Calvin Coolidge and the No-Third-Term Tradition

[David T]

I discovered a very interesting thing in reading *The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics* [the "collapse" part was obviously premature--the book was published in 1943] by Charles W. Stein: During the mid- to late 1920's, when it was discussed whether President Coolidge would run again in 1928--and many people thought he would, even after the famous "I do not choose to run" statement--the question was usually put as whether Coolidge would seek a "third term" in 1928. There was much debate as to whether the anti-third-term tradition would stand in his way.

Now at first that surprised me, because Coolidge had served only nineteen months of Harding's term. But then it occurred to me: I was approaching the matter wrongly because I was unconsciously assuming that the Twenty-Second Amendment's definition of the anti-third-term rule ("for more than two years of a term for which some other person was elected President" etc.) had already been agreed to. But of course it hadn't been! The Amendment was in the distant future; the anti-third-term tradition was just that--a *tradition*, with no law to define its extent. Hence, people could and did differ on what a "third term" was. (At least prior to Grant's failure to get the GOP nomination in 1880, one could argue that the tradition only prohibited three *consecutive* terms--and of course TR tried to revive that interpretation in 1912, one problem being that it seemed to clash with what he himself had said on Election Night in 1904. [1]) Some argued that the whole no-third-term traditon was silly and should be scrapped, anyway. Others said that the tradition was sacred and should prevent Coolidge from seeking a third term. What would today seem an obvious position--that the tradition was valid, but that Coolidge had not served enough of Harding's term for it to be applicable--was indeed taken by some commentators, but was not quite as widely accepted as might be imagined. Incidentally, one advocate of another term for Coolidge proposed that he should promise if elected to resign on August 2, 1931, so that he would not have served more than eight years!

This controversy raises a question: If Coolidge ran and won in 1928--and let's assume for present purposes that his administration is not too different from Hoover's and that FDR gets in as in OTL in 1932--how would that affect the third term issue in 1940? FDR's supporters would say that the no-third-term tradition had *already* been breached by Coolidge and was therefore no longer valid. OTOH, it is possible that FDR himself would say something in 1928 criticizing Coolidge for seeking a third term which the GOP would quote against him in 1940. (In the same way, opponents of a Coolidge candidacy in 1928 searched old newspapers to see if Coolidge had said anything against TR's attempt at a third term in 1912. Alas, they found nothing--evidently Cal had remained silent...) But probably not to much effect. Almost everyone who voted for FDR in OTL would still do so--and would say that if FDR seemed inconsistent, well, after all, Adolf Hitler wasn't much of a threat to the world in 1928.

No doubt in this ATL it will later be argued that the language of the Twenty Second Amendment was adopted by conservatives precisely in order to attack FDR's legacy without casting aspersions on Coolidge's...

[1] "On the 4th of March next I shall have served three and one-half years, and this three and one-half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." Note that he didn't say "two consecutive terms" or qualify his "another nomination" with "in 1908." (Of course his supporters argued that, as the *Outlook* put it, "When a man says at breakfast in the morning, 'no thank you, I will not take any more coffee,' it does not mean that he will not take any more coffee to-morrow morning, or next week, or next month, or next year.")

 

[Deleted member 9338]

I wonder if his party would want Coolidge for a third term. He was a popular as any other GOP candidate.

I will have to keep an eye out for this book. A sort of snap shot on history.

 

[NickCT]

If Coolidge's third term was disastrous, isn't there a good chance the people would agree no president should have a third term again? I seem to think it would be a "third term curse" which FDR himself may be afraid of.

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

Calvin Coolidge had a serious heart condition, it's actually what historically drove him not to seek another term because he knew he wouldn't survive it.

His heart failed him in 1933 IOTL, the stresses of the Oval Office could easily do him in much sooner, especially once the Depression starts to hit.

 

[Lord Grattan]

Calvin Coolidge had a serious heart condition, it's actually what historically drove him not to seek another term because he knew he wouldn't survive it.

His heart failed him in 1933 IOTL, the stresses of the Oval Office could easily do him in much sooner, especially once the Depression starts to hit.

Very true. It's likely that Coolidge may become the 2nd POTUS in a row to die in office. If so, the legend of "the third term curse" would be born. Even FDR (if he's elected in '32 & '36 as per OTL) might hesitate to run for a 3rd term in light of this. Would President Charles Dawes seek election to a full term in 1932? If not, who - Herbert Hoover, Frank Lowden, Charles Curtis, or, George Norris?

