Franz realized that the Jumo 004 would have to be redesigned to incorporate a minimum of these strategic materials, and this was accomplished.

All the hot metal parts including the combustion chamber were changed to mild steel protected by an aluminium coating, and the hollow turbine blades were produced from folded and welded Cromadur alloy (12% chromium, 18% manganese, and 70% iron) developed by Krupp, and cooled by compressed air “bled” from the compressor. The engine’s operational lifespan was shortened, but on the plus side it became easier to construct.

The first production model of the 004B weighed 220 lb (100 kg) less than the 004A, and in 1943 had passed several 100-hour tests, with a time between overhauls of 50 hours being achieved.

Later in 1943 a series of engines suffered vibration problems, and solutions dragged on. Eventually, in December, blade-vibration specialist Max Bentele was once again brought in during a meeting at the RLM headquarters, and the problem was solved by raising the blades’ natural frequency by increasing their taper, shortening them by 1 millimetre, and reducing the operating speed of the engine from 9,000 to 8,700 rpm.

It was not until early 1944 that full production of the 004B could finally begin in the interim the 004A would be used for the Me-262-A0’s in various operation test and training units that would be set-up in early 1944. These setbacks were the principal factor delaying the Luftwaffe’s introduction of the Me-262 into full squadron service.

Given the lower-quality steels used in the 004B, these engines typically only had a service life of some 10-25 hours, perhaps twice this in the hands of a skilled pilot. Another shortcoming of the engine, common to all early turbojets, was its sluggish throttle response. Worse, it was fairly easy to inject too much fuel into the engine by throttling up too quickly, allowing heat to build up before the cooling air could remove it. This led to softening of the turbine blades, and was a major cause for engine failures. Nevertheless, it made jet power for combat aircraft a reality for the first time.

The exhaust area of the 004 featured a variable geometry nozzle, which had a special restrictive body nicknamed the Zwiebel (German for onion, due to its shape when seen from the side) which had roughly 40 cm (16 inch) fore-and-aft travel to vary the jet exhaust's cross-sectional area for thrust control, as the active part of a pioneering “divergent-convergent” nozzle format.

One interesting feature of the 004 was the starter system, which consisted of a Riedel 10 hp (7 kW) 2-stroke motorcycle engine hidden in the intake. A hole in the extreme nose of the centre body contained a pull-handle, which started the piston engine, which in turn spun up the turbine. Two small gasoline tanks were fitted in the annular intake.

The Jumo 004 could run on three types of fuel:-
1. J-2, its standard fuel, a synthetic fuel produced from coal.
2. Diesel oil.
3. Aviation gasoline; not considered desirable due to its high rate of consumption.

All Jets would use the J-2 fuel, as this type of fuel was more readily available than the other two types.

Armament

The armament of the Me-262 would consist of 4 30mm cannons mounted in the nose of the aircraft, the MK 108 (Maschinenkanone or Machine Cannon) was an 30 mm calibre autocannon manufactured by Rheinmetall-Borsig for use in a variety of aircraft. This weapon would become synonyms with the Me-262 for it killing power against all types of allied aircraft.

The cannon used specially developed 30x90RB mm ammunition 30 mm calibre, 90 mm case length and rebated/reduced rim. Unlike most other weapon rounds, which used traditional brass for the case, the MK 108's ammunition used steel cases. Several types of ammunition were developed, including practice, armour piercing, high explosive and incendiary.

The cannon proved to be very effective and reliable, yet comparatively light, compact and easy to manufacture. These characteristics stem from its simple construction 80% of the weapon was made from stamped parts, and the number of moving parts was kept to a bare minimum using a simple blowback operation. However, the simple blowback operation had its disadvantages.

