Can Grossdeutchland and France be allies after 1848?

In a Spring of Nations TL, can a liberal-ish France and a Frankfurt Diet Grossdeutschland remain allies as the center of a proto-EU. I'm assuming a united Italy, an independent Hungary, and a Habsburg collapse. A united Scandinavia is optional, as is Galicia and Congress Poland successfully rebelling.

With the cause of the Nations and Liberalism largely successful, can these states avoid their irredentist claims on one another leading to outright rupture? Or are sticking point like Alsace-Lorraine and Trieste inevitably going to lead to conflict?

Can we see a common market and full military alliance emerge?

Do the Continental powers still seek a colonial empire? I'd imagine that at least France does, and probably Germany and Italy as well, but perhaps they can cooperate pretty closely.

How would Britain react to such a power bloc? Is it a direct threat, or can they work with them, as they did with Napoleon III IOTL?

Russia? Particularly with an independent Poland in the bloc, I imagine it feels deeply threatened; but they likely won't feel too confident even if they gain Galicia. Can the powers cooperate on carving up the roast in the Balkans? Might be the only way to keep Russia chummy. Or does Russia seek a British entente?

The United States? I presume they're not all that focused on the situation - other than the wave of immigrants - but they're probably pretty happy to see liberalism triumph overseas. Maybe they even seek an anti-British alliance under the right circumstances.

Does the Netherlands join the emerging power bloc, or do they balance their interests, given their trading ties to Britain?

Do the powers hope to divide Belgium and Switzerland? Or, as in the Latin Monetary Union IOTL, are they brought in as sovereign partners?

I imagine the Spanish are destabilized by all this liberalism north of the Pyrenees, and we might even see liberal adventurers in Iberia whenever the next civil war breaks out. Or can Spain evolve into sort of a last stand for European absolutism?

How do the Balkans react? I'm guessing Greece, as well as Romanian, Serbian, and (to a lesser extent) Bulgarian nationalists are trying to utilize the lessons of 1848 to achieve their own national unifications. The Continentals are likely sympathetic, especially to the Greeks; as are the Russians and British, for their own divergent reasons. But the British will probably come down in support of the Turks in order to keep the straits out of either Continental or Russian hands.
 
Assuming all these things happen, you still have national rivalries, national ambitions, and other sources of conflict.

So:
What would Grossdeutchland and France be allies against?

Why would they want a common market?

Liberal as opposed to absolutist doesn't mean everyone loves each other.

And a Habsburg collapse is going to be messy. Messy = not good for peace.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Assuming all these things happen, you still have national rivalries, national ambitions, and other sources of conflict.

True, but without the Alsace-Lorraine sore, they have no obvious reason to be enemies, too. It might go both ways.

What would Grossdeutchland and France be allies against?

Russia, most likely.

Why would they want a common market?

Because French and German liberals were often strong supporters of free trade ?

Liberal as opposed to absolutist doesn't mean everyone loves each other.

Not necessarily so, but such political divides may easily be the basis for an alliance.

And a Habsburg collapse is going to be messy. Messy = not good for peace.

In all likelihood, not that messy. Besides, while the Habsburg collapse happens, France shall be paralyzed by its own revolution.
 
True, but without the Alsace-Lorraine sore, they have no obvious reason to be enemies, too. It might go both ways.

Why is there no sore? I know this is a sticking point of the TL and the main reason I almost labelled it an AHC. Frankfurt Diet Grossdeutschland will start out sans-A-L, but they will have a strong claim on the territory. Can war over this be averted?

I assume the Nations would be allies initially not due to external threat, but due to brotherhood-of-man utopian ideology, which was really prevalent in 1848. Not that different from the post-Cold War EU, really. Maybe by the time that "history resumes," the Nations will have a stronger foundation for remaining together.

As far as free trade, it was one of the underpinnings of Liberal ideology, and is one of the best reasons to avoid a war. In fact, in a really lucky TL, it might be the reason that the Continentals and the UK work things out - they're both pushing for open markets.
 
True, but without the Alsace-Lorraine sore, they have no obvious reason to be enemies, too. It might go both ways.

No obvious reason other than the usual reasons nations had fights.

