Byzantines hold onto all of mainland Italy

What would happen if the Byzantines were to hold onto all of mainland Italy, the Balkans, and it's territories in Spain while losing its territories in the Middle East and North Africa to the Muslim Arabs?
 
What would happen if the Byzantines were to hold onto all of mainland Italy, the Balkans, and it's territories in Spain while losing its territories in the Middle East and North Africa to the Muslim Arabs?
That's not really possible : either Romans do well enough in the Romano-Persian wars to keep most of it, or these weaken the Empire just enough to make it unable to hold most of it, even before the Arab conquests.

I'll slide quickly on Spania, because it's whole raison d'être was preventing Goths to meddle in Africa and Mediterranean basin : loosing Africa makes keeping it moot, even if Constantinople somehow manage to prevent the Gothic "reconquista" that happened IOTL even before the lost of Carthage (which Goths seems to have actually defended IOTL).
The problem is that Romano-Persian wars did their jobs to weaken the Byzantine Empire and more importantly in this case, their hold on the west : a good part of the "Christian commonwealth" geopolitical perception of Constantinople about the late Romania ensemble, was that Constantinople held relations trough a system of trade and redistribution in Barbarian courts.

But with the VIth century, silk and gold (along with grain and other perisable goods) became rarer in western Romania or even in balkanic Romania : while the Roman withdrawal (strategical and political) was relatively smooth until Heraclius (the mediterranean policy of Mauricius is a clear exemple of how Constantinople went trough an affirmation of strength in Spain and Gaul) it declined enough for allowing no other policy for byzantines regions than nativisation, if not defense.
 
@LSCatilina If I read you right, you're saying it is impossible because the Romans were unable to influence the other Christian countries in the same way as before? Whilst the expounding on the Byzantine method of influence is certainly interesting, I'm not sure it answers the question. (Either that or my mind is thick as mollasses today).

For me? I could see this happening IF (and only if) the Romans maintained a complete and utter naval dominance in the Med. As in, the Arabs don't manage to counter Greek Fire, don't build fleets large enough to oppose them, or a prevented from doing so - by both the Romans, and those coastal cities more scared of the consequences of doing so than they are of the Caliphate.

I actually think that if you had the first part, the loss of Syria leading to the Romans negotiating a peace of sorts where they hold Anatolia and Egypt, and the Caliphate agrees to not build ships - whilst completely flouting this and then Rome getting its ass handed to it in Anatolia, Egypt, and Africa, time after time on land - but still dominating at sea. Fun as an idea, but devastating for an Empire that isn't known for its naval supremacy. Perhaps it requires a PoD to strengthen its control over the Med so as to assist Spania.

In such a scenario, I think you'd probably see the Empire have to focus on controlling trade, which is fun - but potentially a considering a relocation (perhaps to Venetia?). But more obvious would be needing to change its policies in certain areas. Spania jumps out - with the Romans changing from trying to prevent the Goths invading Africa, to trying to convince the Goths that they don't want to have to face the Caliphate alone.

Whilst I'm doubtful it would WORK, the image of an Empire based in Constantinople, or Alt-Venice, regularly enforcing its own arbitrary trade laws on the Caliphate (i.e. you pay us our due or you burn), is a fairly dystopic version of the Mediterranean. However, a Caliphate that essentially pays tribute to the Romans in exchange for trade, or burning, is a weaker Caliphate than IOTL.

(Heh, the idea of the Romans going full-Vandal-stereotype is a fun one though. Super-Vikings).

If this Caliphate breaks down, with the Romans on a near-permenant naval war footing, I could see the Romans trying to be all friendly to coastal cities. "Hey guys, you join us now, and we'll defend you, and you don't have to worry about burning!"
 

trajen777

Banned
What you need to do in this case is have the defenses in Italy firmed up under Justinian so options for this are
1. Wave away the Plague that devastated the Byz empire -- 25- 33% death rate -- this would have meant more resources for a quick victory and a profitable Italy for self defense (actually a positive cash flow to Byz vs a financial drain)
2. Have Belisuarius in full charge of Italy vs breaking the Byz army in Italy (or give him 2 x the troops initially) broken up among various independent commanders. He had wrapped up the conquest quickly before being recalled. more commanders etc. This keeps the Lombard out of Italy.
3. Help support the Gepids to keep a balance between the Avars and Lombard's, so the Lombard do not have to migrate into Italy.
4. You need STRONG Defenses in Libya to stop the loss of Cartage (very very profitable area)

