Can 1915 Command structures solve German problems of 1914?

NoMommsen

Donor
@Riain
... as a HG commander of let's say 1st and 2nd army without the task to care for one of the armys in details
... he would see them more as one unit, one front
... and ask/demand information all across this/his larger sector
... which he will get earlier than a supreme command can somewhere way back the front, maybe still in Germany (as OTL)

I would say : very possible ... perhaps even more if Kluck (more agressive, more pushing) instead of Bülow leads the HG
 
@Riain
... as a HG commander of let's say 1st and 2nd army without the task to care for one of the armys in details
... he would see them more as one unit, one front
... and ask/demand information all across this/his larger sector
... which he will get earlier than a supreme command can somewhere way back the front, maybe still in Germany (as OTL)

I would say : very possible ... perhaps even more if Kluck (more agressive, more pushing) instead of Bülow leads the HG

I agree but wonder if 2 armies would be enough to give the commander enough scope to see the problem / opportunity and enough forces to deal with / take advantage of the situation.
 
About the Marne, because the German leadership was not at the front this resulted in ex post facto decision making

To win at the Marne I think requires mass artillery like at Verdun that could neutralize Allied defenses but they would need reserves to develop the breakthrough past the interior to the exterior defenses. The reserves would have helped against the counterattack by the Allied armies, but was also neccessary to defeat enemy defenses, based on the premise as the Greek phalanx.

However, the Marne did not achieve the densities of artillery that happened at Verdun, nor did it have the reserves, and every attempt to exploit a breakthrough failed OTL

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They should have put the right wing, Armies 1-4 or 1-3 under one overall commander, and the left wing, Armies 5-7 or 4-7, under one commander, though you can argue for three army groups consisting of 1-2, 3-5, and 6-7.

That brings up who commands these groups. The Crown Prince would have to take the left wing one. Probably Molkte would have put Kluck in charge of the right wing one. Whether Kluck was up to that is another question.

However, when Falkenhayn was head of OhL they didn't have an army group structure in the West and it didn't seem to hurt. I really don't think this was the problem.
 

Perkeo

Banned
[The Gemans need to take]Neither Paris nor Dunkerk or Calais.

They needed to defeat and crush the french army, eliminating France from the roster.
Nope. All the French need to do is to keep the Gemans busy and wait for the Russians and the British embargo to do the job. And this you can do with scattered remenants of the French army and the BEF.

The whole concept behind the Schlieffen plan was doomed from beginning. THe German leadership should have anticipated a desasterous defeat by mid 1915 at the latest. That's what would have happened if the concept that Germany can't fight a two front war of attrition hadn't turned out to be false as well.
 
IIRC at one stage on about 20 August Lanzeracs 5th Army was exposed and an opportunity appeared and was lost to surround and cut off half or more of it. If 2 of the 3 right wing armies were under the command of one man, with his own army having a AG to lessen his own command load, would this opportunity be realised and seized?
This Soviet military theorist named Georgii Isserson says it was possible in a Soviet prewar military publication, but Soviet military theory at that time was advanced, but there was nothing actually stopping it from happening then.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@Perkeo :) Absolutly agree with you.

I "just" stated what they would have needed IMO ... not they would have been able to do so.
( Did I mention somehwere, that I'm a fan of an "East-First" option ? ;) ... beside an avoidance of war at all)
 
All the French need to do is to keep the Gemans busy and wait for the Russians and the British embargo to do the job. And this you can do with scattered remenants of the French army and the BEF.

The Russians will do what now?
 

Perkeo

Banned
The Russians will do what now?
The Russians will invade eastern Germany and A-H and hope that they will either score a big victory or Germany runs out of nitrate and is forced to surrender. That should have been the expected outcome from the Schlieffen plan. IOTL Germany somehow managed the supposedly impossible task of fighting a long war of attrition on two fronts, but the decision makers didn't know that - and of they had known, they'd known that the France-first strategy was obsolete. Either way the Schlieffen plan was crap.
 
The Russians will invade eastern Germany and A-H and hope that they will either score a big victory or Germany runs out of nitrate and is forced to surrender. That should have been the expected outcome from the Schlieffen plan. IOTL Germany somehow managed the supposedly impossible task of fighting a long war of attrition on two fronts, but the decision makers didn't know that - and of they had known, they'd known that the France-first strategy was obsolete. Either way the Schlieffen plan was crap.

Unlike many on this board, but like the men on the spot in Germany, I'm a 'westerner' in that I believe that an east first plan would not have lead to a better result than the OTL Moltke Plan.

I think the Germans understood pretty well the mobilisation timetable of Russia; 2 Armies to East Prussia at week 2, 4 Armies to AH week 4 2 Armies to Silesia week 6 and France: balls deep into Germany on day 10 and acted accordingly in a strategic sense. I also suspect that the Germans had some idea of the tactical inferiority of the Russians, which would make the problems in the East manageable. Both assumptions turned out to be right.
 

Perkeo

Banned
Unlike many on this board, but like the men on the spot in Germany, I'm a 'westerner' in that I believe that an east first plan would not have lead to a better result than the OTL Moltke Plan.
A better result is not for granted, but a worse result is hardly possible. Or do you have a realistic way of how Germany could have ended the war even if the Schlieffen Plan had worked better?

I think the Germans understood pretty well the mobilisation timetable of Russia; 2 Armies to East Prussia at week 2, 4 Armies to AH week 4 2 Armies to Silesia week 6 and France: balls deep into Germany on day 10 and acted accordingly in a strategic sense. I also suspect that the Germans had some idea of the tactical inferiority of the Russians, which would make the problems in the East manageable. Both assumptions turned out to be right.
If they foresaw that a two-front war was manageable, why on earth did they hurry the DOW on France?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
If they foresaw that a two-front war was manageable, why on earth did they hurry the DOW on France?
Foresaw ... I would say they rather tought of and hoped for. Otherwise the whole concept they had tied themself too would have blown away.

