But for a vote: Ken Clarke wins the 2001 Tory leadership contest

Part 4

The prime ministerial convoy passed a primary school on their left and Blair’s mind switched back to Britain. Yes, we have delivered on domestic reform this time. No: I’ve delivered, he thought, correcting himself emphatically. Academy schools across the country, NHS trusts up and operating, the fox hunting ban at last, crime down, minimum wage up. It’s not a bad record; good enough to see us through the election even without having split the Tories.

As for the international stage, for all that Gordon wanted to drive policy, that’s never entirely possible when other leaders want to negotiate one-to-one. Still, he’s refocused attention on Africa and development generally, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Right to do so too.

He did what he said he would on the five tests too, in his last month at the Treasury. Blair pictured in his mind’s eye the opposition front bench across from him when Brown had had reached the peroration of his statement to the House. “Mr Speaker. As I said to the House in my Budget earlier this year, The prudent economic policies of this government have delivered the lowest inflation and the lowest interest rates since the 1960s, lower unemployment than America, Japan or Europe, the highest growth of any of our major competitors and a net public borrowing requirement which will maintain Britain’s net debt as the lowest ratio to GDP in the G7 and the lowest of all our major European competitors.”

“These achievements mean that Britain meets the four fiscal and monetary criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty. As I have stated to the House earlier in my speech, with reference to this government’s own five tests, it is the Treasury’s assessment that the Britain’s adoption of the Euro would be beneficial to the country, today and for the foreseeable future. It will be good for jobs, stability and growth. It will be good for the financial services industry. It will be good for inward investment and for investment from domestic firms.”

“I can therefore announce that in order for fulfil the fifth Maastricht criterion, Sterling will enter the ERM II mechanism at 6pm this evening at a central rate of €1.54 to the pound.” The final words of Brown’s sentence were lost as the House erupted. The Tory backbenches, which had listened sullenly to the Chancellor reeling off economic statistics and argument now roared their disapproval. Their Labour opposite numbers shouted their approbation and waved their Order papers, even those who were somewhat sceptical about the Euro. The Tory front bench squirmed silently, knowing what was to come next.

“Mr. Speaker,” Brown continued, over the din, “Mr. Speaker. This government will do what is right for Britain. It will therefore introduce a Bill to enable Britain to adopt the Euro on 1 January 2005, subject to the agreement of the British people in a referendum, one I commend to the House.” Blair patted him on the back as he sat down, the two men united for once in the belief that what they were doing was in the interest of the country, their party and themselves – maybe even in that order.
 
Interesting. I've never thought of Ken Clarke having a chance at winning the Tory leadership, but you make a good case for it.

Looking forward to the end here!

fasquardon
 
Part 5

The Bill had gone through parliament easily enough. Opposition from the majority of the Tories and from some in the Lords was to be expected but the government always had two trump cards: the referendum itself and the fact that the Conservative leader supported the policy. With the Lib Dems strongly on side and only a few Labour rebels, the final vote in the Commons had been 438 in favour and 172 against.

That had been the turning point of the parliament, Blair reflected. True, there’d been the occasional scandal and ministerial casualty but nothing out of the ordinary in the big scheme of things. The Tories might have claimed the odd scalp but apart from the European division between leader and the rest, they also had increasingly divisive arguments over social policy between reformers and traditionalists, and over support for the US over Iraq; divisions which led to Liam Fox and Iain Duncan Smith both resigning from the shadow cabinet, joining William Hague on the backbenches. Their shadow cabinet was just too lightweight to make an impact; all the more so with Michael Portillo looking increasingly disengaged from politics opposite Gordon Brown at Shadow Foreign Secretary.