If you do this you have a profitable and populated Italy with solid defensive able borders in the northern regions. As to Spain send 15,000 troops vs 5,000 to Spain and have them conquer up to the Pyrenees (defensible borders). You would need to keep strong naval forces to defend vs the Arabs. If you modify to defend at the Taurus mt in Anatolia (easily defensive) you have strong natural borders and a great financial kingdom.
Other benefits :
1. A combined Christian world (Pope protected by the emperor) so no great schism in 1050.
2. No Italian states taking away $$ from Byz.
3. As the Arab states fractured, Turkish invasions, Mongols etc happened the Western / Byz empire would do well in reconquest's
4. Massive financial advantages (maybe double or triple ) to add additional layers of defence. (ie - Spain and Italy would have resources to defend themselves and have positive cash flows to the Empire for additional troops vs the Arabs)
 
@LSCatilina If I read you right, you're saying it is impossible because the Romans were unable to influence the other Christian countries in the same way as before?
It goes deeper than this : not only Romans were wasting large ammount of fiscal and strategical resources in their wars against Sassanids, but they were unable to use nearly as much they could before, outside the empire proper, but as well in Italy, Africa and Balkans.
It's not enough to conquer regions : there's the problem of maintaining a control over these with more limited fiscal resources (which were already made more vulnerable by Justinian's policies, giving that you couldn't really count on Africa and even more Italy to supply itself entierly).

Lombards up to the last Romano-Persian war did enjoyed a particularily favourable situation, as the Gothic War (due to poor political and strategical assumptions, IMO) was particularly disruptive. But up to the 570's, they remained fairly stuck in the north of Annonarian Italy, and anything south of Po where you had a Lombard presence was possibly not really controlled before the end of the Lombard Interregnum.
Not that the vice-royaltisation in Italy or Africa wasn't a sound idea : I think that Mauricius western policies were mostly spot on or at least coherent. But it was made at the cost of some neglect (Africa is barely mentioned in imperial chancery at this point, for exemple; and Roman Italy became sort of vice-royal confederation of Duchies) and for being less costly for the empire overall, it still required some exchanges dominated by Constantinople in provinces that were either "other Christian countries" but as well the vice-royalties that Exarchates were.

I wouldn't dismiss the importance of the role of the Empire for Trans-Danubian chiefdoms, tough. The presence of a strong empire and the its capacity to influence and balance entities as Lombards, Gepids, Kurtigurs, etc. was critical to the stabilization of the border, would it be to avoid the emergence of a complex or super-complex chiefdom, and to advance that a peaceful relationship with the Empire would be more awarding than warring against it. With the emergence of Avars, the lack of strategical resources to fend off these as it was the case with Kurtigurs, and a lesser capacity from Constantinople to sustain a court/emporia relationship with trans-danubian entities...

None of this happened overnight, of course, but the combination of the lack of military and strategical ressources and the unability to project itself trough a controlled trade or gift exchanges was certainly a main reason for the Empire to be unable to maintain a certain rule in Italy and Balkans (Africa is another case, mostly because of the absence of Saharian threat, even if eastern Berber chiefdoms did collapsed or submitted quickly, opening Tunisia for Arabs).

Whilst the expounding on the Byzantine method of influence is certainly interesting, I'm not sure it answers the question. (Either that or my mind is thick as mollasses today).
I tried to precise my point just above in a manner that may satisfy you, altough I agree there is a component that I didn't mentioned, while it was related to the weakening of imperial role and authority, namely the religious opposition.
Imperial religious policies such as monoenergism and critically monothelism alienated them a lot of support and credibility in the West (possibly more in the western provinces and exarchates than within Barbarian kingdoms). It tends to be dismissed on this board because...reasons I guess, but in conjunction with the growing independence of these region and the support Roman pontiffs knew they could count on, did its job to prevent a certain imperial loyalism to appear against its withdrawal.

As in, the Arabs don't manage to counter Greek Fire
They didn't. A good part of Roman survival comes from that Arabs never really managed to break the supply chain in Mediterranean basin.

don't build fleets large enough to oppose them or a prevented from doing so

Early Arabic seafare was mostly due to the relative inclusiveness of the Arabo-Islamic entities : where existed a strong naval tradition, it was maintained and developed. But it wasn't from scratch : the famous Battle of the Mastes involved an essentially Coptic and Syrian-issued navy rather than Arabic.
It doesn't mean that Abul A'wal was clueless on seafare, of course, and his previous raids in eastern Mediterranean proove that caliphates could perfectly well use naval warfare.

A good part of Byzantine-Arab naval conflicts was more a game of cat and mouse up to the late IXth, searching to avoid big clashes unless a clear advantage was obtained (and Romans did changed their strategy first because they had so, tactically and qualitatively), and the Battle of the Mastes is one of the exceptions, possibly due to sheer incompetence of the basileus, who didn't ordered any fighting formation.
 
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