I'm not saying they inevitably and immediately plunge into war, but its not as if Alsace-Lorraine happened as a result of a situation that would never occur to a liberal government or that they will never have mutually exlcusive interests in say, Africa.

Russia, most likely.

Fair enough.

Because French and German liberals were often strong supporters of free trade ?

Free trade =/= a common market without barriers or boundaries.

It's a start, but it's not the end .

Not necessarily so, but such political divides may easily be the basis for an alliance.

True. I believe I worded that poorly - being liberal instead of being absolutist doesn't mean everyone is on the same side.

I don't want to say you can't get a peaceful (within Europe) 19th century, or even 20th century - but its going to be easier said than done, like with all good things.

In all likelihood, not that messy. Besides, while the Habsburg collapse happens, France shall be paralyzed by its own revolution.

Why wouldn't it be messy? Empires dissolving in revolution almost never do so peacefully.

And France doesn't have to lift a finger - it would be messy enough internally (within what was the Habsburg Empire) as loyalists and rebels and those in favor of the former - judging by OTL, Russia for instance - fight over the issue.


I should note that I'm a pessimist, and I'm pretty sure that you're not - but I don't think this is impossible, just a difficult and long term process rather than "1849: Germany and France sign the Treaty of Perpetual Alliance and Friendship.".

Heck, maybe not even 1859. A lot is going to depend on who is in charge more specifically than "liberals", and what their intentions are - even if we assume men of good will on both sides, that doesn't mean they by definition see eye to eye.
 
Why wouldn't it be messy? Empires dissolving in revolution almost never do so peacefully.

The problem is really Italy. Hungary is Hungary, Cisleithania is Germany, except for Galicia which is either free Poland or Russia's pound of flesh. But what does Italy get? Lombardy and Veneto, sure, but Trieste? Fiume? Illyria? South Tyrol? Any of these claims will lead Italy into conflict with Germany or Hungary.

Peaceful division is still possible, but Italy could easily end up disappointed. And since this is an attempt to create a German-French bloc, no one will promise Cavour Nice, Savoy or Corsica.

The best Italy can hope for is concessions in the Balkans, Aegean, and/or North Africa.

Can Italy end up being a - well, a less selfish nation than OTL 1848-1945, given the earlier success of the Risorgimiento? Maybe if Garibaldi becomes more influential? Or is that exactly the wrong cure?
 
The problem is really Italy. Hungary is Hungary, Cisleithania is Germany, except for Galicia which is either free Poland or Russia's pound of flesh. But what does Italy get? Lombardy and Veneto, sure, but Trieste? Fiume? Illyria? South Tyrol? Any of these claims will lead Italy into conflict with Germany or Hungary.

"What if the Habsburg Empire dissolved peacefully and no one minded?" is pretty implausible all on its own.

You're going to have to go through that mess before "Hungary is Hungary, Cisleithania is Germany . . ." even comes up.

Peaceful division is still possible, but Italy could easily end up disappointed. And since this is an attempt to create a German-French bloc, no one will promise Cavour Nice, Savoy or Corsica.

The best Italy can hope for is concessions in the Balkans, Aegean, and/or North Africa.

Can Italy end up being a - well, a less selfish nation than OTL 1848-1945, given the earlier success of the Risorgimiento? Maybe if Garibaldi becomes more influential? Or is that exactly the wrong cure?

Selfishness is part of nationhood. You could have wiser policies/policy-makers (and I don't know if more Garibaldi is going to make it worse or better), but Italy is going to have thwarted interests, and nations whose interests are thwarted plan to do something about it. One way or another.

And why wouldn't Italy want to, in this timeline? Giving them some stuff elsewhere may work, or it may be meaningless. Are those concessions in areas Italy (I'm assuming for discussion's sake that "Italy" or "France" or "Germany" - etc. - can be spoken of as having a coherent policy, because otherwise this falls on its ass and things get ugly) wants? How will the people in those areas react to Italian rule?

So much chafing, so little salve.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
In all likelihood, not that messy. Besides, while the Habsburg collapse happens, France shall be paralyzed by its own revolution.
How would it not be messy. Austria was already in a sorry mess in 1848. It would have gotten even worse. Also Russia would probably invade, they did OTL.
 

