Can be the Kaiser Wilhelm Plan be Fulfilled in Any CP scenario?

Hi to the Alternates, in fact again thanks to the discussion about the fates of Nations in a CP power victory, and i found the Kaiser Wihelm II Edict of October of 1914, maybe the only one 'official' post war 'aims' of germany(this was before Italy enter of the Entente/Betrayl by the POV), and i found very lenient against every Entente aims(even versallies), well the edict follow(i don't remeber whet i obtain it)

Kaiser Wilhelm II's War Edict of 1914
In October of 1914 the Kaiser issued his famous War Edit of 1914 spelling out his goals for the war, and the guidelines that would be used in the peace process. This coupled with a subsequent top secret meeting of the Imperial Staff and the Kaiser established protocols for the conduct of the war, and the German diplomatic efforts towards a resolution of the war. There were two key components to the War Edict

1. Military Security:
-Never again could the German nation allow itself to become ringed with enemies as it was in 1914. The British, Russian, and French nations must be soundly defeated by the German military so that they cannot again threaten the German people.

-Territorial gains will be made as needed to insure domestic security for the German people in the west and in the east Border States will be created out of the former Russian territory to create a buffer between the German and Russian peoples, and to free those oppressed cultures presently under yoke of Tsarist tyranny.

-The Royal navy must be brought to a more manageable level

2. Economic Security
-colonies in Africa and the Pacific shall be enlarged to grant the German industry a stronger base of natural resources

-the German Economic Union will be enlarged to include as much of Europe as possible
(in a secret memo the list of nations shall include: Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Finland, Ukraine)

-a land connection between all German colonies in Africa shall be established to facilitate the collection of natural resources in those areas.

-War indemnities shall be collected as needed from those nations deemed responsible for the war


And here(thanks i think Susano or Thande), Some French Original Plans War Aims (before Versailles)
Meh, it pales into insignificance if you see what Clemenceau wanted to do to Germany- 6 seperate states with French forts all over them, £200 billion reparations, trade embargo against Germany until they'd finished paying, France to annex all the land between Bremen and the Swiss border... Ouch
(again i doubt who was the original poster)

I think for the most of the pro-europeist(I'm not european for that the existance of that insitutions means little unless they afect Inmigrant in case of my uncle) will love point 2.2, but in general, It's possible in any CP Victory Scenario(both early, East first or Late), and the Butterflies of this

that is my OP

Att
Nivek von beldo

waraimsinwesterneurope5sw.png
 
Yeah - it's fairly reasonable compared to their late-war aims, even. Look at the east map and the actual Brest-Litvosk border.
 
Was Brest-Litovsk really a late-war aim? I was under the impression that it was unexpected.

What do you mean, unexpected? By who? The Russians? The Germans expected it, they wrote it.

War aims went up throughout the war, due to the necessity to "make a profit" on the godawful cost of the war - in 1914 the French would probably have been satisfied with Alsace-Lorraine and the knowledge that they'd won, and look at the Clemenceau plan upthread.
 
I'm a little bit at a loss. - I know Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's 'September-Programm', but I've never heard about a 'Kaiser Wilhelm Plan'.
If it is in fact the 'September-Programm': This was an compilation of what Germany should demand in a peace conference. The Imperial Government did - at this point in time - not consider to dictate peace conditions to the enemy. - So, the 'September-Programm' is just a list of wishes, with which Germany would enter negotiations.
 
What do you mean, unexpected? By who? The Russians? The Germans expected it, they wrote it.

True, but when the Germans first approached the Bolsheviks, they were offering something more like the map above (not that Ukraine is marked for what actually happened, not what was planned in 1914, when Ukraine was a totally inegrated part of the Russian Empire) then B-L: Poland, Lithuania, the chunks of other governorates necessary to make a neat and defensible border, Courland, and possibly Riga.

It was indeed the bizarre Bolshevik diplomacy as they shifted gear from political revolutionary cell to governnment of a world great power that led to Germans marching into Estonia and the Ukraine.
 
I'm a little bit at a loss. - I know Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's 'September-Programm', but I've never heard about a 'Kaiser Wilhelm Plan'.