The low muzzle velocity needed for this simple operation became the MK 108's main shortcoming, with the result that its projectile trajectory was seriously affected by bullet drop after a comparatively short range, 41 meters of drop in the first 1000 meters of range. This made effective firing ranges very short and aiming a challenge, particularly with fast flying aircraft as the Me-262, though with four of these mounted in the nose, this meant that a one second burst from all four cannons would put just over forty rounds on a target at close range, this was normally enough to bring down or seriously damage any allied aircraft. This meant that the Me-262 had to get close before firing, with it superior speed that was not a problem, all that was need would be to train the pilots on the procedure, a unit called Kommando Schreiber would set the basic tactics for the Me-262, along with Kommando Nowotny in mid 1944.

Otherwise, it was simple to manufacture and maintain, and its compact size and weight as well as its electrical priming made it ideal for aircraft installation. The cannon's distinctive heavy pounding sound and high rate of fire gave it the nickname “pneumatic hammer” amongst Allied aircrews, amongst which the cannon gained a fearsome reputation due to its destructive power.

In operations however, two major ammunition types were used, Minengeschoß (“mine-shell”) high-explosive incendiary. The Minengeschoß was made by drawn steel (the same way brass cartridges are made) instead of being forged and machined, as was the usual practice for cannon shells. This resulted in a shell with a thin but strong wall, which hence had a much larger cavity in which to pack a much larger explosive or incendiary charge than was otherwise possible.

The incendiary rounds were also often fitted with a hydrostatic fuse, which detonated when it came in contact with liquid. This was to ensure that the round did not merely explode on the target aircraft’s skin (which would cause little damage), but instead penetrated it and exploded when it came into contact with fuel or coolant inside the fuel tanks or radiators respectively.

Ar-234

Meanwhile the other Jet about to enter production was the Ar-234, the Ar-234 development was also progressing, but the Ar-234 development was many months behind that of the Me-262. The Ar-234 was not even entering pre-production at the same time, as Hitler has assumed, but events in early 1944 would lead Hitler to assume that the Ar-234 was entering full-scale production, just slightly behind that of the Me-262.

The Ar-234 would also be fitted with the Junkers Jumo 004B-1 turbojets like the Me-262, this would cause a shortage of engines for both aircraft, and this problem of supplying of the Junkers Jumo 004B-1 turbojets would not be solved until early 1945, by fitting the Ar-234 with four BMW 003A engines.

As 1943 came to a close, Germany was on the verge of introducing a very high performance fighter (Me-262), but with a large number of technical problems still existing, most of which were to do with the engines. This would not be an easy “birth” for the Me262, or even the Ar-234.

What would 1944 bring for the Me-262 and the Ar-234?

To be continued, if there is any interest in this TL?
 
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hmm, interesting. I am not sure I buy Hitler accepting the "It can't carry bombs" quite that easily but I am willing to go with the flow and see where it carries this one.:p
 
hmm, interesting. I am not sure I buy Hitler accepting the "It can't carry bombs" quite that easily but I am willing to go with the flow and see where it carries this one.:p

Hi tchizek

Had to start with a PoD thought that was the best one, but we shall see!

Thanks for the support:)

There is interest here. I'd like more. Sorry for the late response but I was kinda busy.

Hi Onkel Willie

Thanks for the support, nice to know someone is interested :)

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I will post the next part soon.
 

Riain

Banned
I love the early jets, but my personal preference is leaning away from the Jumo and BMW engine scenarios and toward one where Heinkel engines get a chance to shine. I think that will official encouragement Hienkel could have gotten the HeS 8 into production earlier than the Jumo and BMWs and it would have been a better engine too.
 
I love the early jets, but my personal preference is leaning away from the Jumo and BMW engine scenarios and toward one where Heinkel engines get a chance to shine. I think that will official encouragement Hienkel could have gotten the HeS 8 into production earlier than the Jumo and BMWs and it would have been a better engine too.

Hi Riain

Agreed with the HeS 8 route would be good for a TL that starts in 1939 or 1940.

But in this TL I have to make do with the Jumo and BMWs :eek::D


Same sentiments. I'm on board for this one, too.

Bobindelaware

Hi Bobindelaware

Welcome onboard :D
 
Here is part 2, comments and support welcomed :)

2.