As for the referendum, it’s not quite been a foregone conclusion but not far off, just as Philip Gould said it would be. A good man, Philip and he was right: in referendums, even more than elections, what matters is who’s on which side. It’s a question of trust. “Their advantage”, Philip had said, “is that they represent the status quo. We have to make the case for change. All they have to do is oppose it. On the other hand, our advantage is that we have you and Gordon, Robin Cook and Peter Mandelson, Paddy Ashdown and Charlie Kennedy, Ken Clarke and Michael Heseltine, and they have William Hague and Tony Benn. No contest.” They’d had Margaret Thatcher too, bless her, enthusing those who were always going to vote No and alienating everyone else. Of course, that brought old Ted out too for one last hurrah. I can’t say he did us much good either but what the heck – he might be an ill man in his late eighties but no-one was going to keep him out of this one and to be fair to him, I suppose it was his life’s work after all. Maybe he’s got his revenge on Maggie after all these years.

The No camp did have the papers though, or at least, some of the big ones. The Sun will take some winning back but that’ll be Gordon’s problem now and in any case, they’re not going back Clarke are they? If he lasts that long. The Mail, Telegraph and Express might have been tricky too if they hadn’t been so over the top it was counterproductive: you’d think a Panzer division was about to roll up Whitehall from their coverage. Anyway, we’ve not been without support: the Mirror as usual, the Guardian, Indy and the FT. The Times’ neutrality was a bonus – Rupert knows his market, I imagine – in fact it’s been a good deal more neutral than the Beeb, Blair smiled to himself.

The No camp hadn’t helped themselves by confusing the question of the Euro with that of the European Constitution. Blair’s heart sank for a moment as he thought about the looming prospect of another EU summit to contemplate the damned document. At least we won’t need a referendum on that too, he thought. That had been the demand of the more EU-obsessed campaigners lining up against him but the opinion polls had shown only a small portion of the electorate keen on a second referendum on Europe within a year or two. Far more felt worn down by claim and counter-claim and while they were happy to be consulted once, that was enough. The result was that many in the No campaign had tried to shoehorn arguments against the Constitution – a Treaty not even yet signed – into this vote, consequently failing to get either message across clearly. Were they against the Euro, the Constitution, the lack of a second referendum or what?

Having muddied their own waters once, they then went on to do it again and again; typical of the ideologue who believes the public have to know every last one of the fifty reasons to do or not do something. Making out that it was somehow illegitimate holding the poll on the same day as the European elections was a strange one and while throwing immigration into the mix might at least have tapped into a strain of national thought, it didn’t really address the issue. I wonder if we should do something about immigration, Blair thought, interrupting himself, besides getting officials who can forecast more accurately – before reminding himself he’d soon no longer be in a position to. Even so, the Tory right claiming that taking on the Euro would lead to even higher immigration sounded ludicrous – as he’d said, were there legions of Poles stuck at Calais because they were incapable of exchanging their currency? UKIP of course had then argued that only leaving the EU could provide a solution, which had then opened up a new split in the No camp and spread further confusion as to what their campaign was for, or against.

And that had been the final nail in their coffin: in the end, the swing voters who were only loosely paying attention decided that the No team literally didn’t know what they were talking about.
 
Part 6

“Nearly there, prime minister.” The chauffeur announced, as the convoy made its way between the light grey walls of the ExCel Arena on their right – flashing vividly blue as they reflected back the police car lights – and the Docklands Light Railway on their left. It was a strange experience travelling alone in the back, with no political or official advisor but it was the result of the kind of farcical logic only the civil service could produce.

The PM was not only encouraged but expected to use the official, armoured Jaguar but because he was going to the event in his partisan capacity as a leader of the Yes campaign, rather than as head of the government, the civil service had said that his officials couldn’t travel with him. On the other hand, because it was an official vehicle, his campaign team weren’t allowed to use it and had to follow on independently. It would have been permitted for he and Brown to have travelled together but no-one thought that a good idea (the Chancellor had instead decided to spend the day in Scotland). Cherie could have come too but hadn't wanted to. At least it’s given me time to think, he contemplated, as the car pulled up at the side entrance, allowing him to avoid the security that lesser individuals had to navigate, though not the media scrum milling inside the doors with cameras and microphones ready.