 

[Paul V McNutt]

Calvin Coolidge had a serious heart condition, it's actually what historically drove him not to seek another term because he knew he wouldn't survive it.

His heart failed him in 1933 IOTL, the stresses of the Oval Office could easily do him in much sooner, especially once the Depression starts to hit.

I have never read of that Coolidge retired for health reasons. It makes sense considering how quickly he died. In Backstairs at the White House, it was reported that Coolidge was depressed in the fall of 1928. wWhich would indicate he was counting on a draft.Maybe it was regret over a decision he had to make but did not want to make.

 

[Paul V McNutt]

Very true. It's likely that Coolidge may become the 2nd POTUS in a row to die in office. If so, the legend of "the third term curse" would be born. Even FDR (if he's elected in '32 & '36 as per OTL) might hesitate to run for a 3rd term in light of

If Coolidge dies in office, it would not stop Roosevelt from running in 1940. considering how little attention he paid to his health in 1944.
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[Strategos' Risk]

I'm wondering if Coolidge's policies would have been better or worse than Hoover's.

 

[Paul V McNutt]

I'm wondering if Coolidge's policies would have been better or worse than Hoover's.

I have read here speculation that Coolidge would not have signed the Smoot Hawley Tariff, but there would certainly not have been a Reconstruction Finance Corporation under Coolidge.

 

[David T]

I have read here speculation that Coolidge would not have signed the Smoot Hawley Tariff, but there would certainly not have been a Reconstruction Finance Corporation under Coolidge.

I have never understood why people think he would not have signed Smoot-Hawley (the economic consequences of which have been vastly exaggerated, btw, but that's another story). Coolidge was a standard Republican protectionist, and he not only supported the Fordney-McCumber tariff but implemented it in a very protectionist way: "Fordney-McCumber let the president raise or lower individual tariffs, and when Coolidge used this power he almost always raised them." http://books.google.com/books?id=HkwzetIhfY0C&pg=PA73

 

[Craig]

If Coolidge ran and won in 1928--and let's assume for present purposes that his administration is not too different from Hoover's...

Hoover was a Progressive. Coolidge's response to the 1929 Crash may have been more like Harding's response to the Depression of 1920–21. If so, the US may well have pulled out of the Depression sooner than Europe. See Amity Shlaes "The Forgotten Man". for the damage FDR's policies did to the United States.

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

I have never read of that Coolidge retired for health reasons. It makes sense considering how quickly he died. In Backstairs at the White House, it was reported that Coolidge was depressed in the fall of 1928. wWhich would indicate he was counting on a draft.Maybe it was regret over a decision he had to make but did not want to make.

According to The Reminiscences of Claude Moore Fuess (1962), p.78-79 from the records of Columbia University, Coolidge's declaration that he did not intend to run again was something that provoked wild speculation (including, as you say, rumors that this was a political move intended to cause people to start a move to draft him as a candidate), but according to this source, a short time prior to his announcement he had suffered a serious heart attack (his weak cardiovascular health, like his predecessor, did ultimately prove to be the thing that killed him), and that this heart attack was what ultimately motivated his otherwise completely enigmatic decision.

I have never understood why people think he would not have signed Smoot-Hawley (the economic consequences of which have been vastly exaggerated, btw, but that's another story). Coolidge was a standard Republican protectionist, and he not only supported the Fordney-McCumber tariff but implemented it in a very protectionist way: "Fordney-McCumber let the president raise or lower individual tariffs, and when Coolidge used this power he almost always raised them." http://books.google.com/books?id=HkwzetIhfY0C&pg=PA73

Hmm, how would you say the H-S Tariff's effects were exaggerated?

Not to sound rude or accusatory, I'm genuinely interested.

 

[David T]

Hoover was a Progressive. Coolidge's response to the 1929 Crash may have been more like Harding's response to the Depression of 1920–21. If so, the US may well have pulled out of the Depression sooner than Europe. See Amity Shlaes "The Forgotten Man". for the damage FDR's policies did to the United States.

Look, I really didn't want to get into this. My focus was simply on what the *fact* of a Coolidge being elected to a "third term" in 1928 would do to the no-third-term tradition, and for that purpose I wanted to simply assume as little a difference between a Hoover and a post-1928 Coolidge administration as possible. Of course it seems to be a given on this forum that whenever a poster says "for present purposes let's *assume* X" someone will completely change the focus of the thread by arguing "X won't happen"--which rather misses the point.

