Burr wins in 1800--in Electoral College

Usually, the "Burr wins" scenarios here have been about his winning in the House (if Hamilton didn't convince enough Federalists to oppose him). But suppose he wins in the Electoral College? Two scenarios:

(1) For some reaaon, one Democratic-Republican elector dilsikes Jefferson and prefers Burr, so he votes for Burr and some other D-R.

(2) Some Federalist elector hates Jefferson (of course) but also hates Adams--even more than Hamilton did. And he deosn't share Hamilton's antipathy to Burr--or at least he feels that the opportunist Burr is a lesser evil than the "fanatical" Jefferson. So he votes for Pinckney (whom he sincerely hopes will win) but also for Burr...

The Jeffersonians of course are going to be very angry. Besides the Twelfth Amendment as in OTL, may we see some sort of constitutional amendment prohibiting faithless electors?

As for why Burr would accept the presidency under such circumstances--with both parties disliking him--rather than yielding to Jefferson and hoping for the Democratic-Republican presidential nomination in 1808 or even 1804 (after all, as John E. Ferling once noted in *Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800,* p. 183, Jefferson had shown a "penchant for retiring to Monticello--he had done so in 1776, 1781, and 1793" https://books.google.com/books?id=j0wB9SX1VrEC&pg=PA183), Ferling observes,

"While the odds were good that Burr would live another twenty years, dying young was not uncommon in the eighteenth century. In fact, Burr's mother and father had died at ages twenty-seven and forty-two, respectively, while his wife, Theodosia, had passed away at forty-seven. Furthermore, Burr like every other activist, was all too aware of the vagaries of politics. Any politician who attempted to plan career moves eight or even four years down the road was on shaky ground. Any veteran of the American Revolution would have known as much, having seen the political landscape turn topsy-turvy by the overthrow of British rule and the demise of the Articles of Confederation. For that matter, within a six-month span in 1798 the Federalist Party had fallen from the giddy heights of supremacy to division and despair, and in two years John Adams had gone from being hailed as the equal of Washington in popularity to a defeated president who was being sent packing."

Of course it may be objected: Didn't Burr reaize that even if he won the presidency in 1800--either through "faithless electors" or in the House--he would be regarded by a majority of Democratic-Republicans as a usurper, and that his presidency would become a shambles even before he took the oath of office? The problem with this line of reasoning is that it assumes that the future lay with the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, and that the wise thing for an ambitious man like Burr to do was to ingratiate himself with them. This is obvious enough *to us* because we know that Jefferson's party was to dominate American politics for decades after 1800. But of course Burr could not know that in 1800. To quote Ferling again (p. 184):

"However, it must be remembered that the political parties in existence in 1800 were not entrenched institutions like those of today. They were less than a decade old and only recently had become reasonably well-disciplined entities. Both parties had members who shifted to the other side as new issues emerged or as the political wind changed direction. In fact, in the run-up to the canvass of 1800 many had been convinced that a party restructuring was under way. There had been much talk in 1799 and early 1800 that Adams and Jefferson would conclude a bargain that resurrected the so-called Adams-Lee Junto, the Virginia-New England alliance that had controlled the Continental Congress during the first several years of the American Revolution. Such a turn of affairs had probably never been in the works, but even some savvy politicians had believed it and suspected that a new party might supplant one of the two in existence or that a third party might come into being. In January and February some who pushed Burr's candidacy appeared to believe--and to welcome--his presidency as the means of restructuring the existing parties along sectional lines. If so, it would not have been inconceivable for Burr to have had the solid backing of a viable new party." http://books.google.com/books?id=j0wB9SX1VrEC&pg=PA184

Given all that, Burr's decision to go after the big prize immediately rather than waiting four or eight years was actually a more reasonable decision than it may look like in retrospect. And anyway in this ATL he has not done anything actively to seek it: the office has been thrust on him, he explains...
 

Skallagrim

Banned
It is certainly fascinating to consider the possibility of a Burr presidency-- and especially under these circumstances. Indeed, he may claim that the office was "thrust upon him", and unlike the more common POD of the election going to the House and Burr scraping by there, this alternative lends more credibility to his position. As for being disliked by both parties... well, he was mostly disliked by the prominent members of both parties, but those parties were fairly loose in any case. He could certainly count on some support.

It comes down to his policies, in the end. What would he try to achieve, as president? We know that Burr was associated with the faction that would become known as the Democratic-Republicans... but loosely. He was, by most accounts, something of a moderate, and he enjoyed support among those sections of the 'party' that found Jefferson too radical. He also counted several moderate Federalists among his allies, and had no trouble crossing party lines in New York politics.

In OTL, Burr sure impressed even his critics with his fair and honest manner as President of the Senate. Even those who disagreed with him found his character to be impeccable, and his farewell address to the Senate (which sadly went unrecorded) apparently moved those present to tears. That is very telling. Burr is remembered as "a schemer" of some sort, but that reputation derives mostly from his enemies. In business, Burr was certainly crafty, but he seems to have had a strong ethical code. He abhorred slavery, and openly supported womens' suffrage (and universal suffrage, in fact). He didn't just talk the talk: he specifically educated his daughter in a progressive manner, hoping to raise her to be independent in her thinking.

All in all, I suspect Burr would be a president who would be fairly moderate, and supportive of generally progressive causes. All in all, there is no reason for him to "rock the boat" with radicalism, and his manner of dealing with the Senate makes me think that he's be able to bring a lot of people around to at least tolerating him and working with him in a constructive manner. The Burr presidency might just turn out to be kind of boring, and surprisingly pleasant.
 
Hunh!
Interesting.