Inside the vast exhibition arena the count for the East London area was nearly complete. Hundreds of election staff were still inside the perimeter but only small clusters were working, finishing the final bundles and conferring on disputed papers. The rest, rather like the activists and media, waited hesitantly, trying to find something to do to fill their time while the last few tasks were completed. There were a few other counts still ongoing elsewhere in the country but all the major urban ones were complete and when the remaining London votes being counted at the ExCel were added in, over 90% of the ballots cast would have been declared. With a remarkably homogenous split in the vote up and down the country, that was more than enough to give an official reaction.

In an anteroom, Blair pinned the Yes campaign rosette to his suit jacket lapel. The design of a union jack centre surrounded by the twelve gold stars and blue background of the EU flag symbolised the theme of Britain in Europe, while simultaneously spiking the guns of the No campaign’s attempt to hijack the flag to their cause. Peter Mandelson had been adamant on the need to make the design public before the No side launched and while it had caused a rumpus at the time, that had died down while the purpose it served – emphasising that the Yes side wanted to be seen as pro-British as well as pro-Euro – had endured.

Half an hour passed quickly. The brief round of applause as he’d entered the public area had been a moment to savour. Interviews with the chief Sky, BBC and ITV reporters on the other hand came and went without making much impression on any of the participants, or indeed viewers.

When the declaration finally came, Blair felt strangely out of place not to be up on stage but with no official leader of either campaign, with Hague – who had returned to front-line politics for the referendum to such effect that he’d become the most visible face of No – staying in Yorkshire, and with the final result not being in yet, or even declared formally at all, it had been agreed that he’d attend the East London count – the biggest in the country – and make a short speech afterwards.

The returning officer stepped forward to the microphone and tapped it to check it was live. Two dull thuds emanated from speakers around the auditorium, as the officer sweated under the glare of both the hot lights and of the national attention he believed was being paid to him. He read from the sheet of paper in his right hand, his voice tight with nerves. “I, being the chief returning officer for the East London district in the referendum to determine whether the UK should adopt the Euro as its currency, do hereby give notice that the number of votes recorded for each option in the said referendum was as follows: Yes – five hundred and twenty-nine thousand, two hundred and eighty-three; No – four hundred and seven thousand ...” a loud cheer went up around the hall, drowning out the returning officer, as Euro-enthusiasts punched the air and beamed celebratory smiles at each other. The officer, even more flustered than before, continued when the hubbub had died down: “No – four hundred and seven thousand, three hundred and two.” Another cheer, though more perfunctory than the first. Not that they were celebrating anything that significant: their count hadn’t concluded with the election of an individual but the addition of more votes to the national result. Even so, most there were experienced political activists who’d been to counts before and who were used to cheering when their preferred result came about, so cheer they did.

Blair, who’d been led down from the media centre to behind the stage on which the returning officer had just announced the result, adjusted his tie in the reflection of a glass panel, brushed his right hand through his hair to put it approximately into place, and then walked out confidently to the microphone centre-stage to still more cheering from his Yes campaigners. Those from the No camp who still remained – and their numbers were thinning now the announcement had been made – found something else to do with their hands or simply watched on passively, as if they themselves were viewing it on TV rather than in person.

As he viewed the scene in front of him - the vast space filled with tables and chairs, papers and boxes, workers and activists, lights, cameras and cables – an old saying suddenly popped into his head: all political careers end in failure. It was an odd thing for his subconscious to bring to mind but maybe the visual refutation of it before him had been the spur. No, they don’t, he answered silently, as his supporters continued to loudly acclaim him. No, they don’t.
 
Epilogue

A week after the referendum, Blair announced his intention to resign as prime minister as soon as a new Labour leader could be chosen; an election scheduled to conclude at the party conference in September. There was no question as to who it would be. Brown’s standing was unassailable within the party: he was seen as having laid the solid foundations on which the current strength of the economy was built, he was widely credited with being the man who kept Britain out of Iraq, and his leading role in the successful Euro-poll all pointed to one conclusion. Blair being the first to sign his nomination paper just put a further seal on that deal and helped, temporarily, to unite the party. The only question was whether there’d be an election at all and it soon became apparent that there wouldn’t: none of the cabinet wished to be humiliated by the inevitable landslide and the party’s far left couldn’t unite on a single candidate with the result that none was nominated.