Eurofed

Banned
In a Spring of Nations TL, can a liberal-ish France and a Frankfurt Diet Grossdeutschland remain allies as the center of a proto-EU. I'm assuming a united Italy, an independent Hungary, and a Habsburg collapse. A united Scandinavia is optional, as is Galicia and Congress Poland successfully rebelling.

I'd say that in a successful 1848, the natural nucleus of a proto-EU would be the liberal-national "CP" states created by the revolutions, IOW Frankfurt Diet Grossdeutschland, liberal united Italy, and liberal independent Hungary. France, if it indeed remains liberal, and if all the partners come to regard reactionary Russia as a common enemy, may come to join such a bloc.

A Polish rebellion in Galicia (butterfly away the 1846 events) and Congress Poland may indeed be part of the reason why the revolutions in Central Europe are successful (it keeps the Russians busy during the critical period) but it is very unlikely to succeed without external help. Such help may easily come a few years down the line as a *Crimean War equivalent between the liberal bloc and Russia, but not in 1848-49, when the revolutionaries are still busy consolidating their victory at home.

A united Scandinavia may easily come if Germany and Denmark find a sensible compromise about the Schelswig-Holstein question (i.e. Schelswig to Denmark, Holstein to Germany), or Germany wins the war, and Sweden strongly supports Denmark in either case. Such a show of Scandinavian solidarity, plus the example of Germany and Italy, may successfully push the creation of Scandinavia.

With the cause of the Nations and Liberalism largely successful, can these states avoid their irredentist claims on one another leading to outright rupture? Or are sticking point like Alsace-Lorraine and Trieste inevitably going to lead to conflict?

It may go either way, depending on political butterflies. 1848 German liberal nationalists would surely like to have Alsace-Lorraine and the Kustenland if they somehow fall in their lap, but they are not going out of their way to forcibly conquer them if Italian revolutionaries seize the Kustenland first (most likely), and France already owns A-L.

Likewise, 1848 Italian liberal nationalists would surely like to have Dalmatia, if it somehow falls in their lap, but they are not going out of their way to forcibly conquer it if Hungarian or Croat revolutionaries seize the Dalmatia first (most likely).

If A-L remains in French hands and Trento and Trieste go to Italy, there is no serious issue of contention between the three powers. Otherwise, there is potential for serious hostility.

Can we see a common market and full military alliance emerge?

If they come to identify a common enemy (most likely Russia), quite possibly.

Do the Continental powers still seek a colonial empire? I'd imagine that at least France does, and probably Germany and Italy as well, but perhaps they can cooperate pretty closely.

All three powers are going to be serious players in the colonial game, Germany and Italy shall be on a much more equal foot with France and Britain than OTL, with such an early unification.

How would Britain react to such a power bloc? Is it a direct threat, or can they work with them, as they did with Napoleon III IOTL?

Depending on political or strategic butterflies, it might identify either the continental bloc as the main threat, or use it to contain Russian expansionism in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Russia? Particularly with an independent Poland in the bloc, I imagine it feels deeply threatened; but they likely won't feel too confident even if they gain Galicia. Can the powers cooperate on carving up the roast in the Balkans? Might be the only way to keep Russia chummy. Or does Russia seek a British entente?

Russia is very likely to feel directly and seriously threatened by the rise of a liberal bloc in Western-Central Europe, more so if it becomes a support for Polish revolutionary subversion. A *Crimean War between the liberal bloc and Russia in the 1850s is quite likely. An alliance between Russia and Britain is possible (if politically and strategtically uneasy) if London sees the continental bloc as the main threat.

The United States? I presume they're not all that focused on the situation - other than the wave of immigrants - but they're probably pretty happy to see liberalism triumph overseas. Maybe they even seek an anti-British alliance under the right circumstances.

They are surely going to cheer up a lot for the victory of liberalism, but otherwise remain in their isolationist standing.

Does the Netherlands join the emerging power bloc, or do they balance their interests, given their trading ties to Britain?

It could go both ways, but Belgium is most likely to stay friendly to Britain and Netherlands to Germany.