First Steps, January to May 1944

Me-262 Production, January to May 1944

With the production site at Regensburg heavily damaged in February, production of the Me-262A1a was put back by several months, however is was decided that production of the Me-262A0 would continue in the interim until Me-262A1a production was fully up and running, Me-262A1a production would now rely on Augsburg, from Augsburg in March one Me-262A1a would be delivered, followed by 15 in April and 7 in May, most of these going or being diverted to Kommando Nowotny from EKO 262.

June would see an increase in production of the Me-262A1a coming from Augsburg, with production not restarting at Regensburg unit September 1944, with the production of the Me-262A0 ceasing in June.

Erprobungskommando 262

Erprobungskommando 262 was formed in February 1944 at Lechfeld to test the new Messerschmitt Me 262, with Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder as the unit’s commanding officer. For the first few months, the Me-262 unit got started training pilots and at the same time send small numbers of these pilots up to intercepting high-altitude allied reconnaissance aircraft that came within range of Lechfeld.

EKO 262 was initially exclusively equipped with the Me-262A0, these Me-262A0’s where flown straight from Messerschmitt’s factory to Lechfeld by the pilots of EKO 262. This was a good start to training pilots, as ferrying the jets would give the pilots of EKO 262 flying experience on the Me-262A0 by ferrying the planes from the factory to Lechfeld this also allowed Messerschmitt’s own test pilots and ground crews to brief the EKO 262 pilots on the planes operational characteristics.

At the same time Hauptman Thierfelder formed a standby of force of four of the jets to intercept enemy aircraft. When an enemy aircraft was detected two jets would be sent to intercept the enemy aircraft (usually a reconnaissance aircraft), the reason for sending two aircraft, was that if one of the jet aircraft had a technical problem, the second aircraft could continue the intercept and shoot down the enemy aircraft, all these interceptions would be filmed using the Me-262’s “gun camera” for use in conforming the kill and as a training tool for new pilots assigned to EKO 262.

Between March and May 1944, Erprobungskommando 262 would regularly intercept enemy reconnaissance aircraft and shoot them down, with a level of increasing accuracy and efficiency. The allied leadership noticed the sudden inability for their reconnaissance aircraft to penetrate certain parts of German airspace, as most allied reconnaissance aircraft sent to those parts of Germany would not return. This will lead to allied reconnaissance aircraft receiving escort fighters, but this did not help matters as the escort fighters would also start to be shot down along with the reconnaissance aircraft, this was the first major conformation for the allies that the Germans were now operating Jets on the front line.

Between March and May 1944, Erprobungskommando 262 would steadily build up its numbers of Me-262A0’s, as by the end of March 1944 EKO 262 would have 50 Me-262A0’s operating, although only about 20 to 25 of these Jets would be available for operations and training at any one time, but even to this was a considerable feat for such a new unit.

Erprobungskommando 262 would build up a considerable record in shooting down allied reconnaissance aircraft and the pilots of Erprobungskommando 262 would gain valuable combat experience on the Me-262 and learn about the aircrafts abilities and flaws/vices for this Jet fighter.

In early May 1944, a new sub unit of EKO 262 would be formed called Kommando Schreiber with eight Me-262A0’s taken from EKO 262 “stock” of Me-262’s. These eight 262’s would be sent to Juvincourt to operate alongside the two Ar-234 operated by Sommer and Götz. Kommando Schreiber would remain under the direct command of EKO 262, cutting Luftflotte 3 out from any ability to command this unit or interfere in the operations of Kommando Schreiber.

Kommando Schreiber would prove how to form a “front line” jet fighter unit properly, this would perform much better than the larger Kommando Nowotny that would be set-up a few weeks later. This would largely be due to Kommando Schreiber being much smaller in size making Schreiber’s unit easier to manage, than the larger Kommando Nowotny, most historians today think that the setting up of Kommando Nowotny was an error and that all effort should have gone into Kommando Schreiber and EKO 262, as a lot of time was lost with Kommando Nowotny.