However, since you got into it, let me state that the whole meme of the "good" anti-interventionist Harding vs. the "evil" interventionist Hoover is simply drivel IMO. I have already noted Harding's and Coolidge's support of protectionism, but as for "Harding's spending cuts cured the 1920-1 Depression" nonsense, I'll recycle an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:


For a critique of the libertarian/"Austrian School" interpretation of the
1920-1 depression, see Daniel Kuehn, "A critique of Powell, Woods, and
Murphy on the 1920-1921 depression" in *The Review of Austrian Economics*,
Volume 24, Number 3, 273-291. To oversimplify, Kuehn's main point is that
the Federal Reserve steeply raised interest rates before the Depression--
and then helped end the Depression by lowering them. Under those
circumstances, Kuehn argues, fiscal stimulus would not, even by Keynesian
standards, be appropriate. Kuehn also notes that the budget-balancing
and spending cuts began with Wilson, not Harding, and that while federal
income tax *rates* were cut in 1921-2 this was offset by an expansion of
the income subject to taxation at any given rate:

"As Woods (2009) points out, President Harding agreed with the Federal
Reserve on the need for 'intelligent and courageous deflation' (Harding
1920). However, the Harding administration's role in the facilitation of
price deflation was marginal at best. By the time Harding called for
'intelligent and courageous deflation,' the New York branch of the Federal
Reserve had already raised the discount rate to the 7% plateau that would
be maintained for the ensuing year. Harding's election in November of 1920
roughly coincided with the halfway point in Strong's high discount rate
policy. The trough in industrial production was in March 1921, the month
that Harding was inaugurated. Thus, despite his forceful campaign
rhetoric, Harding did not play a significant role in the painful, but
necessary, deflation of 1920-1921. The emphasis that Powell (2009) and
Woods (2009) place on Harding's role in liquidating malinvestments with a
contractionary fiscal policy is therefore consistent with Harding's
personal outlook on economic policy, but it is historically inaccurate.
Instead, the impact of the Harding administration during this time period
must be assessed by examining his fiscal policy during the recovery,
rather than the initial deflation.

"While active monetary policy seems to have had the most decisive
influence on the 1920-1921 deflation, the fiscal policy of the Wilson
administration should also be taken into account. Wilson's most important
contribution to the deflation was to balance the federal budget. The 3-
month moving average of the difference between federal expenditures and
federal tax receipts turned and remained positive (indicating a budget
surplus) in November 1919. Thus, net federal borrowing ceased 7 months
before Harding vowed to 'strike at government borrowing,' 12 months before
he was elected to office, and 24 months before Harding passed his first
budget.

"Although modern Keynesians place greater emphasis on the federal deficit
than on federal spending, an almost identical narrative is provided by
spending data; the Wilson administration cut expenditures dramatically
before the 1920-1921 depression and before Harding took office. The claim
of Woods (2009) that 'instead of 'fiscal stimulus,' Harding cut the
government's budget nearly in half between 1920 and 1922' obscures the
fact that federal spending was falling precipitously over the course of
1919 and 1920. When Harding took office in March of 1921, the Wilson
administration had already reduced monthly federal spending to 17% of its
war-time high. The bulk of this reduction was achieved by the end of 1919.
While it is certainly true that the Harding administration would reduce
spending further, the cuts were not as substantial as the cuts made by the
Wilson administration immediately prior to the downturn. The use of annual
data of Woods (2009) instead of monthly data is misleading because
spending was still being winnowed down over the course of the 1920 fiscal
year. It gives the false impression that most of the adjustment to federal
spending occurred during the depression, when in fact most occurred well
before the downturn began...