Do the powers hope to divide Belgium and Switzerland? Or, as in the Latin Monetary Union IOTL, are they brought in as sovereign partners?

A partition of either is quite unlikely unless butterflies cause the revolution in Switzerland to go much different than OTL and create a deep feud between Wallons and Flemish.

I imagine the Spanish are destabilized by all this liberalism north of the Pyrenees, and we might even see liberal adventurers in Iberia whenever the next civil war breaks out. Or can Spain evolve into sort of a last stand for European absolutism?

If the revolutions triumph everywhere else in Europe, we may expect Iberian liberals to try and follow their example.

How do the Balkans react? I'm guessing Greece, as well as Romanian, Serbian, and (to a lesser extent) Bulgarian nationalists are trying to utilize the lessons of 1848 to achieve their own national unifications. The Continentals are likely sympathetic, especially to the Greeks; as are the Russians and British, for their own divergent reasons. But the British will probably come down in support of the Turks in order to keep the straits out of either Continental or Russian hands.

More or less, yes.
 
How would it not be messy. Austria was already in a sorry mess in 1848. It would have gotten even worse. Also Russia would probably invade, they did OTL.

There is that. If the Habsburgs fall quickly enough, and France and Germany aid Hungary and Italy in a defensive war against Tsar Nicholas, alone, Russia will lose. So maybe there's your catalyst for European integration.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Why is there no sore? I know this is a sticking point of the TL and the main reason I almost labelled it an AHC. Frankfurt Diet Grossdeutschland will start out sans-A-L, but they will have a strong claim on the territory. Can war over this be averted?

It was not such a strongly felt claim, one they are going to go at war to enforce. If they come to clash with France for other reasons and win, surely they shall claim A-L at the peace table. If France is otherwise sufficiently friendly, they shall not endanger good relations for it.

I assume the Nations would be allies initially not due to external threat, but due to brotherhood-of-man utopian ideology, which was really prevalent in 1848. As far as free trade, it was one of the underpinnings of Liberal ideology, and is one of the best reasons to avoid a war. In fact, in a really lucky TL, it might be the reason that the Continentals and the UK work things out - they're both pushing for open markets.

A feeling of internationalist liberal solidarity between European revolutionaries of various nationalities did exist, when they were not directly at odds for conflicting claims on some territory.
 
A feeling of internationalist liberal solidarity between European revolutionaries of various nationalities did exist, when they were not directly at odds for conflicting claims on some territory.

That brings up a thought worth addressing if one wants to write this sorto f timeline:Assuming the liberals win, which means they're no longer in the "If we don't hang together, we shall most assuredly hang separately" situation - will they still feel solidarity and brotherhood as fellows against the Old Order?

Or will more national interests take over? Not even "France hates Germany" or vice-versa, but Germans thinking of themselves as Germans, for instance.

I find it almost impossible to believe that even if those at the forefront of the revolutions remain brothers that this would translate into everyone (in practice, every voter/politician) in Germany feeling the same.

Or in France, or anywhere else here.
 

Eurofed

Banned
But what does Italy get? Lombardy and Veneto, sure, but Trieste? Fiume? Illyria? South Tyrol? Any of these claims will lead Italy into conflict with Germany or Hungary.

South Tyrol, Fiume, and Illyria were not so strongly felt Italian claims in 1848. Like A-L for Germany, the Italians would surely love to have them if they fall in Italy's lap, but they are not going to start a war or ruin a good perspective alliance for them. The real sore points would be Trento and Trieste.

However, the former is almost sure, and the latter most likely, to be seized by Italian revolutionaries first in an Habsburg collapse, and Germany or Hungary are not likely to go out of their way to forcibly seize them if it happens.

Peaceful division is still possible, but Italy could easily end up disappointed. And since this is an attempt to create a German-French bloc, no one will promise Cavour Nice, Savoy or Corsica.

Nice and Savoy are still owned by Piedmont in 1848, so in all likelihood they would end up part of a united Italy. A friendly France and Italy might swap Savoy and Corsica.
 