Both of these units (EKO 262 and Kommando Schreiber) would find the Me-262A0’s better to operate than the production Me-262A1’s, as the Me-262A0’s had been manufactured to a much higher standard than the production machines, the Me-262A1a’s also tended to have a shorter engine lifespan than the pre-production machines.

By May, EKO 262 consisted of three staffels and a command Stab with a total of 60 Me-262’s in a mix of A0 and a few A1’s (after May). Only about half of these aircraft are available at any one time for training and intercepting enemy reconnaissance aircraft and sometimes intercepting enemy bomber formations. The latter was now becoming more common for the pilots of EKO 262 as the year went on, though the number of Me-262’s that could be sent up as any one time was limited to no more than 10 (May 1944), this did not make a major impact on the numbers of bomber destroyed, but it did show that the Me-262 when used properly could penetrate a bomber streams fighter protection without much difficulty.

EKO 262 would be disbanded in Late July 1944 and reform as a dedicated jet-training unit this would be the III Group of the Ergänzungs-Jagdgeschwader 2 (EJG 2) with and increase from three Staffels to four Staffels in early August 1944.

Kommando Nowotny

Kommando Nowotny would be formed on the 2nd June 1944 in Achmer and Hesepe with Stab/Kommando Nowotny from Stab III./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), 1./Kommando Nowotny from 9./ZG 26, 2./Kommando Nowotny from 8./ZG 26 and 3./Kommando Nowotny (new). Thus its strength was 3 Staffeln and a Stab flight.

On the 30th June 1944 Kommando Nowotny attained operational status with a complement of about 40 Me-262A1a jet interceptors. Over the next month and a half the unit operated against allied aircraft, while at the same time trying to establish proper tactics for a Jet fighter unit. Kommando Nowotny also had to deal with many technical problems plaguing the unproven production Me-262A1a version.

The unit was the first to realise that a dedicated protection-squadron of propeller-driven single-engined fighters like the Bf 109 and FW 190 were a necessity for the jets, as the Me-262 could not manoeuvre or accelerate well at low speeds, and thus was a sitting duck for any allied fighters nearby during take-off and landing.

Due to the experimental nature of the unit, and the technical difficulties in operating the jet fighters, the unit had a less than illustrious record. A total of 22 enemy aircraft were claimed for a loss of 26 Me-262s. Shortly after Walter Nowotny’s death on 8th August 1944, the unit would be re-designated III Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) on 19th August1944, and therefore ceased to exist as an independent unit.

The Jagdgeschwader 7 (JG 7) would be set-up in the way Kommando Schreiber was, with pilots who understood their aircraft, with proper training, from early September 1944 the JG 7 would begin operations against allied bombers. The JG 7 would become the most successful Jet fighter unit of the war, amassing a large number of kills.

German industry was now suffering from increasingly heavy bomber raid and the current versions of the piston engine planes operated by the German Air Force were insufficient to penetrate the allied fighter screens protecting the allied bombers. The Me-262 was seen as the potential saviour of Germany being bombed, if the jet can be deployed in sufficient numbers.

Ar-234, First Steps

In March 1944, the fifth and seventh Ar-234 prototypes are equipped with cameras and handed off to a special Luftwaffe reconnaissance unit for operational readiness tests, in preparation to fielding the Ar-234B. Before being sent to France in late April early May 1944, to provide more information on the allied invasion preparations, as normal piston engine aircraft were being shot down before being able to do a reconnaissance, this unit would eventually be named Sonderkommando Sommer.

While this was going on the ninth prototype, designated “Ar-234 V9” or “Ar-234B0”, was the first Ar-234B, with a built-in undercarriage, and first flew on the 10th March 1944. By this time, production lines were being set up to build the aircraft in quantity, and the first of 20 pre-production Ar-234Bs would off the line in June 1944.

However, ambitious plans for massive production of new variants had to be scaled back. During the last week of February 1944, the Allies pounded German aircraft factories and seriously damaged production capacity. While the “Big Week” raids had spared Arado production facilities, since they were too far east and out of range, the following reshuffling and dispersal of production meant that resources originally planned for building new types of aircraft had to be reserved for manufacturing existing types.