Germany was a state with many contrdictory political currents during the war (a fascinating and overlooked tidbit is that the Tsar's government was this close to a seperate white peace in 1916 (Stuermer knew that Russia was coming to bits at home even as her military success saved France from the killing blow, even if the Tsar didn't) and it was only Ludendorff being, as usual, a gigantic cock that sabotaged this.

But the later Spetember Programme actually overlaps with these aims quite a lot.
 
Never heard of this plan. My impression was that annexing large parts of Belgium and France were a megalomaniac Ludendorffian scheme. Im also confused with post-war Poland. Wasnt it supposed to be the territories of Congress Poland?
 
Never heard of this plan. My impression was that annexing large parts of Belgium and France were a megalomaniac Ludendorffian scheme. Im also confused with post-war Poland. Wasnt it supposed to be the territories of Congress Poland?

Whether any chunks of Poland were going to be annexed seems to have been controversial, with the local German minorities, the nationalists, the military, and the chancellery all having their say. Certainly Ludendorff never actually gave his sham kingdom borders.

The September Programme is a pretty realistic take on early victory in the west.
 
The September Programme is a pretty realistic take on early victory in the west.

I don't know. Your talking about widespread annexations, including much of Belgium, a neutral Germany attacked, Luxumburg (ditto) and the Netherlands [ditto except that Germany couldn't spare the troops to attack them as well.

Not to mention the political conditions. Germany was ringed by 'enemies' because its own abysmal diplomacy and actions had worried its neighbours so greatly. The RN's size was already largely dictated by German actions as it was built up in response to the challenge by the German navy, who needed a huge, short ranged battlefleet to???

The problem was that the military dominated state in Germany viewed security as being powerful enough militarily to defeat any combination of neighbouring states, overlooking that that meant extreme insecurity for its neighbours. Hence by threatening them all it created the circumstances that the Kaiser is complaining about.

Steve
 
I don't know. Your talking about widespread annexations, including much of Belgium,

The programme mandated only border adjustments. That's hardly "much".

a neutral Germany attacked, Luxumburg (ditto)

This is about the realism of Germany imposing the Septermber conditions after an early victory, not their moral high ground.

and the Netherlands [ditto except that Germany couldn't spare the troops to attack them as well.

Entirely untrue. That would imply that Germany wanted to undertake agression against the Netherlands (an essentially friendly neutral who allowed German troops to cross her soil in 1918 and refused to cough up Kaiser Wilhelm) for the sheer hell of it. In fact, the Germans had a plan for First Army to skirt Dutch territory as part of the wider Schlieffen plan, but this was abandoned precicsely because Germany didn't want to antagonise the Dutch. First Army still existed. It just had to squeeze.

Not to mention the political conditions. Germany was ringed by 'enemies' because its own abysmal diplomacy and actions had worried its neighbours so greatly.

An overly simplistic position.

The RN's size was already largely dictated by German actions as it was built up in response to the challenge by the German navy, who needed a huge, short ranged battlefleet to???

True, but how is that relevant to the September Programme?

The problem was that the military dominated state in Germany viewed security as being powerful enough militarily to defeat any combination of neighbouring states,

And this is differant from the Two Power Standard (directed originally against France and Russia in a euphemistic way) how?

overlooking that that meant extreme insecurity for its neighbours. Hence by threatening them all it created the circumstances that the Kaiser is complaining about.

Steve[/QUOTE]

This is war propaganda, for one thing. For another, we were discussing Hollweg's September Programme, not this Kaiser Wilhelm Programme. For another, moral high ground before wars has never dictated how they end and never will.
 
The programme mandated only border adjustments. That's hardly "much".

Including the annexation of part or all of 3 neutral powers who just happened to be neighbours of Germany.



Entirely untrue. That would imply that Germany wanted to undertake agression against the Netherlands (an essentially friendly neutral who allowed German troops to cross her soil in 1918 and refused to cough up Kaiser Wilhelm) for the sheer hell of it. In fact, the Germans had a plan for First Army to skirt Dutch territory as part of the wider Schlieffen plan, but this was abandoned precicsely because Germany didn't want to antagonise the Dutch. First Army still existed. It just had to squeeze.

Entirely accurate from what I have read. They didn't think they could afford the extra commitment to occupy the Netherlands as well because of the extra forces needed to counter the growing French strength.