"Powell (2009) and Woods (2009) suggest that the Harding administration's
decision to cut income taxes was instrumental to the recovery which began
in 1921 and continued in earnest the following year. This is a misleading
account of the Harding administration's tax policy. The Harding
administration did cut tax rates for higher income families in 1922 (the
highest bracket's rates were reduced from 73% to 58%) and implemented an
across the board rate reduction in 1923 (from 58% to 43.5% for the highest
bracket and from 4% to 3% for the lowest bracket). However, these rate
cuts were accompanied by a considerable expansion of the income taxable at
any given rate (Internal Revenue Service 2010). For example, while the top
bracket's rate was reduced by 15% points from 1921 to 1922 in Harding's
Revenue Act of 1921, the income taxable at that rate was expanded from all
income over $1,000,000 to all income over $200,000. Therefore, while the
tax rates were lowered, the amount of income that these tax rates were
assessed against was considerably increased by the Harding administration.
The net effect was that from 1921 to 1922, the period of the initial
Harding tax 'cut,' the percent of individual income collected as revenue
through the income tax actually increased from 3.67% to 3.95% (Internal
Revenue Service 2010). While this expansion of the tax burden under
Harding is not particularly large, it belies claims by Powell (2009) about
a tax cut during the economic recovery. After 1922, further rate cuts
assessed on the same income brackets did result in a decline in the tax
burden from 1922 to 1923. The early Harding administration saw increasing
income tax burdens for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being
the restored economic growth, which pushed more families into higher tax
brackets. However, the statutory expansion of these tax brackets in
Harding's Revenue Act of 1921 represented a deliberate, though modest, tax
increase in the interest of maintaining a balanced federal budget...[The]
brief decline in the tax burden that occurred in 1923 came too late to be
considered as a factor in the recovery from the 1920-1921 downturn.." http://www.springerlink.com/content/5683j4v650187261/fulltext.html

**

As for Amity Shlaes, discussing her arguments against the New Deal would lead us even further afield from my topic. Suffice it to say that I suggest you read http://behl.berkeley.edu/files/2013/02/WP2013-06_Hausman.pdf before you conclude that expansionary fiscal policy can't work...

 

[Stolengood]

See Amity Shlaes "The Forgotten Man". for the damage FDR's policies did to the United States.

Amity Shlaes has been debunked so many times, it's not even funny.

 

[HeavyWeaponsGuy]

Amity Shlaes has been debunked so many times, it's not even funny.

To add to this, a helpful graph:

In the purest, most simple terms without delving into the intricacies of the New Deal and the economics that went into it, this really should be the only answer needed for the question of the New Deal's effectiveness. Undoubtedly there were missteps, but that's inevitable with a program of such an unprecedented and widespread scope in American politics as the New Deal. It's really hard to underestimate just how unprecedented it was, particularly in the United States which had a longstanding tradition of the government remaining fairly divorced from economic happenings outside of protectionist policies such as tariffs and the like. And its effects were clear and often quite positive, some of which still live with us today in the form of the buildings and projects undertaken by the Works Progress Administration (my high school in Southern California has a theater that was built by the WPA). Not to mention this graph comes largely before the major period of US military buildup in WWII (though we're starting to see some of that by the 1940-41 period, but it's only the beginning) which is typically held up as the "real" reason why the US got out of the Great Depression. In reality, the only times the New Deal ever really slipped as a whole was when FDR succumbed to political pressure from Congressional Republicans and slashed New Deal programs across-the-board.

While there was the brief and ultimately abortive experiment of the First and Second Banks of the United States, these ultimately fell apart and the US wouldn't actually put a central banking system into place again until the Wilson administration. While I know he's often maligned on this forum, I think the Federal Reserve can be argued, in a walk, as the best domestic achievement of the Wilson presidency. It really is hard to underestimate just how much the Federal Reserve has done to improve the overall financial stability of the United States and even in times of major economic downturn, it has prevented short, stinging recessions from turning into prolonged depressions. There's a reason that central banking and currency regulation have become entrenched parts of both national and international economics. One would think that that alone is an overwhelming and compelling argument in favor of central banking institutions.

 

[1940LaSalle]

Very true. It's likely that Coolidge may become the 2nd POTUS in a row to die in office. If so, the legend of "the third term curse" would be born. Even FDR (if he's elected in '32 & '36 as per OTL) might hesitate to run for a 3rd term in light of this. Would President Charles Dawes seek election to a full term in 1932? If not, who - Herbert Hoover, Frank Lowden, Charles Curtis, or, George Norris?

It's very doubtful that Dawes would have been Coolidge's running mate in 1928: with Dawes' failure to get in the chair in time to cast a tie-breaking vote on legislation near and dear to Coolidge's heart, that cemented a rift between the two. (Indeed, IOTL, Dawes was considered for the position as Hoover's running mate but Coolidge let it be known he would consider that a personal affront.) Thus, I'd suggest Charles Curtis as the most likely VP candidate.

With Coolidge's dual health problems of depression and a worsening cardiac condition, it's not impossible he would have died in office, likely more than a year before his death IOTL (January 1933). That would leave Curtis as the 31st president of the United States from, say, autumn 1931 until 4 March 1933.