Ar-234 first mission

Sommer enters his airplane through the right-hand canopy, the airplane is lifted on its takeoff dolly, and the ground technicians verify the last minute smallest details. Outside around the Arado, all the access doors are closed.

Already positioned on the “Rollstrasse” (taxiway) from its underground hangar, the Arado is directed towards the concrete runway. Elsewhere, propeller driven fighters ME 109s and Focke-Wulf 190s from designated fighters units are warming up their engines. There role in this mission is to escort, and protect the Arado during its departure and its return, the flight segments where allied fighters could shoot down the airplane, as this is were the jet would be most venerable to attack.

Once arrived at the departure end of the runway, and with the assistance of the ground technicians, Sommer starts the jet engines with a “Riedel” auxiliary power unit.

Ground crewmen, equipped with fire extinguishers are ready to intervene in case of problems. Sommer has very little room to move around in the cockpit of his twin jet airplane. On his left, there are two levers (the throttles), which must be manipulated with the “hand of an angel” to control the regime of the engines. One last look outside indicates that everything is OK. Via radio communications, the control tower provides the latest instructions, and the airplane is ready for takeoff.

Slowly, the Arado accelerates, and the whistling noise produced by the jet engines seems strange to the inhabitants of Juvincourt used to the noise of propeller airplanes. From afar, they look at the airplane taking off towards the west.

With a slight bump, the dolly falls off the airplane slowed by a parachute, but for safety reasons in case of problems during takeoff, the three skids designed for landing are left extended a while longer.

With the skids just barely retracted, Sommer is surrounded by the escort German fighters, and while verifying the multitude of instruments, he climbs, and finally reaches twelve thousands meters, by which time the escort fighters have been left well behind. This is the altitude (30,000 feet) at which he will be invulnerable to anti aircraft guns, and enemy fighters, with the exception of a few stratospheric spitfires reserved for the surveillance of Britain.

Flying at nearly nine hundred kilometres per hour, it takes very little time to reach the English coast, and before arriving over the objectives, the pilot readies the cameras (RB 50/30). In front of him, a periscope permits to check the sky, mostly for vapour trails, because if too numerous they could attract the attention of the anti aircraft gun observers. Sommer checks his map, and begins the photographic session.

The Ar-234, with its high speed, seemed likely to penetrate Allied fighter screens, and on the 25th April 1944 the two aircraft left Germany for France. One had to turn back, but the other arrived safely, only to wait a week for the take-off trolley, rocket booster units, and other kit to arrive by truck.

This first operational flight took place on the 2nd May 1944, when Lieutenant Erich Sommer took his Ar-234 on a reconnaissance flight over the beachhead, cruising at about 740 kph (460 mph) at above 9,200 meters (30,000 feet). Two Rb 50/30 aerial cameras where mounted in the rear fuselage, each canted 12 degrees from the vertical in opposite directions. At operating altitude, they took one set of pictures every 11 seconds, imaging a swath almost 10 kilometres wide across the direction of flight.

Sommer came and went unhindered. His aircrafts altitude and speed kept him safe, and in fact he wasn’t even detected. The images he returned would show the build-up of more than 1 million men and a matching amount of supplies and weapons along the south coast of England. That day the second Ar-234 finally arrived, and over the next three weeks the two machines would fly 13 more missions without interference from Allied defences. Sommer and Götz would return high-quality intelligence data about the situation over the south coast of England and the possible allied embarkation points to invade France.

All has gone well, and without any difficulties. Overhead Soissons Arado begins to lose altitude and rejoins the fighters that have got airborne to protect his aircraft. Juvincourt is in sight and Sommer extends the long central landing skid as well as the other two located under the jet engines. He reduces the airspeed, lowers the flaps and prepares for the landing after one hour and thirty minutes aloft. Gently, under radio contact with the operator responsible to guide him towards the grass runway, the descent continues: two hundred meters, fifty, twenty, ten, and he cuts off the engines.