The election for deputy leader was, by contrast, a lively one after John Prescott announced his own decision to stand down too. Peter Hain ultimately just edged past Clare Short in the final round, after Alan Milburn and Harriet Harman had been eliminated earlier on.

That, however, was merely the warm up for the main event at Labour’s conference: the triumphant handover from Blair to Brown, with both outgoing and incoming leaders at the peaks of their respective games – an almost unique historical occurrence – and the party frighteningly confident about its prospects. A Sion Simon article in the New Stateman confidently predicted that Labour would govern for twenty years or more, and that accurately reflected the mood of the moment.

The Tories’ conference by contrast was all set to witness blood-letting on an epic scale as the bitterness that had been pent up since the referendum found its first natural outlet. Rumours swirled that the Chief Whip had already received well in excess of the requisite number of letters demanding a vote of no confidence in Clarke to trigger a ballot and that he was only waiting for the conference season to be over and for the start of the new parliamentary season to announce the fact. Prospective alternative leaders avoided the media as much as possible.

But the conference and the vote never happened. The week before it was due, Brown had sent Labour spirits through the roof when he closed his own conference speech by announcing that in addition to the mandate his party had given him, he would seek a mandate from the country both for himself and for Labour (not ‘New’ Labour, many noted).

The general election was held on October 28 and proved something of an anti-climax: coming only four months after the referendum, voters, media and activists alike were suffering from campaign fatigue. The lacklustre campaign was notable more for Tory infighting than Brown’s safety-first approach. Labour’s majority of 92 was more than respectable, if less than those that Blair won, as the strong economy offset concerns about public services, immigration and Brown’s leadership style.

*

Five months later, Brown sat proudly beside his Chancellor as she delivered her first Budget. It had been a controversially big step up for her but she’d plenty of Treasury experience and appointing a woman had gone down very well with the media and sections of the party. The lack of her own support base was no bad thing either, he mused; nor was the opportunity it granted him to reassert himself at the Treasury, which had slipped somewhat out of his orbit during the past three years. Jack hadn’t particularly wanted to move but a return to the Foreign Office wasn’t a bad consolation prize, after he chose that over the Leadership of the House as an alternative.

The thought relaxed him as she continued reading, a little stridently. With a national mandate in his pocket, a largely united party behind him, a cabinet mostly of his own choosing, no serious rival on his own benches, a none-too-threatening new Leader of the Opposition in David Davis, Brown presided imperiously over the political scene. True, Tony was still revered within the Party but Tony was no longer around: he’d stood down at the election and was splitting his time between sorting the Middle East out, writing his memoirs and earning obscene amounts of money for Cherie. His influence would wane with his fading proximity to power.

Meanwhile, the surging economy was flooding taxes into the government’s coffers as the Eurozone interest rate of 2% made its mark. The prime minister listened contentedly to his colleague turning the Treasury spending taps on, making full use of the windfall: more money for investment in schools, in hospitals and in transport; for extended benefits and for higher pensions. It was time to rebuild Britain, literally as well as socially. He vowed to himself that his would be a government that would make a mark on the country that would last half a century or more.

It would. Two miles away in the City, traders paid passing attention to the events in Westminster but Budgets weren’t what they once were. Caught in the same spiral of optimism and fast money, they pushed the value of their ever more complex portfolios to ever higher levels. Doom-mongers foretold that it was all too good to last but then doom-mongers always do. Why pay attention to them - didn’t they know: it was different this time.

- The End -
 
This is such great stuff.

There's lots of interesting things in here, and I for one suspect that Kenneth Clarke is going to be regarded as one of the worst leaders in Conservative history once the eurozone crisis hits. It'll be interesting to see what a Conservative government elected after Brown's economic credibility is discredited by the Great Recession, if there is indeed such a government (which from the look of it there may well not be due to the Conservatives lacking credibility and having to build up from a lower base while competing with nationalist parties that regard the Conservatives as too left-wing, while the likes of Cameron themselves are less likely to get the Conservative leadership than some hard-right leader because of fear of Clarke 2.0), would do in regard to the euro; pulling out would be popular among the right-wing base but may well be regarded as economically foolish by a Conservative government that is based fundamentally on economic credibility.