An overly simplistic position.

But accurate. ;)

True, but how is that relevant to the September Programme?

Because the programme referred to limiting the British navy to a manageable level - presumably for the Germans to dominate as it was perfectly manageable for Britain.;)


And this is differant from the Two Power Standard (directed originally against France and Russia in a euphemistic way) how?

It wasn't directed against anyone, but simply perceived as a requirement for Britain to protect its supply lines. The British fleet could do a lot of damage to enemy economics but was in no position to occupy nations as the German army was.

This is war propaganda, for one thing. For another, we were discussing Hollweg's September Programme, not this Kaiser Wilhelm Programme. For another, moral high ground before wars has never dictated how they end and never will.

No, again it is accurate. It was bad diplomacy that made Germany worsen relations with Russia and prompted a re-alignment between republican France and imperial Russia. This also caused concern in Britain as it had disputes with both those powers but Germany forced Britain into the allied camp by its stupid and pointless naval programme. Read 'The Luxury Fleet' as that gives a good coverage of the matter.

Steve
 
Including the annexation of part or all of 3 neutral powers who just happened to be neighbours of Germany.

You haven't read the September Programme, have you?

Entirely accurate from what I have read. They didn't think they could afford the extra commitment to occupy the Netherlands as well because of the extra forces needed to counter the growing French strength.

Where did you read this and how do you respond to the obvious circumstantial evidence of good Germano-Dutch relations and the simple fact that only First Army was to briefly skip across Dutch territory in the original Schlieffen plan?

But accurate. ;)

No one power bears responsibility for the First World War. Partly it was simply a product of its times: the feelings of national strength, pride, and unity, the strictly timetabled war plans, the chaotic alliance systems, the utter mess in the Balkans, the commercial and colonial tensions, all that stuff. Partly it was the fault of the members of Black Hand. Partly it was the fault of Austria, for agressivemoves against Serbia. Partly it was the fault of Germany, for backing them.

Everybody fucked up.

Because the programme referred to limiting the British navy to a manageable level - presumably for the Germans to dominate as it was perfectly manageable for Britain.;)

As I made very obvious initially and repeated several times, I am not talking about the Kaiser Wilhelm Programme, I am talking about Bethmann-Hollweg's "September Programme". It contained no words about the British fleet.

It wasn't directed against anyone, but simply perceived as a requirement for Britain to protect its supply lines.

That the two powers could only be France and Russia was something British commentators at the time were not terribly shy about, IIRC.

The British fleet could do a lot of damage to enemy economics but was in no position to occupy nations as the German army was.

And the Germans needed or felt they needed a land army to protect themselves. Remember that Russia was undergoing a major boom, and we saw in 1941 that Russia, having suffered the most total failure of military leadership in recent history, was still able to quite frankly rape Germany up the bum. Germany felt it needed its powerful army to defend itself against Russia. And why did Russia need a powerful army? You guessed it, to potect themselves against Germany.

Neither Germany nor Russia, nor France, nor any of the European countries could be blamed for having mass-conscript armies. They all had them.

No, again it is accurate. It was bad diplomacy that made Germany worsen relations with Russia and prompted a re-alignment between republican France and imperial Russia.

This seems to me to be demanding that German diplomacy be ever infallible and all mistakes or misfortunes are Germany's fault and make her responsible for every consequent event. By the same token, wasn't everything Napoleon's fault, for failing to unite Europe under his rule?

The antagonisms of the tiem have been hugely exaggerrated since. British political cartoons were worried about Franco-German alliances in 1899-1900. I recomend a thorough study of the period. Struggle for Mastery is still definative in many areas.

An alignment between Imperial Russia and Republic France was no earth-shattering triumph/catastrophe of German bluster. Nicholas I had written to Paris in 1848 that "Only an absolute monarchy and a popular republic serve the people. Constitutions are invariably drawn up for the benefit of some select class," or words to that effect.

This also caused concern in Britain as it had disputes with both those powers but Germany forced Britain into the allied camp by its stupid and pointless naval programme. Read 'The Luxury Fleet' as that gives a good coverage of the matter.

Again, the German naval programme was pointless and stupid, but the Anglo-German relation was a lot more complex than this.
 
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