Thanks to a Luftwaffe archive film, it can be seen that ground contact is somewhat rough, with the airplane skidding at a fast speed after touching down. Sommer extends the drag chute, and the long landing on the green grass ends; all three landing skids have endured the landing, and now ground personnel are rushing towards him. In the cockpit, Sommer unhooks his oxygen mask, and takes a deep breath. He sees his comrades smiling at him through the canopy. Helped by a technician assigned to the Arado, he unfastens his seat belts and shoulder harnesses that have held him solidly attached during the flight.

Outside the airplane, the sun is blinding, and some ground personnel hurry to shake his hand. After all, this has been the world's first reconnaissance flight with a jet airplane.

With the first mission a success, the film from Sommer’s flight over the south coast of England is analysed, a detailed analysis will take several weeks, though a rough report is delivered within two weeks of Sommer’s flight. This shows German intelligence that the likely invasion point is Normandy and not the Pas de Calais, by the time Hitler had been informed and the information confirmed, by subsequent flights by both Sommer and Götz small reconnaissance unit.

By the time the information on this film had been conformed it was the 4th June and within 48 hours D-Day would begin, it was just to late to make a difference, something that Hitler would reinforce that his judgment concerning the use of Jets was right and Goring was wrong, this train of thought by Hitler was have ramification in December/January, when Goring goes just too far for Hitler.

These two reconnaissance aircraft proved that Jets could safely operate over England without being intercepted, they also proved that piston engine aircraft could not intercept these Jet reconnaissance aircraft operating at high altitude.

The 23rd May 1944, the S**t Hits the Fan!

To compound all the difficulties that these jets were having, it was at this time that the disconnect between the left and right hand led to an uproar. On the 23rd May 1944, Goering, Milch, Galland, other senior Luftwaffe officials, as well as Armaments Minister Albert Speer and his people, were called to Hitler’s residence at Berchtesgaden to discuss the current fighter production program.

The meeting was routine up to the point where introduction and production of the Me-262 as a fighter was discussed. Hitler was puzzled: “I thought the Ar-234 was coming into production as a high-speed bomber at the same time. How many of the Ar-234 already manufactured can carry bombs?”

Milch replied: “None, mein Fuehrer. The Ar-234 has not started full scale production yet.” After a chilly silence, Milch then pointed out that the aircraft could not be in service until late June of 1944 and at the moment only the two Ar-234 prototype reconnaissance aircraft where currently operational in France.

Hitler was shocked. Back in November of 1943, he had asked if the Ar-234 would be introduced at the same time as the Me-262 and received a glowingly positive answer nobody had protested the decision. He had been including the Ar-234 in his plans for the defence of the Reich against an amphibious landing by the Western Allies, which was expected any time soon and in fact would take place within weeks, on the 6th June 1944.

Now Hitler was being told that not only were there no Ar-234 bombers available, but that the assurances he had been given about its feasibility were false, and to make matters worse nobody had told him of any of this. This would have angered more moderate men than Hitler, and he was furious: “Who pays the slightest attention to the orders I give?! I gave an unqualified order, and left nobody in any doubt that the aircraft was to be produced at the same time as the Me-262!”

Goring made excuses and passed the blame onto Milch, who was presently stripped of most of his powers. Hitler ordered that work now be focused on delivering the Ar-234 bomber as soon as possible. Hitler’s hope had been dashed about the Ar-234, on the good side Hitler was pleased that his orders regarding the Me-262 had been carried out and praised Galland (much to the annoyance of Goring).

Within a week allied troops would be landing in Normandy and Hitler had no Jet bombers available to stop them, but the two Ar-234 reconnaissance aircraft would show Hitler that the allies had deceived German intelligence this would lead Hitler to believe the reports from the Ar-234 reconnaissance aircraft over that of German intelligence.

This would have major changes in Hitler’s approach when his armies are engaged in battle, especially on the eastern front.

Me-262 Kills and Losses January to May 1944

The Me-262 unit EKO 262 has by the end of May 1944 shot down 73 allied aircraft (mostly reconnaissance aircraft), for no combat losses, but losses due accidents and technical failures stand at 53, with 22 jets being written off killing 12 pilots.

