By Lenin's Will (Lenin's Testament Succeeds TL)

1923-1929: The Development of the Union
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formally proclaimed in 1922, but it was not clear what the relationship between its constituent members would be. In his Testament, Lenin spoke harshly of the possibility of "Russo-centrism" of the Soviet state, and this laid the foundations for the so-called "weak federalism" that would develop over the coming years.

The USSR itself would be a strong body. That much was inevitable; the Bolsheviks could not build their planned economy on a weak state. But on the other hand, the national aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet Union were to be respected: they were independent, at least locally. While the federal bureaucracy was multinational with an emphasis on Russians, the local administrative officials were largely selected from local ethnic groups (Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR, Georgians in the Georgian SSR, et cetera). In a way, the early Soviet Union encouraged nationalism, rather than (as the Tsars had done) attempt to destroy it. The 1924 Soviet Constitution ensured that this would be the way of things for the indefinite future, and blocked Russification.

The Russian SFSR was, by its very nature, bound to be the nexus of the Soviet Union. It comprised over two-thirds the population of the Union (101 million of 147 million total), it was the origin of the entire state, and, of course, it was the inheritor of the legacy of the Russian Empire. But what Lenin had wanted was to be achieved; the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples were to be respected. The strength of the RSFSR, in dominating the domestic affairs of the constituent republics, was weak, though it always took the forefront internationally.

The Ukrainian SSR was the second largest member of the Soviet Union, and adopted its own constitution in 1925. One anomoly was its retention of the spirit (though not the precise wording) of the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, which was no longer retained by the RSFSR that had pioneered it. The relatively lax position of the Soviet Union towards constituent states at this time, however, allowed them to adopt the constitution in spite of this peculiarity.

Inside the RSFSR were a number of Autonomous Soviet Republics. The RSFSR, in its May 1925 constitution, allowed these ASSRs to adopt constitutions that would be confirmed by the TsIK and the congress of Soviets of the RSFSR. However, with Lenin's Testament's strong derision of Russo-centrism, many of these ASSRs rapidly gained constitutions; even the Volga German ASSR, whose constitution downplayed its loyalty to the RSFSR and played up its loyalty to the USSR, was allowed to have its own.

In general, the new constitutions of these states, while they all generally fell in line with the constitution of their superior states (e.g. the constitution of the Abkhazian ASSR was in line with the constitutions of the USSR, the Transcaucasian SFSR and the Georgian SSR), were a hodge-podge, with unpredictable emphasis and strange reflections of their own importance.

Except for the reorganization of the Turkestan and Kazakhstan (then Kyrgyzstan) ASSRs in the early 30s into its own various SSRs (and, by extension, their removal from the RSFSR), the borders that had been drawn would remain, with no ASSRs becoming independent SSRs.

The "independent" SSRs of the Soviet Union in both 1924 and 1929 were the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Transcaucasian SFSR (which was comprised of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Georgian SSR and the Armenian SSR).
 
1926-1927: The Scizzors
In late 1926, the government began to deal with the "goods famine" that had developed: retail prices of industrial goods were far higher that they "should" have been, due to excessive scarcity as industrial capacity was devoted more and more to investment and industrialization rather than the production for the peasants. This was a serious issue for the regime; with glass, for example they "built factories that are better than 'in Europe' but glass prices have become even more expensive." It was referred to as the "scizzors," for the way that industrial goods and agricultural goods prices, when compared, appeared on a graph to be a pair of open scizzors.

The Trotskyists and Zinovievites were willing to simply allow this: to them, there was no problem. If industrial prices were high, obviously industrial workers were the ones to benefit from them. While they did offer a minor concession, saying that lowering retail prices would be beneficial, they believed that wholesale prices should be allowed to increase as they needed. The "wholesale-retail scizzors" (the divergence between wholesale and retail prices of industrial goods) were no doubt a difficulty, and this concession was by no means meaningless; many bureaucrats involved in the passing of industrial goods to the peasantry were more than willing to exaggerate their costs or use their resources inefficiently.

The Right, however, favored the solution of 1922 and 1923: simply cut retail prices. As the head of the economy, the Soviet state could probably alter the prices at will - but not without consequences. Most now agree that the problem was simple supply and demand: production had not increased enough in comparison to demand, and prices were thus bound to increase. Cutting the prices would have accomplished nothing; the markup would simply have moved to the black market.

Kalinin dissented with the Right: he recalled the similar crisis in '22 and '23, saying that they thought their solution then was a rousing success but "now we see this is not so." Kalinin ended up siding with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, granting them the majority.

As a consequence, the Soviet Union began closely examining the bureaucracy at the time, attempting to cut down on inefficiency and theft. Beyond that, no serious reforms were made.
 
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Okay, so this thread has kind of died, and for that I'm sorry. The fact is that I'm really not sure what happens next. I took as my assumption that the ideas of Lenin's Testament succeeded, and attempted to take a reasonable development of the Soviet Union from that. I definitely think I succeeded, but it's only gotten me a little bit in.

If anyone has better knowledge of early Soviet Union economics than I do, I'd much appreciate their opinions on how this would all resolve. I certainly don't think that the left's solution is any better than the right's, and neither of them seemed to have a good idea of how to combat it. But what does that mean? Does it mean that the Soviet Union spends the next couple years grasping back and forth until it hits upon a functional solution? And what is that solution? The historical solution was forced collectivization, but I really doubt the Left is going to do that, and I know the Right isn't.
 
Interesting thread. I know its been dormant for a while- hope a bump is okay.

Early Soviet history is interesting (and important). I am a bit shaky on some of this.Some observations, for what its worth.

Trotsky, in his autobio "My Life" explained some of the dynamics of the power struggle-the troika of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin,vs. Trotsky, if I remember, developing even while Lenin was alive. There are different ways this could have played out depending on the longevity of Vladimir Ulianov and other factors.Early Soviet Russia was under severe strain and under the circumstances its difficult to imagine things developing much differently. Nadezda Krupskaya was asked what would have happened if Lenin had lived longer. "He'd be in jail", she replied.

Max Eastman, then a friend of Trotsky, got a copy of the Last Testament and had it published in a New York newspaper. Trotsky was seriously pissed about this.

Later, during the scissors crisis period, Trotsky, (then in exile in Alma Ata) recommended collectivising agriculture and "exploiting" the peasantry as a way to jump start the economy. Stalin took over these ideas but applied them in a far more lethal way.

Well, I hope this is of some interest.
 
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