Nice and Savoy are still owned by Piedmont in 1848, so in all likelihood they would end up part of a united Italy. A friendly France and Italy might swap Savoy and Corsica.

Oh, good catch!

But would Cavour really give up the seat of house Savoy if he can avoid it? And if Louis Napoleon gains any power, I can't imagine he would dare give up his uncle's homeland.
 

OS fan

Banned
The nationalist German volunteers of 1813 had hoped to win the Alsace, but their hopes were disappointed.

Germany has the bigger territory, the bigger population and will soon also have the stronger industry. And the French would accept an alliance only if they were the leaders. Of course, given the fact that the German liberals lacked practical experiences in politics, the French tail wagging the German dog isn't completely impossible. And if the necessary changes in Europe to make this scenario happen also lead to an independent Poland, the French would immediately make an alliance with them to keep the Germans in check. Realpolitik.
 
I don't think there's any way that a French-sponsored anti-German Poland can win in 1848. That requires the alignment of the planets: simultaneous disaster for the Russians, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians, as in OTL's 1918-19. A successful Spring of Nations is good for the Germans, and while a Frankfurt Diet Germany isn't Wilhelmine Germany, they won't just give Posen away. To have any hope of success, the Poles will have to make their peace with Prussia's 1815 borders.
 
True, but without the Alsace-Lorraine sore, they have no obvious reason to be enemies, too. It might go both ways.
I tackled this in a recent thread, albeit under somewhat different circumstances. Systemically, a united Central Europe is just too problematic for France in too many ways for them to be allied. Großdeutschland would be hegemonic by its very nature, but France as of 1848 would be completely incapable of accepting that hegemony without a lot of bloodletting and a few other lucky breaks for Germany. Proto-EU just isn't happening.

---

We need to be clear on how, precisely, this France and this Großdeutschland come to be. The latter is particularly tough because it requires Austria to die, and Austria is pretty damn powerful. One potential avenue is for, say, Cavaignac to emulate Napoleon the Great: sponsor Italian unification under the Savoyard banner, fight and destroy Radetzky's Italian army, and push onto Vienna, potentially causing the Habsburg Empire to completely collapse. I can completely see Friedrich Wilhelm IV - perhaps with Heinrich von Arnim-Suckow leading the governmental charge - rallying the Frankfurt Parliament around the flag and pushing the French out. I have no fucking clue what Russia would do in those circumstances, with Nikolai I forced to choose between two of his least favorite options (revolutionary France and revolutionary, united Germany). But it seems clear that such a Großdeutschland would be light-years away from allying with France, much less creating a proto-EU.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I don't think there's any way that a French-sponsored anti-German Poland can win in 1848. That requires the alignment of the planets: simultaneous disaster for the Russians, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians, as in OTL's 1918-19. A successful Spring of Nations is good for the Germans, and while a Frankfurt Diet Germany isn't Wilhelmine Germany, they won't just give Posen away. To have any hope of success, the Poles will have to make their peace with Prussia's 1815 borders.

The Frankfurt Diet planned for a partition of the province of Posen between Germans and Poles as its default solution to the issue. If agreement can be reached on such a platform, and a similar sensible solution can be found for Galicia as well between Hungarians and Poles, Polish irredentism can have the support of a liberal Germany and Hungary. This way, Posen and Galicia can become the Polish "Piedmont".

As I see it, the most likely event chain for the liberation of Poland in a victorious 1848 TL can be more or less this way:

the liberal-national revolution triumphs in France, Germany, Italy, and the Habsburg empire; a partition political solution is found that allows to set up part of Posen and Galicia as an independent Polish homeland; Congress Poland rises up but is crushed by the Russians; this however keeps the Tsar busy and stops him from aiding reactionaries in Europe till it's too late; political antagonism build up between Russia and the liberal continental bloc of France, Germany, Italy, and Hungary; a general war (TTL broad equivalent of the Crimean War, only of a larger scope) happens sometime in the 1850s; the liberal bloc wins it, leading to the reunification of Congress Poland and free Poland.
 
Is there any way that, in the Habsburg disaster scenario, a young Franz Josef is persuaded to give up on Hungary and Italy in favor of the German crown? Or is that just too absurd?
 
Top