My favourite part of the whole story, though, was undoubtedly Tony Blair's memento mori moment. Just beautifully written.
 
I must say, I would have liked to see more exploration of what Ken Clarke would do as leader and how it would effect the Conservatives in the long run.

fasquardon
 
I must say, I would have liked to see more exploration of what Ken Clarke would do as leader and how it would effect the Conservatives in the long run.

fasquardon

Yes - sorry about that. The difficulty was fitting it into the main narrative and I wanted to keep the whole thing relatively short.

In social policy, Clarke would probably have strengthened the emphasis civil liberties, which would have been the one part of his policy set that many of the right of the party would have supported him on and may have entrenched that strain of thought, particularly if followed by David Davis. He'd also have supported Blair on the Human Rights Act, which would have been much less popular.

On economics, he'd almost certainly have criticised Brown on any number of actions but with minimal effect. With the very significant exception of the Euro, where he'd have had to have offered an unwhipped, free vote, we'd have been pretty much as OTL.

Personnel is harder to call, though I took a few stabs at that in the main piece. The Tory party at the time wasn't overly blessed with talent and he wouldn't have had all that much option but to make use of those already there. In any case, the balance of the activist base and parliamentary party would have mitigated against too much movement.
 
This is such great stuff.

There's lots of interesting things in here, and I for one suspect that Kenneth Clarke is going to be regarded as one of the worst leaders in Conservative history once the eurozone crisis hits. It'll be interesting to see what a Conservative government elected after Brown's economic credibility is discredited by the Great Recession, if there is indeed such a government (which from the look of it there may well not be due to the Conservatives lacking credibility and having to build up from a lower base while competing with nationalist parties that regard the Conservatives as too left-wing, while the likes of Cameron themselves are less likely to get the Conservative leadership than some hard-right leader because of fear of Clarke 2.0), would do in regard to the euro; pulling out would be popular among the right-wing base but may well be regarded as economically foolish by a Conservative government that is based fundamentally on economic credibility.

My favourite part of the whole story, though, was undoubtedly Tony Blair's memento mori moment. Just beautifully written.

Many thanks.

I chose to end the timeline in 2005 partly because I think there's a natural conclusion but also because I want to write a different Britain-in-the-Euro thread with a difference, earlier, PoD.

However, my stab at your questions:

- Yes, Clarke would probably end up reviled by 2010. He has solid support in Rushcliffe and probably wouldn't be deselected (rather like Heath) but UKIP would certainly be gunning for him in 2015.

- Brown's economic credibility would be shot by 2008/9, though actually his worst ratings came before the crash - something even more likely with a longer lead-in. Davis would probably be in a better position to capitalise that Cameron ended up in as Davis wouldn't have gone for the environmentalist / hug-a-hoodie centralist vote first. More by accident than design, events would have worked out quite well. By contrast, Brown would have planned for an election in May 2008, October 2008 or May 2009, all of which would have been badly affected by the recession. In the end, he'd have probably hung on until the last moment in October 2009 but after more than five years as PM, his unsuitability for the job would have shown through greatly. Furthermore, the crash would have been brutal; even worse than OTL. We might well have been looking at IMF intervention (which itself would have had butterflies if the UK took a sizable chunk of their funds). I suspect that in such circumstances, Davis would have done better than Cameron despite starting further back. Clegg would again have flattered to deceive as OTL. Thereafter, we can get quite divergent from OTL: there'd have been major protests against the austerity demanded, possibly a re-run of 1981 re riots, and a strong chance that Scotland would have gone independent, to name but a few repercussions.

- Euroscepticism would undoubtedly gain a boost and it's difficult to see UKIP not doing at least as well in 2014 as OTL, however they'd be taking votes from both Lab and Con. Obviously, the Lib Dems would be doing better than they did in reality. How that played out would depend on the 2015 election. If Labour retook power (and on balance I don't think they would: Ireland, which is the closest comparison to the UK in this case, was growing strongly by this point), then I could easily see the Tories electing a Withdrawalist leader. On the other hand, were Davis to win a second term, that EUphobia would probably begin to fade.
 