Reason for the hurry for the DOW or a DOW at all ... same question could be asked for the request/ultimatum to Belgium for letting them through.
IMO an "ethos" of legality and adhearance to "propper forms" alien to most of todays people, teached and brought when all that counts it "productivity"(in broadest terms), "profit" and "outcome" no matter what.

At that time values like "honorable behavior" ... counted, and not only as lip-service. They died for it.
 
A two front war was feasible. But no one was counting on the Tzar getting evicted, a revolution, and Russia withdrawing from the war, and the Bolsheviks taking over. Making it only a one front war. So what if the Mensheviks win the revolution, and Lenin doesn't come out of exile?
 
A better result is not for granted, but a worse result is hardly possible. Or do you have a realistic way of how Germany could have ended the war even if the Schlieffen Plan had worked better?

Really, you think that capturing a huge and highly productive chunk of northern France and then sitting on the tactical defensive/strategic offensive is the worst result possible? I'd say that given the military state if the art and the strategic situation Germany found herself the result of the offensive in the west was pretty good and dominated the course of the entire war, certainly nothing remotely as critical could have been won in the east by mid September. What's more I think the 1915 command arrangements would have improved on this offensive, but I don't know if they were enough to win decisive success or merely let the Germans end on a better position.

If they foresaw that a two-front war was manageable, why on earth did they hurry the DOW on France?

Manageable until week 6, the number quoted in virtually every article about WW1. They had 6 weeks to cripple France in the battle of the Frontiers and in the enveloping swing through Belgium; defeat an army or two, capture a big haul of prisoners and guns so they could then send armies to meet the two Russian armies which took 6 weeks to mobilise against Germany. This would leave several armies to mop up against France. Simple!
 

Perkeo

Banned
Really, you think that capturing a huge and highly productive chunk of northern France and then sitting on the tactical defensive/strategic offensive is the worst result possible?
Although I may rise eyebrows: Really I do think not capturing most of France, not destroying most of the French army and as of November 14 loosing the tactical defensive/strategic initiative is the worst result possible.

I'd say that given the military state if the art and the strategic situation Germany found herself the result of the offensive in the west was pretty good
I never denied that. I just denied that good - or anything even remotely realistic - would have been good enough.

and dominated the course of the entire war, certainly nothing remotely as critical could have been won in the east by mid September. What's more I think the 1915 command arrangements would have improved on this offensive, but I don't know if they were enough to win decisive success or merely let the Germans end on a better position.
The French stuck in A-L, Britain either not entering the war at all or without a convincing casus belli, world (i.e. American) opinion not ruined by the rape of Belgium, that is a much better scenario - even if they don't conquer a square foot more than IOTL.

Manageable until week 6, the number quoted in virtually every article about WW1. They had 6 weeks to cripple France in the battle of the Frontiers and in the enveloping swing through Belgium; defeat an army or two, capture a big haul of prisoners and guns so they could then send armies to meet the two Russian armies which took 6 weeks to mobilise against Germany. This would leave several armies to mop up against France. Simple!
Did the Germans move any units that actually fought on the western front to the east? The 8th army was moved east, but that was reserve, wasn't it?

With the benefit of hindsight, Germany could have won by not goint west - they don't even have to go east. Without hindsight, the only winning move was not to play. They needed a diplomatic solution.
 
Although I may rise eyebrows: Really I do think not capturing most of France, not destroying most of the French army and as of November 14 loosing the tactical defensive/strategic initiative is the worst result possible.

That was the plan; a major victory on the frontiers followed by a pursuit of the remnants of the French, but it didn't pan out that way party due to command problems.

I just denied that good - or anything even remotely realistic - would have been good enough.

There are several scenarios where Germany can win the war after the offensive in the west falling short of utopia, winning the Race to the Sea alone would most likely be sufficient.

The French stuck in A-L,

Would make France much stronger and Germany much weaker in the long war, a net loss to Germany.

Britain either not entering the war at all or without a convincing casus belli

They'd find a c-b once the shooting starts, one would present itself.

world (i.e. American) opinion not ruined by the rape of Belgium, that is a much better scenario - even if they don't conquer a square foot more than IOTL.

America didn't give a shit about Belgium, it only cared about uboats killing Americans. Britain only cared about Belgium because it was close to Britain.

Did the Germans move any units that actually fought on the western front to the east? The 8th army was moved east, but that was reserve, wasn't it?

The 8th Army was mobilised in East Prussia, 5 divisions were taken from the German right wing after the fall of Namur an sent East, a move which took these units out of action at the most crucial time of the war from the most crucial place.

With the benefit of hindsight, Germany could have won by not goint west - they don't even have to go east. Without hindsight, the only winning move was not to play. They needed a diplomatic solution.

Yes, hindsight's good like that, but alternatively hindsight could do all sorts of things to allow them to win the war.
 
I would have given Kluck HG Belgium, then I would split 1. Armee in two as it was too big for a single army command. So you get HG Belgium with 1,2,3, and 9 Armee under it (same amount af troops as OTL). Create a separate Armee Gruppen Siege under HGBe to conduct the sieges in Belgium/Northern France.

This gives you an overall offensive command with 4 maneuver groups/Armee and a stationary force that knocks out the redoubts.

To the south you give the Crown Prince HG France, with 4,5,6 & 7 Armee.

And to the east you create a joint HG with AH under General Dankl, yes this means some of your German troops will fall under AH command. But as it means Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf won't have direct command of the AH army's I count this as a win.
 
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