Looking at the Wiki article on the election, the plan had been for one voter to abstain in voting for the VP candidate. Suppose signals AREN'T crossed, and some elector gets told 'hey, vote for Jefferson but not Burr, we're picking you, 'cause you're not important enough to cast two votes.' (Obviously, that wouldn't be the wording used, but it could be how the guy hears it, especially if the realization happens at the last minute, and some Joe, whose only importance before or after, was being an Elector, gets called in the night before the vote and told to give up half his 'glory' or 'duty' or whatever he thinks of his votes being.
Being insulted by the last minute demand, he broods all night (possibly over a couple of bottles of gin), and in a foul mood the next day casts his vote exactly oppositely to what he was ordered to do.

Technically, this guy isn't even a faithless voter, as he's told by his electorate to vote for the Jefferson/Burr ticket. The party commands him to vote differently from what his voters wanted, and so he does. Just not that way.

Note that the fact that the House had to ballot 36 times before they could manage to break the Jefferson/Burr tie suggests that he had more support, or Jefferson had less, than popularly supposed.
 
Note that the fact that the House had to ballot 36 times before they could manage to break the Jefferson/Burr tie suggests that he had more support, or Jefferson had less, than popularly supposed.

Iirc it was only the delegations with Federalist majorities which voted for Burr. The DR ones were for Jefferson. Things took so long because the DRs contolled only eight of the 16 delegations, hence were one shrt of a majority, so the deadlock couldn't be roken until some of the Federalists gave up hope and abstained.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Burr presidency might just turn out to be kind of boring, and surprisingly pleasant.
Actually, it does occur to me that such a president might just butterfly the War of 1812, and here's how.

"The law of Britain and most other countries defined nationality by birth, but the United States permitted nationality to be gained by a period of residence. There were therefore many people who were British in the eyes of English law and American in the eyes of United States law. This would have been a substantial difficulty in any circumstances, but it was compounded by the refusal of Jeffferson and Madison to issue any official citizenship documents. Their position was that all persons aboard American ships were to be regarded as US citizens without further evidence. This claim, unsustainable in US or any other law, was designed to make negotiations impossible. Behind it lay the advice of Albert Gallatin, the long-serving Secretary of the Treasury, who calculated that 9,000 men, half the seamen in American deep-sea merchant ships, were British subjects. The prosperity of the US economy (and the revenues of the US government, which came largely from Customs) depended on them. Since no agreement could possibly keep acknowledged British subjects in foreign service against their sovereign's wishes, it was necessary to avoid an agreement. When two American diplomats actually reached one with the friendly Whig government in 1807, Jefferson refused to send it to Congress for fear it might pass.

In the absence of official documents, US consuls issued unofficial ones which were often respected, but left numerous occasions of dispute. Even the most scrupulous consuls had to depend on unverifiable declarations for their evidence of citizenship, and by no means all were scrupulous in a business which earned large fees."

NAM Rodger, "The Command of the Ocean" (2006) pp565-6

(emphasis mine, quote via Robcraufurd)

Note that with Burr instead of Jefferson there's other possible choices than Gallatin as well. It may not come to pass, but good citizenship documents pretty much at a stroke destroy the contention between US and Britain with regard to impressment.
 
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Skallagrim

Banned
Actually, it does occur to me that such a president might just butterfly the War of 1812, and here's how.

"The law of Britain and most other countries defined nationality by birth, but the United States permitted nationality to be gained by a period of residence. There were therefore many people who were British in the eyes of English law and American in the eyes of United States law. This would have been a substantial difficulty in any circumstances, but it was compounded by the refusal of Jeffferson and Madison to issue any official citizenship documents. Their position was that all persons aboard American ships were to be regarded as US citizens without further evidence. This claim, unsustainable in US or any other law, was designed to make negotiations impossible. Behind it lay the advice of Albert Gallatin, the long-serving Secretary of the Treasury, who calculated that 9,000 men, half the seamen in American deep-sea merchant ships, were British subjects. The prosperity of the US economy (and the revenues of the US government, which came largely from Customs) depended on them. Since no agreement could possibly keep acknowledged British subjects in foreign service against their sovereign's wishes, it was necessary to avoid an agreement. When two American diplomats actually reached one with the friendly Whig government in 1807, Jefferson refused to send it to Congress for fear it might pass.

In the absence of official documents, US consuls issued unofficial ones which were often respected, but left numerous occasions of dispute. Even the most scrupulous consuls had to depend on unverifiable declarations for their evidence of citizenship, and by no means all were scrupulous in a business which earned large fees."

NAM Rodger, "The Command of the Ocean" (2006) pp565-6

(emphasis mine, quote via Robcraufurd)

Note that with Burr instead of Jefferson there's other possible choices than Gallatin as well. It may not come to pass, but good citizenship documents pretty much at a stroke destroy the contention between US and Britain with regard to impressment.

Considering that Burr was a moderate, known to be sympathetic to a more Federalist-style financial approach (at least in moderation), while Gallatin was very much in line with Jefferson, it's easy to see Burr appointing someone else, so a calm-headed resolution for this whole issue seems more likely. On the other hand... it would demand that Burr do well enough to be re-elected, or that a Federalist gets into office after him. During this scenario's first (or only?) term for Burr, the tories are governing in Britain-- under Addington, I think. Not the best government to make deals about contentious issues with.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I don't think it's necessary for there to be a deal, per se - just an issuance of official US citizenship documents (and the refusal seems to have been the fault of Madison, Jefferson and Gallatin). That alone would prevent almost the entire contention.

There's also two periods under Pitt during or before Burr's term, including one almost a year long. But Addington also has the government which signs a peace with Napoleonic France, so they're certainly capable of making deals.
 
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