Would it be possible for the UK to exert a greater role in the ECB though, so that austerity wouldn't be as much of a thing as OTL?
 
Would it be possible for the UK to exert a greater role in the ECB though, so that austerity wouldn't be as much of a thing as OTL?

In theory, yes, but in practice that would depend on the extent to which Britain was able to dictate the terms of its own borrowing, which given the exposure of the banking sector to poor quality lending might have been quite limited. The risk of a country the size of Britain needing a bailout would have given the EU kittens and would likely have increased the insistence on austerity and balancing the books from the Germans and ECB. An Irish-style boom and bust would have been very messy in an economy fifteen times the size even if, due to Britain's late Euro entry, the relative scale wasn't quite so big.
 
An Irish-style boom and bust would have been very messy in an economy fifteen times the size even if, due to Britain's late Euro entry, the relative scale wasn't quite so big.

Yeah... the British banking crisis was serious enough. Add in a greater prior property bubble, the inability to devalue via a floating currency and the absence of QE to prop things up and the crash would have been much worse. Talk about a return to sterling would have negated the historical safe haven effect and intensified the bond crisis in a nasty feedback loop.

The result would have been a hideous political crisis. The Tories would want to leave the Euro and there'd be broad public support for that, but it's close to impossible to leave the Euro in a crisis without descending into further crisis and default. So they might try to tough it out, but any bailout programme would be even more toxic.
 

Sideways

Donor
This was very interesting. Though I seriously wonder if Blair would have left without Iraq giving him a push. My instinct is that he wouldn't.

I look forward to your next UK in the EU TL. It would be good to see.
 
Would it be possible for the UK to exert a greater role in the ECB though, so that austerity wouldn't be as much of a thing as OTL?

Heck, the UK would need to be more engaged in Europe across the board. That would have tremendous butterflies and would really change the evolution of the Eurocrisis - I think one of the under-appreciated dynamics in Europe over the last 7 years has been how unusually disengaged in Europe Britain has been. In a TL where Britain is within the Euro, we could see the dominant force in Europe being a Franco-British duopoly, rather than the rather unwilling German primacy of OTL.

fasquardon
 
This was very interesting. Though I seriously wonder if Blair would have left without Iraq giving him a push. My instinct is that he wouldn't.

I look forward to your next UK in the EU TL. It would be good to see.

The sketch of the deal being done at Dorneywood in 2002 is grounded on real events. The three men did meet there on 24 February 2002, one of several ad hoc meetings the three held that parliament to attempt to iron out disagreements and tension between the PM and Chancellor. At a later one in November 2003, Blair agreed to resign in favour of Brown before the following general election providing Brown supported Blair’s domestic public service reform plans. Blair later justified his failing to fulfil that commitment by Brown having failed to fulfil his promise of support.

Had Brown been Foreign Secretary, rather than Chancellor, that would have given him much less scope to interfere in domestic policy, partly because he literally wouldn't be around for much of the time when he was on foreign missions, but equally because he wouldn't be controlling the purse strings. Whether he was tempted to or not (and IOTL, of course, he was), it'd be far harder for him to break his word.

Would Blair not have resigned anyway? It's certainly a possibility and you could see why he'd be tempted to lead Labour into a third term that was there for the taking but on balance I think he would if Brown had done as asked because there wouldn't have been a compelling reason not to. IOTL, Blair stayed on mostly in order to block the damage he saw Brown as creating; here, with a closer working relationship, that motivation would have been far less pressing. It's not as if Blair could have done much in one year at the fag-end of a parliament and the start of the next that would inevitably be riven with a split with a then-raging Brown who'd believe - rightly - that he'd been betrayed and made a fool of. Although Blair wouldn't have felt the effects of that first-hand before, he'd have known what Brown was capable of and such a split would have paralysed the government. Why bother?

But having said all that, I wouldn't rule it out as a possibility.
 
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