To anticipate a question: no, Curtis would not have been the GOP nominee in 1932. Until Richard Nixon in 1960, vice presidents were not considered viable presidential material (OK, there was a modest move in '52 to run VP Alben Barkley but it went nowhere fast). I suggest that a Hoover / Dawes ticket (with Coolidge no longer around to object) would run and lose to Franklin Roosevelt.

But the spectre of what could be interpreted as a third term would begin to materialize, perhaps leading Franklin Roosevelt to somehow groom James Farley for the nomination in 1940...imagine the spirited give-and-take of a Farley vs. Willkie campaign...

 

[David T]

It's very doubtful that Dawes would have been Coolidge's running mate in 1928: with Dawes' failure to get in the chair in time to cast a tie-breaking vote on legislation near and dear to Coolidge's heart, that cemented a rift between the two. (Indeed, IOTL, Dawes was considered for the position as Hoover's running mate but Coolidge let it be known he would consider that a personal affront.) Thus, I'd suggest Charles Curtis as the most likely VP candidate.

With Coolidge's dual health problems of depression and a worsening cardiac condition, it's not impossible he would have died in office, likely more than a year before his death IOTL (January 1933). That would leave Curtis as the 31st president of the United States from, say, autumn 1931 until 4 March 1933.

So the US gets its first American Indian president... ("Native American" would not have been used in those days--it was more likely to be used by nativists to distinguish themselves from immigrants.)

 

[1940LaSalle]

So the US gets its first American Indian president... ("Native American" would not have been used in those days--it was more likely to be used by nativists to distinguish themselves from immigrants.)

Quite so: the term "Native American" in association with those indigenous people was not used as such until the relatively recent ascension of political correctness.

Also, Curtis would have been the last president not to be clean-shaved--at least, given developments thus far. Whether or not Dewey gets the Oval Office remains to be seen, if indeed this is carried forward.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

Until Richard Nixon in 1960, vice presidents were not considered viable presidential material...

Umm... John Adams, Martin van Buren, John Breckinridge?

(I don't include Jefferson because he became VP as a Presidential candidate.)

Breckinridge might be excluded as a fake candidate. It's arguable that none of the "party" which nominated him ever thought he could be elected.

Garner should be excluded, because while he may have thought he was (since he ran), it doesn't appear that anyone else did.

It is certainly true that Nixon in 1960 broke a streak of 100 (or 124 years) of the VP not being a Presidential candidate. It would have been 72 or 96 years in 1932. Mondale (ex-VP) was nominated, GHW Bush was nominated and elected, Gore was nominated.

VP's nominated who hadn't been President: Adams, Van Buren, Breckinridge, Nixon (twice), GHW Bush, Gore.

I had excluded Vice Presidents who had become Presidents by succession, but I note that in this case Curtis would be the sitting President by succession, and in fact the previous two such Presidents (Coolidge and T Roosevelt) had both been renominated and re-elected. (Later on, Truman, Johnson, and Ford were renominated.)

Arthur was definitely a contender for renomination in 1884; Fillmore was in 1852, and was the Know-Nothing nominee in 1856. Tyler wanted to be renominated in 1844; he failed miserably, but it was personal failure, not the taint of the VPcy, that stopped him.

Succeeding VP's renominated: T Roosevelt, Coolidge, Truman, LB Johnson, Ford.

Former VPs nominated, all types:

Adams (1796, 1800), Jefferson (1800, 1804), Van Buren (1836, 1840), Fillmore (1856), Breckinridge (1860), T Roosevelt (1904, 1912), Coolidge (1924), Truman (1948), Nixon (1960, 1968, 1972), LB Johnson (1964), Ford (1976), Mondale (1984), GHW Bush (1988, 1992), Gore (2000). 21 total nominations, of which 9 were in 1960-2000.

If one excludes elected Presidents seeking another term, that leaves 15 nominations, 7 in 1960-2000. So 1960 really does mark a change.

I'll add a point I just thought of re Curtis in 1932. If the Depression is roaring along as OTL, the Republican nomination might well be viewed as a poisoned chalice, and Curtis might be stuck with it.

 

[Paul V McNutt]

Getting back to the original question, I don't think Coolidge getting elected and probably dying in office has much effect. I don't see anything ITTL that stops Roosevelt from becoming the front runner for the Democratic front runner in 1932. With the depression, it is going to be a a Democratic year. After the Fall of France, Democrats are going to rally around their President. wWith Coolidge elected for a third term, the only change I see is there is less controversy over Roosevelt's third term.