To be continued.
 
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Good update!

I look in my crystal ball and see death for Goring...only so often you can let Hitler down like than and not get slabbed.
 
hmm, interesting. I am not sure I buy Hitler accepting the "It can't carry bombs" quite that easily but I am willing to go with the flow and see where it carries this one.:p

Maybe instead of "it can't carry bombs" (which most fighters could), its "while possible for light bombs (say, 2, 50-kilo bombs max), it cannot be modified into a real fighter-bomber short going back to the drawing board and redesigning it from the landing gear up"
 

Riain

Banned
The HeS 8 was cancelled in June 1942, but I get your point; the decisions were made and the damage was done in 1940 and the Germans were stuck with the dodgy BMW 03 in 1944 because of it.
 
Maybe instead of "it can't carry bombs" (which most fighters could), its "while possible for light bombs (say, 2, 50-kilo bombs max), it cannot be modified into a real fighter-bomber short going back to the drawing board and redesigning it from the landing gear up"

But then you have Hitler, who would insist on it carry bombs, that is why I did the flat no, though the Me team in OTL did have to back to the drawing board to get the Me-262 to carry bombs!

Good update!

I look in my crystal ball and see death for Goring...only so often you can let Hitler down like than and not get slabbed.

I thought I could feel someone looking over my shoulder :D

The HeS 8 was cancelled in June 1942, but I get your point; the decisions were made and the damage was done in 1940 and the Germans were stuck with the dodgy BMW 03 in 1944 because of it.

Yep I am, but even some of the offshoots of these BMW and Jumo can be of use.
 
I'm liking this one.:) Great techinical detail, too.:cool::cool: (Changed the blade taper? Really? Hmm...) And I can believe Hitler'd listen if Willy said "No can do." Not many people had the nerve to tell Hitler the truth, & IMO WM was one of 'em. If he had, IMO, Hitler'd listen; when Speer, as a pro, told him something couldn't be done, Hitler accepted it. (Whether that's because Speer was an architect & Hitler had aspirations, I've no idea...:p)

Only one gripe: I've always understood chord to be the wing width, not the width to thickness ratio. Am I wrong?:confused:

Keep 'em flying!
 
Excellent, what is needed now is the response butterflying off of this from the Allies. There would be survivors from the recce planes and their escorts plus reports leaking back from the downed pilots in prison camps. The R&D and manufacturing capacity of the allied aviation industry would get a shift in emphasis to development of their jet aircraft. This could lead to the first jet contacts being more that five years earlier leading to a much more rapid development of jet aircraft performance.
 
I'm liking this one.:) Great techinical detail, too.:cool::cool: (Changed the blade taper? Really? Hmm...) And I can believe Hitler'd listen if Willy said "No can do." Not many people had the nerve to tell Hitler the truth, & IMO WM was one of 'em. If he had, IMO, Hitler'd listen; when Speer, as a pro, told him something couldn't be done, Hitler accepted it. (Whether that's because Speer was an architect & Hitler had aspirations, I've no idea...:p)

Only one gripe: I've always understood chord to be the wing width, not the width to thickness ratio. Am I wrong?:confused:

Keep 'em flying!

Hi pacifichistorian

Thank you for the comments and support :)

Yep WM was one of the few people that could say no to Hitler and get away with it.

I will look into the "gripe" :D

Whatisinaname
 
Excellent, what is needed now is the response butterflying off of this from the Allies. There would be survivors from the recce planes and their escorts plus reports leaking back from the downed pilots in prison camps. The R&D and manufacturing capacity of the allied aviation industry would get a shift in emphasis to development of their jet aircraft. This could lead to the first jet contacts being more that five years earlier leading to a much more rapid development of jet aircraft performance.

Hi The Dean

The allies own Jets will start to appear in this TL, but as in our TL they will be used to counter the V1 fro the rest of 1944.

After that, well we shall see :D

Thanks for the support:)

Whatisinaname
 
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